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Abstract 
This thesis seeks to contribute to the growing literature on the theoretical issues 
surrounding the notions of space and place, by examining how they can be put to 
work in a historical study. This work is achieved through a reading of Foucault, who 
not only sketched a history of space, but also undertook a number of spatial histories. 
To understand this, and these histories, this thesis begins by reading Foucault's 
professed influence on history, Nietzsche, and goes on to highlight the key role that 
Heidegger plays in this understanding. Just as Heidegger is central to Foucault's work 
on history, it is suggested that the importance of space also stems from Heidegger, 
especially from his work in the 1930s which critically engages with Nietzsche and the 
Romantic poet Hölderlin. The importance of space, or more fundamentally place, 
becomes central to Heidegger's later work on modern technology, his rethinking of 
politics and the mö?. , and art. 
Reading Foucault's work on history draws out the nature of his spatial language. Not 
only is his work replete with spatial metaphors, but he also made analyses of actual 
spaces. This is most evident in Foucault's two large scale historical projects - the 
history of madness from the Renaissance to the beginnings of psychology in Histoire 
de la folie, and the study of modern discipline in the army, hospitals, schools and 
prisons found in The Birth of the Clinic, Discipline and Punish but also in numerous 
shorter pieces and lectures. His two major works are re-read as spatial histories, and 
the standard interpretations to an extent re-placed, in the light of the argument 
developed in the previous chapters. Foucault's historical approach is often described 
as a history of the present: given the emphasis on_ space, it is here rethought as 
mapping the present. 
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Introduction 
In recent years within the social sciences there has been a noticeable shift from 
questions of temporality to those of spatiality. As Frederic Jameson asks, "why 
should landscape be any less dramatic than the event? "' Questions of spatiality 
have often been thought to be the preserve of geographers and urbanists, and 
there has recently been a number of attempts in these fields to critically theorise 
space. 2 For example, Edward Soja states his aim as "the reassertion of a critical 
spatial perspective in contemporary social theory and analysis"; 3 and Derek 
Gregory suggests his book is a set of essays that "spiral around a common set of 
themes dealing with power, knowledge and spatiality". 4 However, there are two 
principal problems with these attempts. 
First, a number of these works have indulged in the intellectual pick 'n' mix 
prevalent in the putative genre of `postmodernism'. In this they are too eager to 
seize upon any theorist who talks of space as `one of them', conflating the work 
' of thinkers whose understandings of space or place are quite different. The 
specific philosophical, historical, political and geographical situation of the 
works utilised is often ignored. However practically valuable, useful and 
interesting these recent studies may have been, they are often worryingly 
conceptually weak. 
Second, whilst there has undoubtedly been a heavy bias in favour of history and 
time in the past, to swing too far the other way through a privileging of 
geography and space is no solution. Yet much of this recent work does precisely 
that. 6 Instead, we need to think of the two together: we need to both historicise 
space and spatialise history. In other words, rather than solely providing an 
analysis of how the meaning and use of the word `space' has changed over time 
-a useful analysis to be sure - we need to recognise how space, place and 
location are crucial determining factors - along with time and politics - in any 
historical study. This is the project of a spatial history. 
1 
Michel Foucault has been one of the major thinkers whose work has been seized 
upon by those who want to argue for the importance of space, and yet relatively 
little is known about his own use of space in his works. This is due to a number 
of reasons. First, Foucault wrote only a small number of pieces that directly 
addressed the question of space, and these have been the principal focus of 
analysis in the works cited above. Other than the incessant emphasis on the 
Panopticon, the most oft-cited work of Foucault's on space is a lecture given to 
architects in 1967, but only published just before his death. This lecture is 
entitled "Of Other Spaces", and introduces the notion of heterotopias. This work 
is of undoubted interest, but it offers a history of the concept of space, and then 
proceeds to discuss and analyse many spaces of our modem world. It is 
important to note that this piece is the exception rather than the rule. The norm 
for Foucault is to use space not merely as another area analysed, but as a central 
part of the approach itself Second, his historical works, which are, I suggest, 
spatial through and through; have been incompletely understood, at least in the 
English speaking world. This is partly due to the fact that a complete translation 
of Histoire de la folie and much of the important material Foucault produced in 
the early 70s relating to the project of discipline have never appeared in English. 
Third, and perhaps most important, Foucault's intellectual heritage has been 
treated only partially. 
Yet from the madhouses of Histoire de lafolie, the hospitals of The Birth of the 
Clinic and the Rio lectures on the history of medicine, and the plague town, army 
camp and prisons of Discipline and Punish, Foucault always seemed to take into 
account the spatial elements of the historical question he 'Was addressing. What 
was the theoretical basis for such an awareness and how, if at all, was it 
anticipated in the work of those he claimed as influences? In essence then, this 
thesis provides an answer to the question "why are Foucault's historical studies 
so spatially aware? " 
Foucault's historical works fall, on his own designation, into archaeological and 
genealogical phases. Explicitly in the second, but implicitly in the first, his work 
was framed by a reading of Nietzsche. Nietzsche's understanding of power, the 
notion of genealogy, and the continued emphasis on Nietzsche in Foucault's 
2 
A 
works has led many critics to examine the Nietzsche/Foucault relation at length. 7 
This thesis therefore begins by examining the work of Nietzsche, especially on 
history, and teasing out the elements within his work that address the question of 
space. Such an examination is useful in a number of ways, but most importantly 
it shows that Nietzsche alone could not have provided Foucault with the 
necessary conceptual apparatus to shape his approach. Because the influence of 
Nietzsche cannot explain the importance of space to Foucault, a number of issues 
arise that raise problems about the standard interpretation of Foucault. Why is 
Discipline and Punish framed as a history of the present? Is there a link between 
Foucault's understanding of the distinction between connaissance and savoir and 
the later notion of historical ontology? What is the theoretical base of his 
discussions of technology and the dispositij? Why, too, are his historical studies 
so overtly spatialised? 
The answer to such questions is found - following a remark Foucault makes in a 
late interview, but arguably following a trend noticeable throughout his career - 
in an examination of the work of Heidegger. Heidegger's influence on Foucault 
is relatively rarely noted, and where it has been, it is approached in ways that are 
not helpful in resolving the critical issues identified here. Crucially, Heidegger's 
work on space has received limited treatment, and little at all of this has been in 
terms of his influence on Foucault. Indeed, arguably the question of the 
Heidegger/Foucault relationship has been addressed poorly overall. This thesis 
argues that the principal influence on Foucault is not Nietzsche, but Heidegger, 
and that often where Nietzsche is important he is being read through Heidegger's 
interpretation of him. 
In order to show how Heidegger's work informed and shaped that of Foucault, it 
is necessary to provide an analysis of Heidegger's career as a whole. If Foucault 
has been badly served by cultural critics eager to get their hands on his 
theoretical `toolkit', Heidegger's work on space and place has suffered through 
simplistic, partial, politically blind, ideologically loaded, or philosophically 
insubstantial readings. As Heidegger was only too aware, his work was perhaps 
best characterised as a `path' [Weg], and on the key issues of space and history 
his work certainly went through a number of changes. It is possible to provide a 
3 
picture of Heidegger's path through the works he published in his lifetime - to 
which Foucault would have had access - but this path becomes much clearer and 
more involved if the lecture courses published in the Gesumtausgabe since 1975 
are taken into account. 
As well as showing the role Heidegger's thought plays in influencing Foucault, 
the exposition of Heidegger's work also makes a number of claims about his own 
development. Concerning the putative Kehre [turn], I suggest that the privilege 
accorded to time in Being and Time is corrected in Heidegger's later works, and 
that the ontology of Dasein is historicised to become a historical ontology. These 
changes - changes that may well have been apparent much earlier if Heidegger 
had published Division III of Part One and Part Two of Being and Time - are the 
true meaning of the Kehre. On the issue of space, it is clear from Being and Time 
that Heidegger wants to rethink it as the resolutely non-Cartesian place. The shift 
from the use of Platz to Ort - both words translated here as `place' - is important 
in understanding this issue. In some of his later works Heidegger suggests that 
`space' can be thought more originally from this understanding of `place'. 
The thesis also accords due emphasis to the political element in Heidegger's 
philosophy. Rather than separate -the man from the thought or merely dismiss 
him as a thinker, moves which have tended to dog discussions of Heidegger's 
Nazism, I follow a number of recent studies in examining the importance of the 
political to his thought. The relationship of the political and the spatial is 
examined in particular detail, particularly through a discussion of Heidegger's 
rethinking of the irO2 ug. 8 Such a reading allows us new perspective on 
Heidegger's retreat from his Nazi allegiance. Heidegger's readings of Kant, 
Nietzsche and Hölderlin are also examined closely - the last of which is 
particularly dependent on lecture course material. 
Having spent this time on an exegesis of the work of Nietzsche and Heidegger, 
the thesis is then able to discuss Foucault's work on history and space from a 
much stronger basis. Showing the influence of Heidegger in these areas situates 
Foucault's work in a much broader intellectual context than is usually 
recognised. This is not simply a case of asking "'where did he get that from? " 
4 
which, as Heidegger suggests, stems "from a shopkeeper's mentality" (GA26, 
54). Rather, concepts of Foucault's such as the connaissance/savoir distinction, 
ontology, dispositif, technologies, the history of the present, space, knowledge 
and power become much clearer - and therefore more useful - if viewed through 
a Heideggerian lens. In this reading, the notion of genealogy is recast as a 
historical ontology, which is framed as a critique of the present. In Foucault's 
work, this Heideggerian notion is described as a history of the present. In this 
thesis, with the emphasis on the important of space, it is re-described as a 
mapping of the present. Such a mapping of the present is a spatial history, rather 
than a history of space. 
The concept of disposrtrf, which I argue to be a translation and utilisation of 
Heidegger's Ge-stell, highlights an important point: language. Throughout this 
thesis Nietzsche, Heidegger and Foucault' s works are referenced back to the 
original language. In some instances this is not merely desirable but essential - 
crucial texts of both Heidegger and Foucault are not yet available in English. 
Where English translations do exist, they have been utilised, though have often 
been modified, to ensure readability, consistency, and to allow emphasis on the 
spatial language used. As the disposit jGe-stell point illustrates, several of the 
issues raised within this thesis are the direct result of due attention to the 
language used in the original texts: several of the problems in existing secondary 
material are due to the absence of this attention. 
With this enriched understanding of Foucault's intellectual heritage we are in a 
better position to understand his historical studies, because as well as being more 
attentive to their theoretical foundations, we can better see the role of space 
within them. To demonstrate this, the final chapter re-reads two of Foucault's 
most celebrated historical studies - the history of madness, and the history of the 
disciplined society. The first of these histories is known to the English reader as 
Madness and Civilisation which, as we shall see, is a greatly edited version of the 
French original Histoire de la folie. As Colin Gordon has pointed out, a number 
of problems arise from this editing. 9 Re-reading Histoire de la Folie shows the 
range of the early Foucault's concerns, and allows us insight into how space has 
been used politically in relation to the mad, showing the exclusion, ordering, 
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moralisation and confinement which were brought to bear on their situation. The 
second history is Discipline and Punish, the central text in a much wider project 
which encompasses The Birth of the Clinic and a number of shorter pieces, 
lectures and courses at the College de France. Re-reading Discipline and Punish 
within this wider project allows us to see that the model for the disciplinary 
society is not punishment, as is usually thought, but the interrelation of a number 
of mechanisms, notably those of the army and medicine. Such a reading enables 
us to shift the emphasis of spatial analysis away from the Panopticon, and to 
recognise the importance of space in a number of other areas. 
In re-reading these histories from the perspective of the spatial question, the 
thesis is able to demonstrate the theoretical insights of the previous chapters in a 
practical setting. In both histories we see the relation between conceptualisations 
of space and their practical applications; how space and time work together 
within a historical study; the way understandings of space have changed over 
time; and how space is fundamental to any exercise of power. Space is inherently 
political, politics is inherently spatial. In addition, through this practical 
demonstration, the final chapter provides a reinterpretation of two justly famous 
and much referenced texts. 
The assertion of space- within social theory must not be at the expense of the 
importance of time and history. In addition, the theorisation of space must be 
philosophically substantial, politically informed, and critically aware. Whilst we 
can profitably learn from a history of the concept of space, just as we can from a 
history of the concept of time, 1° to simply undertake this history is, 
paradoxically, and contrary to the avowed intent of geographers, to continue the 
modernist occlusion - of space. Space simply becomes another term to be 
historically examined. Rather, we need to spatialise history, to inject an 
awareness of space into all historical studies, to,. critically examine the power 
relations at play in the ways space is effected and effects. Understanding the way 
Nietzsche and Heidegger shaped Foucault's historical approach shows this 
notion of a spatial history to be immanent to Foucault's major works. Foucault's 
work can therefore be thought of - and potentially employed - as a mapping of 
the present. 
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Chapter One 
Against Egyptianism 
The Role of History 
Nietzsche's first published work was a history, a study of Greek tragedy. Though 
in his later thought many of its ideas were revised, when The Birth of Tragedy 
out of the Spirit of Iviusic was first published in 1871 it caused shock waves 
through the academic discipline of philology. One of the reasons for this was the 
lack of conformity to accepted academic standards - the book has no footnotes 
and no Greek quotations. Another reason was the blurring of academic 
boundaries - Nietzsche was trained as a philologist, but the book was saturated 
with thoughts appropriated from Schopenhauer, Hegel and Kant, though again 
not acknowledged in standard ways. Finally the book was clearly intended to 
serve a purpose beyond an understanding of Greek tragedy. All of these together 
led to severe criticism. ' 
Nietzsche's analysis is important and challenging. His distinction between the 
Apollinian and Dionysian elements of tragedy shows the darker, irrational side of 
Greek culture in tandem with the more usually recognised rational, ordered side. 
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This analysis of tragedy takes up the first fifteen sections of the book, and 
original drafts finished here. 3 The next ten sections continue the argument by 
relating the historical study to conditions in the contemporary period. Nietzsche 
draws parallels between Greece in the era of the Persian wars and the newly 
formed German Reich, suggesting that the social conditions of Greece at this 
time were key in the formation of tragedy as an art-form, in particular the works 
of Sophocles and Aeschylus. He sees much the same formative influences in the 
work of Richard Wagner, a close friend at the time. 
Nietzsche suggests that Greece at the time of the Persian wars was in great 
danger, both because of the military struggle and Apollinian militarism and 
because of the rise of the Dionysian cult. Tragedy provided an aesthetic way of 
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mediating between these two conflicting things. It is argued that Germany in the 
early 1870s was in a parallel position. The military threat was the Franco- 
Prussian war, which Nietzsche himself was involved in, the Pans Commune and 
the International raised the prospect of "mob rule" on a level that appalled 
Nietzsche. Wagner - having been a revolutionary in 1848, and being now a 
supporter of German nationalism - was able to act as a mediating force between 
these two dangers, and his music-drama could play a similar aesthetic role to that 
which tragedy had played in Greece. Wagner is the German Aeschylus who 
should be used for the benefit of the new state. 
Nietzsche felt that the final sections of the book had spoilt it (GT Attempt, 6), but 
as the book stands it provides an excellent example of how Nietzsche used 
history. For Nietzsche, history is not capable of objectivity, and where this is 
aimed for often great harm results. Instead, history has to be subjective, and 
therefore the historian needs to be aware of the uses to which their work is being 
put. This is the topic of the second of Nietzsche's Untimely Meditations, a set of 
essays written immediately after The Birth of Tragedy. In the preface to this 
work, Nietzsche provides a succinct summary of how he sees the use of historical 
study: 
For I do not know what meaning classical philology would have 
for our time if not to have an untimely effect within it, that is, to 
act against the time and so have an effect on the time, to the 
advantage, it is to be hoped, of a coming time (UB II, Preface). 
In other words, Nietzsche is aware that studying the past allows us to affect the 
present, and through this, the future. This much was clear from The Birth of 
Tragedy. Nietzsche sees that there is something fundamentally wrong with the 
present, that there may be things in the past that may be of interest and 
illumination, and that knowing these things may be useful to change both how 
we see the present, and the future. Nietzsche's diagnosis of the cultural malaise 
of his own time - exacerbated by the threat of war and the Pans Commune - can 
be cured by seeing how Greece dealt with a parallel problem. Wagner's music- 
dramas can, once reinterpreted in a particular way, provide future benefit. 
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The Untimely Meditation suggests that history is a necessary part of men's lives. 
Unlike the animal, who forgets and is therefore able to live unhistorically, what 
distinguishes man is that he remembers. Man lives with a sense of time, he 
remains attached to the past like a chain. The fleeting moment, though it flashes 
by, can return as a "spectre" to haunt a later moment. Man therefore has a need 
of history, but we need to be careful to ensure that it is used to the best advantage 
of life. This involves a number of balances. First, we must learn that if we 
remember everything we would never act. Some degree of unhistorical living is 
necessary (UB II, 1). 4 Nietzsche then distinguishes between three types of history 
- the monumental, the antiquarian and the critical. As far as humans are active 
and striving, they have need of monumental history; where they preserve and 
admire, antiquarian; and where they suffer and are in need of liberation, critical 
(UB II, 2). 
Monumental history is the kind of history needed by someone who aspires to 
greatness. Nietzsche suggests that by looking back into the past one can see what 
might be capable again in the future, because what was once possible can be 
possible again. The question arises as to what difference there is between a 
monumental past and a mythical fiction? In order to serve its ends, the 
monumental approach has to generalise and be selective. A dominance of this 
mode of history would be dangerous because of the fear that some things might 
be forgotten, and because this mode deceives by analogies, because things will 
not be the same again (UB II, 2). Antiquarian history is for use by those who 
preserve and revere; who give thanks for their existence by acknowledging their 
debt to the past. However, like monumental history, antiquarian history has its 
problems. It has a tendency to inflate the past, runs the risk of nostalgia and is 
possibly not entirely critical. Without some critical perspective there is the 
danger that all is equally revered - without selection - and that the new is 
despised in relation to the past. Nietzsche suggests that this could mean that life 
is no longer preserved but is mummified (UB II, 3). The antiquarian and the 
monumental thus both complement and contradict each other: one takes the spirit 
from the past in order to elevate the future; whilst the other praises heritage. 
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To accompany these modes of history Nietzsche thinks that man "must have the 
strength, and use it from time to time, to shatter and dissolve something to enable 
him to live". As he would repeatedly stress in his later work, he who wishes to 
create must first destroy. This is the critical attitude to the past (UB II, 3). It is 
clear from this early essay that Nietzsche sees the three modes of history as all 
having their particular context. He suggests that much harm is caused by 
thoughtless transplanting of the modes. Out of their native soil they will grow as 
weeds (UB II, 2). At the start of the essay Nietzsche had quoted from Goethe: 
"Moreover I hate anything which merely instructs me without increasing or 
directly enlivening [beleben] my activity" (UB II, Preface). Nietzsche uses this 
quotation to suggest that we need history, but for life [Leben] and action, in order 
to serve life, rather than for narrow, scholarly, scientific goals. Given the choice 
of life ruling over knowledge, over science, or knowledge ruling over life, we 
should chose life, for any knowledge which destroys life would also have 
destroyed itself: knowledge presupposes life (T UM II, 4). ' 
A Critique of Modernity 
Nietzsche describes his project as a critique of modernity (EH 10,2) and it is 
clear from the project outlined in the-Untimely Meditations that he sees his work 
having an affect on the present. However, as Nietzsche recognises in some of his 
later work, at this early stage he `vvas trapped within certain philosophical 
frameworks. In his early, Wagnerian, period Nietzsche was influenced greatly by 
Schopenhauer, and largely accepted Schopenhauer's reworking of Kant in 
response to Hegel. 6 Nietzsche later realises that ideas which are at odds with 
Kant and Schopenhauer cannot (Fe expressed in terms of their formulas (G'1' 
Attempt, b). In order to fully find his feet as a thinker, Nietzsche needs to free 
himself from Wagner, Schopenhauer and the Kantian traces that still remain in 
his work. 
The distancing of Nietzsche's later work from Wagner and Schopenhauer is 
relatively well known, and need not detain us here. 
7 The critique of Kant is far 
more complex, and has important implications for the argument in this thesis. A 
central passage to understanding the difference between Nietzsche and Kant's 
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perspective is found in Nietzsche's commentary on the fundamental question of 
Kant's first Critique: "how are synthetic a priori judgements possible? "8 Kant's 
search for an answer to this question is his reply to Hume's scepticism: synthetic 
a priori knowledge allows the foundation of a mathematical system, science to 
proceed by means of experiment, and the establishment of a ground for an ethics. 
Kant answers this question by suggesting that though experience is a necessary 
condition for knowledge, it is not a sufficient condition for knowledge. For any 
knowledge which is not merely an explication of the meaning of something 
already known - analytic knowledge - some synthesis of experience and reason 
is necessary. Kant puts this famously as "thoughts without content are empty, 
intuitions without concepts, blind". 9 Nietzsche suggests that Kant's answer to the 
question "how are synthetic a priori judgements possible" is "by faculty of a 
faculty [Vermöge eines Vermögens]". These faculties - Kant's perceptual 
manifold and the categories - continue into his moral thought, with the 
"discovery" of the categorical imperative. Nietzsche suggests that this is not 
really an answer, or an explanation, but rather a repetition of the -question. It has 
parallels, he suggests, with the doctor in Moliere's play: opium induces sleep 
"because it contains a sleepy faculty whose nature it is to put the senses to sleep". 
Nietzsche suggests such replies should remain in comedy, and that therefore we 
should replace -the Kantian question "how are synthetic a priori 
judgements 
possible? " by the question "why is belief in such judgements necessary? " (JGB 
11). 10 This question is. I suggest, the key to understanding the genealogical 
approach of Nietzsche's later work. It will equally inform the work of Foucault, 
and his investigation of the historical a priori. For what Nietzsche, Heidegger 
and Foucault share is a realisation that the structures of knowledge that are taken 
as absolutes at a particular time are contingent, and that they must be examined 
historically. 
This is a question of fundamental importance for Nietzsche because of the search 
for values to fill the void left by the death of God, so as to avoid nihilism. The 
first statement of God's death in Nietzsche's work comes in 1882 (FW 108), and 
in this he is claiming nothing new, as Hegel had already made this point in 
1802.11 Nietzsche, however, goes a stage further and brings into question all the 
other assumptions that have been made because of a belief in his existence. "We 
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have killed him - you and I" says Nietzsche's madman, and those that have 
"wiped away the entire horizon" (FW 125) must now "vanquish his shadow too" 
(FW 108). For Christians God is the source of value, and so, Nietzsche claims, it 
follows that with no God, there are no God-given values. 
However, it is not just Christians who have taken God-given values as their 
values. Even "pale atheists... still believe in truth" (GM III, 24), 12 taking things 
at face-value, and unquestionably falling into the Christian mode. As Camus 
says, "take our moral philosophers, for instance, so serious, loving their neighbours 
and all the rest - nothing distinguishes them from Christians, except that they don't 
preach in churches". 13 The problem, according to Nietzsche, is that "moral 
judgements agree with religious ones in believing in realities which are not 
realities" (GD 7,1). It is not simply morality that is tied up with belief in God. 
Nietzsche suggests that a number of other things - reason, language, truth and 
logic - are all closely interlinked with theology. The words at the beginning of 
John's Gospel show this: "In the beginning was the Word [Xö^roq], and the word 
was with God and the word was God... the word became flesh and made his 
dwelling among US. ). ). 14 If the word, köv, oc, is God, then we need to -think carefully 
how terms are dependent on this. Our linguistic structure causes us to think in a 
set of pre-ordained ways - for example providing a belief in a subject - and the 
linguistic tradition invented at an early stage in our development still holds sway: 
"I am afraid we are not rid of God because we still have -faith in grammar" (GD 
3,5; see BGE 20). 
"`Progress' is merely a modern idea" (A 4), states Nietzsche, as he criticises 
"transcendental and teleological forms of discourse". 
1' Not only belief in God 
can create an -imaginary teleology: a history with purpose, or 
design, For 
Nietzsche there can be no `purpose' in history, and no Hegelian notion of 
inevitable progress either. 16 For Nietzsche, without a "revaluation of values" the 
world is heading for nihilism, and he suspects such theories of "mollifying the 
fears of the craven". 17 He is also particularly scathing about some of the claims 
made in such histories: "German historiography, for example, 
is convinced that 
Rome represented despotism and that the Germanic tribes brought the spirit of 
freedom into the world. What difference is there between this conviction and a 
1? 
lie? " (A 55). His disillusionment with the Reich led him to believe that any form 
of historical analysis that made great claims for the German people or state was 
mistaken. 
Nietzsche therefore realises that the declaration that God is dead - by which he 
means that belief in the Christian God has become unbelievable (FW 343) - is 
itself not enough: "in former times, one sought to prove that there is no God - 
today one indicates how the belief that there is a God could arise and how this 
belief acquired its weight and importance" (M 95). This, essentially, is why 
Nietzsche puts emphasis on history, and specifically what he develops as the 
genealogical approach. What needs to be examined, he argues, is how beliefs and 
ideas arose, and how they developed. These beliefs are historically and culturally 
situated, and can only be examined within their specific context. Nietzsche's 
main area of examination with the genealogical approach is morality, and he 
spends a great deal of time examining how various moral "norms" became 
accepted. Nietzsche argues how customs/mores [Sitte] relate to morality 
[Sittlichkeit] (M 9), and throughout his career claims that "there are altogether no 
moral facts" (GD 7,1), "there are no moral phenomena, only moral interpretation 
of phenomena" (JGB 108), meaning that all moralities are essentially historically 
and culturally relative. Nietzsche denies the idea that there are absolute values. '8 J 
Nietzsche does not dismiss the notion of truth entirely. '9 He recognises that 
"there are many kinds of `truths', and consequently there is no truth" (WM 540). 
This is a plural notion of truth. Certain things are taken as `true' at a given time, 
within a given context, time and place. They may be part of a system that is 
internally consistent, and can seem to be undisputed - even -a priori - truths, but 
Nietzsche suggests that they are historical, and his work denies the certainty of 
absolutes. 
'Truth': this, according to my way of thinking, does not 
necessarily denote the antithesis of error, but in the most 
fundamental cases only the posture of various errors in relation to 
one another... An assumption that is irrefutable - why should it 
for that reason be `true'? The proposition may perhaps outrage 
logicians, who posit their limitations as the limitations of things: 
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but I long ago declared war on this optimism of logicians (WM 
535). 
Clearly this is not to say that the values, morals, and judgements of an age are 
unimportant. "A tablet of the good hangs over every people" (Z 1,15), but it is the 
fourth great error of man that he invents "ever new tables of goods and always 
accepts them for a time as eternal and unconditional" (FW 115). Nietzsche argues 
that morality has not remained static throughout time, but that within its age it is 
treated as an absolute, as if it had remained static. Essentially, "truths are illusions 
which one has forgotten are illusions" (KSA I, 880-1; PT 84). The excuse, as 
Nietzsche sees it, that values and morals are God-given, is no longer tenable: God 
cannot be truth. Man creates his own meaning, his own values, his own concepts of 
good and evil, "0 As Nietzsche says, "they did not take it, they did not find it, nor did 
it come to them as a voice from heaven. Only man placed values in things to 
preserve himself - he alone created a meaning for thing, a human meaning. 
`` Therefore he calls himself 'man'- which means: the esteemer" (Z I. 15). 
Moral judgements are therefore never to be taken literally: so 
understood, they always contain mere absurdity. Semiotieaiiy, 
however, they remain invaluably they -reveal, at least for those 
who know, the most valuable realities of cultures and 
inwardnesses which did not know enough to `understand' 
themselves. Morality is mere sign 'language, mere 
symptomatology: one must know what it is all about to be able to 
profit from it (GD 7,1). 
This is a complicated passage, and there is much to take from it. Semiotics, as 
well as meaning the study of signs, also means the study of the symptoms of 
disease. Nietzsche pursues this disease/cure metaphor throughout his work, and 
his use of medical terminology is revealing both for the approach, and for 
showcasing the parallels between his own illnesses and those of modernity. As 
early as 1873 Nietzsche was seeing the curative powers of good historical and 
philosophical study when he started, though later abandoned, a treatise entitled The 
Philosopher as Cultural Physician [Arzt der Kultur] (KSA VII, 545 ff; PT 69-76; 
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see also FW Preface), and throughout his career he used the German word 
Heilmittellehre, meaning healing through learning, specifically history. 
Nietzsche's On the Future of our Education Institutions lectures recognise the 
dual disease and cure potential of education. 22 It is also perhaps worth 
remembering that one of the alternative and unused sub-titles for Twilight of the 
Idols was "a moral code for physicians". 23 
Arthur Danto has called On the Genealogy of Morality "a medical book: 
etiological, diagnostic, "2 therapeutic, prognostic . 
Etiology is the philosophy, or 
study, of causation - the first step in any genealogical approach to a subject, 
where the emergence and descent of the phenomena being studied are traced. 
Those "judgements, judgements of value concerning life, for it or against it" that 
could never be "true" can, nonetheless, "have value only as symptoms" (GD 2, 
2). After a full diagnosis, an analysis to gain understanding and perspective, the 
therapeutic stage can begin. Nietzsche's prognostications can not be adequately 
be detailed here - though they are well documented - but are essentially the 
doctrines that accompany that of the Übermensch. For Nietzsche, the therapeutic 
and prognostic (a very wilful prognosis) go hand in hand, though this is not 
necessarily so. Indeed Nietzsche tacitly warns this: his cures may be difficult to 
swallow. While for Hollingdale Nietzsche's "effect was curative, like an electrical 
storm that breaks up the cloud and bad weather which has caused it", 2' the passage 
of Thus Spoke Zarathustra that this clearly refers to carries just such a warning: 
"behold, I am a herald of the lightning and a heavy drop from the cloud; but this 
lightning is called Übermensch" (Z Prologue, 4). 
Returning to the passage above on morality, it is clear that the language used can 
reveal a large amount about the morality itself: things that are not obvious at a 
first glance. This justifies the etymology used in On the Genealogy of Morality, 
where Nietzsche traces the original meaning of the term `good' to noble and 
aristocratic and `bad' to ignoble and plebeian (GM 1,4). An etymological study 
can reveal important things, because, as Nietzsche explains, man did not 
conceive that he was simply giving things a name (any name), but that he was 
injecting a meaning into them through language by giving them a particular 
name. 
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The significance of language for the evolution of culture lies in 
this, that mankind set up in language a separate world beside the 
other world, a place it took to be so firmly set that, standing upon 
it, it could lift the rest of the world off its hinges and make itself 
master of it... The sculptor of language [Sprachbildner] was not 
so modest as to believe that he was only giving things 
designations, he conceived rather that with words he was 
expressing supreme knowledge of things (MAM 11). 
The sculptor of language, because of his immodesty, has opened up a whole field 
of study, which Nietzsche, trained as a classical philologist, is only too willing to 
explore. The Greek and Latin roots of many contemporary European .6 words can 
reveal much about their meaning, as there is a tendency to forget that words have 
a sense beyond their particular designation. Nietzsche speaks of the "linguistic 
danger to spiritual freedom - every word is a prejudice" (WS 55), and another 
central part of his studies is the use to which language and truth are put, as part of 
a system of dominance. 
Such an analysis can be drawn out of one of Nietzsche's most remarkable 
passages, "How the `True World' Finally Became a Fable" in Twilight of the 
Idols. In a six stage summary, Nietzsche traces the history of the 
appearance/reality distinction through Platonism, Christianity, Kantianism and 
his own thought. In the first stage, the true world is seen to be attainable by the 
sage, the philosopher-kings of Plato's Republic. This is because the last stage of 
knowledge is the knowledge of goodness, so those who attain knowledge of the 
real world are the ideal legislators. `' In the second stage, this Platonic idea is 
made Christian. The true world is unattainable in this life, but is promised for the 
sinner who repents, for the pious, virtuous man in the afterlife. This has led to the 
pre-eminent position of the priest, as he has determined the concepts of "true" 
and "untrue" (A 12) and because he preaches the "supreme law" that should be 
followed, a set of rules to live a life to. For absolution, the priest teaches that 
"`God forgives those who repent' - in plain language: those who submit to the 
priest" (A 26). The third stage looks at Kant, and suggests that there has 
been 
effectively no change. The true world - noumena, the thing-in-itself - is 
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unattainable, unknowable, but, suggests Nietzsche, is still thought of. As it is 
thought it can act as a consolation, an obligation, and an imperative - the 
categorical imperative. So, though the true world is unknowable it still affects 
our lives, 28 
What is clear from these initial stages is that Nietzsche realises the political and 
moral implications that come from the structures of knowledge in existence at the 
time. Other relations of concepts of thought to those of power are also common. 
As Nietzsche says, "knowledge works as a tool of power. Hence it is plain that it 
increases with every increase of power" (WM 480). An example is found in the 
analysis of the second essay of On the Genealogy of Morality, where Nietzsche 
shows how the concepts of guilt, responsibility and punishment developed. 
Importantly the notions of punishment and responsibility - which depends on a 
notion of freedom - developed separately. "Men were considered 'free'... so that 
they might become guilty" (GD 6,7). This creation of free will was made by the 
ruling classes in order to justify punishment (WS 9), in order to secure their own 
position. 29 
The problem with circumventing these structures of knowledge, and the 
concomitant power relations they entail, is that we also necessarily think within a 
tradition, we cannot think alone. Independent thought is necessarily a challenge, 
and therefore a danger, to the status quo. Nietzsche makes the point that the 
education institutions of his time no longer teach how to think. He claims that 
thinking (and writing) is a skill to be learned like dancing, talking of the "delicate 
shudder which light feet in spiritual matters send into every muscle! " (GD 8,7). 
R. J. Hollingdale tellingly calls Nietzsche's works "a unique course in 
thinking", 30 and in many ways this is how his books best function: "for one 
cannot subtract dancing in every form from a noble education - to be able to 
dance with one's feet, with concepts, with words... with the pen too" (GD 8,7). 
For Nietzsche then, we have reached a stage where not only are there problems 
with the present, but it is in the nature of those problems that we have lost the 
ability to solve them. 
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From what Nietzsche has already said, it follows that if we create our values, we 
are thus free to create new ones: we are free to choose our values. However, for 
any revaluation of values, the ground must be cleared, which is why Nietzsche 
realises that "whoever must be a creator always annihilates" (Z I, 15). And, from 
this destruction, Nietzsche sees the recovery from nihilism: "one can speak of 
spring as long as one has had a winter to precede it". ý'- Genealogy is this 
"curative science" and, as was shown in The Birth of Tragedy, we may find the 
cure in previous more healthy times. The times which Nietzsche says that we 
must look at are the "tremendous eras of `morality of mores' which precede 
`world history"', as they are the "actual and decisive eras of history which 
determined the character of mankind" (M 18). Nietzsche calls the Greece of 
Homer until that of Socrates a "healthy culture", as opposed to our "unhealthy 
modernity". Greece is important because of what they achieved, by organising what 
Nietzsche calls the "chaos of foreign ... 
forms and concepts" (UB II, 10). The 
parallels of building a new out of the modernist descent into nihilism are clear, as 
are the links Nietzsche makes to the German state. Socrates is looked at as an 
example of a sea-change in thought. Nietzsche sees Socrates as a fundamental 
challenge to the established order in Ancient Greece, for the worse Nietzsche 
thinks, which led to the setting up of a new order in its place: one that Nietzsche 
feels is still very important today. 
The other main period that Nietzsche looks at closely is pre and post Christianity. 
As well as being a genealogical study of Christianity The Antichrist also looks at 
the Jewish precedent. As with Socrates, Nietzsche sees that what was achieved by 
Christ (or St Paul) was a massive revolt against the established system: in this case 
the Jewish Torah (law). As Nietzsche says, the "god on the cross promised a 
revaluation of all the values of antiquity" (JGB 46)_ Again, what was established 
in its place has had an enormous impact on the world in the last two thousand years. 
Nietzsche argues that we must look closely at these "actual and decisive eras", 
and learn from them rather than emulate them - history should not merely be "a 
storage room for costumes" (JGB 223). He recognises that this is almost 
impossible, but this is where the alternatives are, where we can observe ourselves 
better (M 18). 
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Nietzsche, though condemning the substance of their teaching, was fully aware of 
the success of the approach that Christ and Socrates had taken, and of their lasting 
impact. In Ecce Homo, his autobiography, Nietzsche calls himself a "turning point 
in history", the implication being that his revaluation will make him, like Socrates 
and Christ/St. Paul, a key person in the development of morals. 32 Indeed, 
retrospectively, he claims this to have been his project all along: "The Birth of 
Tragedy was my first revaluation of all values" (GD 10,5). He realises that this 
will bring him condemnation and vilification - "behold the believers of all faiths! 
Whom do they hate most? The man who breaks their tables of values, the breaker, 
the lawbreaker; yet he is the creator" (Z Prologue, 9) - but relishes the opportunity. 
So what is to be made from this (deliberate) tangling of diagnosis and cure? 
Nietzsche certainly had his own agenda, which was specifically why he developed 
the notion of a genealogy of ideas and ideals. Whilst I would not suggest that 
Nietzsche developed this approach as one he thought could be pulled from his 
books and applied elsewhere, I would suggest that this is what can be done, albeit 
with caution. That said, Nietzsche's distrust of systems generally, and his absence 
of a systematic elaboration of a "genealogical method" specifically, alert any 
potential genealogist of one clear danger. There can be no set order of actions, no 
fail-safe checklist of directives, no genealogy by numbers. Rather, there is perhaps 
an approach, or perhaps, in a true Nietzschean manner, a style. This style would be 
one endlessly adaptive to the subject and the context: "these are the services history 
is capable of performing for life; every man and every people requires, in 
accordance with its goals, energies and needs, a certain kind of knowledge of the 
past" (UB IT, 4). 33 
Spatial Metaphors and Analyses 
Until now my argument has looked at the role of history in Nietzsche's work. This 
section will give attention to the use of space in his work, both as metaphor and 
analysis. It is noticeable that in Nietzsche's works spatial metaphors are often 
used to designate different moralities, different systems of thought, different 
ways of being. 34 For example in The Antichrist, Nietzsche makes such an 
analysis of the nature of truth: "Truth and the faith that something is true: two 
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completely separate realms of interest - almost diametrically opposite realms - 
they are reached by utterly different paths" (A 23). Throughout his work he 
makes references to the "morality of [an] environment" (JGB 186), bordered by 
boundary stones35 to mark out the territory, a "labyrinth of `fixed ideas"' (GM II, 
22). Concepts are divided by "rigid mathematical lines", like a "templum'' (a 
delimited, often religiously sanctified, space or area), or a "columbarium" (a 
Roman vault with niches for funeral urns). Similarly, we can visualise a beehive 
of concepts, or a spider's web (KSA 1,881ff; PT 85ff). Nietzsche also talks of 
the philosopher's (Kant's) urge towards "classifications... tables of categories" 
(FW 348). Nietzsche's "revaluation of values" is dedicated to "toppling 
boundary markers" (FW 4), as "one digs up morality when one digs up boundary 
stones" (WS 285), whilst his genealogical studies, as a necessary prelude to this 
philosophy of the future, serve to map them out. This can help us break out from 
the prisons of our convictions (A 54). Nietzsche's own philosophy, especially as 
seen in Thug Spoke Zarathustra, is clearly seen by him in this light, as a spatial 
inclusion/exclusion: "I draw circles around me and sacred boundaries; fewer and 
fewer men climb with me on ever higher mountains" (Z III, 12,19). 
To move outside of these boundaries, Nietzsche uses two main metaphors. The 
first is that of flight, the conquest of space - new seas, mountains, wildernesses. 
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He who will one day teach men to fly will have moved all boundary stones" (Z 
III, 11,2), says Nietzsche, and he makes several references to flight, to birds, in 
his works. One of the key passages is found at the end of Daybreak, where he 
talks of "brave birds which 11y out into the distance", who "somewhere or other 
will be unable to go on and will perch on a mast or a bare cliff-face". However, 
there remains "an immense open space before them", they have not "-flown as far 
as one could fly". Nietzsche closes this book with the promise that "other birds 
will fly farther! " (M 575). Flight is clearly linked here with the thought patterns 
of the original thinker, able to think outside the boundaries he is enclosed 
within. ' For a great thinker, the ability to move outside the boundary stones, to 
move outside the system, must be based on the experience of the system they are 
within: "anybody who has built a `new heaven', only mustered the power he 
needed through his own hell' (GM III, 10). 
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The other spatial metaphor used is that of excavation. On The Genealogy Of 
Morality can be read as a digging down below moral systems; while others are 
content with building structures on the ground (M Preface, 3), Nietzsche 
excavates below to uncover the underpinning foundations. His preface to 
Daybreak shows this clearly: "in this book you will discover a `subterranean 
man' at work, one who tunnels and mines and undermines" (M Preface, 1). 38 
Foucault would later call this excavation of the foundations of a system an 
archaeology. Psychologically the excavation metaphor also holds, as 
consciousness is merely a surface (EH 2,9; see also JGB 230; 289), and shows 
the influence that Nietzsche would later have on Freud: "it is a painful and 
dangerous undertaking... to tunnel into oneself and to force one's way down into 
the shaft of one's being by the nearest path" (LIB III, 1). 39 Nietzsche sees in the 
figure of Luther another who looked beneath the surface into himself, saying he 
remained "an honest miner's son", 40 who, shut up in a monastery, lacking "other 
depths and `mineshafts' descended into himself and bored out terrible dark 
galleries" (M 88). Nietzsche also applies this subterranean reading to the German 
soul (JGB 244). 
But Nietzsche does not solely use spatial language and metaphors. There are a 
number of spatial analyses in his work, which, though certainly not proving 
anything as clear cut as a method for_ dealing with spatial questions, certainly 
provide some initial hints and suggestions. The divide between a spatial analysis 
and metaphor is perhaps well-bridged by how Nietzsche uses the idea of 
community in a spatial way. Nietzsche's main argument about community is 
related to his ideas about morality, as he argues that "to be moral, to act in 
accordance with custom, to be ethical means to practice obedience towards a law 
or tradition established from of old" (MAM 96; see also M 9). Traditions and 
customs are "above all directed at the preservation of a community, a people" 
(MAM 96). Community is, of course, an exclusion as well as an inclusion, a 
segregation. 4' Transgressing the community's rules (Nietzsche uses the 
comparison of a debtor and creditor) leads to the transgressor being "cast out" 
(GM II, 9), leading to Elend, the common German word for misery, but which 
literally means `other country', banishment, exile, 12 Space here functions both as 
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metaphor and fact: the community often has both actual, physical boundaries, 
and more figurative boundaries of custom and morality. 
Kant's theories of the a priori nature of space and time are Nietzsche's starting 
points for the philosophical basis of his work on space. Briefly, Kant thought that 
space and time were intuitions that we have, prior to experience, that serve to 
shape how we perceive and structure the world, how we experience things. 43 In 
The Birth of Tragedy Nietzsche praises Kant for showing that these conceptions 
make what we perceive (phenomenon) appear to be the "sole and highest 
reality", when there is actually no proof that this is the true nature of things (GT 
18). Indeed, in The Gay Science, Nietzsche argues that we have built an 
imaginary world of "lines, planes, bodies, atoms, divisible time spans, divisible 
spaces", in order that we can exist in this world built around our image, around 
how we perceive things (FW 112; see FW 121; WM 487). Tested consistently, 
says Nietzsche, these perceptions are logically false (MAM 18), and in places, 
especially in his notes (see WM 515; 516; 530; 553ff), he begins to pick apart the 
notions behind these constructs. However, these notes are sketchy at best, and 
this critique is pursued more effectively in Heidegger's work. At the very least 
we can take from Nietzsche an awareness that if we perceive everything as 
existing within time and space, because we can only perceive things irr these- 
terms, an analysis of how time and space have been used becomes important, 
indeed essential. 
Some of Nietzsche's most interesting spatial analyses are found in his ideas 
about architecture. -Nietzsche feels that we "no longer understand architecture", 
and are missing the insights into it that we used to have: "everything in a Greek 
or Christian building originally signified something, and indeed something of a 
higher order of things: this feeling of inexhaustible significance lay about the 
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building like a magical veil" (MAM 218). Reading buildings provides a valuable 
understanding of our "cultural architecture" (MAM 276; see also UB If, 3), and 
indeed Nietzsche sees that "the architect has always been under the spell of 
power. His buildings are supposed to render pride visible, and the victory over 
gravity, the will to power. Architecture is a kind of eloquence of power in forms 
- now persuading, even flattering, now only commanding. The highest feeling of 
-7 
power and sureness finds expression in a grand style" (GD 9,11). Like so much 
else in a Nietzschean analysis, architecture is an exhibition of a will to power at 
work. Understanding the power relations behind a building - the construction 
and use of space - can provide useful observations about the culture44 it is 
situated within. 
The most sustained example of an analysis of the spatial properties of 
architecture is found in The Birth of Tragedy, when Nietzsche provides an 
insightful reading of the Greek theatre. 4' Nietzsche argues that the "public of 
spectators as we know it was unknown to the Greeks", rather than the division 
into boxes or levels of seats of more contemporary theatres, there was a terraced 
structure of concentric arcs, without hierarchical division. This seating area, 
known as the theatron (seeing place) was sometimes cut into the side of a hill - 
like "a lonely valley in the mountains" - cutting out outside distractions and 
focusing attention on the orchestra (dancing place) - "at bottom there was no 
opposition between public and chorus". This structure made it possible for the 
public to "overlook [Übersehen]" the spectacle, in both senses of the word - to 
survey; and to be oblivious to the outside world_46 "The architecture of the scene 
[the backdrop]" was a "splendid frame" in which the action was revealed. Such 
an arrangement made the "men of culture" in the audience -much -closer - 
physically, culturally and psychologically - to the symbolism of the 
performance, and is part of the entire Greek attitude to tragedy and life (GT 8). 
Nietzsche's attitudes to the theatre are anticipated somewhat by Wagner's 
expectations of the "artwork of the future", where he expects the public to forget 
"the confines of the auditorium", so that it "lives and breathes now -only in the 
artwork which seems to it life itself' . 
47 Wagner's Bayreuth project, which built a 
theatre around a Greek design, was, in its initial stages, the subject of praise from 
Nietzsche (see UB IV, 9), but the actual Bayreuth festival, where the famous 
Ring cycle was performed for the first time complete, singularly failed to live up 
to expectations. It is interesting to note the way in which Nietzsche uses space in 
his attack on Wagner after Bayreuth. The section entitled "On The Flies Of The 
Marketplace" in Thus Spoke Zarathustra has clear links with the festival, with 
the countryside and solitude of Sils-Maria (where Nietzsche often lived) 
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contrasting with the marketplace of Bayreuth: "Where solitude ceases the market 
place begins; and where the market place begins the noise of the great actors and 
the buzzing of the poisonous flies begins too" (Z 1,12). 4s Later in the same work 
Nietzsche/Zarathustra pointedly tells the crowd: -`I do not love your festivals 
either: I found too many actors there, and the spectators, too, often behaved like 
actors" (Z 1,16). 
Nietzsche's developing contempt for the masses led him against the idea of the 
theatre as cultural spectacle, describing it as a cruder measure than art itself: 
"Wagner, too, did not change anything in this respect: Bayreuth is large-scale 
opera - and not even good opera. - The theatre is a form of demolatry [worship 
of the people] in matters of taste; the theatre is a revolt of the masses, a plebiscite 
against good taste" (FWa Postscript, see also GS 368). 49 However, the Bayreuth 
theatre is regularly described as having the best acoustics in the world, 50 and 
other spatial/architectural features of the building are also praised. One famous 
example is the hidden orchestra - no visual distraction, and no orchestra pit to 
distance the audience from the dramatic action - but it also makes it impossible 
to locate the source of the sound. '' Clearly, the use of space, both in Athens and 
Bayreuth, had social consequences and, most evidently in the latter case, 
- exhibited the signs of a will to power at work. 
Religious buildings are also open to such an analysis, and Nietzsche talks of 
"enclosed domains to which divine right denied entry except under certain 
conditions: in the first instance these were simply areas of ground, inasmuch as 
certain places were not to be stepped upon by the feet of the uninitiated, who 
were seized with fear and trembling when they approached them". This exclusion 
is then extended by religion to other things, for example to sex, which becomes a 
"privilege and adytum [innermost chamber of a temple, where oracles are 
developed] of maturity", from which "the gaze of youth must for its own 
advantage be directed away". In this passage, Nietzsche links the ideas of 
`shame' and `mystery', saying that the Arabic word for chamber is `harem', 
meaning both sanctuary and the forecourt of a mosque (literally forbidden place), 
as well as having the sexual connotations (MAM 100). 
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Given Nietzsche's lifelong engagement with the Christian religion, it is not 
surprising that he offers some thoughts on the spaces of churches. Some 
comments are similar to others he makes on aspects of the religion, dismissive 
and hardly worthy of serious attention, such as "one should not go to church if 
one wants to breath pure air" (JGB 30), but others are more substantial. 
Nietzsche argues that the architecture of the churches symbolically relates to the 
faith of the religion, with "stairways of repentance", "sweet-smelling caves" with 
"falsified light" and "musty air", where "the soul is not allowed to soar to its 
height" (Z II, 4). The symbolism of height within a church could clearly be 
expanded upon - for example the pulpit, the altar, kneeling and standing. 
Nietzsche also associates the Christian religion with darkness, nooks and corners, 
"an underworld kingdom, a hospital, a souterrain kingdom, a ghetto kingdom" 
(A 17), which he links both to the church itself - "the breath of the architecture, 
which, as the abode of a divinity, reaches up into obscurity, in the dark spaces of 
which the divinity may at any moment make evident his dreaded presence" 
(MAN 130) - and to the teachings of the religion - "public acts are precluded; 
the hiding-place, the darkened room, is Christian. The body is despised, hygiene 
repudiated as sensuality" (A 21) 5` Nietzsche continually makes references to the 
Christian religion's despising of the bodyc-l - and of drives and passions, arguing 
that it often demands the extirpation, the covering, the hiding of the passions. 
Indeed, for Nietzsche, only the destruction of these buildings, and what they 
stand for, is enough, looking for a time "when the pure sky again looks through 
broken ceilings and down upon grass and red poppies near broken walls" (Z II, 
4), as he does "not see how we could remain content with such buildings even if 
they were stripped of their churchly purposes. The language spoken by these 
buildings is far too rhetorical and unfree, reminding us that they are houses of 
God and ostentatious monuments of some supramundane intercourse" (FW 280). 
This last quoted passage shows that Nietzsche realises that for his own 
"philosophy of the future", new buildings must be built, space must be used in 
new ways. "Quiet and wide, expansive places for reflection" are missing from 
our cities, "buildings and sites that would altogether give expression to the 
5 
sublimity of thoughtfulness and of stepping aside" (FW 280). This reading of a 
town, of buildings, is well shown when Nietzsche comments on the town of 
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Genoa. The region, for Nietzsche, is "studded with the images of bold and 
autocratic human beings. They have lived and wished to live on: that is what they 
are telling me with their houses, built and adorned to last for centuries and not for 
a fleeting hour", he sees "violence and conquest" in the eyes of the builders. The 
"whole region is overgrown with this magnificent, insatiable selfishness of the 
lust for possessions and spoils" and each "conquered his homeland for himself by 
overwhelming it with his architectural ideas and refashioning it into a house that 
was a feast for his eyes" (FW 291). A similar attitude is found when Nietzsche 
contrasts "quiet, aristocratic Turin" with "a small German town... [a] pinched 
and flattened, cowardly world" and "a German big city - this built-up vice where 
nothing grows, where everything, good or bad, is imported" (EH 2,8). 
The figure of solitude is much used in Nietzsche's works, partly at least because 
he spent so much time alone. In On The Genealogy Of Morality, Nietzsche talks 
of finding "deserts" to withdraw to, to become a hermit in, in order to think in 
solitude. These deserts need not be "Syrian... a stage desert", mountains, "even a 
room in some crowded, run-of-the-mill hotel" can be a desert, can be "desolate 
enough". Nietzsche compares the Temple of Artemis, where Heraclitus withdrew 
to think, with what he calls his "nicest study", the "Piazza di San Marco" (GM 
III, 8). Ears Gustafsson reads this as a place where Nietzsche is almost inviting 
us "to come and see him"55; but this misses the point that though this is a large 
public square in Venice-, undoubtedly busy and full of people, Nietzsche values 
its anonymity. The point is surely that the spatial characteristics of this square are 
conducive to Nietzsche's thoughts, that one can be alone even when other people 
are around. However, it is not sorely man-made space that can be read in this 
way, 57 as natural space also serves to shape- "Tn the writings of a hermit one 
always also hears something of the echo of the desolate regions, something of the 
whispered tones and the furtive look of solitude" (JGB 289). 
Kant conceptualises the objects "outside us" as being in space , 
'' but there is also 
surely a space "inside us" in a non-metaphorical and non-mental sense: the space 
of the body is something that has been written about in some detail in recent 
years. '9 Some of Nietzsche's thoughts on this subject rely on nineteenth century 
physiology, ` and can lead him to several of his most ill-judged passages (see for 
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example M 241), but there are still some potentially useful ideas to be found. 
Nietzsche sees it as an important advance of the nineteenth century that "more 
and more decisively the question concerning the health of the body [Leibes] is 
put ahead of that of `the soul' (WM 117; see also WM 491; 532; Z I, 4; and Z III, 
10), and as well as berating philosophers for their lack of historical sense, he also 
attacks them for their neglect of the body (GD 3,1), and of physiology (WM 
408). 
"Taking a large view", Nietzsche wonders if "philosophy has not been merely an 
interpretation of the body [Leibes] and a misunderstanding of the body", and he 
looks to the day when "a philosophical physician" will read the "symptoms of 
the body" (FW Preface, 2), as his own work in this area clearly does not go this 
far-61 "We can an lyse our body spatially", says Nietzsche (WM 6176) and this 
can lead us to understanding our senses `inside' and `outside' (WM 500), and, 
the inference is drawn, of the culture we are within. In two of Nietzsche's notes, 
he sketches some ideas about the body as a "political structure 
[Herrschaftsgebilde]" (WM 660) "in which the most distant and most recent past 
of all organic development again becomes living and corporeal, through which 
and over and beyond which a tremendous inaudible stream seems to flow" (WM 
659). - 
Another point relates to the (Aristotelian) unities of time, place and dramatic 
action that Nietzsche praises the French dramatists for (MAIM 221). Thus Spoke 
Zarathustra clearly shows Nietzsche's own best achievement of this, particularly 
the fourth part, and Nietfische occasionally relates some of his ideas to a 
particular temporal and spatial situation, for example that of the eternal return in 
August 1881: "it was penned on a sheet with the notation underneath, '6000 feet 
beyond man and time'. That day f was walking through the woods along the lake 
pf Silvaplana; at a powerful pyramidal rock not far from Surlei I stopped. It was 
then that this idea came to me" (EH 9,1). Throughout Thus Spoke Zarathustra, 
Nietzsche sets up "antithetical spatial images", 
6' height and depth, mountain. and 
sea, and the important bifurcation of over and under, unter and über, that can be 
traced throughout the work '63 
As Hollinrake and Luke have pointed out, these 
spatial (dramatic) conceptions often mirror the philosophical content of 
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Zarathustra's teachings, for example the tightrope walker between two towers 
(dramatic) with the idea of man as a bridge "between beast and Übermensch" (Z 
Prolos ue, 3-6). 64 Whilst the dramatic unities can serve to enhance the 
philosophical content of this particular work, they have also led to both 
Nietzsche's dismissal as a poetic figure rather than a philosopher, and his 
confused reception by those that do try to appreciate his work. 
The Spaces of the Eternal Return 
The eternal return is the key teaching of Zarathustra, and the key message of 
Thus Sooke Zarclthusstra. 65 Within the work it functions as an important dramatic 
device, and the narrative is shaped around Zarathustra's thoughts, doubts and 
teaching of this message- 66 In Nietzsche's work as a whole the eternal return is 
mentioned in several places, the most important in I he Gay Science (F W 341), 
where it appears as a test to be thought through, and though in some of his notes 
of the 1880s Nietzsche attempts a scientific proof (see WM 1053ff)67 it certainly l1\//J 
functions best as a dramatic idea, a test of a life and its living, through which it 
links with other key ideas of Nietzsche's, such as the Übermensch, the will to 
power, amor fati, and the revaluation of all values. 
Zarathustra's first problem with his "abysmal thought" is that any thought of the _ 
eternal return must involve the return of the small man, the rabble, which causes 
the nausea he struggles to fight for the next two parts. Zarathustra's own life with 
its attendant problems (and we are surely not mistaken if we read Nietzsche's 
own sufferings in parallel) is not the thing he is unable to affirm, but the return of 
the mediocre is (Z II, 6). This inability to fully affirm prevents Zarathustra from 
expounding the doctrine, forcing him into silence (Z II, 20), and retreat to the 
cave and solitude. Here he confesses that he is aware of the thought: "I know it, 
but do not want to say it! " He knows the name of his "awesome mistress", but 
this is a name as yet unsaid, and unknown to the reader (Z II, 22). 
In Part Three, Zarathustra struggles to come to terms with his thought, a thought 
he calls his "ultimate peak", his "hardest path" and "loneliest walk". The eternal 
return is first presented by Zarathustra in the form of a riddle, a "vision of the 
28 
loneliest". In this riddle, Zarathustra is walking up a mountain path, "not cheered 
by herb or shrub", with his archenemy the spirit of gravity, in the form of a 
dwarf, sitting on him, weighing him down. Zarathustra climbs slowly, making 
his assent, praising courage, which he says can slay "even death itself, for it says, 
`Was that life? Well then! Once more! "' (Z III, 2,1). Just as Zarathustra is about 
to present the riddle, his abysmal thought, the dwarf jumps from his shoulders, 
freeing Zarathustra from the weight. The key spatial element of this teaching is 
now revealed, a gateway, with two faces, where two paths meet, two long lanes 
which no one has ever followed to the end, both stretching onwards for an 
eternity. The name of the gateway is inscribed above it: "Moment". This English 
translation loses many of the overtones of the German word used by Nietzsche, 
Augenblick. This word, a compound of das Auge, eye, and der Blick, glance, was 
used by Martin Luther in his translation of the Bible into German, in Paul's first 
letter to the Corinthians: "we will all be changed - in a flash, in the twinkling of 
an eye [Augenblick], at the last trumpet". 68 The usage of this word by Nietzsche 
tends a visual hint to the temporal that is missing in the English, but which is 
perhaps better preserved in the word instant (used in the French translation) 69 
which, deriving from the Latin instare (to be present), has at least a distant echo 
of the double meaning of present, the temporal and spatial signifier. Throughout 
what follows, where moment is used, the key visual nature of this term should 
not be forgotten. - 
Zarathustra then asks whether it is possible for these two paths to contradict each 
other eternally, and berates the dwarf for his answer, which though essentially 
correct for the doctrine (that "all truth is crooked, time itself is a circle") is 
without the weight and difficulty that Zarathustra attaches to it. Zarathustra 
suggests that all has passed along these paths before - the dwarf, the gateway, 
himself, and, restating The Guy Science (FW 341), the slow spider in the 
moonlight - will do so again and again 
for all eternity. Zarathustra at this point 
starts speaking ever more softly, and suddenly encounters a return from his own 
past, a howling dog that he remembers from his childhood, 
70 which swiftly 
changes into a scene that dramatises Zarathustra's nausea at this idea, a shepherd 
gagging on a heavy black snake. 
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Whilst this thought is essentially temporal, 7l though better utilised as a 
theoretical test of the self-affirmation of the Obermensch, "', the message is also 
couched in both dramatic and spatial terms. Dramatically, as we have seen, 
Zarathustra has struggled with the thought of the eternal return for the entire first 
three parts, and it is only at the very end of the third, when, overcoming his 
nausea, he is able to speak of his love for the third of the figurative women found 
in the work, Eternity. In the penultimate chapter of the third part, Zarathustra 
meets Life, who realises he must leave her soon, but Zarathustra whispers into 
her ear something to which she replies, " you know that, 0 Zarathustra? Nobody 
knows that". It is clear that Zarathustra has informed her that he knows the truth 
of the eternal return. For Zarathustra, "life was dearer to me than all my wisdom 
ever was" (Z 111,15,2), but now both Life and Wisdom must be left behind, as 
Zarathustra embraces his awesome mistress: "For I love you, 0 eternity? " (Z III, 
16,1). This cry is repeated seven times, in a dramatic recapitulation of the return. 
In the fourth part Zarathustra discovers that his final trial is pity. 
As a work as a whole, Thus Spoke Zarathustra is structured around a spatial 
return, a circle, with the key high point being Zarathustra's cave and the 
mountains, and the low point being the depths of mankind in the town. The 
spatial return is mirrored in the metaphor of the sun, and in a dramatic 
restatement of dialogue. In the Prologue, Zarathustra's descent to the town 
follows his speech to the sun, as that morning "he rose with the dawn" and 
"stepped before the sun". In order to talk to men, Zarathustra must, like the sun., 
go under", set f iuntergehen]73 (Z Prologue, 1). Zarathustra then goes down to the 
forest, and from there to the town. At the dead of night he leaves the town, 
returns to a forest, and then sleeps under a tree until "not only dawn. passed over 
his face but the morning too" (Z Prologue, 9). The Prologue ends with 
Zarathustra declaring his goal as "the sun stood at high noon", at which point he 
sees his animals from the mountains overhead. Then Zarathustra again begins to 
"go under". At the end of the first part, Zarathustra returns back to the mountains 
himself, speaking to his followers of "the great noon when man stands in the 
middle of his way between beast and 
Übermensch and celebrates his way to the 
evening at his highest hope: for it is the way to a new morning" (Z 1,22,3). 
What we have here is a spatial return - mountains, forest, town, 
forest, 
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mountains - paralleled by the rising, setting and rising to high noon of the sun. 
Finally, Zarathustra, setting like the sun, goes down to man once again. 
A similar, yet larger, spatial return, takes place in the book as a whole, 
specifically in the second and third parts. At the beginning of the second part 
Zarathustra is back in his cave, withdrawn from men, "like a sower who has 
scattered his seed". He stays here, we are told, for several months and years, 
before he tells his animals that his "impatient love overflows in rivers, downward 
towards sunrise and sunset. From silent mountains and thunderstorms of 
suffering my soul rushes into valleys" (Z II, 1). Zarathustra is then absent from 
his cave and mountains for the whole of the second part of the book, towards the 
end of this part he realises he must return, but as he is a long way from home, 
having dwelt in the blessed isles, he spends most of the third part undertaking 
this journey. 
Zarathustra returns from the blessed isles to the mainland, but does not proceed 
directly back to his mountains and cave, but takes a winding and circuitous path, 
encountering various people, an indirect route for which he realises the end, 
likening himself to a "river that flows, winding and twisting, back to its source 
[Quelle]! " (Z III, 5). It would appear that Zarathustra realises this spatial return 
before he can cope with the thought of the eternal return. On his way back, 
Zarathustra comes to the gate of a great city, and then reaches the town known as 
The Motley Cow, in which he had spent time earlier, where he realises he has 
"only two more days to go to reach his cave... his soul jubilated continually 
because of the nearness of his return home". This return is completed in the 
chapter actually entitled `The Return Home'. While in his cave, Zarathustra 
again cannot face the thought of the eternal return, until his animals tell him of 
the importance of this doctrine, and his own role in it: "For your animals know 
well, 0 Zarathustra, who you are and must become: behold, you are the teacher 
of the eternal return - that is your destiny" (Z III, 13,2). It is after this spatial 
return, and his overcoming of the nausea, that Zarathustra declares his love for 
eternity. 
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lie foutth pail. again shows a similar return, aS Zarathustra descends ltom his 
cave and meets various people, who then gather at his cave waiting for him to 
join them. The final chapter, `The Sign', is both a recapitulation of the theme of 
the Fourth Part, Zarathustra's struggle with pity, and as a restatement of key 
themes from earlier neatly serves to tie up the work as a whole. Zarathustra is 
back in the mountains, and leaves his cave, "glowing and strong as a morning 
sun that comes out of dark mountains". He then speaks to the sun "as he had said 
once before", in the Prologue. Thus the chapter returns both to the Prologue, and 
in its final lines returns to its own start, as Zarathustra once more leaves his cave, 
"glowing and strong as a morning sun that comes out of dark mountains" (Z IV, 
Historical Sense 
Philosophers and historians contemporary to Nietzsche should be condemned for 
their "lack of historical sense... their Egyptianism. They think that they show- 
respect for a subject when they de-historicise it, sub specie aeterni - when they 
turn it into a Mummy. All that philosophers have handled for thousands of years 
have been concept-Mummies, nothing real escaped their grasp alive. When these 
honourable idolaters of concepts worship something, they kill it and stuff it, they 
threaten the life of everything they worship" (GD 3, I). 74 Nietzsche sees that, as 
yet, historical sense is still both "virtue and disease", capable of conferring an 
advantage or a disadvantage to life, as a method it is still "poor and cold". 
However Nietzsche feels that the future development of this sense is possible, 
and that the benefits may be substantial. "If this seed should be given a few 
centuries and more, it might ultimately become a marvellous growth... that 
might make our old earth more agreeable to live on" (FW 337; see UB II). On 
which uses it may be put to confer an advantage, Nietzsche is not short of 
suggestions. 
Care must clearly be exercised, for there is no certain transformation of one stage 
into another, and the descent of ideas may be unclear. To look in the past for 
something in the form it is now found in the present may be an error. ``Every 
conviction has its history, its preliminary forms, its trials and errors: it becomes a 
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conviction after not having been one for a long time, and after scarcely having 
been one for an even longer time" (A 55). The genealogist must continually see 
things in both the specific and the wider context: not ripping the roots from the 
soil, but also not forgetting that histories, too, have a history, and that another 
time's perception of its history may be very different from our perception of it. 
Also, any study is necessarily incomplete. Nietzsche recognises that it is not just 
the large events and the key personalities of the past that are important, and is 
aware of the potential effects of even the smallest thing. He talks of the "the great 
effects of the smallest thing: It is similar to that stunted vegetation which 
gradually reduces the Alps to dust" (PT 13). Strong calls Nietzsche's method "a 
form of human archaeology, an analysis of the particular `soil' from which these 
p and this must he coupled with seeing how these ideas problems have s run '' g", 
have changed, how they have been used, and how they have been accepted. That 
said, history should not be seen a straight line, with events, concepts and values 
continually evolving. Nor, should history be seen as inevitable or purposeful: "in a 
genealogical understanding, there is no automatic logic to the evolution of a set of 
events"76 . 
We must realise our limitations: "our usual imprecise mode of observation takes 
a group of phenomena as one and calls it a fact: between this fact and another 
fact it imagines in addition an empty space, it isolates every fact. In reality, 
however, all our doing and knowing is not a succession of facts and empty 
spaces but a continuous flux" (WS 11). If we cannot hope to know every detail of 
this "flux", we are surely better to realise it than not, and that any perception we 
make is necessarily our perception. This does not mean that there is no worth in a 
genealogical study, or that there is no point in attempting it, though it should be 
stressed that any genealogical study is a genealogical study, with an emphasis on 
the indefinite article. This last point not withstanding, as has been argued, "the 
aim of Nietzsche's genealogy is finally not a relativism but a `revaluation of all 
values'. This clearly presupposes the possibility of judging some values to be 
better than others" . 
77 The genealogical approach does not direct the genealogist 
to bland, relativistic loquacity, but enables them, like Nietzsche, to 
prognosticate, and finally to change: "to be physicians here, to be inexorable 
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here, to wield the scalpel here - that is our part, that is our love of man, that is 
how we are philosophers" (A 7). 
This chapter has shown the Nietzschean approach to the question of history, and 
grouped together his scattered thoughts on the issue of space. It demonstrates that 
though he discusses space, he does not develop his insights clearly: the 
metaphors used and analyses made are not substantial or coherent enough. Given 
that, as we shall see, space is central to Foucault's work, this means that 
Nietzsche alone could not have provided Foucault with the tools he so clearly 
uses in his historical studies. The standard reading of Foucault is that he picks up 
on this Nietzschean approach in what he calls archaeology and later genealogy, 
but such a reading is deficient in a number of ways. Why does Foucault suggest 
his work is a history of the present, what is the basis for his distinction between 
connaissance and savoir, and from where does he develop his discussions of 
technology and the dispositi f? Why, too, are his historical studies so overtly 
spatialised? In Chapters Five and Six I will argue that Foucault's insights have 
been misunderstood because of a lack of background knowledge. This is 
particularly true of Foucault's major historical studies (examined in Chapter Six). 
The current chapter has pushed the Nietzschean influence as far as the texts will 
allow, and yet a number of fundamental questions remain unanswered. The key 
to some of the answers will be found - as Foucault himself intimates - in a 
detailed examination. of Heidegger. 
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Chapter Two 
Space and History in Being and Time 
Introduction 
The fundamental questions identified at the end of the last chapter require 
answers. The general point being made is that while Nietzsche's influence on 
Foucault is of great importance, there are a number of central issues in Foucault's 
work that cannot be explained solely with reference to Nietzsche and Foucault's 
appropriation of his ideas. Towards the end of his life, in an interview, Foucault 
suggested that "Heidegger has always been for me the essential philosopher... 
My whole philosophical development was determined by my reading of 
Heidegger. But I recognise that Nietzsche prevailed over him... Nietzsche by 
himself said nothing to me. Whereas Nietzsche and Heidegger - that was the 
philosophical shock! " (DE IV, 703; PPC 250) Commenting on this remark, Scott 
suggests that "Nietzsche, not Heidegger, defines the horizon from which 
Foucault most often takes his departure. Heidegger's influence is apparent 
throughout Foucault's writing, but it is found in a more Nietzschean context". ' It 
is a central claim of this thesis that the reverse is closer to the real picture. What 
role then does Heidegger - and in particular his reading of Nietzsche - play in 
the shaping of the importance of space in Foucault's historical approach? 
In order to answer this question, the following three chapters focus on the work 
of Heidegger. As well as illuminating the debt owed to Heidegger by Foucault 
they make a number of claims about Heidegger's own work. This chapter looks 
at the- process that led to the publication of Being and Time and examines the 
working out in lecture courses of parts of unpublished divisions. The chapter 
ends at the turn of the 1920s into the 30s -a crucial time for Heidegger both 
philosophically and politically. Chapter Three picks up the story at this point, 
outlining the philosophical points at stake in the Rectorship and its aftermath, 
concentrating on the key readings of Nietzsche and Hölderlin - two central 
figures in Heidegger's own development and important in terms of the argument 
here concerning his influence on Foucault. Chapter Four then looks at a number 
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of issues in Heidegger's work - art, technology, poetic dwelling and the nOktg - 
which showcase the application of the theoretical insights into space, place and 
history traced in the preceding two chapters. 
The current chapter therefore looks at the work of the 1920s, of which until 
recently Being and Time, Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics and odd lectures 
were the only texts available. The incompleteness of Being and Time - only two 
of a projected six divisions were published - and the fact that it appeared after 
more than a decade of silence on Heidegger's part, has always caused difficulties 
in understanding its importance and situating its insights. With the publication of 
Heidegger's lecture courses in the Gesamtausgabe and the coming to light of 
some other pieces a number of issues become much clearer. At the same time a 
number of complications arise. The lecture courses develop material originally 
scheduled for the unpublished divisions, situate Heidegger in relation to the 
tradition of phenomenology in greater detail, and provide closer analysis of key 
figures in his development, notably Kant. Most of the material covered in this 
chapter was produced while Heidegger was lecturing at the University of 
Marburg, the significance of which will be remarked upon below. Recently, the 
wider context of the genesis of Being and Time has been discussed in great detail 
in Kisiel's pathbreaking work, 2 and this -study is indebted to it. However, 
regarding the issues of space and history, some elucidation is still required. 
Ontology, History and Time 
Husserlian phenomenology was basically ahistorical, 
3 perhaps because of 
Husserl's background in mathematics and logic. For Heidegger however, as Krell 
has argued, the history -of philosophy was an "essential counterweight to 
phenomenology": whereas Husserl had once remarked that he had "forgotten 
about history", Heidegger never did. ` In Being and Time Heidegger makes some 
comments indicating the importance of the historical project, though, as shall be 
seen, his later work suggests that here he did not go far enough. The basic issues 
at stake can be seen if the distinction Heidegger makes between optic and 
ontological knowledge is examined. Ontic knowledge is knowledge pertaining to 
the distinctive nature of beings as such, whereas ontological knowledge is the 
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basis of which any such theory (of ontic knowledge) could be constructed, the a 
priori conditions for the possibility of such sciences. Heidegger's own exercise, 
as f sndamental ontology deals with the conditions of possibility not i ust of the 
ontic sciences, but also of the ontologies that precede and found them. This is the 
niieCtinn of heinQ (( A7 1 1' > 
see ýTA76,195_7(171 
I....,. _.. _. b'J. 
A glimpse of the possibility this insight allows is found in Heidegger's 
discussion of Newton. 
To say that before Newton his laws were neither true nor false, 
cannot signify that before him there were no such beings as have 
been uncovered and pointed out by those laws. Through Newton the 
laws became true; and with them, beings became accessible in 
themselves to Dasein. Once beings have been uncovered, they show 
themselves precisely as beings which beforehand already were. Such 
uncovering is the kind of being which belongs to `truth'. 
That there are `eternal truths' will not be adequately proved until 
someone has succeeded in demonstrating that Dasein has been and 
will be for all eternity. As long as such a proof is still outstanding, 
this principle remains- a fanciful contention which does not gain in 
legitimacy from having philosophers commonly `believe' it. 
Because the kind ofbeing that is essential to truth is of the character 
offDasein, all truth is relative to Daseins being (GA-2,227) 6 
From this, it is clear that Dasein and truth are fundamentally linked, that truth is 
context dependent. This does not mean that truth is only what an individual 
thinks, but that truth only has a context dependent on the existence of Dasein 
(GA3,281-2). Any eternal truths must rest on an eternal immutability to Dasein. 
It clearly follows from this that if being changes, or is historicised, so too is truth. 
It has been remarked by some critics that Heidegger does indeed, in Being and 
Time, suggest such an immutability to Dasein, examining it and its structures as 
if they were true eternally. Such critics sometimes point to a shift in the later 
Heidegger towards an understanding of historical nature of being, of Dasein, 
which would, following the quotation and explication here, lead to a historicising 
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of truth. 7 The ontic/ontological distinction - especially when historicised - is one 
that Foucault would go on to elaborate and utilise in the difference between 
connaissance and savoir in The Archaeology of Knowledge, where he examined 
what he called the "historical a priori". 8 
The idea of the history of being does not appear as an explicit theme until later 
works, though it would appear that the second part would have covered some of 
this area. However, in Being and Time Heidegger does offer some thoughts on 
history. These theses are developed in the second division of the work, and are 
designed for an examination of the historical nature of existence. Lest there be 
confusion between what Heidegger does in Being and Time, and what I will 
argue he does later, the following point should be considered. In Being and Time, 
Heidegger attempts to understand the structures of Dasein, among which is the 
sense of history. In his later works, Heidegger historicises these very structures; 
in the specific case effectively historicising the sense of history. If in Being and 
Time Heidegger attempts an ontology of history (for which the ground must be 
Dasein rather than historiography), 9 in his later work he attempts a history of 
ontology. This radical shift is central to the influence he was to have on Foucault- 
The model of history that Heidegger utilises is that of Nietzsche in the second 
Untimely Meditation, "On the-Uses and Disadvantages of Historiography for 
Life". This is the only passage of Being and Time that treats Nietzsche at any 
length, a point that shall be returned to. Nietzsche, says Heidegger, 
"distinguished three kinds of historiography - the monumental, the antiquarian, 
and the critical - without explicitly pointing out the necessity of this triad or the 
ground of its unity" (GA2,396). In fact, though his later genealogical approach is 
arguably a fusion of these - three types of historiography, Nietzsche never 
explicitly states that the three should be conflated. 10 Given Heidegger's purpose, 
this joining together is of key importance. "The threefold character of 
historiography [Historie] is adumbrated in the historicality [Geschichtlichkeit] of 
Dasein... [which] enables us to understand to what extent these three 
possibilities must be united factically and concretely in any historiography which 
is authentic [eigentliche]" (GA2,396). It is important to note the distinction 
Heidegger draws between Historie and Geschichte. Historie is, for Heidegger, 
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the writing of history, the discipline; Geschichte is history as it actually happens 
[geschehen], the events. l 1 
Heidegger reads these three types of historiography as having distinct attitudes to 
time. The antiquarian approach orientates itself to the past, the having been, the 
monumental to the future; and the critical to the present. It is the reading of the 
last of these that Heidegger departs from Nietzsche, for Nietzsche used the 
critical approach as an orientation to the past. 12 As far back as 1922 Heidegger 
had suggested this: "The critique of history is always only the critique of the 
present" (PIA 4). He explains: "Dasein temporalises itself in the way the future 
and having been are united in the present... As authentic, the historiography 
which is both monumental and antiquarian is necessarily a critique of the 
`present'. Authentic historicality is the foundation for the possibility of uniting 
these three ways of historiography" (G A2,397). 13 These three temporal 
dimensions come together, as will be examined later, in the reading of the 
Nietzschean moment Augenbl! ekJ. 
14 Given t! iis, it 
is surprising that in Being and 
Time Heidegger does not either mention Nietzsche in his discussion of the 
moment, or make the linkage clearer. It is only in his lectures of the 1930s that he 
brings these critical themes into the open, and links them to space. 
Understanding Heidegger's use of the three types of historiography helps to 
explain his comments earlier in Being and Time. At one point he writes "thus 
`the past' has a remarkable double meaning; the past belongs irretrievably to an 
earlier time; it belonged to the events of that time; and in spite of that, it can still 
be present-at-hand `now' - for instance, the remains of a Greek temple. With the 
temple, a `bit of the past' is still 'in the present"' (GA2,378) t' For the historical 
structure of Dasein, it is therefore clear that the past is `present' in the present, a 
claim Foucault would make many times in his writings. For our present purpose 
it is worth bearing in mind that Heidegger tends to assimilate the meanings of 
two German words for presence, both that which means the presence of someone 
in a place or at an occasion [Anwesenheit], and presence in the temporal sense 
[Gegenwart] (GA24,305ff). 16 Heidegger makes this idea of presence clearer in 
the following passage, which highlights a point Foucault would later elaborate in 
his reading of Nietzsche: "What we next have in mind with the term `history' is 
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not so much `the past' in the sense of that which is past, but rather derivation 
[Herkunft] from such a past. Anything that `has a history' stands in the context of 
a becoming. In such becoming, `development' is sometimes a rise, sometimes a 
fall... Here `history' signifies a `context' of events and `effects', which draws on 
through `the past', the `present', and the `future'. On this view, the past has no 
special priority" (GA2,378-9). 
Although Heidegger's remarks in Being and Time are generally limited to the 
historicality of Dasein, at times he does hint at the direction of his thought to 
come. Dreyfus has suggested that the sketchy and hurried nature of Division Two 
should be attributed to the rush in which it was appended to the more polished 
first division: this may explain its partial nature. 17 Heidegger suggests that "what 
is primarily historical is Dasein. That which is secondarily historical, however, is 
what we encounter within-the-world... also the environing nature as the `very 
soil of history"' (GA2,381). 18 Usually the comments on the more general nature 
of history are those that directly relate the history of things to their use in reading 
the history of Dasein, such as the following example: "Remains, monuments, and 
records that are still present-at-hand, are possible `material' for the concrete 
disclosure of the Dasein which has-been-there" (GA2,394). At one point 
Heidegger remarks, "equipment and work - for instance, books - have their 
`fates [Schicksale]'; buildings and institutions have their history. And even 
nature is historical. It is not historical, to be sure, in so far as we speak of `natural 
history'; but nature is historical as a countryside, as an area that has been 
colonised or exploited, as a battlefield, or as the site of a cult [Kultstätte]" (GA2, 
388). 19 In some ways then, rather than being the soil of history, nature might be 
tentatively designated as the site of history, a claim that will be discussed in 
Chapters Three and Four. 
In Being and Time Heidegger briefly discusses the notion of the moment 
[Augenblick], '° which would come to assume central importance in the Nietasche 
lectures. In this text however, the notion is not developed in great detail, and, at 
least on the surface, seems to owe more to Kierkegaard .21 
The moment is linked 
to the existential situation [Situation] which Heidegger defines thus: "The 
existential attributes of any possible resolute Dasein include the items 
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constitutive for an existential phenomenon which we call a situation... [in 
which] there is an overtone of a signification that is spatial" (GA2,299). 
Heidegger uses the German Situation to mean a temporal/spatial `there', and 
opposes it to the solely spatial Lage [position] (see PIA 10). Each situation is a 
place in time and space, where existentially Dasein has acted authentically: 
"When resolute, Dasein has brought itself back from falling, and has done so 
precisely in order to be more authentically `there' in the `moment of vision' 
[Augenblick] as regards the situation which has been disclosed" (GA2,328). 
Regardless of the existential baggage that was later marginalised in his work, `2 
these two concepts provide an initial glimpse of what Heidegger, and certainly 
Michel Foucault, went on to do: the putting into practice of the understanding of 
the dimensions of time and space concurrently. 
One of the intended divisions of Being and Time was to be a critique of the 
Aristotelian notion of time (GA2,40). Though it has never appeared, there are 
occasional hints of what it may have included, and indeed The Basic Problems of 
Phenomenology discusses some of this area. The Aristotelian view of time was 
"as a succession, as a `flowing stream' of `nows', as `the course of time"' (GA2, 
421-2). 23 Instead of this temporal sequence, of the now-no-longer, the now, and 
the not-yet-now (GA24,348-9), we must, following Heidegger's reading of 
Nietzsche on history, see the dimensions of past, present and future together, in 
terms of the authentic `moment' (see GA29/30; 226). 
2` It is notable that whilst 
Heidegger praises Kierkegaard's concept of the moment, his main complaint is 
that it is equated with the now in the common sense (GA2,338niii, GA24, 
408). 25 Heidegger's development of this idea is far too inchoate in what was 
published of Being and Time, and even in the later The Basic Problems of 
Phenomenology and The Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics, but again there 
are several hints of where it may lead. It will be suggested that it is in 
Heidegger's extended reading of Nietzsche in the later 1930s and beyond that 
these ideas come to greater fruition, and that this formulation becomes clearer: 
"When historicality is authentic, it understands history as the `return' 
[Wiederkehr] of the possible, and knows that a possibility will recur only if 
existence is open for it fatefully, in a moment, in resolute repetition" 
(GA2,391- 
2). 
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The Space of Dasein and Equipment 
It is not difficult to immediately find clues that would appear to show the 
spatiality of Heidegger's thought. Right from his earliest works, he uses the 
German word Dasein, which, as a noun, means `existence', but which also, as a 
verb, means `to be there'. If this word is broken apart, or is, as Heidegger often 
does, hyphenated to Da-sein, it literally means `there-being', `being-there'. It has 
regularly been translated as the latter of these in English, and in French has often 
been rendered as the equivalent Ptre-l'i, most famously in the works of Sartre. 26 
Contemporaneous to this use of the word is another of Heidegger's important 
terms, In-der-Welt-Sein, `being-in-the-world'. A privileging of the spatial over 
the existential overtones of the preposition in this phrase would seem to 
underline the importance of space and place in Heidegger's early works. 
However, such a reading of these terms would be both too simplistic, and in 
certain respects inaccu_rate. 27 Indeed, as will be shown, Heidegger's early works 
often appear to go out of their way to condemn such ideas. Understanding the 
Heideggerian attitude to space is a more difficult and delicate task. 
Early in Being and Time Heidegger makes it quite clear that a spatial reading of 
several of his key terms -is not the primary sense intended. For example, on the 
term being-in-the-world, Heidegger asks specifically "what is meant by `being- 
in'? " (GA2,53). In contrast to the spatial being in [Sein in], such as we might 
conceive of the water `in' the glass, or the garment `in' the cupboard, Heidegger 
sets up the "existentiale" being-in [in-Sein]: "Being-in' is thus the formal 
existential expression for the being of Dasein, which has being-in-the-world as 
its essential state" (GA2,54, see GA20,211-3). Heidegger goes on to suggest 
that this does not deny every kind of spatiality to Dasein, but that an 
understanding of being-in-space is only possible after an understanding of being- 
in-the-world as an essential structure of Dasein (GA2,56). A similar distinction 
is made some pages later, around the concept of environment [Umwelt]: "The 
spatial character which incontestably belongs to any environment can be clarified 
only in terms of the structure of worldhood" (GA2,66). 
As Heidegger believes that "Dasein does not fill up a bit of space as a real thing 
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or item of equipment would" (GA2,368), the spatiality of Dasein is not a 
primary characteristic. Even its spatiality in a secondary way is not what would 
ordinarily be termed spatial 2' and does not, compared to other analyses of 
Heidegger's, much further the purpose here. That which Dasein encounters - 
things, locations and equipment [Zeug] - have, on the other hand, very important 
spatial characteristics. Many of Heidegger's most interesting and perceptive 
comments on the first two of these three are found in his work of the 1930s and 
later, but his meditation on the last, equipment, begins in Being and Time. 
Heidegger explains that equipment "always is in terms of [aus] its belonging to 
other equipment: writing equipment, pen, ink, paper, blotting pad, table, lamp, 
furniture, windows, door, room" (GA2,68). He continues, "what we encounter 
as closest to us... is the room; and we encounter it not as something `between 
four walls' in a geometrical spatial sense, but as equipment for dwelling 
[Wohnzeug]" (GA2,68; see GA24,414), '9 Another example perhaps upsets our 
customary notions: "When, for instance, a man wears a pair of spectacles which 
are so close to him distantially that they are `sitting on his nose', they are 
environmentally more remote from him than the picture on the opposite wall... 
Equipment for seeing... has what we have designated as the inconspicuousness 
of the proximally ready-to-hand" (GA2,107). 
This highlights an important point: for Heidegger, we encounter things in space 
in a way that stands in opposition to Descartes' view. Heidegger's thoughts on 
the spatiality of the ready-to-hand suggest that our encounters with equipment 
are not primarily determined by geometry and measurable distance, but by the 
more prosaic notions of closeness or nearness [Nähe], de-distancing [Ent- 
fernung] and directionality [Ausrichtung]. "The `above' is what is `on the 
ceiling'; the `below' is what is-'on the floor'; the `behind' is what is `at the door'; 
all "wheres" are discovered and circumspectively interpreted as we go our ways 
in everyday dealings; they are not ascertained and catalogued by the 
observational measurement of space" (C'TA2,103). 30 What Heidegger has given 
here is a more common-sense understanding of how we relate to space. As he 
notes, "space is neither in the subject nor is the world in space" (GA2,111). 
Space is encountered in everyday life, and lived in, not encountered in 
geometrically measurable forms and shapes. It is part of the structure of our 
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being-in-the-world. Blackham has provided a useful example, linking this 
thought on space to that of a temporal history: "The brake is on the wheel which 
is on the road which joins the places... the hoe has been made and will be used 
for hoeing and is at present lying there in the tool-shed"). 31 As with Heidegger's 
thoughts on using equipment and coping with life, he believes that standard 
investigations begin at the level of abstraction, rather than at the level of 
everyday action. Just as he believes that we encounter the hammer only as a 
hammer if there is a problem with it, we encounter the room or space 
geometrically only when something is wrong, when we purposively think it in 
that way (see GA2,109,361-2; GA24,231 ff). 32 
All of this links to his thoughts on place [Plat-]. Heidegger suggests that all 
things have their place, but that often "the region [Gegend] of a place does not 
become accessible explicitly as such a region until one fails to find something in 
its place" (GA2,104). 33 Our coping with space in life is therefore essential, but is 
usually understood at a level removed from the everyday. When Heidegger starts 
to relate these thoughts on equipment to the structure of being-in-the-world, he 
again uses these everyday notions: "We say that to go over yonder is a good 
walk, a stone's throw, or `as long as it takes to smoke a pipe"' (GA2,105). - 
Heidegger also extends his consideration to nature, a point he will return to in, his 
later work on technology. "Nature is not to be understood as that which is just 
present-at-hand, nor as the power of nature. The wood is a timber forest, the 
mountain a rock quarry; the river water-power, the wind is wind `in the sails'. As 
the `environment' is discovered, the `nature' thus discovered is encountered too" 
(GA2,70). Several of these key ideas are developed in Heidegger's important 
later essays. 
Reading Kant Phenomenologically 
In his genealogy of Being and Time, Kisiel suggests that the 1924 lecture and 
manuscript The Concept of Time was directed to the question `what is history? ' 
and was indebted to Dilthey; the summer semester course of 1925, History of the 
Concept of Time: Prolegomena was directed to the question `what is being? ' and 
was Husserlian; and the published version of Being and Time asked 'what is 
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time? ' Kisiel called this the kairological (from the Greek xatp6S - right time, 
opportunity, crisis, moment), or Kantian version. 3`ý What is the relationship of 
Heidegger to Kant, especially round the questions of ontology, history, time and 
space? 
It should immediately be noted that Heidegger's reading of Kant does not claim- 
to be a piece of neutral and objective scholarship, but a reading designed to 
illuminate his own project. He makes two important remarks on this point. In 
1928 he tells his students that "when some years ago I studied the Critique of 
Pure Reason anew and read it, as it were, against the background of Husserl's 
phenomenology, the scales fell from my eyes; and Kant became for me an 
essential confirmation of the accuracy of the path which I took in my search" 
(GA25,431). Some years later, in response to critiques of his Kant and the 
Problem of Metaphysics, he admitted "it may not be good Kant, but it is awfully 
good Heidegger". 35 These two accounts jar slightly, but the overall intent is quite 
clear: a phenomenological reading of Kant, and in particular of the Critique of 
Pure Reason, can further the early Heidegger's project. We might note in passing 
here that the same intent is later applied to Nietzsche and Hölderlin, a point to 
which-I return below. 
There are two central issues that I wish to examine-in Heidegger's reading of 
Kant. The first is that Heidegger sees Kant as recognising the ontic/ontological 
distinction; the second is the role of space and time, and in particular the 
privileging of time over space. First then, it will be recalled that ontic knowledge 
is knowledge pertaining to particular beings, ontological knowledge is the 
condition of possibility for such ontic knowledge. Ontological knowledge is the a 
priori conditions for ontic knowledge, it concerns being rather than beings, and is 
the major concern of the early Heidegger, especially in Being and Time. The 
predominant strain of Kant interpretation in Heidegger's time was the neo- 
Kantianism of the Marburg school, which argued that the Critique of Pure 
Reason was a work of epistemology. This view, put forward by Cohen, Rickert 
and Natorp, amongst others, held sway from the late 19th and early 20th century. 
Heidegger - lecturing at Marburg - tackles this 
interpretation head on- the 
Critique of Pure Reason is a theory of knowledge, but it is not a theory of ontic 
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knowledge (i. e. experience) but rather of ontological knowledge - transcendental 
philosophy, ontology (GA3,17; GA24,180-1; GA25,186). 36 Ontic knowledge 
(of beings) must conform to ontological foundations (being). This is the real 
meaning of Kant's Copernican revolution, that instead of our knowledge 
conforming to objects, objects must conform to our knowledge (GA25,55-6). 37 
What was for Kant the examination of the transcendental possibility of 
experience, becomes in Heidegger's terms an examination of the ontological 
possibility of the optic. Heidegger continues, with the problem of 
transcendence, a `theory of knowledge' is not set in place of metaphysics, but 
rather the inner possibility of ontology is questioned" (GA3,16-7). Ontology is 
seen as the laying of the ground for metaphysics as a whole (GA3,124-5; see 
GA29/30,306). This interpretation has a number of effects, and forms the basis 
for Heidegger's reading of Kant throughout his career. For example, in the 
Critique of Pure Reason, as in other places, Kant demolished the proofs for an 
existence of god, arguing that being was not a real predicate. Heidegger draws a 
conclusion from this wholly in keeping with his wider interpretation: "Being, as 
being possible, being actual, being necessary, is not, to be sure, a real (ontic) 
predicate, but it is a transcendental (ontological) predicate" (GA9,294). In other 
words, in order for something to be something, it must first be. Being in general 
is the condition of possibility for being in particular. 
What is particularly important in this discussion though is that Heidegger's 
reading of the optic/ontological distinction runs almost parallel to Kant's 
discussion of synthetic a priori knowledge. The central question of the Critique 
of Pure Reason was "how are synthetic a priori judgements possible? " the 
central question of Being and Time 
_ 
could be rephrased as "how is ontological 
knowledge possible? "38 Synthetic a priori knowledge is possible on the basis of 
the original synthetic unity of the pure productive power of imagination, on the 
basis of temporality. As temporality is the basic constitution of human Dasein, 
humans have the possibility of having a pure understanding of being. The 
understanding of being in general (i. e. ontological knowledge) is possible on the 
basis of the temporality of Dasein (GA25,424-5). 
39 In Kant, as in Being and 
Time, this is a radically ahistorical question. In Nietzsche - who asks not how 
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synthetic a priori knowledge is possible, but why is it necessary (JGB 11) - and 
the later Heidegger, this question, the problem of metaphysics, or the question of 
being (GA3,249), is posed historically. 
Heidegger again explicitly distances himself from the Marburg school in his 
reading of the Transcendental Aesthetic. The prevalent interpretation, 
characterised by Natorp, is that the placing of the Transcendental Aesthetic at the 
beginning of the Critique is a "well-meant mistake", giving, as it does, priority to 
time and space over the categories. 40 Natorp wants, Heidegger suggests, to 
dissolve the Transcendental Aesthetic into the Transcendental Logic, to rethink 
time and space as categories (GA25,122). In contrast Heidegger does not wish 
to dissolve the Transcendental Logic into the Transcendental Aesthetic, but to 
examine the relation between the two: something Kant was not able to do. 
Heidegger continues, pointing to his interpretation: "what the Transcendental 
Aesthetic deals with is not simply turned off in Transcendental Logic... rather, 
the Transcendental Logic takes up what the Transcendental Aesthetic deals with 
as a necessary foundation and a central clue. From a purely external perspective 
this shows itself in the fact that the time which is interpreted in the 
Transcendental Aesthetic in a preliminary fashion functions in all the crucial 
sections of the Transcendental Logic - and indeed as something fundamental" 
(GA25,79). What is central. here is that not only does Heidegger read Kant as 
providing the ontological foundation of the Transcendental Logic in the 
Transcendental Aesthetic, he sees the examination of time in the latter as the 
fundamental clue to the former. 
It is worth thinking this through in some detail. Reading the problematic of 
synthetic a priori knowledge as the question of an ontological foundation leads 
Heidegger to reinterpret the Transcendental Aesthetic in an important way. For 
Heidegger, "the `Transcendental Aesthetic' has as its task to set forth the 
ontological aicoOimc [aisthesis - perception] which makes it possible `to disclose 
a priori' the being of beings" (GA3,51). 
4' The two elements of the 
Transcendental Aesthetic, time and space, are, in Kantian terms, the principles to 
which all objects we perceive must conform. Space and time are the horizon 
within which we encounter all things: experience must take a spatio-temporal 
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form. Heidegger explains the implications of this by suggesting that the 
employment of space (and time) as pure intuition is transcendental, because 
space is understood as being constitutive for the enabling of a pure a priori 
knowledge with respect to things themselves. In this usage space is 
`transcendental', which means that it is ideal and not real. "Therefore the 
Transcendental Aesthetic investigates such intuitions which, as pure intuitions, 
first make possible the empirical intuition of what is spatially and temporally 
present-at-hand" (GA25,187-8). The transcendental makes possible the 
experience of present-at-hand objects. 
Now, for Heidegger, although Kant opens up this fundamentally important 
avenue he remains trapped in the conceptions of modern thought. Kant is, in 
certain key respects, Cartesian (GA2,24,204). Previous sections of this chapter 
have shown how Heidegger was keen for time to be thought more originally than 
as a now-point, and for space to be thought otherwise than by extension. Yet 
Kant remains-in this position. As Heidegger notes, in the Groundwork for the 
Metaphysic of * Morals Kant suggests "the idea of a twofold metaphysics: a 
metaphysics of nature and a metaphysics of morals". 42 Heidegger interprets these 
as an ontology of res extensa and an ontology of res cogitans" (GA24,1.97-8) - 
precisely the Cartesian formulation Heidegger is trying to escape, through a 
rethinking of space without a basis in. extension, and through a rethinking of 
Dasein that is not reducible to a subject (see GA20,237ff, 322). There therefore 
arises a central distinction between Heidegger's interpretation of Kant and Kant 
himself. To take the example of time, in Kant we intuit through time, in 
Heidegger temporality is the basic constitution of that which intuits (GA25,368). 
We might expect this, given the title of Being and Time, and the fact that, for 
Heidegger, `and' often functions as a copula. 43 Heidegger explains, "Dasein, 
conceived in its most extreme possibility of being, is time itself, not in time" (CT 
13-4). This is well illustrated in a remark Heidegger made in The Basic Problems 
of 'Phenomenology: "perhaps it is precisely time which is the a priori of the I 
[Ich] - time, to be sure, in a more original sense than Kant was able to conceive 
it" (GA24,206). 4` 
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In the Transcendental Aesthetic Kant discusses time and space in turn, only to 
accord priority of time over space. In Being and Time Heidegger argues that the 
"temporality of being-in-the-world thus emerges, and it turns out, at the same 
time, to be the foundation for the specific spatiality of Dasein" (GA2,335). To 
what extent are these two positions linked? In the Critique, Kant argues that 
space is the formal condition of the physical. In order to encounter beings other 
than ourselves, we must have outer intuition = an experience of the outside. 
Therefore space is the pure form of outer intuition. However, in order to 
experience the outside, we must first be able to experience: we must be able to be 
self-aware. Self-awareness is in no way spatial, for Kant, but is rather a sequence 
of states - representations, volitions and moods. This shows that time is crucial, 
and time is both the formal condition of the psychical, and the pure form of inner 
intuition. Kant continues from this that "time is the formal a priori condition of 
all appearances whatsoever". 45 It follows from this, Heidegger suggests, that 
"time has a pre-eminence over space" (GA3,48-9; GA25,145ff). 
As Heidegger recognises, it is not immediately apparent why this should be so. 
As he nötes, "already in the Transcendental Aesthetic there comes to light a 
peculiar priority of time over space. And in subsequent and more decisive 
sections of the Critique time emerges again and again at the centre piece of the 
transcendental, via. ontological, problematic" (GA25,111-2). Heidegger reads 
this problematic in a way that certainly furthers his own project, if not Kant 
scholarship generally. Time is not a feature of physical objects in an immediate 
sense, but when represented to us, they become temporal in a mediated way. 
Because then both the external world and the internal world are dependent on the 
temporality of the perceiver, time is the formal condition of outer, spatial 
46 appearances, and therefore has priority over space (GA25,148). 
This hierarchical ranking is continued throughout Heidegger's early work. We 
can now perhaps understand Heidegger's suggestion that "Dasein's spatiality is 
`embraced' by temporality in the sense of being existentially founded upon it... 
[but this] is also different from the priority of time over space in Kant's sense" 
(GA2,367). For Kant time has priority over space as it is the formal requirement 
for the experience of all objects; for Heidegger temporality is the basic 
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constitution of Dasein and therefore spatiality is founded upon it. Heidegger 
claims that this does not mean that space is deduced from, or dissolved into, time 
(GA2,367). Whilst this is perhaps in itself true, it is not revealed in Being and 
Time how this is the case. 47 Indeed, Heidegger suggests in History of the Concept l 'J 
of 'Time that he has thought the notions of de-distancing, region and orientation in 
a way that suffices "in relation to what we need for time and the analysis of time" 
(GA20,322). It is possible that had Heidegger been more interested in space 
itself in his early career, he would have made good this claim. However, on the 
evidence of his early work, Heidegger has perpetuated the primacy of time over 
Space found in, amongst others, Kant, 
49 It is worth noting that the section this 
claim is made in is one that Heidegger would refute in later life (see ZSD 24; TB 
23) -a point discussed in Chapter Four - and that in several places in Being and 
Time Heidegger warns against founding time on space, even when it appears that 
time is measured by movement in space, by, for example, observation of the sun 
or shadow clocks (GA2,412ff; see CT 18). 
Throughout his early work, Heidegger uses the notion of time as the point of 
departure for his analyses. In Being and Time, for example, the analyses of 
being-toward-death, the attunement Angst, falling prey, understanding and 
discourse are fundamentally temporal analyses (see GA2-, 335ff). In the 1929/30 
lecture course The Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics, where Heidegger 
provides an analysis of the fundamental attunement of boredom, this too takes its 
departure from an analysis of time. This is perhaps not surprising given that the 
German word for boredom is T. ang"; eile, which literally means `long-while' 
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Whilst rwould not wish to suggest that these analyses should have been made 
from the point of view of space, it is notable that Heidegger continually 
concentrates on the temporality of Dasein 
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It is also worth noting, though there are exceptions, that Being and Time is 
concerned almost exclusively with Dasein, and moreover Dasein as an ahistorical 
idea. In his later works Heidegger encompasses other areas and realises the 
history of being. It is in these works particularly that are central to understanding 
Foucault. Glimpses of his later work can be seen in his thoughts on the duality of 
the situation and the moment, and the hint that they may be linked to the study of 
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history. However, in his thoughts on the spatiality of equipment, Heidegger does 
set up some important distinctions, specifically with the Cartesian notion of 
space. Descartes' view of space was that it should be seen as mathematical, 
geometric, viewed in terms of spatial location, measurable by co-ordinates. On 
the other hand, Heidegger realises that for the living of space - space as actually 
experienced - notions of near/far or close/distant are more practical and better 
reflect life. 3' However, Heiideguver's neglect of the important question of the body 
is well known: another point he aims to address later in his work. '` 
Towards Hölderlin and Nietzsche 
Being and Time is still the foundation of Heidegger's entire oeuvre, though it is 
but a fragment of the intended whole, and is, as even Heidegger would come to 
accept, radically flawed in certain respects. One of the missing divisions was 
entitled "Time and Being", and was intended to discuss time in relation to being 
as a whole, not simply to Dasein. Villela Petit has even suggested that this 
section would also have dealt with "the third term that the dyad being and time 
had, in a certain manner obscured, namely space" 53 Whatever it is certain that 
Heidegger's later writings in this area differed in certain key respects from what 
had gone before. It will be suggested that the later Heidegger, from the mid 
1930s on, is far more sympathetic in his treatment of space. For, despite his 
attempts to explain otherwise, in Being and Time Heidegger remains overtly 
Kantian in his belief in the inherent primacy of time over space. 
At the very end of the year Being and Time was published, Heidegger replied to a 
letter from Rudolf Bultmann. 
My work is directed toward a radicalisation of ancient ontology and 
at the same time toward a universal structuring of this ontology in 
relation to the region of history. The fundament of this problematic is 
developed by starting from the `subject', properly understood as the 
human Dasein, so that with the radicalising of this approach the true 
motives of German idealism may likewise come into their own. 
Augustine, Luther, Kierkegaard are philosophically essential for the 
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cultivation of a more radical understanding-of-Dasein, Dilthey for a 
radical interpretation of the `historical world', Aristotle and 
scholasticism for the strict formulation of certain ontological 
problems. All this in a methodology guided by the idea of a scientific 
philosophy as it has been grounded by Husserl, not without the 
influence of the logical investigations and philosophy of science of 
H. Rickert and E. Lask. 54 
The correspondence with Bultmann is of marginal use, as Kisiel notes, as it was a 
response to loaded questions about how an encyclopaedia article on Heidegger 
might run. What is interesting is less the choice of names - Bultmann had 
mentioned most in the original letter - than those left out: notably, contra Kisiel, 
Nietzsche. 55 In Being and Time it is notable that there are minimal references to 
Nietzsche. Compared to Kant and Aristotle, who both receive over thirty direct 
references, Nietzsche is only referred to three times, and only one of these 
references is of any substance. 56 Not mentioned at all is H6lderlin. 57 
Yet not only does Heidegger turn to Nietzsche and Hölderlin in such detail - six 
courses on the thinker, three courses on the poet, and one entitled "Thinking and 
Poeticising" - but most of the thinkers seemingly so influential in the years 
leading up to Being and Time are rarely discussed-after it. After the summer 
semester 1931 Aristotle is never the subject of a course again, there are no more 
courses on religion, and Heidegger ceases to describe himself as a 
phenomenologist. 58 There is only one course on Kant, Die Frage nach dem Ding. 
Instead the principal thinkers Heidegger discusses - other than Nietzsche and 
Hölderlin - are the pre-Socratics - Anaximander, Parmenides and Heraclitus. In 
terms of the themes so far discussed, it is only when Heidegger devotes several 
years to reading, thinking and writing about Nietzsche and Hölderlin that his 
thoughts develop and clarify. Crucially the ontology is no longer universal in 
relation to the region of history, but is itself historicised as a historical ontology. 
This means that the de-struction [Destruktion] of the tradition is no longer 
pursued with temporality as the clue - which implicitly allowed the 
predominance of time over space - but historically, which allows for a 
fundamental rethinking of the time/space, or time/place, relation. 59 
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Chapter Three 
In the Shadow of Nazism: 
Reading Hölderlin and Nietzsche 
Einführung: Introduction 
The 1930s are the years where Heidegger's life and thought are most radically 
altered. They see his turn [Kehre] around from the published Being and Time;! 
the beginning of his lengthy encounters with Nietzsche and the poet Hölderlin; 
several important lecture courses and texts - some of which have only been 
recently published - and, certainly not least, his involvement with the Nazi 
movement. Heidegger became Rector of Freiburg University in April 1933, and 
resigned in early 1934. The facts of his tenure are now relatively well known (he 
himself called it his "greatest het of stupidity" [die grösste Dummheit]? l, and in 
the last few years have occasioned a number of articles and books detailing the 
case against him. 3 The "Heidegger controversy" has ýmetime been used as a 
way of avoiding the difficult and important task of engaging with Heidegger. 
This is not to absolve Heidegger from blame, nor to suggest that his thought and 
his practice are sufficiently divorced that we can condemn the man and applaud 
his writings; far from it. As Janicaud suggests, to maintain our previous faith and 
admiration, on the one hand, or to dismiss Heidegger out of hand are false 
options. What must be done is to examine how the political intrudes in the 
4 thought. - 
For the purpose here, it is most important to see how Heidegger-'s political. 
thought relates to his ideas of history, and centrally, space. It has been suggested 
in the previous chapter that Heidegger's attitudes to space in Being and Time 
undergo a fundamental change in his later thought. In situating that change it 
must be ascertained whether the change is in tandem with his political thought, 
entirely divorced from it, or a reaction to it. The place to begin would appear to 
be the 1935 lecture course An Introduction to Metaphysics. Three initial themes 
present themselves for consideration within this course: Heidegger's reaction to 
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the use and abuse of Nietzsche at the time of the lectures, and to Nazi philosophy 
as a whole; the importance of the historical to the study of being, and not merely 
as a part within it; and the increasing importance of early Greek thought, with the 
implications this has for the understanding of space. I shall briefly sketch out the 
issues involved in each of these, before moving on to the central task of the 
chapter, Heidegger's readings of Hölderlin and Nietzsche. 
It is within this course that Heidegger first starts to engage with Nietzsche's 
thought at length. Heidegger was at this time following a common trend, as the 
philosopher of the "superman" and the will to power appeared, on a cursory 
reading, to lend himself ideally to the National Socialist movement. ' Heidegger 
was desperately keen to avoid being seen as part of the same trend. Indeed as 
shall be seen, he would later claim that his work on Nietzsche was a 
confrontation with Nazism. Nietzsche was, for Heidegger, able to withstand the 
pressures of poor interpretation: "Even now [in 1935] this philosophy holds its 
ground against all the crude importunities of the scribblers who cluster round him 
more numerous with each passing day. And so far there seems to be no end in 
sight to this abuse of Nietzsche's work. In speaking here of Nietzsche, we mean 
to have nothing to do with all that... " (GA40,39; IM 36). This was written 
barely a year after Heidegger's attempt to den Führer -u führen - to lead the - 
leader, to head the philosophical movement heading National Socialism - had 
collapsed with his resignation as Rector. 6 We are surely not mistaken if we note 
the German title of this course - Einführung in die Metaphysik - certainly a 
leading into metaphysics, but is it a leading from National Socialism or to its true 
heart? 7 
Heidegger's own answer would appear to lie in the words that he speaks towards 
the end of the lecture course: "The works that are being peddled about nowadays 
.s the philosophy of 
National Socialism but have nothing whatever to do with the 
inner truth and greatness of this movement (namely the encounter between global 
technology and modern man) - have all been written by men fishing in the 
troubled waters of `values' and `totalities"' (GA40,208; IM 199). It would seem 
that Heidegger is claiming that Nazi philosophy is not merely flawed, but has 
gone away from the true core of what, he believes, the movement should be 
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about. Perhaps this is merely Heidegger's Angst at losing out in the battle for 
intellectual supremacy, or perhaps he genuinely believed that a movement was 
needed that would confront the problems and possibilities of the -encounter 
between global technology and modern man". To claim that the remainder of 
Heidegger's work is an examination of this encounter would not be an inaccurate 
description. On the other hand, this quotation is seized upon by some 
commentators because, if we follow i ieidegger's note (GA40, XI; EM xi), we see 
that "matter in parentheses was written while i was reworking the text". it is only 
later (and not in 1935) that Heidegger clarifies what he means or, to put it less 
kindly, explains an incriminating remark. ' If one thing counts more against 
ieidegger 
i than his aciiun`J 173J-3-t, IL i ills 
lies, ova evasions and icwiviusuu vi LiiS 
own history after that date. 
In An Introduction to Metaphysics there is the first clearly evident use of the 
historical approach I. have argued is implicit in Being and I ime. whereas there 
history was a structure of Dasein, one that could be examined ontologically, now 
the question of being is itself historicised, becoming the history of being, or a 
historical ontology. National socialism has proved to be not the solution to the 
problems facing man, but rather their culmination. 1 ne problematic of nihilism 
manifests itself with increasing clarity under the political corm or fascism" (HC 
65; see GA0.2,33n). flow did this happen"! AS Heiäegger states, we maintain 
that this preliminary question [about being] and with it the fundamental question 
of metaphysics are historical questions through and through" (GA40,40; iM 43). 
He then suggests that even men's relation to history is itself historical: an 
example of the historicising of the (in Being and Time) ahistorical structures of 
Dasein. With his regular references to the etymology of Key terms, the historical 
references to the Greek beginnings, and the more oblique allusions to tracing- a 
path of thought, Heidegger allows this historicising to pervade this and 
practically all future work. Once again there is a reference to the concurrent 
nature of the dimensions of time, joining together in the study of history: 
"History as happening [Geschichte als Geschelen] is an acting and being acted 
upon which pass through the present, which are determined from out of the 
future, and which take over the past" (GA4O, 48; IM 44). The importance of the 
historical for Heidegger's purpose is shown when he sets out his aim of the 
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present study: "1. The determination of the essence of man is never an answer 
but essentially a question... 2. The asking of this question is historical in the 
fundamental sense that this questioning first creates history" (GA40,149-52; IM 
140-3 ). 9 
In Being and Time Heidegger argues for the importance of presence. In this later 
work he sets up an opposition between being as presence and being as substance. 
The former is, he argues, the correct understanding of the Greek napouma, 
which is usually translated as the latter. The German word for presence, An- 
wesen, "also designates an estate or homestead " (GA40; 65; TM 61_ ). 10 What we 
have here is another break with the Cartesian and indeed the modem tradition. 
Heidegger consistently argues that the translation of Greek thought into Latin has 
had serious consequences for the understanding of what the ancients intended 
(for example GA40,15-6; IM 13; GAS, 13; BW, 149; VA 50ff; QCT 165ff; 
GAS, 303; EGT 19). 11 Most European languages are, because of their descent 
from Latin, inextricably linked to this misunderstanding, which has coloured the 
entirety of modem philosophy. German, because of its non-Latinate roots, is 
however perhaps able to avoid the problems that other languages fall into, 
Heidegger believes it to be, along with the Greek, "at once the most powerful and 
spiritual of all languages" (GA40,61; IM 57). Heidegger even argues that "in the 
-Greek language what is said is at the same time in an excellent way what it is 
called", alone among languages it is ?. 'yoq (WiP, 44/5; GAS, 313; EGT 28). 
Throughout much of his later work, Heidegger will go back to original texts, 
often dispensing with-accepted translations, seeking to think back to the Greek 
terms, and to provide more "accurate" renditions. 
There are two interesting discussions related to this point in An Introduction to 
Metaphysics. In the first, Heidegger argues, through an examination of Plato's 
Timaeus, that there has been a fundamental shift in notions of spatial location and 
place. Heidegger begins by suggesting that "the Greeks had no word for `space'. 
This is no accident; for they experienced the spatial on the basis not of extension 
but of place [Ort] (tong); '' they experienced it as x6pa, which signifies neither 
place nor space but that which is occupied by what stands there" (GA40,71; IM 
66). 13 The whole Cartesian approach to space is founded upon this notion of 
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bodies extended in space, but Heidegger here suggests that this concept was not 
found in early Greek thought: rather there was a conception of space that is far 
closer to the notions Heidegger suggested in Being and Time. The Greek 
understanding of place is far closer to experiential than mathematical. Heidegger 
goes on to suggest that the shift from zonoc and xcpa to a `space' [Raum] 
defined by extension was initiated by Platonic philosophy, because of its 
interpretation of being as iSEa (GA40,71; IM 66; see GA55,335-6; WhD 174; 
WCT 227). 14 
The second important discussion of place occurs later, this time in an analysis of 
Sophocles' Antigone. Heidegger focuses particularly on line 370, "vyiino?, 
änokiS", a line which hinges on the Greek word 7t0Aic, which is translated in a 
standard English version as "city". 15 Heidegger suggests that this does not 
capture the full meaning: 'TI ktq means, rather, the site [die Stätte], the there 
[Da], wherein and as which historical Da-sein is. The noktq is the historical site 
[Geschichtsstätte], the there in which, out of which, and for which history 
happens [Geschichte geschieht]" (GA40,161; IM 151-2). These brief remarks 
are greatly developed in courses on Hölderlin and Parmenides, and are discussed 
at length in Chapter Four. 
This brief outline of this lecture course has therefore introduced us to several 
themes that will be important in our understanding of Heidegger's later work. It 
has especially highlighted four important things: Heidegger's disenchantment 
with Nazism; his wish to save Nietzsche from his interpretation at the hands of 
this movement, in order to prepare the ground for his own reading of him; his 
growing understanding of the importance of the historical approach he had 
developed for understanding Dasein's historicity to his actual project; and a 
return to early Greek thought in order to see how and where things and ideas 
have changed. It is in this Greek thought that Heidegger finds much that supports 
the way he wishes to go forward. For my purposes this is especially true 
concerning place/space, and this important notion of "historical site". He is not 
alone in this. Two fundamentally important figures paved the way. As Heidegger 
himself says, Nietzsche "understood the great time of the beginning of the entire 
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Greek Dasein in a way that was surpassed only by Hölderlin" (GA40,135; IM 
126). 
I Höiderlin 
In Heidegger's lifetime, the principle source for his reading of Hölderlin was the 
book Erläuterungen --u Hölderl ins Dichtung [Commentaries on Hölderl in 's 
Poetry]'6 which was continually updated to include new pieces on the poet. 
Other essays appeared in the collections Holcwege, Vorträge und Aufsage, and 
Unterwegs. rur Sprache. Heidegger also delivered three courses on Hölderlin at 
the University of Freiburg which have appeared in the Gesamtausgabe 
posthumously. The first, given in the Winter Semester of 1934-35 was dedicated 
to the hymns `Germania' and `The Rhine'; the second, given in the Winter 
Semester of 1941-42, looked at the `Remembrance' hymn; and the final course, 
given in the -Summer Semester of 1942, examined `The Ister' hymn and 
Sophocles' Antigone, 17 
A number of important aspects of Heidegger's work become much clearer in the 
light of this reading, though the emphasis here is largely on the issue of space, or 
rather place. ' 8 Heidegger describes his Commentaries as having their place in the 
dialogue between thought [Denken] and poetry [Dichten] (GA4,7). As is evident 
from his later work, he sees thought and poetry, thinkers and poets, as having a 
close and special relationship. Though Heidegger discusses other poets - George, 
Rilke, Trakl, Hebel - Hölderlin is the only one he treats at such length, and the 
one he certainly takes the most interest in. ' 9 
It would be amiss to neglect the political context of these lectures. It is notable 
that the lecture courses given between the summer semester of 1932 and the 
summer semester of 1934 have not yet appeared in the Gesamtausgabe, 
20 so 
Hölderlins Hymnen 'Germania' und `Der Rhein' is the first course delivered 
after the Rectorship that is available. All of the Hölderlin lectures post-date the 
explicit political career, but they are all written by a card-carrying Nazi, as he 
remained in the party until 1945. Various links become evident: the visit to Karl 
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Löwith in Italy in 1936 was to deliver the lecture `Hölderlin and the Essence of 
Poetry', found in Commentaries, and criticised in the Hitler Youth magazine 
Wille und Macht [Will and Power]. 21 As Löwith remarked to Karl Jaspers, "what 
the essential nature of this poetry has to do with the swastika is hard to see". It 
seems that Löwith felt there was nothing in common, but on this trip Heidegger 
famously wore a swastika badge. 22 We should also note that the publication of 
the first edition of Commentaries came on the heels of the publication of an 
NSDAP edition of Hölderlin for the troops on the front. Similarly Heidegger's 
final lecture as full professor in 1945 - before his ban from teaching under the 
Denazification laws - was on Hölderlin. 
23 Remarks in the lectures on Hölderlin 
regularly mention the wider political events in Germany and the world. In these 
texts we must hear the distant roar of battle; we are forced to confront the 
political in the thought. 
The Germania and Rhine hymns 
Heidegger's first course looks at the hymn `Germania', and, in its second half, 
`The Rhine', one of Hölderlin's many hymns to rivers. Though Heidegger 
considers Hölderlin's poetry, he does not simply see him as a poet. Indeed he 
suggests that he "is one of our greatest, one of the most rich prospects as thinker, 
because he is our greatest poet" (GA39,6). The engagement with the poetry 
opens up many avenues of thought. Right from the beginning of the course it is 
clear that Heidegger sees in Hölderlin an understanding of being that avoids 
many of the modern pitfalls. 
One considers Hölderlin `historiographically' and one is unaware 
of -vvhat is essential, the fact that his work - which has not yet 
found its time-space - has already overcome our historiographical 
fuss [historisches Getue] and has founded the beginning of an- 
other history [Geschichte], that history which starts with the 
struggle [Kampf] deciding the arrival or flight of the gods (GA39, 
1). 
This is, of course, the distinction suggested in Being and Time between history 
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[Geschichte] and historiography [Historie], parallel to that between experiential 
and clock-time. This is regularly emphasised in Heidegger's reading of 
Hölderlin. Heidegger argues that the standard understandings of time are totally 
insufficient for mastering the poetically thought experience of time in Hölderlin 
(GA39,55ff). Such a critique is made clearer in the 1939 lecture on the poem 
"As on a holiday... " Here, Heidegger focuses on the first line of the third strophe 
- "But now day breaks! [. Je: t aber tagts! ]". 24 He suggests that the `Now' is 
clearly Hölderlin's time, but that it needs to be understood in a different way to 
standard understandings of time: "Such a time can never be dated, and is never 
measurable in numbers of years or the division of centuries". This time is 
historical not historiographical (GA4,75-6). 2' 
`Germania' is a hymn to the German homeland - Heidegger's discussion 
therefore also looks at the spatial aspects of the poetry. Here too he finds the 
problem of relying on the modem understanding, in this case geography: "the 
earth of the homeland is not simply a space delimited by exterior frontiers, a 
natural region, a locality [Örtlichkeit] destined to be a scene for this and that to 
take place. The earth which is the homeland is readied for the gods" (GA39, 
104). Later Heidegger warns against allowing this space to be thought of as a 
storeroom [Abstellraum] -(GA39,108). What Heidegger is suggesting is that 
Hölderlin's poetry; and his conception of historical time and of the homeland are 
more poetic, more experiential, than those of modem metaphysics. This can be 
designated the lived: "The poet moulds something... which is `lived' [erlebt] in 
his interior and exterior world, a so-called `Experience' [Erlebnis]" (GA39,26). 
However, the attitude of Being and Time remains, as the passages on space are 
relatively rare, and the spatial characteristics of the homeland are not considered 
as important as those on historical fate [Geschick]. Time and space need to be 
thought differently, and there is a linking of these two characteristics - "neither 
place spatially [Ort räumlich] nor time temporally [Zeit seitlich] understood in 
the habitual sense" (GA39,141) - but the hierarchical ranking still remains. 
Indeed, at one point Heidegger shows that he has not departed from the attitude 
of Being and Time, citing §§65ff as his exposure of the essential constitution of 
originary temporality (GA-3 39,109). 
60 
Such an attitude is, to an extent, amended in the second part of the course. 
26 To 
make the transition, Heidegger asks what Hölderlin means by the "waters of my 
homeland" in line four of the `Germania' hymn. He suggests that ordinary poets 
sing of forests and meadows, streams and shrubs, mountains and sky. Why then 
does Hölderlin's late poetry speak so often of rivers - `At the source of the 
Danube', `The Rhine', `The Ister', etc? 27 These poems, suggests Heidegger, have 
an intimate relationship with the `Germania' hymn (GA39,90-1). It is for this 
reason that this course moves from a consideration of the `Germania' hymn to 
`The Rhine'. The first is the general topic, the second a particular aspect of it 
(GA39,137-8). This leaves us in no doubt that the later lectures on `The Ister' 
also fall within this general project. 
In the first part of the course Heidegger had quoted a couple of lines from 
Hölderlin, lines he would continue to quote throughout his entire engagement 
with the poet. 28 The lines come from a poem known by its first line, `In lovely 
blueness... ' 
Voll Verdienst, doch dichterisch, wohnet der Mensch auf dieser 
Erde. 
Full of acquirements, but poetically, man dwells on this earth. 29 - 
These lines pinpoint the entire project at stake here. Heidegger suggests that the 
opening words mean that "what man works at and pursues, is through his own 
endeavours earned and deserved". The line hinges on the next word: "`But' - 
says Holderlin in sharp antithesis - all this does not touch the essence of his 
dwelling on the earth, all this does not reach the foundation of human existence: 
The latter is fundamentally 'poetic'... To `dwell poetically' means: to stand in 
the presence of the gods and to be involved in the proximity of the essence of 
things" (GA4,42; EB 306). Therefore, as Bernstein has noted, in Hölderlin 
Heidegger finds "a contrast between a dwelling place and an abstract space". 30 
Space is characterised as Cartesian; place as experiential, lived: it is to be 
understood poetically. 
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In `The Rhine' hymn, Heidegger immediately notices that the first strophe of the 
poem indicates a place, rather than a time (GA39,167-8). This seems to 
prefigure an increased stress on the spatial, or rather the platial. In these works 
Heidegger tends to use the word Ort and its compounds örtlich, Ortschaft and 
Örtlichkeit. Ort had been rarely used in Being and Time, where Raum [space] 
and Platz [place] had been used instead. Such a change seems to be initiated in 
the lectures on Hölderlin, where Heidegger seems to designate `space' as 
conforming to Cartesian notions, and to replace it with a more originary 
understanding of 'place'. 31 In Being and Time, as noted in the previous chapter, 
the remarks on place were largely confined to the place of equipment, for which 
the word Platz is appropriate; when the discussion has moved onto the place of 
humans, the word Ort is used. Ort can be variously translated as `place' or 
`locale'; its compounds usually as `local' or `locality'. There is something to be 
said for working with `place' and `placing', coining the neologism `platial' to 
reflect its use in adjectival forms. This is perhaps particularly apt given the Latin 
roots of `local', but the Greek roots of `place'. Local also gives rise to the 
misunderstanding that the term is about scale. 
The rivers in Hölderlin's poems do not simply have their own place, but also 
-make the places around them. We must not think of the rivers as symbols or 
images for something else, "they are themselves in question, and with them the 
earth of the homeland [die heimatliche Erde]" (GA39,195). This shows the link 
between `Germania' and the river poetry. In Heidegger's reading of Hölderlin, 
"the river... founds the country [das Land] as a country, the homeland for the 
people" (GA39,259). The links between the founding power of the river, the 
spatial characteristics it delivers and the notion of poetic dwelling are well 
illustrated in the following passage: 
The river now founds [schafft jetzt] in the country a characterised 
space [geprägten Raum] and a delimited place [Ort] of settlement, 
of communication, [giving] to the people a developable 
[bebaubares] country which guarantees their immediate Dasein. 
The river [Der Strom] is not a watercourse [ein Gewässer] which 
passes by the place of men, it is its streaming [Strömen], as 
62 
country-developing [als landbildendes], which founds the 
possibility of establishing the dwelling of men (GA39,264). 
It was seen in the earlier part of the course that Heidegger found problems with 
the standard modern understandings of time and space. In the second part of the 
course, and in a later essay, he elaborates this in more detail. It is well known 
that Heidegger felt that the pre-Socratics had understood being in a more 
fundamental way, and he sees Nietzsche and Hölderlin as being two thinkers 
who paved the way for this recognition (see GA40,135; IM 126; and GA39, 
269). A particular example of this affinity comes when Heidegger discusses 
Hölderlin's use of the word `nature' [Natur]. Both English and German come 
from the Latin natura, which is in Greek cpvrnr. Heidegger suggests that the 
translation of cpvß by natura immediately transfers in later elements and 
replaces the originary meaning with something alien (GA40,15-6; IM 13-4). 
"(Dvaig, $Elv signifies growth [Wachsturm]... Hölderlin's word `nature' 
poetises its essence from the basis of the truth reserved for the initial word: 
32 cpvmg... In the word `nature', Hölderlin poetises the other... " (GA4,56-7). 
In this criticism of the modem view of nature, Heidegger is laying the foundation 
for his later questioning of modern technology. He suggests that because the 
"metaphysical sense of nature, natura, cpvmS, in the originary nominative force 
of the word [in der uranfänglichen Nennkraft des Wortes], is already an essential 
[wesentliche] interpretation of being, it has little to do with the sciences of 
nature" (GA39,195). This is an example of how his later thought recognises the 
historical aspects of the question of being. Rather than the attitude of Being and 
Time, which tended to set universal conditions, the later works realise that this is 
a historical problem. We must therefore leave behind the standard 
representations of nature: "Earth and homeland are understood in a historical 
sense. The river is historic" (GA39,196). 
It must be remembered that this is a course delivered only a few months after 
Heidegger had resigned as Rector. Throughout the course there is a stress on the 
national character and words that cannot fail to carry political overtones in mid 
1930s Germany - people [Volk], homeland, soil [Boden], earth. That said, 
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towards the end of the course he criticises the "contemporary snivelling about 
national character, blood and soil" (GA39,254). 33 The tension in the course is 
illustrated in the conclusion to a 1939 lecture: "Hölderlin's word calls the Holy 
and also names a unique time-space [Zeit-Raum]... This word, is, however, still 
unheard, and is stored in the Western German language" (GA4,77). Here we 
have a statement both of the philosophical project - the possibility of a different 
understanding of time and space - and of its potential political overtones - the 
uniqueness of the German. If the Rectorship address was a politicising of the 
philosophy of Being and Time, in these lectures we find a philosophising of the 
Rectorship's politics. In particular, Dasein is now taken to refer to a Volk, rather 
than an individual (GA39,8; see SdU; HC). 
Heidegger cannot fail to realise that the political situation he was lecturing within 
- even without his own political involvement - charges the language he uses. For 
someone -so attentive to the use of particular words it defies belief that he was not 
aware of this. His remembrance of Norbert von Hellingrath, editor of Hölderlin's 
works, who fell at the age of 28 at Verdun in 1916 (GA39,9) has noticeable 
echoes of the praise of the war-dead found in mainstream Nazi discourse. 34 His 
evocation of Hölderlin as "the poet of the poet and of poetry" and "the poet of 
the Germans" (GA39,214), even when he suggests that the latter should be 
understood "not as subjective genitive, but as objective genitive: the poet who 
has poetised the Germans" (GA39,220), 35 is understood as a political project: to 
make Holderlin a "power in the history of our people [die Macht in der 
Geschichte unseres Volkes]" (GA39,214). In the discussion of the `Germania' 
hymn poet and thinker are joined by State-Creator as the three creative forms of 
the historical Dasein of a people (GA39,51; 144). 36 These cannot fail to stress 
the nationalist and political overtones of the course. 
However uncomfortable Heidegger's nationalism is, he does engage in criticism 
of the uses it is being put to in contemporary interpretations of Hölderlin. 
Hölderlin himself was made, like Nietzsche, part of the mythologised pantheon 
of Nazism. In his work was found elements of the leadership principle, division 
of the German race from others and recurrent references to the fatherland. 
However, as Megill notes, Heidegger "did not take up this aspect of the 
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Hölderlin myth: his attachment was not to the mighty fatherland but to the more 
intimate and personal native region, not to the Vaterland, but the Heimat [home, 
homeland]. Instead he emphasises the notion of Hölderlin as seer and prophet". 37 
Heidegger suggests that the `patriotic' element [das Vaterländische] is that which 
is emphasised, but argues that this is one strand [Inhalt] among others, and that 
the praise of Greece and the apparent censure of the German could equally be 
emphasised (GA39,224). He is unequivocal in his critique of the racist, 
biologising aspects attached to contemporary German nationalism. Heidegger's 
nationalism is cultural and linguistic, praising the landscape of the Black Forest 
and the poetry of Hölderlin; it is not the same as the race-based nationalism of 
Alfred Rosenberg. This trades on Heidegger's important lectures on biology in 
1929/30, published as The Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics. This lecture 
course shows that accusations of vitalism, biologism and scientific racism cannot 
be applied to Heidegger. In the Hölderlin course, Heidegger quotes 
Kolbenheyer's 1932 pronouncement that "poetry is a necessary biological 
function of the people", 38 and sarcastically remarks that "the same observation is 
as true for digestion: that too is a necessary biological function" (GA39,27). 39 
Heidegger's failure as Rector seems to be attributed not to an error of his 
judgement, but to a failure on the part of the movement as a whole. Heidegger 
sees his Hölderlin and Nietzsche lectures as a "confrontation with National 
Socialism". 40 It is worth making two remarks on this. First, the word Heidegger 
uses for confrontation is Auseinandersetzung, which is literally Aus-einander- 
set. rung, a setting apart from one another. 
41 Second, the decisive political 
situation still exists, yet Heidegger thinks the movement misguided as to its true 
aims: the reassertion of the national and cultural aspects; the confrontation with 
global technology (GA40,208; IM 199). Heidegger's letter to the Academic 
Rectorate of Albert-Ludwig University is useful here: "I thought that Hitler, after 
taking responsibility in 1933 for the whole people, would venture to extricate 
himself from the Party and its doctrine... This conviction was an error that I 
recognised from the events of 30 June 1934 [the Night of the Long Knives]. I, of 
course, had intervened in 1933 to say yes to the national and the social... the 
social and the national, as I saw them, were not essentially tied to a biologist and 
racist ideology". 42 Heidegger however, ends this course with a dangerously 
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prophetic call to arms: "The hour of our history has struck" (GA39,294). 43 
The Ister hymn 
It was to be six years before Heidegger returned to lecturing on Hölderlin. But, as 
we have seen, he wrote a number of shorter essays, some of which were 
published in the intervening years. Other courses, notably An Introduction to 
Metaphysics, and the Nietzsche courses discussed in the next section, furthered 
the overall project at stake here: more so than the second course on the poet, 
which discussed the `Remembrance' hymn (GA52). The third course, however, 
both broadens and deepens the understanding developed in the first. In this 
course Heidegger again looks at a `river hymn', one that Hölderlin himself never 
published, that was given the title `The Ister' (the Danube [die Donau]) by von 
Hellingrath (GA53,2). `The Ister' begins with what Heidegger describes as a 
calling [ein Rufen]: "Now come, fire! " (GA53,5). Once again Heidegger 
suggests that Hölderlin's `Now' cannot be grasped `historiographically' and that 
it cannot be related to historical dates of well-known historical events: "No 
calendrical date can be given for the `Now' of his poetry". However, though the 
poem begins with a `Now', in line 15 there also follows the naming of a 'Here'- 
"Here, however, we-wish to build" (GA53,8-9). 
Before I examine the way in which the `Now' and the `Here' work together, 
which is an important element of this course, it is worth devoting a little more 
space to the discussion of place, an understanding that is enriched here. From 
both `The Rhine' hymn, and now from `The Ister' hymn, Heidegger suggests that 
we learn that "the rivers are a distinctive and significant place [Ort] at which 
humans [der Mensch], though not only humans, find their dwelling place 
[Wohnstatt]" (GA53,12). The river determines the dwelling place of humans 
upon the earth, but this dwelling is not to be understood as the possession of 
accommodation and housing. Whilst such things are indeed dwelling, they do not 
fulfil or ground its essence: "Dwelling takes on an abode and is an abiding in 
such an abode, specifically that of humans upon this earth". The crucial thing 
pertaining to the abode is its place, and the placing of the place [die Ortschaft des 
Ortes]. Therefore, "the river `is' the placing that pervades the abode of humans 
66 
upon the earth, determines them to where they belong and where they are homely 
[heimish]" (GA53,23). As Heidegger later notes, "the river does not merely 
grant the place [Ort], in the sense of the mere place [bloßen Plates], that is 
occupied by humans in their dwelling. The place is intrinsic to the river itself 
The river itself dwells" (GA53,41). 
Heidegger suggests that Hölderlin's other poetry emphasises the `Now', a 
moment [Augenblick], but that in this poem "equal intonation" is given to the 
`Here'. Slightly further on he suggests that the river "abandons the Now", by 
which he means not that space is prioritised over time, but that the time does not 
remain static, it "passes into what is bygone, or into what lies in the future" 
(GA53,16). This helps us to understand the sense of the following passage: 
The river is simultaneously vanishing and full of intimation in a 
double sense. What is proper to the river is thus the essential 
fullness of a journey. The river is a journey- in a singular and 
consummate way. We name the consummate essence of the 
journey [Wanderung] a journeying [Wanderschaft], corresponding 
to the placing [Ortschaft] of the place [Ort]. The river is the 
- journeying... Becoming homely and dwelling upon this earth are 
of an-other essence. We may approach it in giving thought to the 
essence of the rivers. The river is the place for dwelling. The river 
is the journeying of becoming homely. To put it more clearly: the 
river is that very place that is attained in and through the 
journeying (GA53,35-6). 
What is obvious here is that not only has the prioritisation of time over space 
been abandoned, but space and time - as placing and journeying - are understood 
as an "originary unity... the one belongs to the other". Journeying has resonances 
of space as well as time; place, in the sense of an abiding, is also temporal. In 
order to understand them, there is a temptation to look back to the unity of space 
and time, understood in their modern sense. It is this temptation that Heidegger 
tries to avoid. The reason for this is linked up to one of the major themes in the 
later Heidegger: the question of technology. As Heidegger suggests, "via our 
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calculations and machinery, we have such convincing power over its `spaces' 
and `times' that the space of our planet is shrinking and the annual seasons and 
years of human life are being condensed into diminutive numerical values for the 
purposes of our calculative planning far in advance" (GA53,46-7). In these 
terms, space is understood as coordinates - x, y, -- and if the spatial element is 
understood as being in motion, changing its location through time, the fourth co- 
ordinate, one-dimensional time -t- is added (GA53,47-8). These coordinates, 
which Western philosophy, modern science and technology have used to 
designate the unity of time and space, allow the exploitation of the world. They 
are considered to be so clear that to further explain them, to question them, is 
looked at as a worthless pursuit. There is therefore a great temptation to reduce 
place and journey back to this understanding. To avoid this is Heidegger's aim 
(GA53,50). 
Heidegger is not successful in this aim, but lays the foundation for one of the 
major projects of his later thought: the overcoming of metaphysics. 44 First 
Heidegger questions whether time and space are objective - gigantic containers 
in which all positions (spatial and temporal) are accommodated. If so, he asks, 
where is space - the container? And, when is time - the container? "Or is space 
itself to be found nowhere, and time itself not to be found at any time? So long as 
we continue to think space and time as appearing within a space and time, we are 
not yet thinking space itself or time itself'. Second, Heidegger asks if time and 
space are subjective. He suggests that if people fight wars over space -a 
comment than cannot fail to have resonance in 1942 with the talk of Lebensraum 
and the Russian campaign - space is unlikely to be something they subjectively 
imagine. Heidegger is therefore reluctant to see them as subjective - as 
-constructs. Time and space are something that "cannot be accommodated within 
the schema of `either objective' - `or subjective'. And in that case the unity of 
space and time cannot consist in space and time being thought together in the 
representational activity of the thinking subject either, as is the custom". 
Therefore, resorting to space and time to understand placing and journeying does 
not help, as "that which is meant to shed light here is itself obscure" (GA53,55- 
4s 6). 
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Heidegger's conclusion is that neither time or space in Hölderlin's hymnal poetry 
- which post 1799 "is not concerned with symbolic images at all" - can be 
understood by metaphysics, or by the metaphysical doctrine of art - aesthetics 
(GA53,20-1). Why then do we turn to metaphysics at all, "why are we even 
becoming involved in these representations [Vorstellungen] of space and time 
that have prevailed now for two thousand years? " The answer is that we cannot 
free ourselves overnight, and "simply because only an explicit look at the 
commonplace representations of space and time and their metaphysical (rather 
than historiographical) provenance permits us initially to become attentive to that 
other than Hölderlin poetizes. In poetizing the rivers, Hölderlin thinks his way 
into the essential realm of placing and journeying" (GA53,58). Heidegger 
concedes that Hölderlin himself never speaks of placing and journeying, but 
suggests that it could be "that the essential origin of space and time lies 
concealed in what we are attempting to think in a unitary manner in the names 
placing and journeying" (GA53,58-9)-. 
Between the spatio-temporal [raumzeitlich] grasping that extends 
toward world domination and the movement of settlement 
subservient to such domination on the one side, and humans 
coming to be at home via journeying and placing on the other, 
there presumably prevails a covert relation whose historical 
essence we do not know (GA53,60). 
The river hymns of Holderlin help in Heidegger's attempt to provide a non- 
metaphysical understanding of time-space. Time is not understood in terms of 
calendrical dates, it is understood as the passage, as the journeying of becoming 
homely. Space is not understood in terms of Cartesian co-ordinates, extension or, 
indeed, space, but in terms of locale or place. Neither of these understandings can 
truly be said to have overcome metaphysics, but the project certainly takes its 
departure from this point. 
Heidegger's reading of Hölderlin therefore opens up a number of the paths in his 
later thought. The project of overcoming metaphysics, the questioning 
concerning technology, and poetic dwelling all become clearer and more 
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developed if we follow the confrontation between thinker and poet. The later 
essays on technology suggest that man is attempting to dominate, to challenge 
nature, partly because man has lost sight of what it means to dwell poetically. 
The modern understanding of time and space is fit only for world domination. To 
find a way to overcome metaphysics is the later Heidegger's project: to avoid the 
nihilism. More broadly, Heidegger's reading of Hölderlin's poetry provides us - 
in the concepts of journey and place - with a new understanding of temporal and 
spatial relations. Geography and historiography are no use for understanding 
these concepts: they are deaf to the other than Hölderlin poetises. As Dominique 
Janicaud has noted, we need to use instead the notions of historicity and 
topology. 46 
II Nietzsche 
Heidegger's Nietzsche is pivotal in this thesis' articulation of the influence of 
these two figures on the work of Foucault. As has been seen, Nietzsche has been 
an absent presence throughout much of Heidegger's work, but it is only in the 
mid 1930s that the confrontation is drawn into the open. It is not quite right to 
suggest, as Megill does, that this confrontation is when Heidegger begins to take 
Nietzsche seri ously, 4' but it is certainly when the seriousness becomes most 
evident. My reading will therefore trace a path through what Derrida has called 
"the plenums and lacunas, projections and indentations, of a certain Heideggerian 
landscape", bearing in mind the admonition that "the arguments of Heidegger's 
grande livre [Nietzsche] are much less simple than is generally admitted". ` 8 
In 1961, Heidegger considered that his Nietzsche volumes provided a view of the 
path of thought that his work had taken from 1930 to the `Letter on Humanism' 
(1947), whereas the Commentaries on Hölderlins Poetry "shed only indirect light 
on that path" (GA6.1, xii; N I, xl). The previous section has shown how indirect 
light provides some illumination, but though since this date several other texts 
have been brought into the open, Nietzsche remains of central importance. 
Heidegger also argued that these collected texts clearly showed his own 
divergence from Nazism: "Beginning in 1936 1 embarked on a series of courses 
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and lectures on Nietzsche which lasted until 1945 and which represented... a 
declaration of spiritual resistance. In truth it is unjust to assimilate Nietzsche to 
National Socialism... "49 Perhaps it should also be asked: is it unjust to assimilate 
Nietzsche to National Socialism? Several points of reference for the discussion of 
this question can be found in Nietzsche, but space precludes a full treatment of all 
of these. As Derrida suggests, these collected lectures and texts on Nietzsche are 
"supposed to withdraw him from any biologistic, zoologistic, or vitalistic 
reappropriation. The strategy of interpretation is also a politics". 50 
The other main obstacle to any reading of this text is the common charge against 
Heidegger about his method of interpretation. Heidegger is variously accused of 
wilful misinterpretation, reading with "violence", 51 and of dealing only with 
selected texts, particularly privileging the Nachlaß material. On this last charge, 
let the following stand as an all-too-common example: "Heidegger, deliberately 
ignoring of the texts written by Nietzsche himself, chose the resulting book [from 
the collation of Nietzsche's notebooks], The Will to Power, as the primary object 
of interpretation". 52 It will be seen that these charges are themselves problematic. 
Regarding the indictment of misinterpretation, Heidegger has this to say to critics 
of his "method of exegesis": "Which interpretation is the true one, the one which 
simply takes over a perspective into which it has fallen, because this perspective, 
this line of sight, presents itself as familiar and self-evident; or the interpretation 
which questions the customary perspective from top to bottom, because 
conceivably - and indeed actually - this line of sight does not lead to what is in 
need of being seen" (GA40,184-5; IM 176). The validity or invalidity of 
Heidegger's reading will be seen throughout the discussion of this text. As a final 
point of introduction, it could also be noted that if there is violence on 
Heidegger's part in his reading of Nietzsche it would also appear that reading 
Nietzsche was an event of considerable intellectual violence to Heidegger. 
Gadamer has remarked that Heidegger used to tell people that "Nietzsche had 
destroyed him, had devastated his experience as thinker". 53 My reading of the 
Nietzsche volumes will focus on four major points - the moment, space, the 
body, power and perspectivism - and one more minor point - the reading itself 
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Returning to the Augenblick 
I suggested in the reading of Being and Time that the Nietzschean moment, 
Augenblick, was central to the fusion of the temporal, the spatial and the 
historical. In the Nietesche lectures, particularly the second lecture course - The 
Eternal Return of the Same - Heidegger elaborates and deepens his reading 
substantially. His main source for the reading is the chapter in Thus Spoke 
Zarathustra entitled "On the Vision and the Riddle". Heidegger asks, "what sort 
of vision, then, does the riddle which Zarathustra tells have? Again we must pay 
heed to the way he tells it, to the where and when and to whom, if we are to 
examine the what aright" (GA6.1,258; N II, 38). Aside from the reference to the 
importance of the temporal and spatial location of the saying, Heidegger has 
shown that the dramatic situation within the work as a whole is important. The 
riddle is told aboard ship, at sea, to the crew and two days into the voyage. 
Having set the scene, Heidegger looks at the riddle itself, where Zarathustra is 
climbing a mountain with a dwarf upon his shoulders: "In his narrative of the 
ascent two regions of an essential imagery converge - and, in fact, Nietzsche's 
transposition of thought into sensuous imagery always haunts these two realms: 
the sea and the mountain heights" (GA6.1,259; N II, 39). As Zarathustra reaches 
the top of the mountain path, the dwarf jumps from his shoulders, and he 
describes the gateway. "With the description of the image of the gateway 
Zarathustra brings the riddle to vision" (GA6.1,260; N II, 40). 
In the chapter in Thus Spoke Zarathustra it is not immediately clear why the 
dwarf has not grasped the riddle when he says "All that is straight lies... time 
itself is a circle". It appears that he has succinctly said what at this point 
Zarathustra cannot. However, Heidegger convincingly argues that the usual 
reading of Nietzsche/Zarathustra's eternal return is close to the dwarfs 
understanding - too easy, and, in essential respects, wrong. To simply look at the 
moment, the gateway, from the outside is not to understand the fundamental 
issue, which can only become clear to "one who does not remain a spectator but 
is himself the moment, performing actions directed towards the future and at the 
same time accepting and affirming the past" (GA6.1,277; N II, 56). Heidegger 
suggests that if the eternal return is thought at the basic level - that `'everything 
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, turns in a circle" then it is perhaps sheer delusion: but that this is not Nietzsche's 
lthought. He suggests that we must think the eternal return in terms of the 
moment, and in terms of overcoming nihilism (GA6.1,400, N II, 182-3). 
Whoever stands in the moment is turned both ways: for him past 
and future run up against one another. Whoever stands in the 
moment lets what runs counter to itself come to collision... But 
the dwarf keeps to the outside, perches on the periphery... That is 
what is peculiar [Eigentliche] to, and hardest to bear in, the 
doctrine of the eternal return - that eternity is in the moment, that 
the moment is not the fleeting now, not an instant rwoment] of 
time whizzing by a spectator, but the collision of future and past 
{GA6.1,277; N II, 56-7). 
0 
Now it has been seen from the understanding that Heidegger gives to Nietzsche's 
three modes of historical inquiry that the past, present. and future should not be 
seen separately; but together. It can now be seen how this links to the concept of 
the moment. The moment, Augenblick, the eye-glance, is the place, the gateway, 
where these three dimensions come together. The authentic individual performs 
actions directed toward the future but remembers the past: "We define the 
`moment' as that in which future and past affront one another, in which future 
and past are decisively accomplished and consummated by humans themselves, 
inasmuch as humans occupy the point [Stelle] of their collision and are 
themselves that collision" (GA6.1,318; N II, 98). 54 Likewise, history too must 
orientate itself toward the future with reference to the past, by becoming, just as 
the Augenblick is the authentic present, a history of the present. 
Heidegger's reading of the eternal return is perhaps the highpoint of his lectures 
on Nietzsche, but he does not fully explicate the thought of Thus Spoke 
Zarathustra. As I have tried to show in Chapter One, the eternal return is clearly, 
and importantly, spatial. There I remarked both upon the importance of the 
spatial return of the book as a whole and on the movement of the sun. Heidegger 
wholly neglects the first of these, but does show an awareness of the second. At 
one point he quotes Nietzsche: "In every ring of human existence in general there 
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is always an hour when the mightiest thought emerges... the thought of the 
eternal return of all things. It is each time, the hour of midday for humanity" , 
and then adds his own commentary: "We know what Nietzsche means by this 
word midday: the moment of the shortest shadow, when fore-noon and after- 
noon, past and future, meet in one. Their meeting-place is the moment of 
supreme unity for all temporal things in utterly magnificent transfiguration... it is 
the moment of eternity" (GA6.1,359-60; N II, 139-40). Heidegger later notes 
how the second part of Nietzsche's riddle, that of the howling dog, takes place at 
midnight - "the most remote time from midday... it is the full moon that is 
shining here; it too is a light, but a merely borrowed light, the most pallid 
reflection of actual illumination, a diaphanous ghost of light" (GA6.1,394; N II, 
177). This discussion of Heidegger's discussion closes with his recognition of the 
symbolism of the eternal return: 
The eagle soars in vast circles in the air. The circling is an image 
of eternal return... The serpent hangs suspended from the eagle, 
coiled around his throat. Again, the coils of the serpent, wound in 
rings about the eagle's throat, are symbolic of the ring of eternal 
return. Moreover, the serpent winds itself about the one who 
wends his way in great circles in the sky -a proprietary and 
essential, yet for us still obscure, tangle of coils... circling in a 
ring, coiling in a circle (GA6.1,265-6; N II, 46). 
Space and the Body 
Though there are moments of insight such as those outlined above, at other 
points Heidegger seems to neglect the importance of space within Nietzsche's 
work. Though, as argued in Chapter One, the articulation of space in Nietzsche is 
unsystematic, a detailed reading of his work provides many useful insights. That 
said, within Heidegger's Nietzsche, the anti-Cartesian project is enriched in a 
number of ways. The following passage of Heidegger's showcases the neglect: 
``Zarathustra begins the episode `On the Great Longing' with the words: `O my 
soul, I taught you to say 'Today' like `One Day' and `Formerly', I taught you to 
dance your round-dance beyond every Here and There and Yonder'. The three 
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words `Today', `One Day' and `Formerly' are capitalised and placed in quotation 
marks. They designate the fundamental features of time... `One Day' and 
`Formerly', future and past, are like 'Today'... today is like what is past and 
what is to come. All three phases of time merge in a single identity, as the same 
in one single present, a perpetual `now"' (VA 105; N II1 218). What is perhaps 
worthy of note is that Heidegger only explicates the first half of the quoted 
passage. Whilst he has made clear his reading of Nietzsche on time, why does he 
not explicitly remark on the fact that the Here, There and Yonder are the 
fundamental features of space? 
In the Nietzsche volumes Heidegger makes the link between the Cartesian view 
of space as extension, criticised, as has been shown, in Being and Time, and the 
wider Cartesian method. 
The certitude of the principle cogito sum (ego ens cogitans) 
determines the essence of all knowledge and everything 
knowable; that is, of mathesis; hence, of the mathematical... The 
mathematically accessible, what can be securely reckoned in a 
being that humans themselves are not, in lifeless nature, is 
extension (the spatial), extensio, which includes both space and 
time. Descartes, however, equates extensio and spatium. In that 
way, the nonhuman realm of finite beings, `nature', is conceived 
as res extensia. Behind this characterisation of the objectivity of 
the nature stands the principle expressed in the cogito sum: Being 
is representedness [Vorgestelltheit] (GA 6.2,145-6; N IV, 116). 
Heideger has spent a number of pages within the text criticising various aspects 
of the cogito, as did Nietzsche before him, and it appears, given the problems he 
has identified with this thought, that he wishes to discard it and its results. It has 
been shown, and it will become clearer in the discussion of later essays, that 
Heidegger wishes to respond to space experientially rather than geometrically. 
Undermining the cogito ergo sum and with it the opposition between res cogitans 
and res extensia clearly furthers this purpose. Moreover, Heidegger continues to 
suggest that though interpreting nature as res extensia is one-sided and 
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unsatisfactory, when thought and measured metaphysically "it is the first resolute 
step through which modern machine technology, and along with it the modern 
world and modern mankind, become metaphysically possible for the first time". 
Now Heidegger's meditations on technology will show the enormous problems 
with this, but Nietzsche (and one is tempted to insert, for different reasons, 
Nazism) is not a solution but a continuation of this, for only the Over-man 
[Übermensch] is "appropriate to an absolute `machine economy"' (GA6.2,146; 
N IV5 116-7; see GA54,66-7.55 
Abandoning the geometric, the Cartesian, does not resign us to disorder, or to 
chaos. In a discussion of Nietzsche on schematising a chaos, Heidegger gives the 
following practical example: "If we simply look around, knowingly, here, in the 
lecture hall, on the street, in the forest, and elsewhere, do we, knowing and 
taking notice, encounter `chaos'? Do we not rather find an ordered, articulated 
region out of which objects that pertain to one another stand over against us in a 
surveyable, handy, available and measurable way? " Heidegger continues to 
suggest, through reading Nietzsche on this point, that our "regulating forms are 
imposed... by our `practical needs'. Thus practical behaviour, the praxis of life, 
not `theoretical' re-presentation is the attitude from which the knowing mode of 
behaviour arises and is determined" (GA6.1,501; N III, ? 2). Now this may help 
to make clear a remark Heidegger made in the previous lecture course: "Space is 
therefore an imaginary, imaginative bit of imagery, formed by force and the 
relations of force themselves. Which forces and relations of force it is that 
instigate the formation of space, that is to say, the self-formation of a 
representation of space, and how they do so, Nietzsche does not say... 
Nevertheless, with this remark Nietzsche is on the trail of an essential nexus, one 
that he never thought through, however, and never mastered" (GA6.1,309-10; N 
II389). Of course, as shall be seen later, the interrelations of space and force, or 
power, are central to Foucault's work. 
However Heidegger still has this to say: "How is this [i. e. Nietzsche's thought on 
space] all bound up with time, which is usually designated together with space. 
In contrast to the imaginary character of space, time is actual. It is also - in 
contrast to the bounded character of space - unbounded, infinite... " There are 
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certainly problems with this. There seem to be difficulties with understanding 
time as actual, unbounded and infinite, and this would seem to contradict some 
of what Heidegger has already argued. Though we may indeed wish to agree 
with Heidegger's opinion that "viewed as a whole, Nietzsche's meditations of 
space and time are quite meagre" (GA6. l, 310; N II, 90), it is perhaps not unjust 
to suggest that Heidegger neglects some of the points I raised in Chapter One. 
Though Heidegger finds Nietzsche invaluable in his de-struction of the tradition, 
on the critical notion of space and place he appears to owe more to Hölderlin. 
One area where Nietzsche's thought is arguably more advanced than Heidegger's 
is that of the understanding of the body. During the Zollikon seminar, Medard 
Boss reminds Heidegger of Sartre's criticism that Being and Time contained only 
six lines on the body. The response is simply that it was the hardest problem to 
solve, and that he did not know how to say any more. 56 Nietzsche however did 
deal with the body, often in unpublished notes, but also in some sections of Thus 
Spoke Zarathustra. Heidegger never appears to discuss the body in anything like 
requisite detail in his publications, although these seminars at Zollikon may be 
the best source. William Richardson suggests that the thoughts on the body here = 
cry out for comparison with the work of MerleaL -Ponty. 
57 There is not the space 
here to elaborate the material in this work, instead some sketching of the 
contours of Heidegger's thoughts on Nietzsche and the body will have to suffice. 
I have already noted that Heidegger was intent on rescuing Nietzsche from the 
crudely reductionist reading that found traits of biologism and racism in his 
works. This reading finds its sources in several places in Nietzsche. The readings 
of the blond beast and the overman as biologically racist Models have been 
convincingly destroyed in recent scholarship, and so need not detain us here. 58 
An area that is perhaps more problematic is that of the body. If Nietzsche wishes 
to pursue a vitalist line, can he do so without being reduced to the Nazi reading? 
Heidegger understands these problems in looking at Nietzsche on the body. 
grapples with - We cannot deny that the things physiology 
particular bodily states [bestimmte Leib_ustdnde], changes in 
internal secretions, muscle flexions, occurrences in the nervous 
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system - are. also proper to affects, passions, and feelings. But we 
also have to ask whether all these bodily states and the body itself 
are grasped in a metaphysically adequate way, so that one may 
without further ado borrow material from physiology and biology, 
as Nietzsche, to his own detriment, so often did. The one 
fundamental point to realise here is that no result of any science 
can ever be applied immediately to philosophy (GA6.1,41-2; N I, 
45). 59 
Heidegger's understanding of the body does not conform to the Cartesian 
mindfbody dualism. It was shown in Being and Time that Dasein did not take up 
a bit of space like a thing did. Dasein is not a body, and its spatiality is 
understood in fundamentally different ways. Heidegger tries to explain: "Bodily 
being does not mean that the soul is burdened by a hulk we call the body. In 
feeling oneself to be, the body is already contained in advance in that self, in 
such a way that the body in its bodily state permeates the self We do not `have' a 
body in the way we carry a knife in a sheath. Neither is the body [Leib] a body 
[Körper] that merely accompanies us and which we can establish, expressly or 
not, as also presenf-at-hand. We do not `have' a body [Leib]; rather, we `are' 
bodily [leiblich] " (GA6.1,99; N I, 98-9). Heidegger understands the body not as 
a noun, as an object, but as an adjectival state or even a verb, to body. This idea 
is expressed in one of the later lecture courses: "Life lives in that it bodies forth 
[Das Leben lebt, indem es leibt]. We know by now perhaps a great deal - almost 
more than we can encompass - about what we call the body [Leibkörper], 
without having seriously thought about what bodying [Leiben] is" (GA6.1,509; 
N III, 79). 
These lines hint at the notion that as beings-in-the-world we are bodily - that 
embodiment mediates our existence. Such ideas would indeed be developed in 
the work of Merleau-Ponty. 60 Heidegger then suggests the sense in which the 
body can be seen as power. "-Body' is the name for that configuration of will to 
power in which the latter is always immediately accessible, because it is always 
within the province of the human identified as `subject"' (GA6.2,270; N III, 
223). Now this does not appear to further the purpose of understanding the body 
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as space, as a site of history, shaped by forces, as Nietzsche seemed to begin. 
However, Heidegger argues that Nietzsche's thought of will to power was 
"ontological rather than biological" (GA6.2,278; N III, 231), an attitude that is 
aimed at disputing the reading of Nazi ideologues. This adds support to his 
earlier formulation of the difference between der Körper and der Leib, two 
German words that are close to synonyms and are both translated by the English 
body. Der Körper is closer to the understanding of body as mass, and is used for 
animals and humans. Der Leib is used only for humans, and can mean body in a 
less tangible way. 61 The following passage seems to link these ideas into a more 
useful formulation. 
The bodying of life is nothing separate by itself, encapsulated in 
the `body' [Körper] in which the body [Leib] can appear to us; the 
body [Leib] is transmission and passage at the same time. 
Through this body flows a stream of life of which we feel but a 
small and fleeting portion, in accordance with the receptivity of 
the momentary state of the body. Our body itself is admitted into 
this stream of life, floating in it, and is carried off and snatched 
away by this stream or else pushed to the banks... Nietzsche 
declared often enough in his later years that the body must be 
made the guideline of observation not only of humans but of the 
world (GA6.1,509; N III, 79-80). 
This perhaps advances us further in the understanding that Nietzsche gives to the 
body, in that we should see the body in historical - transmission and passage - 
terms. Foucault's major essay on Nietzsche will elaborate some of these ideas. 
Heidegger does not fully support Nietzsche however, as he quotes The Will to 
Power paragraphs 489 and 491, and argues that though Nietzsche -founds 
his 
thought on the body and not on the `I', he is still fundamentally following 
Descartes. This is because "the body is to be placed first `methodologically'. It is 
a question of method... That the body is to be placed first methodologically 
means that we must think more clearly and comprehensibly and still more 
adroitly than Descartes, but to do so wholly and solely in his sense. The method 
is decisive" (GA6.2,165-6; N IV, 133). This provides a good example of how 
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Heidegger's later. work on Nietzsche (these particular lectures date from 1940) 
sees him as the last thinker of metaphysics, reversing several key points, but still 
from within a metaphysical framework. 62 Whether Heidegger is any more able to 
escape from metaphysics is a much-debated point. 
Power and Perspectivism 
"What a revelation it was for the mass of people who were unfamiliar with actual 
thinking and its rich history when two decades ago, in 1918, Oswald Spengler 
announced that he was the first to discover that every age and every civilisation 
has its own world view! Yet it was nothing more than a very deft and clever 
popularisation of the thoughts and questions on which others long before him had 
ruminated far more profoundly. Nietzsche was the most recent of these" (GA6.1, 
321; N II, 101). With these words, Heidegger links Nietzsche to the 
philosophical tradition - the reference to Spengler's appropriation, and the 
suggestion that Nietzsche is the most recent profound rumination - and suggests 
an attitude that was to become important in some of his own works, and 
absolutely central to the work of Foucault on the episteme, most obviously in The 
Order of Things. This historical understanding of understanding links to 
important ideas such as the space of possibilities and to earlier Heideggerian 
concepts such as the difference between ontic and ontological knowledge. The 
key issues at stake are those of power and perspectivism. 
By the time of the Nietzsche lectures Heidegger has realised that his own project 
of "de-struction [Destruktion], like `phenomenology' and all hermeneutical- 
transcendental questions, has not yet been thought in terms of the history of 
being" (GA6.2,378; EP 15), and that, fundamentally, though these critical 
approaches can be useful, these must be used alongside that of history. "History 
is the history of being [Die Geschichte ist Geschichte des Seins]" (GA6.2,20; N 
III, 182) says Heidegger, and much of his later work is taken up in an 
investigation of the history of philosophy, that in many ways, like Hegel, though 
with clearly divergent results, becomes a meditation on the philosophy of 
history. 63 In the third lecture course on Nietzsche, Heidegger reaches the stage it 
was suggested was implicit in his formulation of the import of Newtonian 
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physics: "In its own being, therefore, truth is historicised" (GA6.2,231; N III, 
187). Truth is now seen as historical, as plural. There is no one truth, but this 
does not preclude the possibility of truths. Dreyfus has called this plural 
realism. 64 Within this formulation of history and truth, Heidegger also sees the 
central importance of Nietzsche's idea of power: "In the sense of Nietzsche's 
interpretation of history, the question asks, what configuration of the will to 
power was at work here? " (GA6.2,102; N IV, 75). So, questions must be asked 
bearing in mind the historical dimension, and considering the power relations at 
stake. 
This is shown not only in Heidegger's thoughts on Nietzsche, but also in the 
separate lecture from the same time entitled "The Age of the World Picture". In 
the Nietzsche lectures, Heidegger makes the link: "Science, for example, 
knowledge in general, is a configuration of will to power. Thoughtful 
reflection... about knowledge - and science in particular - must make visible 
what will to power is" (GA6.1,443; N III, 19), and some pages later, "the 
essence of knowledge, that is, the essence of truth, must be defined in terms of 
the will to power" (GA6.1,448; N III, 24). These formulations are ones that 
Foucault later elaborates, and in Chapter Five I shall argue that Foucault's 
understanding of the Nietzschean concept of power/knowledge is impossible 
without the mediation of Heidegger. These thoughts on power and history 
provide a link into the thought that underpins them: that of perspectivism. "Is 
there anything at all like an observation of history that is not one-sided but omni- 
sided? Must not every particular present always examine and interpret the past in 
terms of its own horizon? Won't its historiographical knowledge be more `alive' 
the more decisively the given horizon of that particular present is taken as a 
guide? " (GA6.2,97; N IV, 71). - 
In a reading of a passage in The Guy Science (374), Heidegger argues that 
Nietzsche "achieves waxing clarity concerning the fact that humans always think 
within the confinements of their little `corner' of the world, their tiny angle of 
space-time" (GA6.1,338; N II, 117). Nietzsche argues that we cannot see round 
our own corner, and Heidegger elaborates this and other scattered remarks on 
perspectivism in some of the most useful passages of his lectures. "Nietzsche 
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thinks tacitly as follows: All thinking in categories, all nascent thinking in 
schemata, that is, in accordance with rules, is perspectival" (GA6.1,532; N 111, 
102). Will to power itself is perspectival, and as every being occurs essentially as 
will to power it too is perspectival. The "will to power is in its innermost essence 
a perspectival reckoning with the conditions of its possibility, conditions that in 
itself posits as such. Will to power is in itself value positing" (GA6.2,244; N III, 
199). Heidegger's example of perspectivism is powerfully simple, and is often 
emulated in descriptions of this idea. 
Assuming that we frequently come across a lone tree outside on a 
meadow slope, a particular birch, the manifold of colours, shades, 
light, atmosphere has a different character according to the time of 
day and year, and also according to the changing perspective of 
our perception, our distance and our mood; and yet it is always 
this `identical' birch (GA6.1,525; N III, 95). 
Several of these ideas are put to practical use in the contemporaneous essay "The 
Age of the World Picture". The following passage shows the main thrust of 
Heidegger's argument. 
When we use the word `science' [Wissenschaft] today, it means 
something essentially different from the doctrina and scientia of 
the Middle Ages, and also from the Greek smaqurl. Greek 
science was never exact, precisely because, in keeping with its 
essence, it could not be exact and did not need to be exact. Hence 
it makes no sense whatever to suppose that modem science is 
more exact than that of antiquity. Neither can we say that the 
Galilean doctrine of free-falling bodies [Körper] is true and that 
Aristotle's teaching, that light bodies strive upward, is false; for 
the Greek understanding... rests upon a different interpretation of 
beings and hence conditions a correspondingly different kind of 
seeing and questioning of natural events. No one would presume 
to maintain that Shakespeare's poetry is more advanced than that 
of Aeschylus (GA5,70-1; QCT 117). 
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Whilst arguing that different conceptions of what we now call "science" have 
existed over time, and that we could trace these changes historically, Heidegger 
warns us as to how such an investigation would have to run. "If we want to grasp 
the essence of modern science, we must first free ourselves from the habit of 
comparing the new science with the old solely in terms of degree, from the point 
of view of progress" (GA5,71; QCT 117-8). Teleology is out, but a revised 
Nietzschean genealogy would be more successful. As Krell notes, the 
investigation of boredom in The Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics is not 
Kulturdiagnostik, phenomenology or fundamental ontology, but close to 
genealogy than anything else. 65 Given the suggestions propounded in the 
previous chapter I suggest that it is historical ontology, a term almost 
synonymous with genealogy. Indeed, in Being and Time, Heidegger talks of the 
"ontological task of constructing a non deductive genealogy of the different 
possible ways of being" (GA2,11. ). We have seen how the ideas of power and 
perspectivism would be important. 
Heidegger considers the modem view of the world: "When we reflect on the 
modern age, we are questioning the modem world picture [Weltbild]. We 
characterise the latter by throwing it into relief over against the medieval and 
ancient world pictures" (GA5,81; QCT 128). However, medieval and ancient 
world pictures are modern inventions reimposed on those ages, as it is only in the 
modern age [der Neuzeit] that the world is conquered and conceived of as a 
picture. Heidegger suggests that this view occurs at the same time that man is 
conceived of as a subiectum and that therefore "observation and teaching about 
the world change into a doctrine of man, into anthropology" (GA5,86; QCT 
133). This is of course a reference to philosophy after Descartes. Heidegger 
continues, "it is no wonder that humanism first- arises where the world first 
becomes picture. It would have been just as impossible for a humanism to have 
gained currency in the great age of the Greeks as it would have been to have had 
anything like a world picture in that age" (GA5,86; QCT 133). 
Such a view links to what Dreyfus has called plural realism, a belief that 
suggests, contra Kuhn, that different conceptions within science across time are 
not all false, but all true. This belief suggests that there is no one truth, but that 66 
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there are, usually across different times and spaces, various truths. Dreyfus 
elaborates: "One can reject the claim that there is a correct description of reality 
and still hold that there can be many correct descriptions, including a correct 
causal description of objectified physical nature". This belief is shown in one of 
Heidegger's examples: "Each historical age is not only great in a distinctive way 
in contrast to others; it also has, in each instance, its own concept of greatness" 
(GAS, 88; QCT 135). The idea of plural realism, though the name is Dreyfus' 
invention, is clearly found in the works of the later Heidegger, and before him, in 
Nietzsche. In several of his works Foucault takes up these ideas. In The Order of 
Things, Foucault particularly develops this notion that the subject, humanism and 
anthropology are concepts of the modern age, and famously argues that they may 
well be nearing their end. 67 
Reading Nietzsche 
This discussion of the four points of the moment, space, the body, and power and 
perspectivism are the main themes that will be taken from this reading of 
Nietzsche. However, as has been stated above, the manner of this reading is itself 
considered by some to be problematic. Often accusations of textual impropriety 
are-thrown at Heidegger, in that he neglects the published corpus and uses the 
notes of The Will to Power. The charge is then extended to say that Heidegger's 
reading of Nietzsche would be impossible if he did not utilise this non-work. It 
has been argued above that the Heideggerian reading has fundamentally enriched 
our understanding of Nietzsche, and, crucially, forms the basis of the use 
Foucault was to put him to: this reading is not one that should be abandoned for 
the charges that are levelled against it, because these charges are, in themselves, 
problematic. Krell considers that the second lecture course, `The Eternal Return 
of the Same', provides material to help us consider these accusations as it shows 
us a Heidegger who reads Thus Spoke Zarathustra and other Nietzschean texts in 
a way that some recent commentators have insisted Heidegger never reads, is 
never able to read... [and] it enables us to assess the strengths and weaknesses of 
68 Heidegger's extensive but not uncritical use of the Nietzschean c'68 
Heidegger cannot, and should not, be excused from the charge that he uses 
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Nietzsche's notes. He does, and he does so frequently. This is part because of his, 
perhaps tendentious, belief that "every great thinker always thinks one jump 
more originally than he directly speaks. Our interpretation must therefore try to 
say what is unsaid by him" (GA6.1,136; N I, 134; GA6.2,442-3; EP 77-8). 69 To 
this end he believes that Nietzsche sketches out ideas in his notebooks that he 
was reluctant to work up for publication. These notebooks therefore become very 
important for an understanding. From a slightly different angle it can also be 
considered that in his notebooks Nietzsche writes in a far more traditionally 
philosophical manner, without the stylistic embellishments and dramatic play of 
his published works. This means that his notebooks sometimes provide a clearer 
picture of what is said elsewhere. There are therefore legitimate reasons for using 
the unpublished notes, providing that they are always acknowledged as such. 
Heidegger does so, and, far more than recent commentators, explains why he 
turns to the notes. 70 
For a picture of the eternal return Heidegger argues that the published passages 
of The Gay Science, Thus Spoke Zarathustra, and Beyond Good and Evil are 
insufficient: "If our knowledge were limited to what Nietzsche himself published, 
we could never learn what Nietesche knew perfectly well, what he carefully 
prepared and continually thought through, yet withheld. Only an insight 
[Einblick] into the Nachlaß in Nietzsche's own hand will provide a clearer 
picture" (GA6.1,235; N II, 15). However, this does not mean that the answer lies 
without difficulty in The Will to Power. In the previous lecture course Heidegger 
had remarked that "insight into these important connections is quite difficult on 
the basis of the book The Will to Power as it lies before us in its present form, 
since the textual fragments assembled here have been removed from a great 
number of manuscripts written during the years 1882 -to 1888. An altogether 
different picture results from the examination of Nietzsche's original 
manuscripts" (GA6.1,204-5; N I, 202). Later, Heidegger again returns to this 
theme: ``Today there lies before the public a book with the title The Will to 
Power. This book is not a `work' of Nietzsche's. Nevertheless it contains only 
what Nietzsche himself wrote down... Of course, the present book The Will to 
Power does not reproduce the thought-path of Nietzsche's will to power... But 
the book is sufficient as the basis for an attempt to follow this thought-path and 
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to think Nietzsche's sole thought in the course of this path. Nevertheless, we 
have to free ourselves from the outset and throughout from the order imposed on 
the book" (GA6.1,436-7; N III, 13). 
Heidegger criticises The Will to Power's philological merit, its structure, and its 
critical apparatus. He claims that a reading of Nietzsche's notes should "avoid 
mixing up passages from very different periods - which is what the book now 
available does" (GA6.1,437; N III, 13-4). He criticises the "pointless confusion 
of the editor's textual arrangement" (GA6.2,35; N IV, 13). He does not see it as 
a legitimate book, and is sceptically cautious about the process by which it came 
to become one. "A portion of [notes], but only a scattered, arbitrarily and 
randomly selected portion, were later collected into the book that after 
Nietzsche's death was pasted together from his Nachlaß and that is known as The 
Will to Power... In this fabricated `book', thoughts from entirely different 
periods of time and from wholly divergent levels and aspects of a question are 
capriciously and mindlessly juxtaposed and intermingled. True, everything 
published in this `book' is Nietzsche's, but he never thought it like that" (GA6.2, 
34; N IV, 11). Why then does Heidegger utilise The Will to Power? The reason 
that Heidegger uses this text is strikingly simple. When the Niet. rsche volumes 
are read it should be borne in mind that we are reading transcripts of lectures that 
Heidegger gave at Freiburg. The Will to Power is the text that he suggested that 
his students should purchase, to give them a sample of the Nietzschean Nachlaß 
(GA6.1,8; N I, 10). Given the problems of finding a useable version of the 
collected works, and the unrealistic nature of expecting students to buy or read it 
anyway, The Will to Power, flaws and all, is the obvious choice. 
It is important to note that under the shadow of Nazism Heidegger reads two 
thinkers who have been appropriated by the movement and openly contests much 
of the official line. Notably, the biologistic, racist appropriations are contested 
continually. It is simply inaccurate to suggest that Heidegger turns to these 
thinkers because of a sympathy with Nazism, or in spite of Nazism. Rather he 
turns to them because of Nazism, precisely in order to contest their readings, 
because, as a thinker, this is the best way of showing his "spiritual resistance". I 
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will give a similar interpretation of Heidegger's rethinking of the nöXtS in the 
following chapter, which challenges the notion of the political prevalent in 
Nazism: one he himself seemed to support in the Rectoral Address. As Hannah 
Arendt suggests, "Heidegger himself corrected his `error' more quickly and more 
radically than many of those who later sat in judgement over him - he took 
considerably greater risks than were usual in German literary and university life 
during that period". 71 
HI eidegger's later work is the product of the twists and turns of the paths of 
thought he has followed since Being and Time. The whole picture comes into 
view, but all the pieces have been at least glimpsed in the readings of Hölderlin 
and Nietzsche. It has been shown how Heidegger's work provides the basis for 
an understanding of history that dispenses with the linearity of time, but which 
sees the dimensions of past, present and future collide in the gateway of the 
moment. This makes any history necessarily a critique of the present. And it has 
been suggested that this history is one that takes a far greater interest in the 
spatial, as opposed to the merely temporal. Through a reading of early Greek 
thought, Heidegger has convincingly shown up the deficiencies of seeing space 
in terms of extension, as Descartes does, and has with waxing clarity moved 
from an understanding of space experientially to dwelling in place poetically. 
This last notion is particularly evident in the work of the later Heidegger. 
Following Greek thought, Heidegger has suggested avoiding of the concept of 
space, which is so tied up with Lhea and extension, and has argued a return to the 
notion of place, zönog, Ort. Such a reading, and a rethinking of the time/space 
relation is particularly evident -in the Hölderlin lectures. This has led Janicaud to 
suggest the duality of topology and historicity, a dyad I would suggest can be 
condensed into the Anglicised neologism platial history. The following chapter 
will examine how Heidegger puts this notion into practice. 
S 
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Chapter Four 
Applications of the Platial 
This chapter shifts from the chronological approach employed in the previous 
two chapters, to a more thematic discussion. The theoretical insights which have 
been traced from Being and Time through the readings of Kant, Hölderlin, and 
Nietzsche can now be used to illuminate the later Heidegger's concerns. The 
issues of place and history are central to many of the pieces Heidegger would 
produce: they are evident in one text of the 1930s, The Origin of the Work of Art, 
and in various ways are utilised in essays and lectures of the 1940s and beyond. 
These pieces cover many topics, but recurrent themes include the question of 
language, the confrontation with technology, the meaning of the word R&Aq, and 
the notion of the fourfold, which Heidegger adapts and elaborates from 
Hölderlin. The question of language itself has only tangential relevance to the 
purpose here, but in various ways the content of the essays on language and 
certainly those' on technology, the noktq and the fourfold relate to the main 
themes of place and history. Many of the essays under consideration in this part 
date from the period after the end of the second world war, when Heidegger was 
banned from teaching by the occupying Allies. The ban remained in place until 
1951, at which point Heidegger resumed courses at Freiburg. Given the range of 
Heidegger's interests, and the fact that I am now moving to a thematic approach, 
an exhaustive treatment is not possible. Those texts that will be considered 
however provide a picture of Heidegger's later concerns, and demonstrate the 
applications to which he puts his theoretical insights. 
The Origin of the Work of Art 
The Origin of the Work of Art is one of Heidegger's most famous and important 
works. Originally delivered as a Freiburg lecture in late 1935, it was repeated in 
Zürich in January 1936, and expanded through the course of that year to its full 
form, which was given in three parts in November and December, in Frankfurt 
am Main. This was the text that appeared in the collection Hol--wege. After some 
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changes, and the addition of the Epilogue and the 1956 Addendum, the text was 
republished as a book in itself in 1960. ' It is therefore obvious that this text, 
which straddles many times and places, bridges the entirety of the work being 
considered in this section. 2 Indeed, I believe that it serves as a particularly 
apposite example of how these ideas can be and are put into practice. It also 
opens up a number of themes that are considered in the later Heidegger's more 
"poetic" work. Early in the first lecture, Heidegger sets out his aim of looking to 
conceptualise what the origin [ Ursprung] of a work of art is. Instead of taking the 
usual, and perhaps obvious, route of claiming that the artist is the origin of the 
work of art, or the reverse route of claiming that the artist only becomes an artist 
as a result of the work, Heidegger suggests that both "artist and work are each of 
them by virtue of a third thing, which is prior to both, namely, that which also 
gives artist and work of art their names - art" (GAS, 7; BW 143). 
Heidegger makes it clear that his investigation is neither abstract or confined to 
pictorial art: "Works of art are familiar to everyone. Architectural and sculptural 
works can be seen installed in public places [Plätzen], in churches, and in 
dwellings" (GA5,8; BW 145). This balancing of the various forms of artworks is 
shown throughout Heidegger's later works, where the plastic arts, which in 
-German includes architecture, are given a ranking equal to the more traditional 
art-forms of literature and painting. Only music seems to be lacking from 
Heidegger's consideration. 3 It is immediately recognised that any question of art 
is by its nature historical, especially one that looks at the problematic "origin". 
Heidegger suggests that "art is historical, and as historical it is the creative 
preserving of truth in the work... Art is history in the essential sense that it 
grounds history... To originate something by a leap, to bring something into 
being from out of its essential source in a founding leap - this is what the word 
`origin' [Ursprung, literally primal leap] means" (GA5,64; BW 202). As with 
much of Heidegger's work of this period, there is an important question of truth, 
and truth, as has been seen, is historicised: "Can truth happen [geschehen] at all 
and thus be historical [geschichtlich]" ? Yet truth, people say, is something 
timeless and super-temporal" (GA5,27; BW 163). There is also an 
understanding of the spatial implications of the work of art, in part due to the 
consideration of form: "The self-contained block of granite is something material 
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in a definite if unshapely form. Form means here the spatial place distribution 
and arrangement of the material parts [Form meint heir die räumlich örtliche 
Verteilung und Anordung der Stoffteile], resulting in a particular outline [Umriß], 
namely that of a block" (GA5,17; BW 154). These implications come to the fore 
in two of the most important passages in Heidegger's study. 
Heidegger sets out to describe a piece of equipment, his example being a pair of 
peasant shoes, particularly as they appear in a painting by Van Gogh, "without 
any philosophical theory" (GAS, 22; BW 158). He is being disingenuous here, 
for, if the argument so far is believed, he is putting into practice his ideas of place 
and history. Heidegger begins by stating the basic impressions we immediately 
have of the shoes: the material they are made from, how they are stitched 
together, their general purpose and the differences that will arise regarding their 
particular purpose. Heidegger has already hinted at the direction he will take in 
his analysis of the shoes and the painting in a remark in An Introduction to 
Metaphysics. He is interested in the nature of being that arises in that visual 
scene, a question of time and space, history and place: "A painting by Van Gogh. 
A pair of rough peasant shoes, nothing else. Actually the painting represents 
nothing. But as to what is in that picture, you are immediately alone with it as 
though you yourself were making your way wearily home with your hoe on a late 
autumn evening after the last potato fires have died down" (GA40,38; IM 35). In 
The Origin of the Work of Art Heidegger elaborates his theme: 
"From the dark opening of the worn insides of the shoes the 
toilsome tread of the worker stares forth. In the stiffly rugged 
heaviness of the shoes there is the accumulated tenacity of her 
slow trudge through the far-spreading and ever-uniform furrows 
of the field swept by a raw wind. On the leather lie the dampness 
and richness of the soil. Under the soles stretches the loneliness of 
the field-path as evening falls. In the shoes vibrates the silent call 
of the earth, its quiet gift of the ripening grain and its unexpected 
self-refusal in the fallow desolation of the wintry field... This 
equipment belongs to the earth, and is protected in the world of 
the peasant woman. From out of this protected belonging the 
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equipment itself rises to its resting-within-itself' (GA5,22-3; BW 
159-60). 
There are few passages in Heidegger that so clearly show the duality of place and 
history. This fictive story that Heidegger has created may read more into the 
painting than should be seen, but it is very much a story in which the spatial 
dimension is important. As well as providing a useful example of how we cope 
with equipment in everyday life, it exhibits elements of what Chapter Three 
tentatively called a platial history. This remains, whether we believe Heidegger 
or not. Meyer Schapiro, in an essay entitled "The Still Life as Personal Object" 
contests Heidegger's reading of Van Gogh's picture, as he claims that the shoes 
are not those of a peasant but those of a city dweller, perhaps even Van Gogh's 
own shoes from his time in Paris. 4 Maybe, maybe not... does it matter? Would 
there be any fundamental difference if Heidegger had eulogised the painting as a 
vibrant representation of the world of the man in the city, walking the streets, 
between the buildings, through the rain and the polluted skies? This too would be 
a possible fictive history, an interpretation of a painting that "represents 
nothing". However the importance of the particular reading that Heidegger 
makes is suggested by Derrida, and following him Bernstein. They argue that it 
is significant that, writing in 1935-36, Heidegger should opt for a reading that 
emphasises the importance of soil, earth. "Heidegger's attribution of the shoes to 
the peasant woman in part licences Heidegger's ideologically loaded description 
of the shoes, with its embarrassing, heavily coded, `poetics of the soil', the earth, 
ground. Derrida sights in this language of soil, earth, ground a still active desire 
for restitution operative in Heidegger despite, and in the midst of, his critique of 
the subject". 5 
A few pages later, Heidegger applies the same treatment to the Greek temple, a 
6 more obviously spatial art-work. 
"A building, a Greek temple, portrays nothing. It simply stands 
there in the middle of the rock-cleft valley. The building encloses 
the figure of the god, and in this concealment lets it stand out into 
the holy precinct through the open portico. By means of the 
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temple, the god is present in the temple. This presence of the god 
is in itself the extension and delimitation of the precinct as a holy 
precinct... Standing there, the building rests on the rocky ground. 
This resting of the work draws up out of the rock the obscurity of 
that rock's bulky yet spontaneous support. Standing there, the 
building holds its ground against the storm raging above it and so 
first makes the storm itself manifest in its violence... The Greeks 
early called this emerging and rising in itself and in all things 
'ücnS. It illuminates also that on which and in which man bases 
his dwelling. We call this ground the earth" (GA5,30-1; BW 167- 
8). 
Rather than simply seeing the temple as a political or religious structure, 
Heidegger also sees the importance of the use of space and place, which will 
come to the fore in the discussion of the n6kig in the following section. However, 
Heidegger's attitude to the idea of origins is also open to question, as his praising 
of the pre-Socratic beginnings sets him up for the damning charge of 
conservative nostalgia, something that is still evident in his attitude to technology 
which dominates several later pieces. Along with the language of earth and soil 
this may well be the enduring legacy in Heidegger's works of his links with 
Nazism. Heidegger's explanation of how he sees the problematic term comes 
right at the start of the piece, and colours all that follows: "Origin here means 
that from which and by which something is what it is and as it is. What 
something is, as it is, we call its essence. The origin of something is the descent 
[Herkunft] of its essence" (GA5,7; BW 143). This notion of "origin" within the 
historical approach that Heidegger adapts from Nietzsche, is one which Foucault 
will depart from. 
Re-thinking the IIö7%i5 
This notion of the origin is a potential problem in The Origin of the Work of Art, 
in the Hölderlin lectures, and will return as a spectre to haunt other later texts of 
Heidegger's. Hölderlin himself is said to have remarked that "nothing is dearer to 
me than the things that are as old as the world itself', 
' and there appears to be in 
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Heidegger's work a desire to return to an original, rural state (though see WhD 
53-4; WCT 23). In one remark in a 1943 piece on Hölderlin, commentating on 
the poem `Homecoming', Heidegger suggests that "homecoming is the return 
into the proximity of the origin [Ursprung]... then must not the return home 
consist chiefly, and perhaps for a long time, in getting to know this mystery, or 
even first of all in learning how to get to know it" (GA4,23-4; EB 278-9; see 
GA53,202). Heidegger's analyses of equipment, of dwelling and building can 
perhaps all be related to this notion of the origin, one that runs close to the idea 
of nostalgia. It has been suggested that the 1934-35 lectures are more open to 
accusations of nostalgia than the later work on Hölderlin, 8 but the rural was 
clearly a very important element in Heidegger's own life - witness his refusal to 
move to Berlin for a teaching post in the 1930s, and his eulogising of his Black 
Forest existence. 9 
Whilst an element of rural nostalgia is found in Heidegger's work, and perhaps 
increasingly in the later pieces which further develop the notion of poetic 
dwelling and introduce the concept of the fourfold [das Geviert] of earth, sky, 
gods and mortals, Heidegger does make a series of important remarks which 
show the importance of place in areas other than the rural. 1° Throughout his 
career, Heidegger- stressed that looking at the fundamental concepts of Greek 
thought with our modern eyes was sometimes dangerous. He argues that a 
fundamental change had been made in the transition from the Greek to the Latin 
language (GA40,15-16; IM 13; GA54,63-4). 11 For example, using our modern 
understanding of logic could not shed light on the Greek concept of X, yoq; that 
of ethics could not describe the realm of r10og; and physics was no use in 
understanding cpi ng. 12- And, perhaps especially, Heidegger made us think of the 
original -meaning of µsTacpvgixä - is . Eia is cpucxä - and used 
this to point out 
the problems of the accepted sense of metaphysics (see GA29/30,55ff; GA9,15; 
GA40; IM). It comes as no surprise then that Heidegger also challenges our 
understanding of politics by rethinking the notion of n6kig. Indeed, Heidegger 
suggests the iröXiS was for the Greeks that which was absolutely worthy of 
question, and yet for the modern mind the `political' is unquestioned: not in 
terms of its content, but in terms of its essence (GA53,117-8). To question the 
political then, through a rethinking of the nöXiS, is to send us nearer the Greeks. 
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One of the reasons that Heidegger wants to rethink the n0kt , and through it the 
notion of the political, is to explicitly distance himself both from the attitude of 
the time and from his own political involvement. It is notable that Being and 
Time does not discuss the n0kiS, the state, or politics. There are only a couple of 
passing references to the state and to politics in the entire work. However, as has 
been suggested, the Rectoral Address was a politicising of the earlier philosophy 
and the first lecture course on Hölderlin a philosophising of these politics. In 
bringing his thought to the political arena, Heidegger is greatly influenced by 
Plato's Uoki-c a [known in English as Republic], 13 with its call for philosopher- 
kings or rulers. Heidegger's important treatment of this text is found in the 
Winter Semester course of 1931-32, Vom Wesen der Wahrheit: Zu Platons 
Höhlengleichnis und Theätet, as well as in the Rectoral Address itself. 
In the lecture course Heidegger makes the following remark: 
Concerning the `state' [Staat] (in this way we translate n6ktS, not 
quite adequately), and the question of its inner possibility, 
according to Plato what prevails as the highest principle is that the 
proper guardians [eigentlichen Wächter] of the being-with-another 
of humans, in the oneness of the nökig, must be philosophical 
humans. -This does not mean that Professors of philosophy should 
become chancellors of the Reich [Reichkanzler], but that 
philosophers must become cp1 aXeg, guardians. The domination of 
the state and its ordering must be guided through by philosophical 
humans who, on the basis of the deepest and widest, freely 
questioning knowledge, bring the measure and rule, and open the 
routes öf decision (GA34,1.00). 
Philosophers are seen here as guardians, glides to the conduct of the state, those 
who can lead the leader, den Führer zu fiühren. Although Heidegger hints at its 
inadequacy, he translates 2r&il as Staut, and uses a word that cannot fail to have 
nationalistic overtones: Reichkan: ler. This attitude - here suggested as an 
interpretation of Plato - is given concrete expression when Heidegger takes over 
the Rectorship. It is notable that throughout the Rectoral Address Heidegger uses 
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the word `state', never explicitly linking it to the word 7wktr, but never denying 
this is the reference intended. The first line of the Address suggests that 
"assuming the Rectorship means committing oneself to leading [Führung] this 
university spiritually and intellectually [geistigen]" (SdU 9; HC 29) 
This leading calls for a new kind of questioning, one which will "ground 
knowledge [Wissenschaft] once again directly in the fruitfulness and blessing of 
all the world-shaping forces of man's historical Dasein, such as: nature, history, 
language; Volk, custom [Sitte], state; poetry, thought, belief; sickness, madness, 
death; law, economy, technology" (SdU 13-14; HC 33). 14 Heidegger appropriates 
Ernst Jünger's concepts of `military service' and `tabour service', and sets up the 
idea of `knowledge service'. In his key work Der Arbeiter [The Worker] Jünger 
likens the worker to the soldier, and opposes them to the security-seeking 
bourgeoisie. 15 Indeed, Wolin suggests that Heidegger's `option' for National 
Socialism was based on the supposition that it was the way toward the society of 
workers proposed by Jünger. 16 Heidegger sees the role of the university as 
`knowledge service', part designed to prepare men for the other two services: 
"Because the statesman and the teacher, the doctor and the judge, the pastor and 
the master builder lead the Volk in its Dasein as a Volk and a state [volklich- 
staatl iche Dasein führen] and watch over this existence in its essential relations 
to the world-shaping forces of human being and keep it focused, these 
professions and the education for them are entrusted to the knowledge service" 
(SdU 16; HC 35). " 
Heidegger's first rethinking of the moats appears in An Introduction to 
Metaphysics two years later. It would seem that the most obvious route to 
understand the concept of the no), tq would be to return to the central texts of 
Ancient Greek philosophy on politics - Plato's IloXrrEia and Aristotle's 
Emurjµrl fIo? dnic>' [The Politics] - or to political texts, histories or documents. 
Instead, Heidegger looks at Sophocles' tragedy Antigone, and particularly at the 
second chorus. The discussion of nokt. forms part of an analysis of the nature of 
man as revealed in this choral ode. There are three remarkable lines for 
Heidegger. The first (line 333-4) describes man as "to bctvöiaiov" - the 
strangest, uncanniest [das Unheimlichste] of all beings, 
'8 and the second (line 
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360) sees man as "mavionöpoq anopoq" - "underway in all directions, on the way 
to nothing". 19 Heidegger explains that möpoq means "passage through..., 
transition to..., route [Bahn]". Man is everywhere a path for being, but is 
therefore flung out of all paths, essentially homeless, unfamiliar. As Heidegger 
notes, the itavzonöpoq anopoq clearly contains an interpretation of SElvöiazov 
(GA40,157-61; IM 148-52). We might also note that the notion of a path was 
very important for Heidegger - he called two of his most important collections 
Wegmarken [Pathmarks] and Holzwege [Woodpaths - the type of paths that lead, 
but not necessarily anywhere in particular]20 and just before his death asked for 
his collected writings to be known as "Paths - not Works [Wege, nicht 
Werke] ". 21 
Heidegger then focuses on line 370, which begins " `i vuiroXtc änok "- 
translated in a standard English version as "he and his city rise high - but the city 
casts out". 22 The line has a similar construction to navzonopog atopog, but 
instead of speaking of the path it speaks of the place where these paths meet, the 
nöl. , 
from which `political' is derived, and which is usually translated as `city' 
[Stadt] or `city-state' [Stadtstaat]. Heidegger suggests that this does not capture 
the full meaning: noXig is so familiar to us through the words `politics' and 
`political' that we no longer see it as worthy of question. "HI ? means, rather, 
the site [die Stätte], the there [Da], wherein and as which historical Da-sein is. 
The it kt is the historical site [Geschichtsstätte], the there in which, out of 
which, and for which history happens [Geschichte geschieht]" (GA40,161; IM 
151-2). To this site and scene of history belong the gods, the temples, the priests, 
the festivals, the games, the poets, the thinkers, the ruler [Herrscher], the council 
of elders, the assembly of the people, the army- and the fleet. All of these do not 
first belong to the rök , or are political through a relationship with a statesman, 
but through their being constitute the iröXtq. This is why man is both vyii toki, - 
rising high above the site - and änoktg - without site. The historical site is the 
result of man's creation: without them it is nothing, without it they are nothing 
(GA40,161-2; IM 152-3). In the first instance then, n6kiS means the historical 
site of Dasein, of human existence. The nOkiS is the site or place where history 
happens: the nöl. is essentially situated and, rather than being spatial, is 
platial. 23 Only afterwards does n6ktq take on its political meaning. 
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These remarks have, however, remained unclear and incomplete, that is until the 
publication of the lectures in the Gesamtausgabe on Hölderlin, and pre-Socratic 
thinkers such as Heraclitus and Parmenides. The lecture course on Hölderlin's 
hymn `The Ister', delivered in 1942, is the next interpretation. Once again the 
source is the choral ode from Antigone, and Heidegger again picks the same three 
lines for analysis, along with one which speaks of the `s6zia [hearth]. In his 
discussion of -co &ivov as das Unheimliche Heidegger accepts that in 
`philological' terms, the translation is `wrong' . 
It can only be seen as justified, 
even necessary, on the basis of an interpretation. The points concerning this 
particular translation need not concern us here, but the general remarks are worth 
bearing in mind. Heidegger reminds us that we get our knowledge of words in a 
foreign language from a dictionary, which is based on a preceding interpretation 
of linguistic concepts. A dictionary can give us pointers as to how to understand 
a word, but it is never an absolute authority to which we are bound. All 
translating must be an interpreting. Heidegger closes: "this interim remark about 
the essence of translating is meant to recall that the difficulty of a translation is 
never merely a technical issue but concerns the relation of humans to the essence 
of the word and to the worthiness of language. Tell me what you think of 
translation, and I will tell you who you are" (GA53,74-5). 
Heidegger sees nopog as "the passage or the passage through to something" and 
n6ktq as a particular realm of iröpoq: "one field in which the latter emphatically 
comes to pass". Heidegger suggests that the contemporary interpretation is that 
everything in Greek thought is politically determined. -This, he suggests, is a 
mistake, but one which is being put to the cause of National Socialism. 
Heidegger argues that it is evident that "the `political' is that which belongs to 
the 7r6ktg and can therefore be determined only in terms of the 7toXi. Yet the 
converse is precisely not the case". If the political derives from the n6klS, then 
we cannot use our understanding of the political to explain the 7l6klS: "The it kiq 
cannot be determined `politically'. The noktS, and precisely it, is therefore not a 
`political' concept" (GA53,98-9). 
Alternatives to seeing it as political would include seeing the nöAiS as `state', or 
as `city', but Heidegger argues that the first leads us to relate it to modern state 
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formations; the second is distinguished from village only because it is `stately', 
again leading to confusion. Instead, "perhaps the n0kit is that realm and place 
around which everything question-worthy and uncanny [Unheimliche] turns in an 
exceptional sense. The noXiS is mö? og, that is, the pole, the swirl or vortex 
[Wirbel] in which and around which everything turns" (GA53,100). The n6ktS is 
therefore "neither merely state [Staat], nor merely city [Stadt], rather in the first 
instance it is properly `the stead' ['die Statt']: the site [die Stätte] of the abode of 
human history". The essential thing about the noktq therefore is this site of 
abode: which means that the political "in the originary and in the derivative 
sense, lies in its being the open site of that fitting destining [Schickung - related 
to Geschichte, history] from out of which all human relations toward beings... 
are determined" (GA53,101-2). To be political means to be at the site of history. 
Heidegger takes this forward by asking us to question two of the most famous 
pronouncements in Greek thought. The first is Aristotle's formulation of the 
human being as "ýc»ov moXt-ciKov", 24 which is usually "translated in a superficial 
way" as political animal, entity, or being. 25 But as Heidegger has argued, the 
nOXiý is determined through its relationship to human beings, and therefore man = 
is that being capable of belonging to the arö?. c (GA53,102-3). The second is the 
suggestion in Plato's Republic that either philosophers should become rulers, or 
26 the rulers philosophers, or there will be no end of trouble for the töXi . 
Heidegger argues that Plato does not mean that philosophers should assume the 
business of the state, because the noki. is not the `state'; nor should rulers "`busy 
themselves' with `philosophy', as though it were something like collecting 
beetles". Instead, Heidegger argues, Plato's statement means that the Roktý - as 
the site of abode of human history - is best served by philosophers, who stand in 
the radiance and light of being. -This does not mean that everything 
is determined 
in terms of the political, or that the political has priority. "The doctrine of the 
unconditional priority of the political on the one hand, and on the other hand the 
conception of the n0kiq as the ground that is worthy of question and as the site of 
beings, are separated from one another by an abyss". Neither Greek nor 
contemporary political thought (by which Heidegger means National Socialism, 
whose historical singularity is stressed) are served by their conflation (GA53, 
105-7). There would therefore seem to be a distancing from the attitude of the 
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Rectoral Address when Heidegger offered his services to National Socialism and 
the state as a philosopher, to complement the Führer's role as ruler. 27 
The lines "navioiropog atopoS" - underway in all directions, on the way to 
nothing - and " `iuyiiacok änoXi. S" - towering high above the site, forfeiting the 
site - show, Heidegger suggests, what is so "'co 6slvöv", Unheimliche, uncanny, 
in human beings. And yet das Unheimliche, the uncanny, is not to be understood 
in terms of an impression of fear or terror which humans instil in others, but to be 
conceived in terms of das Un-heimische, the un-homely, "namely that unhomely 
that is the fundamental trait of human abode in the midst of beings" (GA53,113- 
4). The `un' of unhomely is not merely a negative - the duality of naviomöpoS 
wtopoq and `v'g1'2oXtg öcno? i; show this. Heidegger explicitly links man's being 
unhomely to the Hold;, which is not some isolated realm - the so-called 
`political' - within a wider realm of nopoq, but "the site within whose expansive 
realm every töpo; moves" (GA53,110-1). This is a reversal of the earlier 
definition, and a progression from that of An Introduction to Metaphysics, but 
Heidegger is quick to counter that it allows the belief that everything is political. 
Rather, all human activity that is historical has "the möXiS as its site, as the` place 
to which it belongs" (GA53,117). Everything that is historical, is therefore 
explicitly situated, platial. 
For modem eyes, the `political' is the way in which history is accomplished, and 
as such is itself unquestioned. Heidegger suggests that the failure to question the 
`political' belongs with its totality. The totality of the political is not simply 
based on the arbitrary wilfulness of dictators, but in the metaphysical essence of _ 
modern actuality in general. This metaphysical essence is, of course, 
fundamentally different from the way in which the Greek world was historical. 
The `political' is unquestioned, yet the nöklg was for the Greeks that which was 
altogether worthy of question (GA53,117-8). Rethinking the n6xig therefore 
leads us explicitly to question the `political', to historicise it, to situate it. 
In the following semester, in a course on Parmenides, Heidegger returns again to 
a discussion of the nöXic. 28 Again Heidegger suggests that we think the Greek 
7r6Xtg and the `political' in a totally un-Greek fashion. Much of the discussion 
99 
replicates that from `The Ister' course, something we might expect given their 
proximity. In this course however, he suggests explicitly that we think the 
`political' as Romans, as since the time of the Imperium, the word `political' 
[mo? l-nxöv] has been thought imperially. The only thing left of Greek in the word 
political is its sound (GA54,63-7). Plato's dialogue on the essence [Wesen] of 
the nöXi. S (GA9,109) is called the IIoXit. ia, which is rendered as res publico 
[public business] by the Romans, Der Staat in modem German, Republic in 
modern English. 29 Earlier in the course Heidegger had distinguished between the 
Greek 1iOcia, the Roman rectitudo, and the modern notion of truth. Aý i0 . ta 
should not be thought of as `truth' [Wahrheit] but as `non-concealment' 
[Unverborgenheit] 30 He suggests that there is a similar distinction to be drawn 
between the it k, the res publica and the state. This is no surprise, he suggests, 
given that the essence of the Greek icö? tg is grounded in the essence of cckr Osia. 
The n0kiq, as the n6kog, the pole, is the site of the non-concealment of beings in 
general (GA54,132-3). 
This detailed reading of Heidegger's remarks on the 7i6Xic is important both in 
ýterrns of his overall development and the implications it might have. 31 In the 
Hplderlin lectures Heidegger thinks the notions of space and time through the 
notions of placing and journeying as we saw in Chapter Three; in these 
discussions he rethinks them through the notions of site and history. On the 
charge of rural nostalgia, it is worth noting, in distinction to this emphasis, that 
the discussion of the nokig is much wider than simply the rural, even if we bear 
in mind Heidegger's admonition not to translate nöXig as city 
Second, and perhaps most interestingly - but certainly most speculatively - is the 
potential for rethinking the political that this discussion provides. We will recall 
that Heidegger suggested that "the `political' is that which belongs to -the 71oa, Is 
and can therefore be determined only in terms of the 7wkti . 
Yet the converse is 
precisely not the case" (GA53,98-9). We could not use our understanding of the 
political to explain the möXiS, but, as the political derives from the nökLS, we can 
use our understanding of irOXtg to rethink the political. 
32 This would enable an 
explicit distancing from the modern - in Heidegger's time, as well as perhaps in 
our own - Schmittian, notion of the political. 
Carl Schmitt, the Nazi jurist we 
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know Heidegger to have read, develops an understanding of the political 
predicated on the friend/enemy distinction. In Schmitt's understanding, "the 
concept of the state presupposes the concept of the political". 33 Such an 
understanding risks confusing the political with the polemical, n6ktS with 
wkEgtog, a word that links closely to noXEµlog, the enemy. 34 Indeed in a 1933 
letter to Schmitt, thanking him for a copy of The Concept of the Political, 
Heidegger suggested that he was "in the middle of iro4gos and all literary 
projects must take second place' ý 35 . 
In distinction to Schmitt, and with 
Heidegger's rethinking, we can suggest that the concept of the political 
presupposes the concept of the n0k . 
Rethinking the notion of the political 
therefore distances Heidegger from his own political involvement of the 
Rectorship period. We might call this his retreating from/re-treating of the 
political. 36 This issue will be picked up on in the discussion of technology in the 
following section. Leading on from this, what implications are there in seeing the 
`political' in terms of its situatedness or platial elements? What potential is there 
for rethinking the notions involved in political theory and practice - especially 
those relating to regional and international politics? Such questions must remain 
unanswered here, but are perhaps the pathmarks for future thought. 
The Question of Technology 
What does Heidegger understand by technology? Starting with the word itself, he 
suggests that it derives from the Greek TcXvlKov, which means "that which 
belongs tot vq ... iEXvq 
is the name not only for the activities and skills of the 
craftsman but also for the arts of the mind and the fine arts... the word tEq is 
linked with the word c tuna ji . 
Both words are terms for knowing in the widest 
sense" (VA 16; BW 318). This should be borne in mind throughout this reading 
of Heidegger's readings, although Heidegger's discussions centre around what 
we would normally understand by technology. This is because technology in the 
modern sense is a particular attitude towards what is, and what constitutes 
knowledge. The piece The Question of Technology was first delivered as a 
lecture on December 1st 1949, and was originally called "Das Ge-stell", "The 
Enframing". This lecture was part of a series of four, under the general title 
"Einblick in das, was ist", "Insight into that which is". The other lectures were 
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"The Turning", "The Thing", and "The Danger". 37 Heidegger explains the 
general title thus: "Insight into that which is - thus do we name the sudden flash 
of the truth of being into truthless being" (GA79,75; QCT 47). These lectures 
aim for an understanding, aquestioning, of the state of affairs in the modern 
world. There is a fundamental shift, a turn, in man's relations with technology, a 
turn that Nietzsche and Nazism were both, albeit for different reasons, unable to 
comprehend. 
Krell has pointed out the importance of the wording of the general title for these 
lectures: "Only the flash of an eye can apprehend such an impending turn: 
Einblick is surely related to what Heidegger has earlier called Augenblick. The 
thinker's task is to train his eye on that possible momentary turning, enabling the 
technological hazard to turn into a kind of rescue". 38 Heidegger himself makes 
much of the links between the words he uses in these pieces: "`To flash' 
[blitzen], in terms both of its word and its matter, is `to glance' [blicken]. In the 
glance and as that flash, the essence, the coming to presence, of being enters into 
its own emitting of light... The in-turning that is the flash of the truth of being is 
the insight [Einkehr des Blitzes der Wahrheit des Seyns ist Einblick]" (GA79,74; 
QCT 45). Bearing in mind everything that is behind Heidegger's notion of the 
Augenblick, it is clear that these lectures aim to use the new understanding of 
history, and of place, to shed light on the issues of technology and poetic 
dwelling. Platial histories, or certainly descriptions, are evident in these lectures. 
Given the contemporary relevance of the topic, they can equally be seen as 
critiques, even histories, of the present. 
Heidegger's analysis of technology looks at how technological apparatus have 
changed over time, and, more specifically, how their attitude toward nature has 
altered. His examples are polarised between those belonging to a rural existence 
and those of a more modern age. "A radar station is of course less simple than a 
weather vane... And certainly a sawmill in a secluded valley of the Black Forest 
is a primitive means compared with the hydroelectric plant on the Rhine River" 
(VA 10; BW 312). 39 It is suggested that modem technology unlocks the potential 
of nature to be a source of power that can be extracted and stored. Heidegger 
refutes the claim that this is what the old windmill did: "No. Its sails do indeed 
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turn in the wind; they are left entirely to the wind's blowing. But the windmill 
does not unlock energy from the air currents in order to store it" (VA 18; BW 
320). This change over time is one that is particularly evident when the changes 
in place and landscape are examined. In our modern age "a tract of land is 
challenged in the hauling out of coal and ore. The earth now reveals itself as a 
coal mining district, the soil as the site of mineral deposits [Erzlagerstätte]" (VA 
18; BW 320). 40 
This concept of `challenging' or `setting upon' is found again when Heidegger 
argues that "the work of the peasant does not challenge the soil of the field". By 
this Heidegger means that the peasant works with the field, using it naturally. In 
contrast, the modern mode of agriculture "sets upon [stellt] nature. It sets upon it 
in the sense of challenging it. Agriculture is now a motorised food industry" (VA 
18; BW 320). The use of machines, chemical fertilisers and similar are unnatural 
ways of working upon the field, not working with it. In consequence, "nature 
becomes a gigantic gasoline station, an energy source for modern technology and 
industry" - (G 18; DT 50). The opposition that Heidegger finds is made 
particularly clear when he makes an examination of the Rhine river. Heidegger 
compares the old wooden bridge over the Rhine with the new hydroelectric plant. 
Whereas the bridge was built into the river, now the river is damned up into the 
power plant. The river has now become a "water-power supplier", which derives 
its essence from the power-plant. "In order that we may even remotely consider 
the monstrousness that reigns here, let us ponder for a moment the contrast that is 
spoken by the two titles: `The Rhine', as damned up into the power works, and 
`The Rhine', as uttered by the art-work in Hölderlin's hymn by that name. But, it 
will be replied, the Rhine is still a river in the landscape, is it not? Perhaps. But 
how? In no other way than as an object on call for inspection by a tour group 
ordered there by the vacation industry" (VA 19-20; BW 321). 
Nature has become standing-reserve [Bestand], a designation that means 
something more than merely stock. This, argues Heidegger, is a fundamental 
shift from the previous attitude to nature, found, of course, in the rural setting. 
But even this is changing irrevocably. "The forester who measures the felled 
timber in the woods and who to all appearances walks the forest path in the same 
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way his grandfather did is today ordered by the industry that produces 
commercial woods, whether he knows it or not". His work is subordinate to the 
demand for cellulose, for paper, which is then turned into newspapers and 
magazines which "set public opinion to swallowing what is printed" (VA 21-2; 
BW 323). There is even talk of the idea of human resources, although man is 
never merely standing-reserve, as it is man, in part, that drives technology 
forward. However Heidegger cautions against simply seeing man as leading 
technology: "It seems time and time again as though technology were a means in 
the hands of man. But, in truth, it is the essence of man that is now being ordered 
forth to lend a hand to the essence of technology" (GA79,68; QCT 37). The 
question of technology is not simply and purely technical, but is something that 
shapes the whole attitude of our age, "not only upon man, but also upon all 
beings, nature and history" (ID 34/98). 
Now such an understanding of technology would be one thing, but if we consult 
the transcript of "Das Ge-stell", rather than the version published as "The 
Question of Technology", we find that the text has been edited. The published 
version suggests that the modern mode of agriculture "sets upon nature. It sets 
upon it in the sense of challenging it. Agriculture is now a motorised food 
industry" (VA 18; BW 320). In the transcript published in the Gesamtausgabe 
Heidegger continues to compare the role of technology in modern agriculture 
with events on a wider world stage: "Agriculture is now a motorised food 
industry, the same thing in its essence [im Wesen das , Selbe] as the production of 
corpses in the gas chambers and extermination camps, the same thing as 
blockades and the reduction of countries to famine, the same thing as the 
ibed production of hydrogen bombs" (GA79,2 
). 41 i acouc-LaUarthe has described 
this remark as "scandalous and lamentably inadequate", sömething it clearly is, 
given Heidegger's compliance with the Nazi regime in its nascent years, but it 
4' should not merely be the cause for accusations. I am aware that I am on 
dangerous ground because a reading of this passage that does not it condemn 
outright could be seen as a tacit acceptance, but it is worth thinking a little more 
about it. 
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In terms of the four examples Heidegger gives - the motorised food industry; the 
gas chambers and extermination camps; the blockades and the hydrogen bomb - 
what they, on his terms, have in common is the essence of technology. The 
essence of modem agriculture is something entirely apart from agriculture - it is 
the Ge-stell that frames agriculture, that of modern technology, the modem ethos. 
In Heidegger's terms this is the inevitable result of the world made picture, the 
Cartesian objectification of the world. What Heidegger fails to realise - and this 
is the scandal, the inadequacy - is that there is something essentially different 
between agriculture and the Holocaust. What many of his critics fail to realise is 
what that difference is. This is exhibited most obviously in de Beistegui's book 
Heidegger and the Political. He suggests that the thinking of the Holocaust in the 
same terms as the hydrogen bomb or the Berlin blockade is the problem. Does 
not, he suggests, the Holocaust force "thinking outside of itself'. 43 
This absence, or indeed failure, is particularly obvious in de Beistegui's work 
because his is a book expressly dealing with the political, and yet what links the 
last three examples is a particular concept of the political. As was noted in the 
discussion of the it kt earlier in this chapter, Heidegger suggests that the failure 
to question the `political' belongs with its totality. He suggests that the totality of 
the political is not simply based on the arbitrary wilfulness of dictators, but in the 
metaphysical essence of modem actuality in general (GA53,117-8). The modem 
concept of the political is, like the modem attitude to technology, not merely a 
regionalised, historically limited event, but one that has its essence in modern 
ways of being. The gas chambers and extermination camps, the blockades and 
the hydrogen bomb all exhibit the political thinking of the friend/enemy 
distinction. There is clearly something in Heidegger's critique of the political that 
aims at Schmitt, yet notably de Beistegui's -book contains no reference 
to 
Schmitt. With the potential of modern technology a friend/enemy problem can 
now be resolved in a way as distinct from previous solutions as modem 
44 agriculture is from the peasant in the field . 
It was noted above that Heidegger's understanding of modern technology rests 
upon his understanding of Ge-stell. This was a word that appeared in The Origin 
of the Work of Art, where he suggest that the figure [Gestalt] of the work of art 
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needed to be understood "in terms of the particular setting [Stellen] and Ge-stell 
as which the work occurs when it sets itself up and sets itself forth" (GA5,52; 
BW 189). In German, Stelle, -n is a word with a range of meanings, including 
place, position, department, and passage in a book; similarly Gestell means 
stand, rack, frame, framework, and chassis, amongst other things. The verb 
stellen means to set upon, to challenge - as in the way modem technology sets 
upon [stellt] nature - but also producing and presenting [Her- und Dar-stellen]. 
The prefix Ge- means bringing together - Gebirg, mountain range; Gebiß, set of 
teeth; Gemüt, disposition, i. e. a gathering of feelings - therefore, in Heidegger's 
usage, Ge-stell does not only mean the support or frame around something, but 
the bringing together of the setting, the en-framing (VA, 23-4; BW 324-6; GA79, 
26-7,32-5). As will be suggested in the following chapter, Foucault's important 
notion of dispositif - as the ensemble of discourses and practices of a given era - 
is closely related to this concept. 
Such an understanding leads to Heidegger's radical claim that the essence of 
technology is before, and not a consequence of, the scientific revolution: a claim 
he makes by opposing historiological chronology [historische Zeitrechnung] to 
history. "For historiological chronology, modern physical science begins in the 
seventeenth century. In contrast, machine-power technology develops only in the 
second half of the eighteenth century. But modern technology, which for 
chronological reckoning is the later, is, from the point of view-of the essence 
holding sway within it, historically earlier" (VA 26; BW 327). This is because 
the modem physical theory of nature prepares the way not simply for technology 
but for the essence of modern technology, which is not in itself technological, but 
is a way of seeing things as calculable, mathematical, extended and therefore 
controllable (see also WhD 155; WCT 135-6). 4' This claim will not be further 
examined here, but it is worth noting the similarity to some of Foucault's claims 
about historical development. The Question of Technology itself will be left at 
this point, in order to discuss the influence of Ernst Jünger on Heidegger's 
attitudes to technology. This also provides the space for a recapitulation of some 
of the more problematic and intertwining themes from the previous discussions 
of Heidegger and Nazism. 
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We have seen how in his Rectoral Address Heidegger had taken Jünger's 
concepts of `military service' and `labour service', and linked them to the idea of 
`knowledge service'. However, as has been seen, Heidegger does turn away from 
this. Similarly, though around 1933 he does seem to support Jünger, by the mid 
1930s he is distancing himself from Ringer's attitudes on, amongst other things, 
technology. Jünger believed that the way out of nihilism was a whole-hearted 
embrace of technology, which would lead us deep into nihilism, but then out the 
other side. There are noticeable parallels with some of Nietzsche's thought on the 
subject. 46 In the later volumes of Nietzsche, Heidegger is critical of Nietzsche's 
attitude to nihilism, suggesting that it is thought nihilistically. Similar accusations 
could be made of Jünger and Nazism. 
It is instructive to compare the following two passages from Der Arbeiter with 
the analysis in The Question of Technology, discussed above. "There is no region 
left that has not yet been chained by streets and railways, by cables and wires, by 
airlines and fairways"; 47 "the field that is ploughed by machines and fertilised by 
nitrogen produced in factories is no longer the same field". 8 The parallels are 
clear, and the immediate reaction might be to suggest Heidegger is appropriating 
Jünger's ideas. Whilst an influence is there, and Heidegger accepts this (GA9, 
219), this does not mean to say that the influence is without dispute. Where 
Jünger praises and wishes to embrace technology, Heidegger, already in the mid 
1930s, more clearly in the later Nietzsche lectures and certainly by 1949, has 
purged his work of any trace of this. Heidegger's attitude to technology is far 
more _ critical. 
In the 1950s, Heidegger and Jünger exchanged articles in 
Festschriften for each other's sixtieth birthdays; Jünger's entitled Cher die Linie, 
Heidegger's Über `Die Linie'. Ringer's article looks at the nihilistic 
consequences of technological domination, implicitly criticising his own ideas of 
the 1930s. Heidegger explains that Jünger's über signifies "across, trans, µc'cä" 
(GA9,214). Jünger is therefore concerned with the passage over the line of 
nihilism, with the consequence of passing through nihilism: Across the Line. 
In contrast, by introducing the quotation marks, Heidegger liberates the über 
from the line. His interpretation of über is in terms of de, nspi. His treatment is 
4 `of the line itself, of the zone of self-consummating nihilism" (GA9,214): 
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Concerning `The Line'. 49 Like Nietzsche, suggests Heidegger, Jünger is taking a 
medical approach: "prognosis, diagnosis, therapy" (GA9,215). Heidegger 
suggests that a cure is not possible for the essence of nihilism, only for the results 
and symptoms: "The essence of nihilism is neither healable nor unhealable: It is 
the heal-less, and yet, as such, a unique pointer into health" (GA9,216). For this 
reason Heidegger offers his piece as an explanation that "seeks an encounter with 
the medical assessment of the situation that you [Jünger] have provided. You 
look and cross over the line; I simply look at the line you have represented". As 
has been seen, Jünger's earlier work believed that it could, like Nietzsche 
believed he could, overcome nihilism by nihilism: "The Worker belongs in the 
phase of `active nihilism' (Nietzsche)" (GA9,217). The later Jünger seems to 
recognise that this approach is shot down in flames: "Total mobilisation has 
entered a stage which is even more threatening than what has gone before" '0 . 
Heidegger's approach, once again, tends toward the descriptive rather than, as 
Ringer's does, towards the prescriptive, and notably uses spatial terms to clarify 
the difference: 
In the article Across the Line your give an Ortbeschreibung [a 
description of the place/platial description] of nihilism and an 
estimation of the situation [Lage] and of the possibility of man's 
movement in respect to the place [Ort] described and designated 
by the image of the line. A topography of nihilism, of its process 
and of its overcoming is certainly needed. Yet the topography 
must be preceded by a topology: the discussion of that place 
[Ortes] which gathers being and nothingness into their essence, 
determines the essence of nihilism, and thus makes known the- 
paths on which the ways of a possible overcoming of nihilism are 
indicated (GA9,240). 
If topology is understood as the study of the limit, and topography as the writing 
of place, Heidegger's intent becomes clearer. Whereas Jünger is looking over the 
line, Heidegger is concerned with the line, the demarcation, a delineation. '' This 
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does not mean Heidegger holds out no hope. He is fond of quoting the following 
lines of Hölderlin: 
But where danger is, grows 
The saving power also52 
Heidegger expressly sees this in terms of technology, a point he makes several 
times in his works. "Thus the essential unfolding of technology harbours in itself 
what we least suspect, the possible rise of the saving power" (VA 36; BW 337). 
Though he is deeply sceptical about the advances of technology, Heidegger, 
contrary to how his critics have often characterised him, suggests that outright 
rejection is absurd. Instead, Heidegger suggests that we must give it a trial. "For 
all of us, the arrangements, devices and machinery of the technological world are 
to a greater or lesser extent indispensable. It would be foolish to attack the 
technological world blindly. It would be short-sighted to condemn it as the work 
of the devil. We depend on technical devices; they even challenge us to ever 
greater advances". What is important is to work with technology, but not 
surrender ourselves to it, so that affects our inner and real core. Heidegger 
suggests that this `yes' and `no' is best summarised as releasement toward things 
[Die Gelassenheit zu den Dingen] (G 22-3; DT 53-4; see ID 40/105). Unlike the - 
early Jünger he neither sees technology as a solution, nor looks to a new mode of 
thought over the line. What we have to do is understand and think: where there is 
danger, there is the potential of salvation; where there is power there lies the 
means of its resistance. This leads Heidegger to one of his most famous 
formulations: "The closer we come to the danger, the more brightly do the paths 
into the saving power begin to shine and the more questioning we become. For 
questioning is the piety of thought" (VA 40; BW 341). 
Dwelling Poetically at the Place of the Fourfold 
In his consideration of the German Poet Johann Peter Hebel, Heidegger declares 
that "man `dwells', if he dwells, in the words of Hölderlin, `poetically... upon 
this earth" (GA 13,147; HFH 98). It has been argued that the model of poetic 
dwelling is very close to the anti-Cartesian understanding of space begun in 
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Being and Time. Perhaps now a return to a etymological formulation found in 
this early work can be properly understood: "`In' is derived from `finnan' - `to 
reside' [wohnen], `habitare', `to dwell'... The expression `bin' is connected with 
`bei', and so `ich bin' ['I am'] means in its turn `I reside' or `dwell alongside' the 
world" (GA2,54). The formulation, whilst now clear, was anything but in Being 
and Time, where the spatiality of being was sacrificed to the wish to ground 
existence on temporality, and to derive spatiality from temporality. The shift in 
understanding has been outlined throughout these chapters. 53 As an example, it is 
worth considering Heidegger's discussion of fragment 119 of Heraclitus: "r Ooq 
av0p6)7Ec) &Ai W)v". 
This is usually translated, `A man's character is his daimon' 
[Jonathan Barnes has it as `is his fate']. This translation thinks in a 
modem way, not a Greek one. rj0oc means abode, dwelling place. 
The word names the open region in which man dwells. The open 
region of his abode allows what pertains to man's essence, and 
what is thus arriving resides in nearness to him, to appear. The 
abode of man contains and preserves the advent of what belongs 
to man in his essence. According to Heraclitus's phrase this is 
&tIp nv, the god. The fragment says: Man dwells, insofar as he is 
man, in the nearness of god (GA9,185). 54 
It is worth noting the fact that the notion of dwelling that Heidegger wishes to 
reintroduce is found (at least by Heidegger) in Greek thought. This of course 
links back to Heidegger's praise of Hölderlin and Nietzsche for understanding 
the great age of Greek beginnings. Heidegger goes on to suggest that gOoq is 
found in the word ethics, and that therefore ethics ponders the abode of man. The 
truth of being is therefore an original ethics, but first an ontology (GA9,186-7). 
The understanding of moral or ethical systems in metaphorically spatial terms is, 
as explored in the other chapters of this thesis, evident in the works of both 
Foucault and Nietzsche. 
However, the notion of poetic dwelling is not intended to be, at least not 
primarily, metaphorical. This therefore begs the question as to where does man 
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dwell poetically? The lines of Hölderlin already quoted suggest "on the earth", 
something which Heidegger suggests counters the accusation that poetic 
dwelling is in the realm of fantasy. That said, I have already cautioned against 
the idea of earth alone. The answer is found in many of Heidegger's pieces, such 
as in the following passage: "If the verb `to dwell' is thought broadly and 
essentially enough, it designates to us the manner in which man, upon the earth 
and beneath the sky, completes the passage from birth to death" (GA 13,138-97 
HFH 93). '5 Man dwells poetically at the place of the fourfold. What this means is 
made clear if the lines of Hölderlin that Heidegger is so fond of quoting 
("poetically man dwells") are returned to their true context: 
As long as kindliness [Freundlichkeit], which is pure, remains in 
his heart not unhappily a man may compare himself with the god 
[Gottheit]. Is God unknown? Is he manifest as the sky [Himmel]? 
This rather I believe. It is the measure of man. Full of 
acquirements, but poetically, man dwells on this earth. '6 
These lines are absolutely key, and are worth repeating, with added emphasis to 
four words. 
"As long as kindliness, which is pure, remains in his heart not 
unhappily a man may compare himself with the god. Is God 
unknown? Is he manifest as the sky? This rather I believe. It is the 
measure of man. Full of acquirements, but poetically, man dwells 
on this earth". 
These four words, man, god, sky and earth are the constituent parts of the 
fourfold, the gathering of the four [Geviert]. Therefore, man's dwelling 
poetically on the earth is also under the sky, before the gods, and with other men: 
"`On the earth' already means `under the sky'. Both of these also mean 
`remaining before the gods', and include a `belonging to men's being with one 
another'. By a originary oneness the four - earth and sky, gods and mortals - 
belong together in one... The simple oneness of the four we call the fourfold. 
Mortals are in the fourfold by dwelling" (VA 143; BW 351-2). Heidegger has 
111 
I 
now clearly shown the site, the place of poetic dwelling. This site or place is the 
truth of being, and the fundamental links between the different thoughts in 
Heidegger's work seem to come together. Heidegger claims that "we have 
thought the truth of being in the worlding of world as the mirror play [spiegel- 
spiel] of the fourfold of sky and earth, mortals and gods" (GA79,174; QCT 45). 
If the above argument is followed, it can be seen that the history of being must 
work in tandem with the notion of poetic dwelling. This is made clear in the 
essay on Jünger discussed earlier. It will be remembered that Heidegger is 
debating with Jünger on the notion of nihilism. Here, instead of opposing being 
to nothingness, the void, nihilism, Heidegger instead effaces the word itself. This 
is because Heidegger argues that "a thoughtful glance ahead [Vorblick] into this 
realm can only write `being' as 
>< 
drawing of these crossed lines initially 
has only a preventative role, namely, that of preventing the almost ineradicable 
habit of representing 'being' only as something standing somewhere on its own 
that then on occasion first comes face-to-face with humans" (GA9,238-9). The 
purpose of this peculiar typographical device is not difficult to understand. "The 
symbol of crossing through [Durchkreuzung] cannot, however, be the merely 
negative sign of crossing out [Durchstreichung]. It points, rather, toward the four 
regions of the fourfold [Geviert] and of their gathering at the place of crossing 
through [Ort der Durchkreu ung]" (GA9,239). The place of intersection is 
and therefore any history of being must take into account the crossed lines 
of poetic dwelling, of platial significance. Krell has schematised this as 
follows: '' 
sky gods 
earth mortals 
Within these four-crossed lines, at their intersection, man dwells, poetically. 
Despite Krell's worry that "Heidegger's preoccupation with `the holy' is indeed 
discomforting", 58 and despite the fact a potentially romantic reading of the 
fourfold (i. e. anti-technology) might be apparent, 
59 there is something of 
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fundamental value in what Heidegger is suggesting here. I am not suggesting that 
histories should henceforth take notice of the fourfold in quite the same way that 
Heidegger suggests, but that they can feed on the insight this reading of 
Hölderlin allows. Foucault, for example, is heavily indebted to the way 
Heidegger has fused the concepts of history and space, and yet he never 
discusses the prison, the hospital or the plague town in terms of the gods, man, 
sky and earth. 
In writing these potentially platial descriptions Heidegger discusses the idea of 
measure taking. "The dwelling of humans depends on an upward-looking 
measure-taking of the dimension, in which the sky belongs just as much as the 
earth. This measure-taking not only takes the measure of the earth, y1 l, and 
accordingly it is no mere geo-metry. Just as little does it take the measure of 
heaven [Himmel], ovpavoq, for itself Measure-taking gauges the between, which 
brings the two, heaven and earth, to one another. This measure-taking has its own 
ji tpov, and thus its own metric" (VA 190; PLT 221). Once again it is not a 
question of understanding space in Cartesian terms, not a simple earth- 
measuring, geo-metry, just as it is not simply a geo-graphy, or earth-writing. To 
lead into the examination of the platial descriptions in Heidegger's later work, it 
is worth considering Heidegger's approving quotation of Hölderlin's 1804 letter 
to von Seckendorf: "At present I am especially occupied with the fable, the 
poetic view of history, and the architectonics of skies, especially of our nation's, 
so far as it differs from the Greek". 60 
Platial Descriptions 
Having gained these insights, Heidegger undertakes some studies that could be 
seen as platial. However, important though the historical is to these pieces, it 
would be pushing credulity to describe them as histories. What instead they do is 
examine, though with ä historical backdrop, the significance of space, place and 
location. Indeed, throughout Heidegger's later works the importance of space and 
place is evident, turning up in some unusual places. For example, in an essay 
entitled "Language", Heidegger discusses Georg Trakl's poem "A Winter 
Evening". His commentary is especially of interest when he looks at the line 
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"Pain has turned the threshold to stone", the second line of the third stanza: "The 
threshold is the ground-beam that bears the doorway as a whole. It sustains the 
middle in which the two, the outside and the inside, penetrate each other. The 
threshold bears the between... " (GA12,24; PLT 204). This understanding of the 
threshold as a place of transition is recurrent in several places in Foucault's work. 
But in the context of this chapter, and to draw together some of the strands, the 
focus will be on three places: the bridge in "Building Dwelling Thinking"; the 
jug in "The Thing"; and, in a return to an earlier theme, a discussion of art and 
space. 
Heidegger's lecture "Building Dwelling Thinking" is geared toward investigating 
two questions. First, "what is the relationship between place [Ort] and space? ", 
and second "what is the relationship between man and space? " (VA 149; BW 
357). As with many of his later essays, Heidegger uses etymology to penetrate 
the words . 
61 He begins by looking at the word space itself: "What the word for 
space, Raum, designates is said by its ancient meaning. Raum, Rum, means a 
Platz that is freed for settlement and lodging". Space is freed, liberated, for a 
purpose. "A space is something that has been -made room for [Eingeräumtes], 
something that has been freed, namely within a boundary, -Greek paq. A 
boundary is not that at which something stops but, as the Greeks recognised, the 
boundary is that from which something begins its essential unfolding. That is 
why the concept is that of the `oplS tog, that is boundary [Grenze]". A freed space 
within a boundary, a threshold. Heidegger continues: "Space is in essence that 
for which room has been made, that which is let into its bounds" (VA 149; BW 
356). There is an important, if slight, shift in Heidegger-'s overall argument here. 
Rather than place being opposed to space, understood as Cartesian, Heidegger is 
suggesting that space can be rethought through its relation to place, in order to 
return us to a more originary understanding. Such an attitude is clearly evident in 
the late lecture "Art and Space" , 
dealt with in detail in the final section of this 
chapter. To further his purpose here Heidegger decides to examine something 
that has been built, a built thing, and to assess how this relates to space and place. 
The example for Heidegger's reflection is a bridge: 
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The bridge... does not just connect banks [Ufer] that are already 
present-at-hand. The banks emerge as banks only as the bridge 
crosses the stream. The bridge expressly causes them to lie across 
from each other. One side is set off against the other by the 
bridge. Nor do the banks stretch along the stream as indifferent 
border strips of the dry land. With the banks, the bridge brings to 
the stream the one and the other expanse of the landscape lying 
behind them [Uferlandschaft]. It brings stream and bank and land 
into each other's neighbourhood... Bridges initiate in many ways. 
The city bridge leads from the precincts of the castle to the 
cathedral square; the river bridge near the country town brings 
wagons and horse teams to the surrounding villages. The old stone 
bridge's humble brook crossing gives to the harvest wagon its 
passage [Weg] from the fields into the village and carries the 
lumber cart from the field path to the road. The Autobahn bridge 
is tied into the network of long-distance traffic, paced and 
calculated for maximum yield (VA 146-7; BW 354). 
The investigation of the question of technology showed that there Heidegger 
opposed the bridge in its relationship with nature to the hydroelectric plant. Both 
are related to the river, but in fundamentally different ways. - The bridge 
Heidegger has in mind here is a site for the fourfold: "To be sure, the bridge is a 
thing of its own kind; for it gathers the fourfold in such a way that it allows a site 
[Stätte] for it. But only something that is itself a place [Ort] can make space 
[einräumen] 
-for a site. The place is not already present-at-hand before the 
bridge... Accordingly, spaces receive their essential being from places and not 
from' space [Demnach empfangen die Räume ihr Wesen aus Orten und nicht 
aus «dem» Raum]" (VA 148-9; BW 355-6). The bridge is such a place. It can 
therefore, as such a thing, function to situate "a space into which earth and sky, 
gods and mortals are admitted" (VA 149; BW 357). 62 
This all links back into the project outlined above, of finding a more truthful way 
of characterising man's relationship with, and perception of, space. Heidegger 
suggests that we should pay heed to the relations between places and spaces, 
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especially as these come together in buildings. Space should not be seen as 
something "over and above" men, because inherent in the concept of man is that 
of dwelling. Instead of the abstracting Cartesianism, Heidegger suggests space as 
locales, places. Numerical magnitudes can never be the "ground of the essence of 
spaces and places" (VA 150; BW 358). Heidegger explains: "Man's relation to 
places, and through places to spaces, inheres in his dwelling. The relationship 
between man and space is none other than dwelling, thought essentially" (VA 
152; BW 359). "Because building produces things as places, it is closer to the 
essence of spaces and to the essential descent `of' space than any geometry and 
mathematics. Building puts up places that make space for the site of the fourfold" 
(VA 153; BW 360). Having attained this insight, Heidegger comes back to the 
purpose for his talk, the housing crisis in Germany. As with many of his essays 
of this period - the work on technology and the nokti are striking examples - this 
is a critique of the present. Building is not simply architecture or construction, 
but a letting dwell. Heidegger suggests that Germany is not just facing a crisis of 
housing, but of dwelling and thinking too (VA 156; BW 363). 63 
Indeed, Heidegger Minks that the crisis of thinking is perhaps the greatest crisis 
facing mankind: "Most thought-provoking in our thought-provoking time is that 
we are still not thinking" (`'V -D 3; WCT 6). As a concluding comment to the 
remarks on this essay, it is worth noting that understanding the German word 
bauen, to build, enables us to understand better Heidegger's notion - already 
there in Being and Time, of Destruktion. This has been continually rendered as 
'de-struction'. Like the English destruction, Destruktion derives from the Latin 
destruere, to pull down, literally de-struere, to un-build. To translate Destruktion 
as `destruction' emphasises the violence rather than the de-structuring. Violence 
may well be a part, but it is a violence of excavation, unbuilding rather than 
obliteration. Nietzsche, Foucault and- Derrida (who most obviously borrows and 
creatively translates this term as deconstruction) all undertake this project in 
various ways. As Heidegger himself clarifies: "De-struction does not mean 
destroying [Zerstören] but unbuilding [Abbauen], liquidating [Abtragen], putting 
to one side the merely historical assertions about the history of philosophy" (WiP 
70-2/71-3; see Q IV, 426). 
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Heidegger's discussion in th electure "The Thing", part of the "Insight" series, 
begins by discussing the way the modern world is making all distances in time 
and space shrink. Now we can reach the other side of the world over-night, hear 
news as it happens across the world, watch speeded up footage of a plant 
growing and see sites from ancient history on film. But, as has been shown, 
Heidegger does not always equate shortness of distance with nearness. Via a 
brief passage that suggests that the atom bomb is the culmination of man's 
attitude to science, Heidegger claims that so far man has "given no more thought 
to the thing as a thing than he has to nearness". Just as the bridge served as the 
example of a built thing, Van Gogh's painting was a representative work of art, 
and the shoes he painted an example of equipment, Heidegger this time chooses a 
jug to stand as his case-study: "The jug is a thing. What is the jug? " (VA 158; 
PLT 166) 
The jug is a holding vessel, something that holds. The holding is done by the 
base and sides, and the jug can be held itself by its handle. The jug is made by 
the potter from the earth. "The jug's thingness resides in its being as vessel. We 
become aware of the vessel's holding nature when we fill the jug". But, asks 
Heidegger, what does filling the jug mean? We fill the jug, which can hold, and 
which does so by the base and sides. This does not mean that we fill the base and 
sides, but rather pour between the sides and over the bottom. We therefore, rather 
than filling anything of the jug, we fill the emptiness of the jug. "The emptiness, 
the void [die Leere], is what does the vessel. 's holding. The empty space, this 
nothing of the jug, is what the jug is as the holding vessel". It follows from this 
that the potter who "forms sides and bottom on his wheel" does not strictly 
speaking make the jug, rather, he shapes the void (VA 16 11; PLT 169). 
Of course, modem science will tell us that there is no void in the jug, but that it is 
filled with air, and that pouring anything else into the jug merely displaces what 
is already there. Heidegger does not dispute that this scientific view is correct, 
but he does argue that it tells us little about the jug. This is because "science 
always encounters only what its kind of representation has admitted beforehand 
as an object possible for science" (VA 162; PLT 170). This is what Heidegger 
was arguing back in Being and Time, that usual theories relate to things at a level 
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abstracted from everyday action. The ontological foundation of modern science 
acts to limit the ontic phenomena it is able to experience and to encompass. 
Science can give us an interpretation, which can even be correct, but it does not 
help in understanding the jug. We can place a stone on a balance, but this merely 
brings its heaviness into the form of a calculated weight; the weight's burden has 
escaped us (GA5,35; BW 172). Similarly, Kant's thing-in-itself means "an 
object that is no object for us" because it is thought apart from the human 
encounter of it (VA 169; PLT 177; see GA41). 
Although Heidegger does not mention it, there has also been a subtle revision of 
his view in Being and Time on the idea of `in', for now it is significant that the 
gift, the wine, is `in' the jug. For Heidegger believes it is important that the 
character of the jug consists "in the gift of the outpouring" (VA 164; PLT 172). 
This thing, in its place, in its context, holding the gift, is another site for the 
fourfold of gods, men, sky and earth: "In the gift of the outpouring earth and sky, 
gods and mortals dwell together all at once" (VA 165-6; PLT 173). Heidegger 
continues, and makes clearer the spatial implications: "What is gathered in the 
gift gathers itself in appropriatively staying the fourfold. This m. nifold-simple 
gathering is the jug's essence. Our language denotes what a gathering is by an 
ancient word. That word is. thing. the jug's essence is the pure, giving gathering 
of the one-fold fourfold into a single stay. The jug essences as a thing" (VA 166; 
FLT 174). Just as we use the hammer, and experience space, we must look at the 
jug in a way akin to poetic dwelling. To understand the jug as a jug we must 
avoid the abstraction of modem science. 
Art and Space 
One of Heidegger's very last pieces is a lecture entitled "Art and Space", 
published in 1969. It picks up several of the themes about space that have been 
discussed in these chapters, and therefore serves well to summarise the argument. 
It also leads us into the arguments concerning Foucault in the following chapters. 
It is very precise in its use of certain key terms, a fact obscured in part by the 
existing English translation. (For this reason a new translation is included as an 
appendix to this thesis: it contains the pagination of GA13 in brackets in the 
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text. ) It was shown in, the discussion of the bridge that Heidegger thought that a 
space is something that has been made room for, something that has been freed, 
namely within a boundary. This idea is found in a few places within his work, 
notably when he looks at elements of the rural existence. In one example he talks 
of the cabinet-maker's apprentice learning to "answer and respond... to all the 
different kinds of wood and to the shapes slumbering within wood... this 
relationship to wood is what maintains the whole craft" (WhD 50; WCT 14-5). In 
another example, Heidegger speaks of the idea of a pathway: a recurrent theme in 
his work. "To clear a way [Einen Weg bahnen] - for instance across a snow- 
covered field - is still today in the Alemannic-Swabian dialect called wegen 
[waying]. This transitive verb means to form a way, giving shape to it and 
keeping it in shape" (GA12,249; WL 129-30). We will remember the titles of 
Holzwege and Wegmarken. A path through the woods may need to be cleared 
before it can be seen. 
It seems to be the same with sculpture, the art-form that is the basis for the "Art 
and Space" lecture. Heidegger begins by suggesting that even those remarks of 
his that are uttered as assertions are actually questions, but it seems as if what he 
is doing is gradually exposing the flaws in some of his initial formulations of the 
question of sculpture, and that the path of thought is becoming increasingly clear. 
At the outset, Heidegger suggests that "sculpted forms [Die plastischen Gebilde] 
are bodies [Körper]. Their mass, consisting of different materials, is variously 
fashioned. The fashioning happens by limitation through an inclusionary and 
exclusionary limit. Through this, space comes into play; occupied by the sculpted 
form as a closed, breached and empty volume". This seems fair enough, and 
perhaps a usual initial reaction. Then Heidegger remarks that "art and scientific 
technology consider and treat space toward various purposes in various ways" 
(GA 13,204). This much has been made clear in his opposition of experiential 
and mathematical space. Heidegger rehearses that argument again here, 
suggesting that "physically-technologically ordered space, however it may be 
determined" should not be held "as the sole true space". This is due to the fact 
that this view of space, of uniform extension, determined by Galileo and Newton, 
is the correlate of modern European subjectivity (GA13,205) - i. e. of Descartes. 
The question of history is central. 
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However Heidegger then outlines what appear to be the three spaces involved in 
an understanding of sculpture: "Space, wit hin which the sculptured orm can be 
met as a present-at-hand object; space, which encloses the volume of the figure; 
space, which persists between volumes". Even if calculative measurement cannot 
be applied to artistic figures, asks Heidegger, are these three spaces still not 
merely derivative of physical-technological space? For an answer to the question 
of the propriety [Eigenes] of space, Heidegger returns to language - so often the 
preoccupation of his late essays. In `space' [Raum], the word `making space' 
[Räumen] is spoken. "This means: clearing out [roden], to make free from 
wilderness. Making space brings forth the free, the openness for the settling and 
dwelling of humans" (GA13,206). This much has been seen in the essays that 
looked at the idea of poetic dwelling. As Heidegger then goes on to suggest, 
"making space is, thought in its propriety, the release [Freigabe] of places 
[Orten]" (GA13,206). 
Shifting the emphasis onto place recalls the insights of the essays on the jug and 
the bridge. These places are important to humans in terms of a home, in terms of 
the gods, in terms of dwelling. We are reminded that "place always opens a 
region, in which it gathers things in their belonging together" (GA13,207), and 
that we must "learn to recognise that things themselves are places, and not only 
occupy a place". This notion of place is now, as before, opposed to 
technological, Cartesian space: "Place is not found within a pre-given space, 
such as that of physico-technological space. The later unfolds only through the 
reigning of places of a region". What this enables is the potential for rethinking 
the notion of space otherwise than extension. Although in these chapters I. have 
often introduced an opposition between space and place, this is in order to 
distance myself from space understood as extension. Here - as in "Building 
Dwelling Thinking" - Heidegger collapses the terms back together, by hinting at 
their originary bond. As shall be suggested in the following chapter, the French 
espace holds this association with place better than the English `space'. 
Returning to the subject of the lecture, Heidegger suggests that the initial 
direction of the piece was misguided, as "the interplay of art and space must be 
thought out of the experience of place and region". Where art is sculpture, there 
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is "no occupying of space. Sculpture would have no confrontation 
[A useinunderset: ung] with space", instead "sculpture would be the embodiment 
of places" (GA13,208). In thinking of sculpture we should abandon the idea of 
volume, "the signification of which is only as old as modern technological 
natural science", which would make sculpture "an embodying bringing-into-the- 
work of places... the embodiment of the truth of being in its work of instituting 
places" (GA13,209). The link to the truth of being, which has been seen to be an 
inherently historical question, makes the suggestion complete. Place is historical: 
history is platial. 
In a 1958 essay on language, Heidegger again returns to the rural, and argues that 
two farmsteads an hour apart can have greater neighbourhood than two 
townhouses. Nearness is not outside and independent of space and time, but it 
does not depend on space and time as parameters (GA12,198-9; WL 103). 
Understanding space and time in a non-mathematically calculated way is 
precisely what Heidegger has been shown to do throughout these three chapters. 
Struggling for a way to express what he means, Heidegger resorts to creating 
new verbs: time times, space spaces. "Space: makes space for placing and places, 
vacates them and at the same time gives them free for all things and receives 
what is- simultaneous as space-time". This notion of space-time brings to 
completion the path that Heidegger has been walking. The Kantian primacy of 
time is gone; time is resolutely non-Aristotelian; the understanding of space by 
extension is discarded. Timing and spacing [Zeitigend einräumend] "move the 
time-play-space of the encounter of the four world regions: earth and sky, gods 
and man - the world play" (GA 12,201-2; WL 106). This is clarified in the 
lecture "Time and Being". As has been shown, Heidegger wishes to conceive of 
time not in terms of the now but of the Moment, in terms of presencing. Here, he 
suggests that presencing "opens up what we call time-space". Time-space does 
not mean the distance between two points in time, it is not a time-span, but the 
"openness which opens up in the mutual self-extending of futural approach, past 
and present. This openness exclusively and primarily provides the space in which 
space as we usually know it can unfold" (ZSD 14-15; TB 14; see GA41,16). 
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These three chapters have attempted to trace the trajectory of the concepts of 
history and space through the works of Heidegger, in order to illuminate both 
Heidegger's own work, and to demonstrate his influence on Foucault. In one of 
his very last wörks, published in 1969, Heidegger concedes that (. 'the attempt in 
Being and Time, section 70, to derive the spatiality of Dasein from temporality is 
untenable" (ZSD 24; TB 23). 64 These chapters have shown how and why 
Heidegger came to realise this. The consequences of this realisation are readily 
apparent in the work of Michel Foucault, whose own path of thought had begun 
at the time of this lecture. Following that path leads into the territory of the final 
two chapters of this thesis. 
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A 
Chapter Five 
Towards a Spatial History 
Introduction 
Foucault was never keen for his work to be analysed as a method, a theory, or 
worse, as a system, but suggested that those interested in his work should do 
genealogies, as he had done. ' But whilst Foucault felt that his work provided a 
set of conceptual tools, a toolbox (DE III, 427; P/K 145) for use by others, these 
tools have sometimes been used uncritically, without due attendance to their 
theoretical underpinnings. 2 It is a principal claim of this thesis that to understand 
how to use Foucault's work it is necessary to understand its theoretical 
background, and, therefore, his intellectual heritage. 
When Foucault's influences are examined the standard procedure is to make 
reference to his rejection of parts of Marxism, debate the charge of structuralism, 
and make a nod toward Nietzsche - especially on the points of the historical 
approach and the understanding of power. Sometimes a passing gesture is made 
to the influence of Bachelard and Canguilhem. 3 However, as was noted at the 
beginning of Chapter Two, in putatively his last interview Foucault made an 
important comment: 
Heidegger has always been for me the essential philosopher. I 
began by reading Hegel, then Marx, and I set out to read 
Heidegger in 1951 or 1952; then in 1952 or 1953... I read 
Nietzsche... My entire philosophical development was 
determined by my reading of Heidegger. I nevertheless recognise 
that Nietzsche outweighed him [Va emporte]... It is probable that 
if I had not read Heidegger, I would not have read Nietzsche. I 
had tried to read Nietzsche in the fifties but Nietzsche alone said 
nothing to me - whereas Nietzsche and Heidegger: that was a 
philosophical shock! (DE IV, 703; PPC 250) 
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Foucault's other references to Heidegger are very brief, and hardly amount to 
anything. Yet he suggests that his entire philosophical development was 
determined by Heidegger, and that reading him was central to his understanding 
of Nietzsche. The reason why Foucault hardly ever mentions Heidegger is, he 
suggests, that one "should have a small number of authors with whom one 
thinks, with whom one works, but about whom one does not write" (DE IV, 703; 
PPC 250). 4 
It is perhaps understandable that Foucault's lack of reference to Heidegger 
should be paralleled in the secondary literature, but a detailed reading of both 
authors shows how deep the influence runs. My contention is that it is very 
difficult to properly understand Foucault's work - or, at least, some parts of it - 
without understanding the influence of Heidegger. Hubert Dreyfus and Paul 
Rabinow - in a book endorsed by Foucault - trace the influence of Heidegger on 
the early Foucault, but see a distance between them in Foucault's later work; ' 
other commentators make remarks such as this: 
Heidegger's influence on Foucault is immense and crucial to an 
understanding of his work, but the Heideggerian influence on 
Foucault is mediated by Foucault- 's understanding of Nietzsche. 6 
This chapter makes the claim that the reverse of this is actually the case - that 
Nietzsche's influence on Foucault is indeed immense, but that it is continually 
mediated by Heidegger, and Heidegger's reading of Nietzsche. This is, of course, 
closer to what Foucault - in the remarks above - actually said. 
' 
Foucault read Heidegger in the original German, 8 and we can therefore be sure 
that in the early 50s he had access to a range of Heidegger's most important texts 
- Being and Time, Letter on Humanism, Hofwege, Erläuterungen zu Hölderlins 
Dichtung, Vorträge und Aufsäre - and though the Nietzsche volumes were not 
published until 1961, important essays which anticipated their contents were 
found in earlier collections. 9 A number of parallels between Heidegger and 
Foucault immediately present themselves - most of which cannot be adequately 
treated here. As Miller has noted, Heidegger's Kant and the Problem of 
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Metaphysics implicitly informs Foucault's second thesis on Kant's 
Anthropology; The Order of Things relies on Heidegger's critique of humanism; 
and The Archaeology of Knowledge looks at the anonymous domain where "one" 
- Heidegger's das Man - speaks. 
1° Similarly, Derrida notes the association 
between the analysis of death in The Birth of the Clinic and in Heidegger's 
work. " It would also be interesting to see how important Heidegger's 
understanding of care [Sorge] and concern [besorgen] is for Foucault's later 
work on the care/concern [souci] of the self, and how Heidegger's reading of 
Greek thought relates to Foucault's readings of antiquity. However, this thesis is 
concerned primarily with Foucault's historical and spatial approaches. 
In terms of the historical approach Nietzsche is usually looked at as the principal 
influence, but this chapter argues that certain key points - the present, power, 
technology and dispositif - are prefigured by arguments of Heidegger's. 
Foucault's spatial analyses have been regularly cited in recent work - especially 
in urban studies and geography - and along with Lefebvre he is one of the key 
theoretical models in this work. However, the understanding of Foucault's work 
has often been patchy or partial, and is often used to either reinvigorate 
geography or to provide a history of space. In this thesis, the aim is to provide a 
s theoretical approach towards a-spatial history. This chapter suggests that thi is 
indeed what Foucault does, and that his understanding of space, and his use of a 
spatialised history, is conditioned by his reading of Nietzsche and, most 
importantly, Heidegger. 
This chapter therefore looks at Foucault's works in the light of the discussion of 
Nietzsche and Heidegger established in earlier chapters. It deals with the 
theoretical formulations of Foucault's work, with emphasis on his 
methodological works, looking at his historical approach, and the role of space 
within it. The following chapter utilises the insights gained from these analyses 
to recast the readings of two of Foucault's most important studies: Histoire de la 
folie; and the genealogy of modem discipline in hospitals, schools, the army and 
prisons found in The Birth of the Clinic, Discipline and Punish and numerous 
shorter pieces. 
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IA History of Limits 
The preface to Foucault's first major work, Folie et deraison: Histoire de la folie 
a1 'age classique, tried to set out some methodological concerns. 12 Foucault 
argues that what he is writing is a "history of limits [limites]" (DE I, 161), a 
history of boundaries. His research examines a realm "where what is in question 
is the limits rather than the identity of a culture" (DE 1,161; MC xiii). Each 
limit-experience - an experience, such as madness, which inhabits the frontiers 
of our culture - "marks a limit which signifies, at the same time, an original 
division" (DE I, 161). 13 This interest in the limits of experience - of 
transgression, of the crossing of boundaries, of the mapping of uncharted space, 
of the path between the known and the unknown - works on two main levels, the 
level of the imaginary and the level of the real. Foucault stresses that he 
undertakes his inquiry "under the sun of the great Nietzschean search" (DE I, 
162), and the link to the approach of The Birth of Tragedy is clear throughout. In 
an interview around the same time he also indicates the influence of the historian 
of religions, Georges Dumezil. Dumezil is important because of his 
understanding of structure, of social segregation and exclusion. In Histoire de la 
folie Foucault is interested in seeing how the physical divide of segregation and 
exclusion interrelates with the experience of madness, with science and 
rationalist philosophy (DE I, 168; FL 8). This relationship of the real and the 
imaginary - of the practical and the theoretical - underpins his studies 
throughout. 14 
The language that Foucault uses in works of his archaeological period - Histoire 
de la folie, The Birth of the Clinic, The Order of Things, The Archaeology of 
Knowledge - is often overtly spatialised, making use of terms such as limit, 
boundary, transgression, and threshold. 15 In its understanding of the 
conceptualisation of knowledge - of discourse and episteme - it bears 
comparison with the spatialised conceptions of Nietzsche and Heidegger. The 
particular terms that Foucault uses are also found in his contemporaneous essays 
on literature - mainly in the journal Critique - on figures such as Bataille, 
Blanchot, Hölderlin and Flaubert. 16 As a particular example of the links between 
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his literary and historical work, it is instructive to compare the books The Birth of 
the Clinic and Raymond Roussel, both published in May 1963. " The opening 
line of the former - "This book is about space, about language, and about death; 
it is a question of the gaze" (NC v; BC ix) - could easily stand as a description of 
the latter (see RR 209; DL 166). 18 
What is important about Foucault's use of overtly spatialised language is that it 
enables him to free his histories from the teleological bias of alternative 
accounts. By conceiving of historical periods or epochs as bounded areas, he is 
able to investigate their limits or thresholds, and trace the potential of 
transgression, or egress. 19 Foucault is occasionally described, therefore, as a 
thinker of discontinuity, in that he tries to locate abrupt shifts, or `breaks' in the 
history of thought. 2° Instead, Foucault argues that he recognises what appear to 
be obvious breaks, but tries to analyse how the shift occurred. For example, The 
Birth of the Clinic is concerned with less than half a century, but it is "one of 
those periods that mark an ineradicable chronological threshold" (NC 199; BC 
195). The work of Bayle seems like a "hilarious object of folklore", whereas 
Pomme's work, even if it contains errors, is "nevertheless part of the same type 
of knowledge as our own" (PPC 100; see DE III, 142-4; FR 53-5). His work is 
therefore a critical operation to investigate this, aiming: 
To establish limits, where the history of thought, in its traditional 
form, gave itself an indefinite space... I would like to substitute 
the notion that the discourses are limited practical domains which 
have their boundaries [frontieres - borders/frontiers], their rules 
of formation, their conditions of existence... to which one can 
affix thresholds, and assign conditions of birth and disappearance 
(DE I, 683-4; FL 41) 
Similarly he conceives of madness and reason, sickness and health in spatial 
terms, and then examines the groups that inhabit the liminal areas. I will return to 
the analyses of actual spaces below, but first it is worth dwelling on Foucault's 
use of spatialised language in his work on history, designated 
by two main 
rubrics - archaeology and genealogy. 
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Archaeology 
Foucault uses the word archaeology in a number of early works, and it at first 
appears, as Sheridan suggests, to be almost just an alternative to `history' as a 
means of distinguishing his approach. 21 Over the course of his work in the 1960s it 
becomes a central concept in his work. Foucault's choice of the term 
`archaeology', however, immediately invites misunderstanding. It is neither the 
search for an origin - in Greek arche - nor does it relate to geological 
excavation. Foucault claims that he is justified by "the right of words - which is 
not that of the philologists" in using the term archaeology to describe his 
researches, as they examine the archive: "Archaeology describes discourses as 
practices specified in the element of the archive" (AS 173; AK 131). In the sense 
he understands his research it is closer to being an archiveology. 
Foucault describes the archive as "the general system of the formation and 
transformation of statements [enonces]" (AS 171; AK 130). An enonce is a 
technical or formal statement, made within a particular discipline - Linnaeus' 
Genera Plantaruma is made up of enonces, the forms of a verb in a book of 
Latin grammar are enonces, as are algebraic formulae (AS 109; AK 82). The 
enonce is neither the same kind of unit as a sentence, a proposition, or a speech- 
act, nor is it the same as a material object. It is "neither entirely linguistic, nor 
exclusively material... it is caught up in a logical, grammatical, locutory nexus" 
(AS 114-5; AK 86). This last definition is important, as the rules of discourse 
function in a similar way to those of logic and grammar. Just as in ordinary 
speech we need to obey the rules of grammar and logic, within a technical 
conversation we have to situate our enonces within the rules of the discourse. 
"An enonce belongs to a discursive formation as a sentence belongs to a text, and 
a proposition to a deductive whole" (AS 152; AK 116). The enonces actually 
permissible at any given time are only a fraction of those logically and 
grammatically possible: the discursive formulation of the subject also acts as a 
limit. This is why, for example, Bayle makes sense to us today, whilst Pomme 
"speaks to us in the language of fantasy" (NC v-vi; BC ix-x); why Borges' 
"certain Chinese Encyclopaedia" provokes such laughter (M&C 7; OT xv). 
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For an enonce to be accepted within a discipline - even before it can be 
pronounced true or false - it must "fulfil complex and serious demands", it must 
be, in Canguilhem's phrase, "within the true" (OD 35-6; AK 224). This is an 
important point, as it proves that a discourse conditions the possibility of all 
enonces - whether they are true or false. We cannot judge Pomme's enonce as 
true or false, it fails at a lower level than that, it is simply `fantasy'. This 
becomes clearer in Foucault's discussion of the "positivity of a discourse" which 
"characterises its unity throughout time... it defines a limited space of 
communication... positivity plays the role of what might be called the historical 
a priori" (AS 166-7; AK 126-7). Foucault accepts that juxtaposing these two 
words produces a "rather startling effect", as the standard understanding of a 
priori is that it is ahistorical, absolute. Foucault's term does not simply mean that 
the a priori is also endowed with a history, rather he is introducing a notion of 
pluralism into the history of ideas, in that there have been several a priori 
structures in various disciplines, that conditioned possibilities in those subjects. 22 
This bears definite comparison with the understanding of the history of science 
found in Nietzsche and Heidegger, discussed in Chapter Three. Foucault's 
understanding of the historical a priori does not function as "a condition of 
validity for judgements, but a condition of reality for enonces" (AS 167-9; AK 
128). 23 
In The Birth of the Clinic Foucault examines the area of physical illness, and argues 
that there has been a shift in how things have been seen. Today, medicine is 
generally accepted to be based upon clear, objective, scientific knowledge: the body 
and diseases seen with an unblemished empirical eye. However, it has not always 
been so, and medicine is not based on pure experience free of interpretation, 
but is 
structured by a set of beliefs relative to the period, a grid of a priori conceptions. 
For the nineteenth century physician the patient (their age, sex, and personal 
history) got in the way of the disease - this interference has to 
be bypassed, through 
the abstraction of the gaze [le regard]. The Birth of the 
Clinic is therefore the 
'2 archaeology of this `medical gaze. 
4 
In The Order of Things this understanding is put to work across a sweep of 
disciplines, examining the knowledges of life, language and wealth through 
three 
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broad historical periods, which Foucault calls epistemes. Interestingly, he finds 
examples of the shift from one episteme to another in literary works. 25 Between 
the Renaissance and the Classical epoch, Don Quixote's adventures "form the 
boundary [tracent la limite]: they mark the end of the old interplay between 
resemblance and signs and contain the beginnings of new relations" (M&C 60; 
OT 46). The birth of modern culture is found in the work of the Marquis de Sade, 
especially in Justine and Juliette (M&C 222; OT 210). The archaeological 
analysis allows Foucault to trace the change in these knowledges, examining how 
the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries had general grammar, natural history 
and the analysis of wealth; whilst the nineteenth century had philology, biology 
and political economy: 
Archaeology, addressing itself to the general space of knowledge, 
to its configurations, and to the mode of being of the things that 
appear in it, defines systems of simultaneity, as well as the series 
of mutations necessary and sufficient to circumscribe the 
threshold of a new positivity (M&C 14; OT xxiii). 
The use of spatial language throughout these works is pronounced. Rather than 
conceive of historical changes as a linear development, Foucault suggests that the 
"domain of the modern epistejne should be represented rather . as a volume of 
space open in three dimensions... [an] epistemological trihedron" (M&C 358; 
OT 346-7). These examinations lead Foucault to one of his most celebrated 
formulations, suggesting that "man is an invention of recent date. And one 
perhaps nearing its end". 
If those arrangements [dispositions] were to disappear as they 
appeared, if some event of which we can at the moment do no 
more than sense the possibility... were to cause them to crumble, 
as the ground of Classical thought did, at the end of the eighteenth 
century, then one can certainly wager that man would be erased, 
like a face drawn in sand at the edge [limite] of the sea (M&C 
398; OT 387) 
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Some key issues arise from Foucault's archaeological period: does his analysis of 
epistemes constitute a global study, and is he able to escape the problem of 
subjectivity; and are his studies structuralist? On these points Foucault was 
unequivocal. He suggests that archaeological analysis is always limited and 
regional: "Far from wishing to reveal general forms, archaeology tries to outline 
particular configurations" (AS 206; AK 157). Whilst it is true that most of his 
studies do look at limited areas - historically and geographically bounded - at 
times he does try to make the broad sweep. The Birth of the Clinic, looking at 
medicine, for about fifty years, and at the French example, is arguably a more 
successful study than The Order of Things, which studies three areas, across 
almost four hundred years, and across the Western world. Whilst Foucault denied 
this, the comparative study in the latter work set him up for refutation by 
counter-examples that did not follow the same epistemic shifts. 
Foucault suggests that "instead of exploring the consciousness/knowledge 
[connaissance]/science axis (which cannot escape subjectivity), archaeology 
explores the discursive practice/knowledge [savoir]/science axis" (AS 239; AK 
183). It is clear that a distinction between connaissance and savoir is essential, 
though they are both usually translated as `knowledge' in English. To explain his 
understanding of these terms, Foucault adds a note to the English edition: `By 
connaissance I mean the relation of the subject to the object and the formal rules 
that govern it. Savoir refers to the conditions that are necessary in a particular 
period for this or that type of object to be given to connaissance and for this or 
26 that enunciation to be formulated" (AK 15n). This understanding is close to the 
distinction Heidegger makes between ontic and ontological knowledge in Being 
and Time. For Heidegger, the question of Being is an ontological question, which 
aims "at ascertaining The a priori conditions... for the possibility of the sciences 
which examine entities" - ontic knowledge (GA2,11). What 
is important is that 
Foucault historicises this ontology - thereby refusing to set universal conditions 
- something that Heidegger only does in his later works. 
Foucault was often thought of as a structuralist, especially with regard to his 
works of the 1960s. 27 By the late 60s he was distancing himself 
from the 
movement, but had earlier certainly utilised its language, and, in a revealing 
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interview given in Tunisia had accepted the label, clarifying how he understood 
and used its tools (DE I, 580-4). But in the 1970 foreword to the English edition 
of The Order of Things, he berates "certain half-witted `commentators' [who] 
persist in labelling me a `structuralist'. I have been unable to get it into their tiny 
minds that I have used none of the methods, concepts, or key terms that 
characterise structuralist analysis" (DE II, 13; OT xiv). This is clearly protesting 
too much. As Neocleous notes, there are clear similarities between Foucault and 
the structuralists over the question of agency, 28 which links to a common anti- 
humanism. The ethnology of Levi-Strauss and the psychoanalysis of Lacan are 
praised in The Order of Things for dissolving man (M&C 385ff; OT 373ff; see 
also AS 22-3; AK 12-3); Foucault's debt to the work of Althusser, and their 
common heritage in Bachelard, Canguilhem and Heidegger showcase other links. 
Similarly Foucault shares with the structuralists an appreciation of the work of 
Saussure, especially evident in the language used in The Birth of the Clinic - 
something he later admits to as a problem (AS 27; AK 16). Rather than accept 
his passage from structuralism to something else - sometimes termed 
poststructuralism - Foucault attempts to cover his tracks, revising The Birth of 
the Clinic in 1972, and purging it of structuralist language. James Miller suggests 
that the use of this jargon was largely cosmetic, as the "buzzwords were easily 
jettisoned in 1972, without touching the book's central argument". 29 However, 
the argument built on structuralist foundations remains untouched: perhaps only 
the language of structuralism was jettisoned. 
Despite Foucault's repeated denials, his archaeological approach owes much to 
the French intellectual scene of the -1960s - though it differs in two central 
respects. The first is that while most structuralists marginalised history, 
preferring atemporal structures, Foucault was from the outset a historian (see DE 
III, 144-5; FR 56; AS 25; AK 15). 30 Second - and a point that will be returned to 
- while Foucault shared with the structuralists a predilection 
for spatial 
metaphors, he alone continually paired them with analyses of actual spaces. ;' His 
histories were not merely spatial in the language they used, or in the metaphors 
of knowledge they developed, but were also histories of spaces, and attendant to 
the spaces of history. 
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Genealogy 
The events of 1968 seem to have had a major effect on Foucault. No longer did he 
concentrate on the workings of language, of discursive practices, but he returned to 
the examination of particular disciplines and their internal shifts, as he had in 
Histoire de la folie. Foucault only rarely uses the terms carefully elaborated in The 
Archaeology of Knowledge again. Hacking suggests that his "obsession with words 
was too fragile too stand", 32 though arguably the theoretical apparatus elaborated 
simply fell into the background. The crucial text in examining the change is 
Foucault's inaugural lecture at the College de France, L 'Ordre du discours. In this 
text we find a burgeoning interest in the uses made of discursive practices, 
particularly their relation to non-discursive practices, rather than their internal 
workings. Foucault has become increasingly interested in political questions: 
"history has constantly impressed upon us that discourse is no mere verbalisation 
of struggles and systems of domination, but is for what, and by what one 
struggles, the power [pouvoir] which one aims to seize" (OD 12; AK 216). 
Foucault's work now looks increasingly at practices, and their necessary power 
relations: what he calls the "the social appropriation of discourse" (OD 45; AK 
226-7). 
Foucault conceives of the historical a priori as a grid [grille] structuring 
possibilities at a given time. In L 'Ordre du discours, setting out his programme 
for future work he suggests that, in our time, the "regions where the grid is the 
most constricting [resserree], where the danger spots multiply, are the regions of 
sexuality and of politics: as if discourse, far from being a transparent or neutral 
element where sexuality is disarmed and politics pacified, is one of those places 
where they exercise, in a privileged manner, some of their most 
formidable 
powers [puissances]" (OD 1 l; AK 216). Later in the same piece 
he gives the 
example of education, suggesting it is "a political means of sustaining or 
modifying the appropriation of discourse, with the knowledge and the powers 
it 
carries with it... following the lines which are marked by 
distances, oppositions 
and social struggle" (OD 45-6; AK 227). 
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Foucault looks at these questions of politics, sexuality and education in later 
works, suggesting that now he is making genealogical studies. With the adoption 
of the term `genealogy' Foucault becomes more explicitly Nietzschean. Such an 
influence had always been acknowledged, but is now brought to the fore. In the 
1961 preface to Histoire de lafolie Foucault had likened his study to Nietzsche's 
The Birth of Tragedy; he gave a paper to a colloquium in 1964 entitled 
"Nietzsche, Freud, Marx", where he clearly identified with the first of these 
thinkers (DE I, 564-79); and in 1967 he had suggested that his "archaeology 
owes more to the Nietzschean genealogy than to structuralism properly called" 
(DE I, 599; FL 31). In this period he had also been involved in the French 
publication of Nietzsche's Complete Works (see DE 1,549-52,561-4). Nietzsche 
was central to Foucault's attempt to go beyond Hegel, Marx and (Kantian) 
humanism: "It was Nietzsche, in any case, who burned for us, even before we 
were born, the intermingled promises of the dialectic and anthropology" (M&C 
275; OT 263). This Nietzschean influence becomes especially pronounced in the 
1971 key essay, "Nietzsche, Genealogy, History" - one -of Foucault's central 
theoretical pieces: 33 
Genealogy is grey, meticulous, and patiently documentary. It 
operates-on a field of entangled and confused parchments, that 
have been scratched over and recopied many times... Genealogy, 
consequently, requires patience and a knowledge of details, and it 
depends on a vast accumulation of source material (DE II, 136; 
FR 76-7). 
A number of points arise for discussion. The question of origins has been 
remarked upon before, in the discussion of Heidegger and his readings of art and 
Hölderlin. Returning to the original German of Nietzsche's texts, Foucault 
suggests that we need to be attentive to the number of different words Nietzsche 
used that are usually translated as `origin' [origine]. The words Foucault singles 
out for treatment are Ursprung, Herkunft and Entstehung (DE II, 13 7ff; FR 77ff). 
Nietzsche, at least in his later works, carefully distinguishes between his use of 
Ursprung and the other two words. Foucault argues that Herkunft and Entstehung 
better capture the true objective of genealogy, and that translating them as 
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`origin' misses Nietzsche's point. 34 He therefore suggests new translations: 
"Herkunft is the equivalent of stock or descent [provenance]... Entstehung 
designates emergence, the moment of arising" (DE II, 140-3; FR 80-3). 35 This 
distancing from the philosophy of origins - Ursprungphilosophie - was also 
shown in archaeology being of the archive not of the arche. As well as 
encouraging textual fidelity in our reading of Nietzsche, Foucault is also 
carefully distancing himself from the nostalgic, romantic excesses of Heidegger 
(see DE 1,372; FL 97). 36 
Crucially, Foucault also sees the domain of Herkunft as concerned with the body, 
and therefore picks up on Nietzsche's discussions in this area - neglected in 
Heidegger: 
The body is the inscribed surface of events (marked by language 
and dissolved by ideas), the locus of a dissociated self (adopting 
the illusion of a substantial unity), and a volume in perpetual 
disintegration (DE II, 143; FR 83). 
Whilst the body received some treatment in Foucault's earlier works - notably in 
The Birth of the Clinic - it is in Discipline and Punish and The History of 
Sexuality that this study becomes intensified. These discussions are examined in 
the second section of the following chapter. This interest in the body is also 
found in Nietzsche's historical sense which, as Foucault remarks, "has more in 
common with medicine than philosophy... its task is to become a curative 
science" (DE II, 149; FR 90), a remark that is developed out of Nietzsche's 
understanding of history as a pharmacology. This orientation of history toward 
the present -a historical diagnosis to cure a current 
illness - is evidenced in 
Foucault's intention to write a history of the present, a point that will be 
discussed at length in the next section. 
Though genealogy is sometimes seen as a replacement for archaeology, it is better 
to see the two as existing together, as two halves of a complementary approach. 
Archaeology looks at truth as "a system of ordered procedures for the production, 
regulation, distribution, circulation, and operation of cnonccs", whilst genealogy 
1 35 
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sees truth as "linked in a circular relation with systems of power which produce and 
sustain it, and to effects of power which it induces and which extends it" (DE III, 
160; FR 74) 
. 
37 This shows that, for Foucault, knowledge and power are linked and 
dependent on each other, but not that they are synonymous: the exercise of power 
perpetually creates knowledge and, conversely, knowledge constantly induces 
effects of power" (DE II 752; P/K 52). 38 This obviously bears comparison with 
Nietzsche - "knowledge works as a tool of power: Hence it is plain that it increases 
with every increase of power" (WP 480) - and with Heidegger's discussion of this 
point in Nietzsche. The relation between the knowledge/power dyad is examined in 
detail in Foucault's future works, though he does realise that this has been the case 
all along: "When I think back now, I ask myself what else it was that I was 
talking about, in Madness and Civilisation or The Birth of the Clinic, but power? 
Yet I'm perfectly aware that I scarcely ever used the word and never had such a 
field of analyses at my disposal" (DE III, 146; FR 57). 
Reading Nietzsche on power gives Foucault some key insights. As he points out 
in an interview, this concept of power is critically important: "it was Nietzsche 
who specified the power relation as the general focus... of philosophical 
discourse - whereas for Marx it was the productive relationship" (DE 11 753; P/K 
53). But Foucault's understanding of power is not the same as standard 
understandings. 39 Three points need to be made. First, power is often looked at in 
opposition to authority, with legitimacy as the distinction. For example, in 
Machiavelli the Prince seizes power, but needs to gain legitimate authority in 
order to perpetuate his rule. 40 Foucault suggests that we need to abandon a 
conception of power rooted in constitution and sovereignty, in juridical terms - 
the view of the right. As Foucault puts it in an oft-cited sentence: "We need to 
cut off the king's head: in political theory that has still to be done" (DE III, 150; 
FR 63; see VS 117; WK 88-9). Similarly we must abandon the Marxist 
understanding of power, where it is posed "only in terms of the state apparatus" 
(DE III, 146; FR 57). 41 Power must be understood as being exercised rather than 
possessed, and consequently as diffused throughout the social body rather than 
coming from above. 
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Foucault locates the change in the second of these two areas in the eighteenth 
century, which "invented... a synaptic regime of power, a regime of its exercise 
within the social body, rather than from above it" (DE II, 74 l) P/K 39). Walzer calls 
Foucault a "power pluralist" because of his emphasis on the workings of power 
from diverse places, and at different ievels. 42 The fact that power permeates society 
necessitates the use of a "microanalysis" to examine its workings at the level of the 
quotidien, looking at savoir de gens - popular knowledge in the sense of particular, 
local, regional knovýledge, rather than gen e al, commonsense, owledge 
(DE 
ICI, 
164; P/K 82). However, Foucault has sometimes been criticised for concentrating 
too much on the microphysics of power, and neglecting the ., rider piýüre. His retort 
is that he accepts that the wider picture should be looked at, but argues that the 
microphysics has previously been neglected, and that he is attempting to redress the 
balance somewhat. He sees this micro-level as essential in any attempt at change: 
"nothing in society will be changed if the mechanisms of power that function 
outside, below and alongside the State apparatuses, on a much more minute and 
O). everyday level, are not also changed' (DE Li, 7ý7-8; Pi K. 59-o 
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The third key point in understanding Foucault on power is shown by his use of 
the French word pouvoir. This is the word he uses to translate Nietzsche's 
Macht, a word normally translated in French as puissance. Macht is-related-to the 
German machen, which has the sense of creative power, of making. In using the 
French word pouvoir - which as a verb means `to be able' - Foucault attempts to 
capture both this creative, productive sense, rather than merely the forceful, 
repressive sense. 44 He suggests that "we must cease once and for all to describe 
the effects of power in negative terms: it `excludes', it `represses', it `censors', it 
`abstracts', it `masks', it `conceals'. In fact power produces; it produces- the real; 
it produces domains of objects and rituals of truth" (SP 227; DP 194). Rather 
than following the model of Reich, Foucault follows the model he finds in 
Nietzsche (DE III, 172; P/K 91). 45 He suggests that power is everywhere, not 
because it embraces everything, but because it comes from everywhere (VS 122; 
WK 93), and that power entails resistance - that resistance is a relation of power 
(VS 125; WK 95). Instead of resistance being understood as freedom, or 
emancipation from power, it is better thought of as empowerment. It is for this 
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reason that Foucault talks of relationships of power, of tactics and strategies, of 
power as a game, with ordered rules and exchanges. 
Foucault's conception of power has been criticised for failing to allow any 
possibility for resistance, 46 a criticism that merely misunderstands him, or, more 
seriously, for not providing any normative frame that allows an answer to the 
question "why resist? "47 It is harder to defend Foucault on this charge. Following 
Heidegger and Nietzsche, Foucault's understanding of power makes his analyses 
perspectivist rather than relativist, in that he attempts to see the bias, the power 
relations, inherent in interpretations, examining "the place from which they look, 
the moment where they are" (DE II, 150; FR 90). Similarly, he realises his own 
work is bound up within the constraints of his time and place (DE II, 720; FL 149). 
Why, however, we should aim to undermine and examine others' interpretations, 
and perhaps replace them with our own is not always clear. Foucault evades this 
question with the answer "one makes war to win, not because it is just" (DE III, 
503). 48 Another fair criticism is that though in theory Foucault suggested power was 
productive as well as repressive, "in practice he tended to reproduce a negative 
conception of discipline". 49 This criticism is somewhat addressed in The Use of 
Pleasure and The Care of the Self, where the individual's self-constituting power is 
so examined in detail. - 
The understanding of power that Foucault develops from his reading of 
Nietzsche also occasions a shift in his use of metaphor. Rather than the literary 
terms used in his earlier works, he shifts to a more militaristic tone. In his later 
works we can indeed hear "the distant roar of battle" (SP 360; DP 308): 
I think the reason we decided to publish all these documents was 
to draw a map, so to speak, of those struggles, to reconstruct these 
confrontations and battles, to rediscover the play of those 
discourses as weapons, as instruments of attack and defence in the 
relations of power and knowledge (MPR 17; IPR xi). 
Rhetorically, Foucault asks that "if power is properly speaking the way in which 
relations of forces are deployed and given concrete expression... should we not 
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analyse it primarily in terms of combat, conflict, and war? " (DE III, 171; P/K 
90). 51 This leads him to his reversal of Clausewitz's famous dictum, suggesting 
that "politics is war pursued by other means" (VS 123; WK 93 see DE III) 171-2; 
P/K 90-1). 52 
Foucault argues that it is important to look at relations of war, conflict and 
struggle, stressing that these are not merely metaphors but actually found in 
reality (DE III, 471). Indeed, he questions the lack of attention paid by Marxists 
- though he exempts Marx and Trotsky somewhat - to what constitutes struggle 
[lutte] when they talk of class struggle (DE III, 310-11; P/K 208; see also DE III, 
206; FL 239-40). The emphasis, it would seem, is on `class' rather than 
`struggle' 
. 
53 It will be shown in the rereading of Discipline and Punish how 
Foucault analyses the army and the figures of warfare as constitutive elements in 
the genealogy of modern punitive society. But, for the purpose here, it is 
important to note that his spatial metaphors often have a military tone in his more 
political later work. This is shown particularly in his interview with the 
geographers at the Herodote journal, where he suggests that the metaphors they 
claim are geographical are actually political, juridical, administrative and 
military. The military link is not surprising, concede his interlocutors, given that 
geography grew up in the shadow of the military (DE 111,332-4; P/K 68-70). 54 
In the extended treatment given to Discipline and Punish in section two of the 
next chapter many of these issues around power will be contextualised. For the 
moment though, it is worth treating two key terms in Foucault's later work in 
positif. Foucault uses the word more detail. These terms are technology and dis 
technology in a number of places, talking of technologies of power, of 
government and of the self. Occasionally he refers to them as `arts' instead - 
both terms being renderings of the Greek techne. For example, in his discussion 
of the notion of `discipline', he suggests that it should not be identified with an 
institution or with an apparatus; "it is a type of power, a modality for its exercise, 
comprising a whole set of instruments, techniques, procedures, levels of 
application, targets; it is a `physics' or an `anatomy' of power, a technology" (SP 
251; DP 215). Similarly in his work on governmentality he discusses the means 
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of policing a society as a particular technology of power, a technology of 
government (see DE III, 635ff; FE 97ff). 
A useful hint as to how Foucault understands this term is found in an interview 
when he was asked whether he considered architecture as a `natural science' or a 
`dubious science'. Foucault suggested that he is more interested in architecture as 
a techne - "a practical rationality governed by a conscious goal". He accepts that 
the disadvantage of the word techne is its relation to `technology', but suggests 
that technology should not simply be thought of a technologies of wood, fire or 
electricity, but also of government (DE IV, 285; FR 255-6; see DE III, 515). He 
understands techne as a `practice', as a 'savoir-faire' (UP 73; UsP 62). Such an 
understanding is related to that of the later Heidegger. As Heidegger says, "zexvrl 
is the name not only for the activities and skills of the craftsman but also for the 
arts of the mind and the fine arts... the word tE is linked with the word 
cß, 6 µq. Both words are terms for knowing in the widest sense" (VA 16; BW 
318). In Heidegger, however, most of his discussions of technology focus on 
what we would commonly understand by the term; in Foucault the term is used 
in its enriched sense. 55 
In the second and third volumes of The History of Sexuality, Foucault uses this 
notion in his understanding of the practices of the self in antiquity. In The Use of 
Pleasure he examines the three great arts of self-conduct, the three major 
technologies of the self - dietics, economics and erotics (US 275; UsP 251). In 
the second of these areas he looks at Xenophon's Oeconomicus, a treatise on 
married life, looking at its rational practices - thought of as- knowledges 
[episteme] or arts/techniques [techne] (UP 169; UsP 152). In this, domestic art - 
or the government of a household - is looked at in the same way as the political 
or military art - as all three are involved in ruling others (UP 171; UsP 154). 
In 
the third volume, looking at the notion of heautou epimeleisthai, cura sui - the 
care of, or concern for, the self [le souci de soi] - Foucault sees these three arts 
as coming together in a wider "art of existence - the techne tou biou" (SS 57-8; 
CS 43). Foucault suggests that this concern with the self is a development from 
the time when man was pressed by needs: 
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The techniques and skills (technai and epistemai) made it possible 
for him to escape from these pressures and to provide for himself 
in a better fashion. People learned to weave garments and build 
houses. Now as the work of the weaver is to the use of animal 
skins, and as the art of architecture is to caves for shelter, the love 
of boys is to intercourse with women. The latter, in early times, 
was necessary in order that the race [espece] might not disappear 
(SS 249; CS 216). 
This needs to be compared to the suggestion in The Will to Knowledge that the 
nineteenth century saw a shift from the act of sodomy to the specification of the 
homosexual (VS 58-9; WK 42-3) - or more widely, the constitution of the self, 
or the subject. In these later works Foucault seems to tie the possibility of a 
technology of the self to a number of times and places. What becomes more 
important than historical development is a number of other factors - the space 
where it happens, the growth of urban society (RC 137), a surplus of leisure time, 
and therefore a concern for well-being rather than just survival. 56 
These technologies should not be analysed in isolation, but need to be located in 
the context in which they develop - what Foucault terms a dispos itif. In 
Foucault's use this term defies translation - although `construct', `deployment', 
`apparatus' and `grid of intelligibility' are sometimes used. '' Although Foucault 
uses the related term disposition in some of his earlier works - "the grammatical 
arrangements [dispositions] of a language are the a priori of what can be 
expressed in it" (M&C 311; OT 297) - the term dispositif is first used in 
Discipline and Punish, and comes to the fore in The Will to Knowledge. What 
Foucault means by this term is clarified in a 1977 interview, when he described it 
as "a thoroughly heterogeneous ensemble consisting of discourses, institutions, 
architectural forms, regulatory decisions, laws, administrative measures, 
scientific enonces, philosophical, moral and philanthropic propositions". What 
needs to be examined is the system of relations between these elements, the 
nature of their connections and their strategic functions (DE III, 298-9; P/K 194- 
5). The notion of the episteme developed in The Order of Things is now seen as 
"a specifically discursive dispositif, whereas the dispositif in its general form is 
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both discursive and non-discursive" (DE III, 301; P/K 197) -a theoretical 
reformulation paralleled in the shift from analysis of knowledge to the dyad 
power/knowledge. 
Foucault's notion of dis positif is clearly related to Heidegger's understanding of 
Ge-stell, which is usually translated as `enframing'. In French the standard 
translation is Arraisonnement, though it has been suggested that Dis positif is 
possible. 58 Given the links between Foucault and Heidegger's understanding of 
technology and the roles they give to dispositif and Gestell it seems that Foucault 
is taking forward Heidegger's term. As Dean notes, "technologies of government, 
techniques of the self and of living, spiritual exercises, systems of manners and 
habits, should be analysed not simply as instruments but as part of a frame (a Ge- 
stell, in Heidegger's sense)". Dean, however, does not suggest that Foucault's 
conception of dispositif is precisely this frame. 59 
In The Will to Knowledge Foucault discusses the dispositif of sexuality (VS 99ff; 
WK 75ff). This sees sex as falling within this general dispositif, framed by 
practices and discourses such as biology, morality, government and mechanisms 
of confession. This understanding is deepened in the introduction to The Use of 
Pleasure - where Foucault suggests that knowledge, rules and norms, and 
individual conduct all form part of the experience of sexuality (UP 9-10; UsP 3- 
4). 60 It is also clearly evident in the texts surrounding the case of Herculine 
Barhin - where the biological theories of sexuality, the juridical conceptions of 
the individual and the modern forms of administrative control dictate the need for 
the hermaphrodite to have one `true sex' (DE IV, 116-7; HB viii) - and that of 
Pierre Riviere. To examine this experience of sexuality, Foucault suggests we 
need to look at the "correlation between fields of knowledge, types of 
normativity and forms of subjectivity in a particular culture" (UP 10; UsP 4). He 
suggests that he has shown how to examine the first two of these axes, with the 
analysis of discursive practices in his archaeological studies, and the analysis of 
relations and technologies of power in his genealogical works. What needs to be 
done now is to examine the technologies of the self that constitute the subject 
(UP 10-2; UsP 4-6). For this purpose, Foucault sees the models of archaeology 
and genealogy put to work together: "this analysis of desiring man is situated at 
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the point where an archaeology of problematisations and a genealogy of practices 
of the self intersect" (UP 19; UsP 13). 61 
II Mapping the Present 
Like Nietzsche, Foucault is opposed to some kinds of history, and demands the 
need for a historical sense. Likewise he is opposed to the tendency toward 
`Egyptianism' - of dehistoricising, or of tearing things from their true context. 
There are two potential situations. Either the historical sense is mastered by a 
"suprahistorical point of view, metaphysics can bend it to its own purpose, and, 
by aligning it to the demands of objective science, it can impose its own 
`Egyptianism"', or, by refusing the certainty of absolutes, "the historical sense 
can evade metaphysics and become a privileged instrument of genealogy" (DE 
II, 146-7; FR 87). Genealogy was for Nietzsche a critical history, it was 
untimely, in the sense that it was "acting counter to our time and thereby acting 
on our time and, let us hope, for the benefit of a time to come" (UB II, Preface). 
Heidegger's reading of Nietzsche on history, found in Division Two of Being 
and Time, made some fundamental points concerning the three modalities of 
history that Nietzsche discussed in the second Untimely Meditation. These points 
are central to understanding Foucault's reading of Nietzsche. 
In a sense, genealogy returns to the three modalities of history that 
Nietzsche recognised in 1874. It returns to them in spite of the 
objections that Nietzsche raised in the name of the affirmative and 
creative powers of life. But they are metamorphosed: the 
veneration of monuments becomes parody; the respect for ancient 
continuities becomes systematic dissociation; the critique of the 
injustices of the past by a truth held by men in the present 
becomes the destruction of the man who mai stains knowledge 
[connaissance] by the injustice proper to the will to knowledge 
[savoir] (DE II, 156; FR 97). 
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Like Heidegger, Foucault sees the three modalities working together, and he 
follows Heidegger's shift in orientating the critical to the present, rather than the 
past. Nietzsche's critical history became for Heidegger a critique of the present, a 
critique which was historicised in Heidegger's later works. 62 For Foucault it 
becomes a history of the present (SP 40; DP 31) 63 
Though Foucault only describes his project in these terms in Discipline and 
Punish, it is clear that it applies to all his worn. As he describes his early works: 
it is a question of presenting a critique of our owIIII time, based upon 
retrospective analyses" (DE II, 183; FL 68). 64 
I consluel fnysell as a Journalist, inso-far as wiiaL interests Me 1J 
the present [l 'actual ite] ... 
Philosophy, until Nietzsche, had 
eternity for its raison d'etr-e. The first philosopher-journalist was 
Nietzsche. He introduced the today [l 'aujourd 'hui] into the field 
of philosophy. Be' re, the philosopher 
knew time and eternity, but 
Nietzsche was obsessed by the present... If we want to be masters 
of our future we must pose fundamentally the question of the 
today. That is why, for me, philosophy is a type of radical 
journalism (DE ii, 434; see also DE iii, 266; Ra 222). - 
Such a critique, or history, of our own time, of the present, is exemplified in the 
advent of the death of man in The Order of Things; the history of the modern 
subject pursued in The History of Sexuality; and in his engagement in debates 
over psychiatry, penal reform, homosexuality and various other issues. It also 
lends an explicitly political tone to his work. Some of the most direct links to 
present-day issues are found in his interviews and journalism, 
65 whereas the 
analyses in his books tend to end around the middle of the nineteenth century. 
The attitude to the present is also the topic of Foucault's reflections on Kant's 
essay "What is Enlightenment? " 
In reading Kant, Foucault returns to the original German. The opening line of 
Kant's text reads: "Enlightenment [Aufklärung] is the exit [Ausgang] of man 
from his self-imposed immaturity [Unmündigkeit]". 
66 It is important, contends 
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Foucault, that Kant defines Aufklärung as "an Ausgang, an `exit', a `way out"' 
(DE IV, 564; FR 34), a way out of the present to the future. This present is our 
immaturity, mentally, spiritually and physically, and Aufklärung will lead us into 
a new maturity, a modernity. This "point of departure... the attitude to 
modernity" (DE IV, 568; FR 38) needs clarification. Foucault concedes that 
"modernity is often spoken of as an epoch, or at least as a set of features 
characteristic of an epoch; situated on a calendar", but wonders "whether we may 
not envisage modernity rather as an attitude than as a period of history... a bit, no 
doubt, like what the Greeks called an ethos" (DE IV, 568; FR 39). This ethos is 
conceived as "a permanent critique of our historical being [eire]... consisting in a 
critique of what we are saying, thinking and doing, through a historical ontology 
(DE E 'r 17 1 A, F1 en crn i1 67 of ourselves» (DEE iv, 571 -'+; c 1+z-. , see 
DE 
r, i 1,6 18; FR 
-i 51). 
Foucault therefore suggests that Kant founds two great traditions in philosophy. 
One of these is the project found in the Critiques, where he looks for the 
conditions of true knowledge, and asks the question "what is man? "; the second 
is found in "What is Enlightenment? " The former was criticised by Foucault in 
the secondary thesis and The Order of Things, but Foucault finds the second 
more interesting, characterising it as "an ontology of the present, an ontology of 
ourselves". This is the tradition Foucault allies himself with (DE N, 687-8; PPC 
95), and these two ontologies clearly delineate the research he pursued in the last 
years of his life. Though this notion of historical ontology is clearly related to 
Heidegger's project in his later works'68 and ties to the notion of a history of the 
present, there is also clearly a shift from Foucault's earlier position, where he 
-tended to conceive of periods, and epochs. 69 Kant uses the word Unmündigkeit 
for "immaturity", the self-imposed state he claims Enlightenment provides an 
exit from. This German noun is formed from the adjective unmündig, which 
literally means under-age, and its use is interesting because escaping from 
immaturity allows the time to achieve the status of being a self-constituting age. 
For Foucault, the Aufklärung is the first period that names itself (DE IV, 681-2; 
PPC 89), and asks the fundamental question "what is our present? " Interestingly, 
it appears that Foucault realises that the notion of period is a tool of hindsight, as 
. Couzens Hoy has put it: "periodisation... is itself a modernist tool" 
70 
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Reading Foucault in this way underlines the continuity that runs throughout his 
work. The notion of an ontology of the present is clearly linked to the general 
project of a history of limits. Speaking of the ethos he sees develop out of the 
Enlightenment, he conceives it as a limit-attitude: 
We have to move beyond the outside-inside alternative; we have 
to be at the frontiers. Criticism indeed consists of analysing and 
reflecting upon limits... The point, in brief, is to transform the 
critique conducted in the form of a necessary limitation into a 
practical critique that takes the form of a possible crossing 
[franchissement - clearing]... this criticism is not transcendental, 
and its goal is not that of making a metaphysics possible: it is 
genealogical in its design, and archaeological in its method (E 
IV5574; FR 45-6). " 
Ho :: lever, to read Foucault in Lhis way is to continue the standard interpretation 
of him as a historian. In terms of the role of space, all it does is recognise what a 
196 7 interviewer called his "predilection for spatial metaphors" (DE 1,599; FL 
31). It was noted as a point of divergence from structuralism that Foucault also 
made analyses of actual spaces in his historical studies. As Flynn has remarked, 
"Foucault's spatialised thinking extends far beyond his well-known use of spatial 
metaphors to include the use of lists, tables, geometrical configurations and 
illustrations". However, Flynn's treatment only looks at two of Foucault's 
examples - Velasquez's `Las Meninas' in The Order of Things, and Bentham's 
Panopticon in Discipline und Punish. 72 Foucault's spatial thinking, and his 
spatial histories, extend far beyond this. 
In his recent Justice, Nature and the Geography of Difference, David Harvey 
takes issue with the current trend for producing `cognitive maps' in politics, art 
and the humanities. He cites the recent books Mapping the West European Left, 
Mapping Ideology and Locating Culture, and suggests that this trend 
"unfortunately evades the problem that mapping requires a map and that maps 
are typically totalising, usually two-dimensional, Cartesian, and very 
. 
Yet I think that Foucault's work can perhaps be undialectical devices" 73 
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subsumed under the designation not simply of writing a history of the present, 
but of mapping [reperage] the present. 
74 
Foucault uses the word reperage in a number of places, some of which are noted 
in this and the following chapter. The term is especially used in The Birth of the 
Clinic. Similarly The Archaeology of Knowledge concerns itself with "the 
mapping [reparage] of discursive formations" (AS 152; AK 116); its aim is to 
"map [reparer] the space" which made earlier investigations possible (AS/AK 
jacket). Reperage is a military term, meaning location, landmark or point on a 
map. The related verb reperer means to locate or discover. In translations they 
are often rendered as `mapping' and `to map'. It is interesting that, in Foucault's 
early studies, this is the main military term used, and thereby prefigures his later 
metaphorical shift - providing another thread of continuity through his career. 
It should be remembered that a map is for use, not to fully describe the terrain. 
Borges' oft-cited fable about the awkwardness of an exact map on the scale of 
1: 1 is worth remembering here. 75 Foucault's maps are not merely cognitive, but 
make use of the notions of site, space, place and location in both figurative and 
actual senses. Following Nietzsche and Heidegger, Foucault points out the 
important role that space plays in our history, and orientates this history toward 
the service of the present. In Chapter Two it was noted that Heidegger's 
understanding of the present, of presence, is a conflation of the two German 
words Gegenwart and Anwesenheit - temporal and spatial presence (see GA24, 
305ff). (It is worth noting that in Binswanger's Dream and Existence Foucault 
translated Heidegger's Dasein as presence. ) It was also argued above that the 
three dimensions of time, which as Heidegger showed relate to Nietzsche's three 
modes of history, come together in the Augenblick - the Moment. This gateway - 
the present - is where future and past collide. Just as the 
individual in the 
Augenblick must act, so too must history orientate itself toward the future with 
reference to the past: a history of the present. 
The spatial links in Thus Spoke Zarathustra, the dual meaning of present, the 
word Augenblick, and the spatial site of the gateway, make it unsurprising that 
there is a role for space in this history. But the equal importance given to time 
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and space in Heidegger's later works - thought as journeying and placing, and as 
historical site - make it essential that this history of the present must also be 
spatially aware: mapping the present. Indeed, Foucault once described himself as 
a "cartographer" (DE II, 725), a designation that, despite Harvey's misgivings, 
seems particularly apt. Foucault's mappings are far from totalising, perhaps best 
seen as sketchmaps, approximations toward, signposts. They highlight key 
features, outline contours, and provide an orientation. Far from being two- 
dimensional, these maps work with both space and time, but are not Cartesian in 
their abstraction; rather, they work on the level of lived experience. 
Foucault's work on space has received relatively little critical attention. Where it 
is analysed critics tend to either seize the Panopticon as the most apposite 
example or rely on Foucault's interviews and a 1967 lecture. The issues around 
the Panopticon receive sustained treatment in the next chapter, and need not 
detain us here. But the focus on a number of short pieces - "Space, Knowledge, 
Power", "Questions on Geography" and "Of Other Spaces" = whilst 
understandable in that they are the most explicit discussions, discounts the places 
where Foucault makes his most useful analyses. 76 The best way to understand 
what Foucault is doing is to look at his studies in context, which will be done in 
- the extended treatment given to Histoire de la folie and his study of modern - 
discipline in the next chapter. " 
In 1967 Foucault delivered a lecture to a group of architects, but only allowed the 
lecture notes to be published shortly before his death. 78 With the exception of the 
passage on the Panopticori, this piece has received more treatment than any of his 
other works on space. Though it is a fascinating piece, there is one central 
problem with it, or at least with its perception. This is that this piece is the closest 
Foucault ever comes to writing a history of space, or spaces, something he later 
suggested as a possible future project (DE III, 192; FL 228). Whilst this indeed 
would be a valuable study, in critical appropriations of Foucault this history of 
space is often given precedence over the spatial histories of his more major 
works. This is a point that will be returned to below. 
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However, Foucault's history of space is not without interest. Starting with the 
Middle Ages, Foucault suggests that at this time there was an "ensemble of 
places [lieux]" - sacred and profane places; protected and open, exposed places; 
urban and rural places. He calls this medieval space - "the space of localisation". 
This understanding was disrupted by Galileo, who constituted an infinite and 
infinitely open space, thus dissolving the place of a thing by seeing it as only a 
point in its movement: "starting with Galileo and the seventeenth century, 
extension was substituted for localisation". In more recent times Foucault 
suggests that the understanding of space on the basis of extension has been 
replaced by the notion of site [emplacement]. "The site is defined by relations of 
proximity [voisonage] between points or elements". The most concrete question 
that arises from this understanding of place [place] or site is that of demography: 
This problem of the human site/living space [l 'emplacement 
humain] is not simply that of knowing whether there will be 
enough space [place] for men in the world -a problem that is 
certainly quite important - but also that of knowing what relations 
of proximity, what type of storage, circulation, mapping 
[reperage], and classification of human elements should be 
adopted in a given situation in order to achieve a given end. Our 
epoch is one in which space takes for us the form of relations 
among sites (DE IV, 752-4; OOS 22-3). 
Foucault's exposition here clearly puts him in the same field as Heidegger. Their 
understandings are not entirely identical, but there is clearly a degree of 
similarity. Like Heidegger, Foucault suggests that the modern era inaugurated an 
understanding of space in terms of extension - Heidegger attributes it to 
Descartes, Foucault to Galileo - and both suggest that a different understanding 
is now possible. In the chapters above it was argued that in Heidegger's later 
thinking there was an increased importance given to space, and that his 
understanding of space, or place, was resolutely non-Cartesian. This entailed 
space being understood not in terms of extension or mathematical co-ordinates, 
but in terms of lived experience, nearness and farness, locale and situation. 
In 
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Foucault's work such an understanding is found in his most explicitly 
Heideggerian piece, the introduction to Binswanger's Dream and Existence: 
In lived experience, at its original level, space is not presented as 
the geometric structure of simultaneity. This type of space, within 
which the natural sciences deploy objective phenomena in their 
coherence, is only constituted by way of a genesis... Before being 
geometric or even geographic, space presents itself first and 
foremost as scene or landscape [paysage]... lived space [l 'espace 
vecu] (DE 1,101-2; DIE 60). 
Whilst Heidegger, suggests that we need to move from `space' to `place', with a 
recognition that we can re-think the former through the latter, Foucault uses the 
terms place, lieu, espace and emplacement almost interchangeably - though the 
understanding of how the meanings attached to these terms have changed is 
implicit. We should also consider that the French word espace has a wider range 
of meanings than `space'. In English some of the other meanings might be 
translated as area, zone, or territory - or even place. With most of Foucault's 
histories looking at periods between the mid-seventeenth and nineteenth 
- centuries, it is not surprising that he finds the spaces of these analyses to be those 
of the period of extension - classification, segmentation, order, and exclusion. 
In this piece, however, he is looking at the spaces of our own era, and perhaps 
this is why the piece has been so popular with contemporary commentators. Here 
Foucault does understand space as the relation between sites. He suggests that we 
could look at "the set of relations by which a given site can be defined... sites of 
transportation... sites of temporary relaxation... closed or semi-closed sites of 
rest", but centres his analysis on particular sites - ones which both link with and 
contradict other sites (DE III, 755; OOS 23-4). Foucault divides these sites along 
the lines of a division he suggested in The Order of Things: 
Utopias afford consolation: although they have no real place there 
is nevertheless a fantastic, untroubled region in which they are 
able to unfold; they open up cities with vast avenues, superbly 
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planted gardens, countries where life is easy, even though the road 
to them is chimerical. Heterotopias are disturbing, probably 
because they secretly undermine language, because they make it 
impossible to name this and that, because they shatter or tangle 
common names, because they destroy `syntax' in advance, and 
not only the syntax with which we construct sentences but also 
that less apparent syntax which causes words and things (next to 
and opposite one another) to `hold together' (M&C 9; OT xviii). 
Utopias are, literally, `happy-places' or `no-places'; heterotopias `other-places'. 
In The Order of Things heterotopia had described Borges' Chinese 
Encyclopaedia; a similar understanding is found in Foucault's work on the 
Belgian painter Rene Magritte. Here too Foucault examines what might be called 
`heterotopias', or, as James Harkess suggests, visual non sequiturs. 79 Where 
Kandinsky and Klee used abstraction to undermine representative realism, with 
colours, lines and shapes, Magritte used everyday objects - pipes, bowler hats, 
candles, shoes, paintings, windows and mirrors. Discussing Magritte's famous 
painting of a pipe with the words "Ceci n'est pas une pipe" below it, Foucault 
suggests that the common place [lieu commun] has disappeared (DE I, 643; TNP 
31). As a later comment makes clear, this is an elaborate pun. Magritte effaces 
the common place of language and art by creating a heterotopia of the everyday 
rather than a non-place (a utopia) of abstraction (DE I, 646; TNP 41), but, in 
doing so, he disrupts the commonplace, the everyday - bottles become carrots, 
paintings fuse with landscapes, mirrors reflect what they conceal, and shoes 
develop toes. 80 
In the lecture "Of Other Spaces" Foucault more directly opposes utopias - "sites 
with no real place [lieu]" - to heterotopias, which he now defines as a place that 
does exist, a "counter-site, a kind of effectively enacted utopia" (DE IV, 755; 
OOS 24). 81 Foucault elaborates and discusses a number of different heterotopias 
- suggesting crisis heterotopias as the boarding school or the 
honeymoon hotel; 
heterotopias of deviation such as rest homes, psychiatric hospitals and prisons; 
the cemetery; theatres, cinemas, gardens and carpets; museums and libraries - 
accumulations of time, and, in contrast, sites of fleeting time - travelling 
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fairgrounds, vacation villages; and various others, including Muslim hammans, 
Scandinavian saunas, motel rooms, brothels, boats and colonies (DE IV, 756-62; 
OOS) 24-6). All this is undoubtedly interesting, but it needs to be understood in 
context. If we examine Foucault's major works, we see that his histories are not 
merely ones in which space is yet another area analysed, but have space as a 
central part of the approach itself. In other words, rather than merely writing 
histories of space, Foucault is writing spatial histories. These spatial histories 
make use of many of the historical tools examined in the previous section of this 
chapter, but also use space itself as a critical tool of analysis. 82 
In one of the best general discussions of Foucault and space, Chris Philo suggests 
that "the spatial relations discussed throughout Foucault's histories of social 
otherness can best be understood not as formal geometries, but as substantive 
geographies". Philo argues that Foucault runs the risk of seeming to simply inject 
a "geometric turn" into his histories, "effectively elevating an abstract sense of 
space above a concrete sense of place", but suggests that the emphasis on 
specificities evades this difficulty. His examples draw on Madness and 
Civilisation 
and Discipline and punish, arguing that they showcase what he 
terms a "'truly' postmodern geography" (in opposition to Soja's reliance on a 
`geometric imaginary'). 83 What Philo misses, and this seems to be due to his- - 
neglect of Foucault's theoretical background, is that in the majority of Foucault's 
studies, the understanding of the complex relationship between the real and the 
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put to work, and this is true of space as well. Indeed, like Heidegger before him, 
and Lefebvre around the same time, Foucault understands both of these to be 
merely parts of a greater whole - the lived experience. Even in The Order of 
Things, the historical study that seems most focused on knowledge alone, and 
removed from practical experience, Foucault suggests that the spatial 
`metaphors' found within are often not of his own invention but ones he was 
"studying as objects... spatial techniques, not metaphors" (DE IV, 284; FR 254). 
Another example is found in his analysis of architecture, where he examines its 
theoretical formulations, its practical applications, and the power relations it 
entails. Architecture is understood as a rechne, and forms part of a dispositif. This 
needs to be remembered in our re-readings of Foucault's histories, in their 
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recastings as spatial histories. If the guiding light of Foucault's historical 
researches is, following Nietzsche, the role of power, we would do well to hear 
the following in mind: "Space is fundamental in any form of communal life; 
space is fundamental in any exercise of power" (DE IV, 282; FR 252; emphasis 
added). 
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Chapter Six 
The Spaces of Power 
Space is fundamental in any exercise of power. It is well known that power is 
central to Foucault's work, and that it is a fundamental focus of his historical 
studies. How then does space figure in these histories? In order to look at this, 
this final chapter re-reads two of Foucault's historical studies from the 
perspective of the suggestion that space is fundamental in any exercise of power. 
In the first part I look at Histoire de la folie, known to the English speaking 
world as Madness and Civilisation. The spatial elements of this work - along 
with much interesting detail in other areas - become much clearer with a reading 
of the unabridged French text. This part therefore seeks to re-place Madness and 
Civilisation, showing what could be called Foucault's re-placing of the history of 
madness. In the second part I examine Discipline and Punish within the wider 
context of Foucault's work on medicine and the disciplinary society generally, in 
order to show that the emphasis on the prison, and particularly the Panopticon, is 
misleading, particularly on the issue of how space is used as a mechanism of 
power. 
I Re-placing Madness and Civilisation 
Colin Gordon's important call for the reading of the un-abridged French original 
of Histoire de la folie, rather than the English translation Madness and 
Civilisation has provoked serious critical attention. ' This is to be welcomed. 
Gordon argues that if the full French text is read several of the criticisms of 
Foucault's work will be seen to be misplaced. Some of the responses to his 
article have argued that the full text would rather reinforce the accusations of 
sloppy scholarship, reliance on literature and art instead of historical fact, and the 
extension of French examples to the European picture. My concern is not with 
these issues: several other people are better placed to debate such counts. But 
taking Gordon's mandate seriously, this section seeks to re-read Histoire de la 
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folie, and in doing so, by being attentive to the role of space, re-place the reading 
of Madness and Civilisation. 
For such an important text, both indispensable for an understanding of Foucault, 
and central to work since the late 60s on mental illness, it is surprising that the 
oft-promised full translation has yet to appear. The original French edition, 
essentially Foucault's doctoral thesis, was published in 1961 as Folie et deraison, 
and an abridged version appeared in the non-academic 10/18 series three years 
later. Both editions went out of print, and in 1972 a second edition, with a new 
preface and two appendices was published in Gallimard's Bibliotheque des 
Sciences Humaines; this text was then reprinted - without the appendices - in the 
cheaper Tel series. The English translation - unlike the German or the Italian - is 
of the abridged 10/18 version, with some additions from the 1961 original. Only 
about 45% of the French original and its attendant notes, references and annexes 
is therefore- available to the English reader, and, as Gordon has pointed out, this 
has led to a less than fair reading of Foucault's work. No French commentator 
could have got away with only reading the 10/18 version. 2 What the English 
reader has is a translation of a skilfully edited version of this text, but one that is 
intended for the general reader. 
To understand Foucault's intent it is obviously necessary to work with the 
original, unedited, text. Reading this shows that not only have whole chapters 
been omitted__from_ the translated version, but that sections from those chapters 
which have been retained are also missing. 3 Foucault's treatment of issues 
around space is immediately obvious even from the truncated version, but a 
detailed reading shows how deep this vein runs through his work. ` As Colin 
Gordon has argued, Foucault's book is often reduced to "the compass of three or 
four striking tableaux: the medieval insane messing around in boats; the carceral 
monolith of the- Great Internment; unreason treated as animality; the spurious 
emancipation of moral treatment". 5 What this section seeks to do is to examine 
both those "striking tableaux" and the less-often mentioned passages of Histoire 
de la folic which exhibit elements of a spatial history. Many of these passages 
greatly prefigure the work of the later Foucault, setting up conceptual apparatus 
und-in. The Birth of the Clinic, The Order of Things and Discipline and Punish. 
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Leprosy, Water and Madness 
The opening words of Foucault's book are well known: "At the end of the 
Middle Ages, leprosy disappeared from the Western World. In the margins of the 
community, at the gates of cities, there stretched wastelands which sickness had 
ceased to haunt but had left sterile and long uninhabitable" (HF 13; MC 3). 
These words - as with the beginnings of so many of Foucault's books - provide 
both an evocative image and establish a backdrop to later events. The lazar 
houses became empty, but the values and images attached to the figure of the 
leper, notably the meaning of their exclusion, remained (HF 15-6; MC 6). These 
places of exclusion, and the formulas attached to them, would, Foucault argues, 
be reused two or three centuries later. The rigorous division between the lepers 
and the rest of the population -a division of social exclusion but spiritual 
reintegration - would be repeated for another marginal group (HF 16; MC 7). 
The group Foucault has in mind is, of course, the mad, and in the edited text the 
next image is of the appearance of the ship of fools. But in the original text, 
Foucault warns of getting ahead of the argument [Mais n 'anticipons pas], and 
argues that before the mad take this position, "a new leper is born, who takes the 
place of the first" (HF 16-7). These "new lepers" are the venereally diseased, 
who inhabit a "moral space of exclusion", one they would come to share with the 
mad (HF 18). 
The use of the venereally diseased as a bridge is important, for it is only with 
them that the idea of moral exclusion is established. Like the lepers they are 
socially excluded, unlike them there is no spiritual integration. 6 This part of 
Foucault's book has received sustained criticism, particularly from H. C. Erik 
Midelfort. Midelfort argues that Foucault over-emphasises the link between 
lazarettos and mad-houses, and suggests that medieval hospitals and monasteries 
are more important precursors. He argues that Foucault sees the treatment of 
lepers as only negative - "a monolithic image of rejection" - and cites recent 
studies that show that the real attitude was more nuanced, a mixture of "fear and 
pity". Midelfort also suggests that the middle link established is dropped in the 
edited text because "perhaps Foucault no longer felt that venereal disease was 
strictly parallel to leprosy and madness". 7 These points are difficult to sustain, as 
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Foucault does look at the role of other precursors (HF 405-6), and the relative 
importance of these different institutions is moot. It should also be noted that 
Foucault's understanding of the attitude to leprosy is considerably more subtle 
than simple exclusion (see, for example, HF 16; MC 7). Midelfort's suggestion 
that the 1964 edits are revisions needs no response other than to suggest a 
reading of the new edition of 1972, where the main text is effectively unaltered. 
The pages on the ship of fools are amongst the most discussed of Foucault's 
book, and once again, he sets up a vignette: "Something new appears in the 
imaginary landscape of the Renaissance; soon it will occupy a privileged place 
there: it is the ship of fools, a strange `drunken boat' which glides along the calm 
rivers of the Rhine and the Flemish canals" (HF 18; MC 7). It is important to 
stress that Foucault notes the appearance of the ship on the imaginary landscape: 
the significance of the ship is as an image, one that appears in the painting of 
Bosch and the words of Brant, symbolic of the attitude to the mad. Foucault talks 
of other ships that appeared in literary compositions of the -time, but then 
counters, "but of all these fantastic [romanesques] or satirical vessels, the 
Narrenschiff is the only one which had a real existence, because they existed, 
these boats which brought their foolish cargo from one town to another" (HF 19; 
MC 8). Toucault's exact point is unclear, and he has been criticised here for 
8 elaborating an argument from sketchy documentary facts, but he seems to be 
suggesting that the imaginary constructs have partners - if not exact - in the real. 
At the time, Foucault suggests, madmen simply had a wandering existence. They 
were driven outside the limits of towns, expelled, sometimes by boat, sometimes 
to wander in the open countryside. 
Madmen were not invariably expelled - some were hospitalised - and there were 
sometimes towns where they gathered. These included the places of pilgrimage, 
shrines [lieux de pelinerage], but also places like Nuremberg where the mad 
were simply thrown in prison (HF 20; MC 9-10). The village of Gheel is singled 
out for mention, a place of pilgrimage that developed into a place of exclusion, 
where "interest in concern [souci] and in exclusion coincide: madmen were 
confined in the holy locus of a miracle [l 'espace sacre du miracle]" (HF 21; MC 
10). 9 Treatment of the mad is therefore shown to be erratic - sometimes tolerant, 
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sometimes exclusionary, sometimes hospitable. There is no regimented model, 
no overall plan. 1° The literary model is one that emphasises passage and 
displacement; what is similarly evident in practice is that the mad are often in 
transition - moving from town to town, to wastelands, to shrines. The ambiguity 
implicit in Foucault's now celebrated sentence - "les fous alors avaient une 
existence facilement errante" (HF 19; MC 8) - may even help to showcase this 
irregular approach; though I would suggest that the most problematic word is the 
last, rather than the penultimate. '' Errant, like the English word, has the sense 
both of wandering and of irregularity, as well as the more direct connotation of 
erring from the path of reason. The English and French both have their 
etymological roots in the Latin errare - to wander, to err. The sentence could be 
translated as "At that time, the mad easily had an errant existence". 
Symbolically, if not actually, water and the passage of the ships across it play 
important roles. 12 Foucault characterises the madman as a restless prisoner of the 
passage, of the transition, figuratively and actually caught between two places: 
"the madman is entrusted to the river with a thousand arms, to the sea of a 
thousand routes, to this great uncertainty outside of everything. He is imprisoned 
in the middle of the most free, the most open of routes: bound fast at the infinite 
crossroads. He is the Passenger par excellence... ". The land to which he is 
travelling is unknown, but as soon as he reaches it, so to is the land from which 
he came, "he has his truth and his homeland only in that fruitless expanse 
between two countries that cannot belong to him". Understanding all of this 
enables us to better make sense of Foucault's description of the madman's 
voyage "across a half-real, half-imaginary geography". The literary and 
attitudinal constructs loosely parallel the actual treatment. This treatment is one 
which inhabits the boundary between care and fear, "the madman's liminal 
position on the horizon of the medieval concern [souci]". It is therefore fitting 
that the mad are often confined within the city gates, a prisoner of the very 
threshold, kept at the point of passage, in the interior of the exterior, and vice 
versa (HF 22; MC 11). 
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A 
Confinement and Correction 
If the place of the mad was, in the medieval period, one continually open to 
question, a restless, transitional location, in the classical age it became fixed and 
immobile. "It will never again be that fugitive and absolute limit. Behold it 
moored now, made fast among things and men. Retained and maintained. No 
longer a ship but a hospital". A restructuring of social space, to a hospital, where 
confinement replaces embarkation (HF 53; MC 35-6). Foucault argues that from 
the middle of the seventeenth century, madness is linked with the notion of 
confinement, and confinement is established as the natural abode [lieu naturell of 
madness (HF 59; MC 39). This actual treatment of madness has parallels, 
Foucault suggests, in the binary divide between reason and unreason in Rene 
Descartes' Meditations. 
In the Meditations Descartes tries to ascertain things that are true, things of 
which there can be no doubt. To this end, he decides to doubt everything, until he 
can be sure of something, and then from this position reconstruct the basis of 
knowledge. This is the method known as Cartesian doubt. Descartes suggests 
that there are three possibilities that might cause him to be misled: that he might 
be mad; that he might be dreaming, and that an "evil genius" might be tricking 
him. 13 Having thought through these three possibilities, Descartes resolves that, 
whatever else, he cannot doubt that he is thinking, and, he argues, it follows from 
this that "the statement `I am, I exist' is necessarily true every time it is uttered 
by me or conceived in my mind". 14 . 
Foucault argues that though Descartes counts the possibility that he is mad as a 
-potential area of doubt, he does not afford it the same significance that he does to 
the possibility that he is dreaming, or that he is being deceived: "Descartes does 
not evade the danger of madness in the same way that he gets round the 
possibility of dreaming or of error" (HF 56), and, again, "in the economy of 
doubt, there is a fundamental imbalance between madness on the one side, and 
dream and error on the other" (HF 57). Foucault sees in Descartes' text a 
dismissal that is tantamount to exclusion. When Descartes asks "how could one 
deny that these hands and that my whole body exist? ", his only possibility, as he 
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sees it, is that he could be "Insane", like those "whose brains are so impaired by a 
stubborn vapour from a black bile that they continually insist... that they are 
gourds, or that they are made of glass". Next comes the sentence that Foucault 
claims is so important: "but they are all demented [amentes], and I would appear 
no less extravagant [demens] if I were to take their conduct as a model for 
myself'. 15 
This dismissal, for Foucault, is in contrast with the treatment Descartes gives to 
the other two possibilities - the deceit and the dream. Descartes believes that 
even if he is being deceived he is still thinking, for being misled into thinking 
that one is thinking is still thinking, and dreams can only be a reflection of things 
that exist, just as "bizarre and unusual forms" created by painters are based on 
things that are true. 16 Indeed, for Foucault, this reading of Descartes would seem 
to suggest that the mad, "the demented" are not only denied the thought, the 
reason, they are denied existence, if not entirely, certainly as equals. '7 This 
denial can be seen as legitimating the "dividing practices" that came into play at 
a similar time to Descartes' text. Meditations was published in 1641, and 
Foucault sees the creation of the H6pital General in 1656 as a key development 
in the exclusion of the mad from society. "Madness was excluded, leaving no 
trace, no scar on the surface of thought" (HF 156). Essentially, reason, in its 
situation in this text, and from then ön, ruthlessly proclaims itself apart from 
madness or unreason; a divide Foucault claims was not evident before. For 
example, though the Greeks had a relationship to something they called `1')(3ptq 
[hubris], the Greek logos "had no contrary" (DE 1,160; MC xiii). In other words, 
the poles of `vßpiq and logos co-existed, there was not the epistemological 
bifurcation of the either/or. 
Foucault argues that the new houses of confinement were very often established 
in "the same walls of the ancient lazar houses", and suggests that, just as "the 
lazar house did not have a medical meaning; a good many other functions were 
active in the act of banishment which reopened these cursed places" (HF 64). A 
new social sensibility suddenly isolated a new group to take the place of the 
lepers, an act "which by tracing the locus [espace] of confinement, conferred 
upon it its power of segregation and provided a new homeland for madness" (HF 
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67; MC 45-6). Understanding the Cartesian divide along with the division of 
confinement explains in part "the mode in which madness was perceived 
[percue], and experienced [vecue], by the classical age" (HF 67; MC 46). The 
fusion of imaginary and real attitudes - especially in the symbolic and actual use 
of space - is particularly evident here- The classical age sees the birth of an 
attitude, a sensibility which had "drawn a line and raised a threshold" between 
reason and unreason (HF 90-1; MC 64). This is marked in the action of exclusion 
and in the thought of Descartes: the asylum replaced the lazar house both in the 
"geography of haunted places" and in the "landscape of the moral universe" (HF 
84; MC 57). 
The insane were often confined along with the poor [les pauvres], in a moral 
punishment of poverty. What is essential here, as was the case with the 
venereally diseased, is the ethical valorisation. The poor are divided into the 
good and bad, and well before being seen as objects of knowledge or of pity, are 
treated as moral subjects (HF 70-3). A shift becomes apparent, madness is now 
an issue of social, rather than religious, concern. It is a problem for "police", 
concerned with the order of individuals in the city. Foucault then contrasts the 
new situation with that which came before: "They err [erne]... but it is no longer 
on the path of a strange pilgrimage: -they disturb the ordering [ordonnance] of 
social space" (HF 74). Foucault locates a shift in the bourgeois conscience 
regarding the urban question, suggesting that by the seventeenth century there 
was a dream of organised and moral city, which necessitated the negative 
organisation of the walls of confinement, prisons of moral order. Confinement is 
both a metaphysics of government and a politics of religion: "police" is the civil 
equivalent of religion for the edification of cities (HF 87-90; MC 61-3). Madness 
"began to rank among the problems of the city" (HF 90; MC 64). 
This concern leads to le monde correctionaire. Correctionaire is a word that 
defies summary translation, as it covers such meanings as correction, proof- 
reading, marking, and punishment. What Foucault would call the disciplinary 
society in Discipline and Punish is clearly anticipated in the arguments here. The 
opening of the Hopital General is an epitome of a trend where "internment 
played not only a negative role of exclusion, but also the positive role of 
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organisation" (HF 96). It was a "social mechanism" (HF 92) for the control of 
the city, for the establishment of a homogenous world (HF 97). The venereally 
diseased and the insane were held in the same place of enclosure, stigmatised and 
punished. "By inventing, within the imaginary geometry of its morality, the 
space of internment, the classical epoch came to find at the same time a 
homeland [patrie] and a place of shared redemption from sins against flesh and 
errors against reason" (HF 100). This divide is one that Foucault thinks 
especially evident in our own time. He suggests that in all cultures and at all 
times there has been a system of constraint toward sex, but that we are 
remarkable for having such a strict divide between reason and unreason, health 
and sickness, and normal and abnormal (HF 103). 
Within these places of confinement, the mad were treated in varying ways. Some 
had places in hospitals and almost had a medical status, whilst others were 
effectively in prison. These two institutions were often confused, partly because 
the mad were indiscriminately distributed between both (HF 127-9; EM 3-5). 
Internment and hospitalisation were two ways of treating the insane, but - contra 
the standard reading of Foucault - there is not an abrupt transition from one to 
the other, but rather a "chronological slippage", where the hospital became 
drawn toward the model of confinement, with assimilation following (HF 137-8; 
EM 11). Within the division of thought, Foucault argues that there is similar 
confusion, in that the homo natura is posited as a given, prior to all experience of 
madness, but is, in fact, a creation, born out of a invention of opposition (HF 
147; EM 19). This is an initial glimpse of Foucault's arguments in later works, 
where he discusses the historicality of the a priori, and the invention of the same 
by the opposition to the other. The madman is now seen as responsible, ethically 
condemned, and is designated "as the Other, as the Stranger, as the Excluded 
One" (HF 148-9; EM 20). 
Observing and Classifying 
"There is there, before the gaze [le regard], someone who is indisputably mad, 
someone who is obviously mad" (HF 184). The rigorous division of the early 
years of the classical age is perpetuated by the use of two mechanisms: 
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classification and observation. 18 A new distance is established between the mad, 
and the subject who pronounces them mad, which is no longer simply the 
Cartesian void of "I am not them", but is a more elaborate divide (HF 199). 
Foucault suggests that the great concern of the classifiers of the eighteenth 
century was to transform the disorders of illness into something akin to the order 
of plants. The organisation of botany could be used to classify pathology, the 
project of a garden of species belonged to the "wisdom of divine forethought" 
(HF 206-7). Once again the organisation of thought has a mirror in the 
organisation of action, the organisation of species [especes] maps directly onto 
the organisation of space [espace], the social structures replicate the structures of 
knowledge [savoir] (HF 223), a theme Foucault later elaborates in The Order of 
Things. 
The parallel with biology is also important in the transfer of elements of the 
ethical to the corporal. Whilst Cartesian dualism had established a strict divide 
between the body and the mind or soul, a new shift to locating mental disorders 
in physical space allowed the treatment of madness as a disease of the body 
rather than of the soul. The body, specifically the brain, became an object of the 
medical gaze. Passion -a mode of illness - causes the circulation, the dispersion 
and the concentration of the spirits "according to a spatial design which licences 
the trace of the object in the brain and its image in the soul... forming in the 
body a kind of geometric figure of passion" (HF 245; MC 87). A disease of the 
soul has, crucially, no place, and cannot be seen, observed, subjected to the 
normalising gaze. Placing it in the observable brain enabled a whole host of new 
approaches. The corporal space is as ethical as it is organic; the seat of-the 
corporal soul is the brain (HF 270-1). Foucault uses as a particular example 
hysteria, which was-located within the space of the body: "in the coherence of its 
organic values and its moral values" (HF 302; MC 143). 19 
Foucault looks at the work of Thomas Sydenham, whose Observationes medicae 
was published in 1676. Sydenham's reputation is based on his notion that 
observation was a more useful medical tool than speculation. But Foucault 
refuses to see this as a scientific, neutral advance. "This 'interior body' which 
Sydenham tried to penetrate with `the eyes of the mind' was not the objective 
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body available to the dull gaze of a neutralised observation; it was the site where 
a certain manner of imagining the body and of deciphering its internal 
movements combined with a certain manner of investing it with moral values" 
(HF 308; MC 150). Madness is slowly becoming `treatable', or at least open to 
medical perception. But this shift is only possible with an attendant shift toward 
the subject responsible, defining a moral space of responsibility. In this space 
established, of physical and moral dimensions, "madness will never again be able 
to speak the language of unreason... it will be entirely enclosed in a pathology" 
(HF 35 8-9; MC 196-7). 
At the same time, the attitude to the houses of confinement also began to change. 
Rather than people being afraid of confinement itself, or those confined within, 
they began to be afraid of its effects, of the disease spreading from these prisons 
and mad-houses - "a fear formulated in medical terms but animated, basically, 
by a moral myth" (HF 375; MC 202). Continuing the parallel with the lazarettos, 
Foucault claims that the fear was no longer of the place of exclusion, but of 
leprosy itself confronting the town: "a terrible ulcer on the body politic". 20 "All 
those forms of unreason which had replaced leprosy in the geography of evil, and 
which had been banished into the remotest social distance, now became a visible 
leprosy and offered their running sores to the promiscuity- of men". The evil, with 
its attendant fear of contagion, which the classical age had attempted to confine, 
was transgressing the carefully established boundaries between reason and 
madness, and threatening the barrier between health and illness - "a melange 
combining the dread of unreason and the old spectres of disease" (HF 377-8; MC 
205). 
The result of this new fear is the introduction of a new series of structures of 
organisation in the places of confinement: "a new exclusion in the interior of the 
old" (HF 406). Foucault suggests that the introduction of a medical figure - 
homo medicus - into the world of confinement is not as an arbiter between crime 
and madness, evil and illness, but as a guardian to protect others from the 
emanating danger (HF 378; MC 205). The aim was to purify these spaces 
through organisation. What this resulted in was the separation of the mad from 
the others confined in the same loci. This happened on both the theoretical and 
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practical level, slowly, through "imperceptible slippage within structures", or by 
"moments [instants] of violent crisis". The mad were gradually isolated, and the 
monotony, the homogeneity, of insanity was divided into rudimentary species: 
Foucault suggests that "no medical advance, no humanitarian approach was 
responsible". Rather, it was a direct result of confinement (HF 418; MC 224). 
The separation of the mad from other prisoners, the ill or the poor was a result of 
a number of changes. It is suggested that "an abyss yawns in the middle of 
confinement; a void which isolates madness... the presence of the mad appears 
as an injustice; but for others" (HF 422; MC 228). Poverty, for example, is now 
seen as an economic phenomenon, the poor are now treated in two separate 
aspects: as a problem of poverty and as a population. To confine was looked at as 
a gross error and an economic mistake (HF 428-30; MC 229-32). 
Instead of being imprisoned within its homogeneity, madness was now freed, 
"free for a perception which individualised it, free for the recognition of its 
unique features and for all the operations that would finally give it its status as an 
object" (HF 440; MC 234). The old space of internment, now reduced and 
limited, and a medical space formed elsewhere become confused; the twin 
mechanisms of classification and observation become entwined. Foucault 
suggest that "another structure is established between-madness and those who 
recognise it, survey it and judge it, a new connection, neutralised, apparently 
purified from all complicity, which is the order of the objective gaze [le regard]" 
(HF 446). This objectifying, individualising gaze marks a contrast between "the 
old space of exclusion, homogeneous, uniform, rigorously limited", and the 
fragmented, polymorphous, social space of assistance, segmented "in accordance 
with the psychological and moral forms of devotion" {HF 447)_ 
Within this entirely restructured social space, madness still takes its place. 
Foucault's example is that of Brissot, who drew up the plan of a perfect house of 
correction, "in accordance with a geometric rigor which is at the same time 
architectural and moral. Each fragment of space took the symbolic values of a 
socially meticulous hell" (HF 448-9). But this exclusion of the mad now took on 
another meaning, "it no longer marked the great caesura between reason and 
unreason, on the ultimate limits of society; but within the group itself it was 
laid 
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out like a line between sentiments and duties - between pity and horror, between 
assistance and security" (HF 453). The practice of confinement and the 
mechanisms of observation and classification concur. What is important is that 
this transformation of the house of confinement into an asylum is not achieved 
by the progressive introduction of medicine, but through an internal restructuring 
of space (HF 457). 
The Birth of Moral Imprisonment 
Sadism, a phenomenon that bears the name of an individual man, was born of 
confinement, and it is therefore no accident that "Sade's entire oeuvre is 
dominated by the imagery of the Fortress, the Cell, the Cellar, the Convent, the 
inaccessible Island which thus form, as it were, the natural habitat of unreason". 
Nor is it an accident, "that all the fantastic literature of madness and horror, 
which is contemporary with Sade's ceuvre, takes place, preferentially, in the 
strongholds of confinement... in the very places where unreason had been 
reduced to silence" (HF 381-2; MC 210). Foucault suggests that the architecture 
of confinement, the enclosed natures of the places of imprisonment, affected = 
Sade in such a way as to direct his creative output, the state of his mind. The 
power of environment, locale, over mind was one of the insights of the late 
eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries. It was suggested that the mad would 
respond in different ways to differing external stimuli: their abode was clearly 
central. 
Such indeed was the view of Samuel Tuke: "It does not require much 
acquaintance with the character of lunatics, to perceive in how great a degree, the 
prevention of abuses, and the compatibility of comfort with security, must 
depend on the construction of their abodes" . 
21 The York Retreat, founded by 
Tuke's father William, was based on just such a calculation: "A place in which 
the unhappy might obtain a refuge -a quiet haven in which the shattered bark 
might find a means of reparation or of safety". 
" Foucault argues that the Retreat 
still functions as an instrument of segregation, but it was a segregation of moral 
and religious dimensions, one that sought to create a milieu similar to that of the 
Quaker community. Madness was not cured but controlled, mainly by placing the 
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individual in a situation where they were in moral debate with themselves, "in a 
perpetual anxiety, ceaselessly threatened by Law and Transgression [Faute]" (HF 
502-3; MC 243-5). 
The power of space, and concomitantly, the importance of the spaces of power, 
was recognised by those involved in the early nineteenth century in the design of 
asylums. Samuel Tuke's Practical Hints are symptomatic. Tuke suggests four 
aims for architectural design: the separation of male and female patients; the 
separation of patients by state of mind; a design that allowed easy and constant 
surveillance; and a design that allowed the patients a voluntary change of place 
and scenery, compatible with security. 23 Within the actual geography of the 
Retreat, there was also the precedent of moving people around the Retreat, to 
other rooms or buildings depending on their behaviour and social class. 24 The use 
of architecture and surroundings is clearly central, a point noted in Erving 
Goffman's thoughts on total institutions (published the same year as Histoire de 
la folie): -"Their encompassing or total character is symbolised by the barrier to 
social intercourse with the outside and to departure that is often built right into 
the physical plant, such as locked doors, high walls, barbed wire, cliffs, water; 
forests, or moors". 25 Whilst Tuke hoped to remove the visible barriers, the 
internal space was carefully controlled, and indeed, the very name Retreat signals 
its distance from the outside community. 
Within the Retreat, overt physical constraints were removed, so as to lend an air 
of freedom to the surroundings. Rooms were structured so that the apparent 
autonomy of the patients was greater than the actual - false handles on certain 
doors, with some spaces forbidden; custodial features were minimised, such as 
the muffling of bolts, and the use of cast iron frames around windows to remove 
the need for bars. 26 Although the design was based on William Tuke's original 
ýý idea of an "architecture of compassion", 27 Foucault sees a more sinister intent. 
The ostensible freedom of the individual actually placed them within a system of 
self-restraint, with the potential threat of guilt (HF 507; MC 250). The notion of 
judgement becomes paramount, with the individual objectified for scrutiny by 
the other, both through the mechanism of work and that of observation [le 
regard] (HF 505; MC 247). For Foucault what this initiates is a system of "moral 
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imprisonment", with the individual disciplining themselves and subject to the 
judgement of the normalising gaze, 'more genuinely confined than he could have 
been in a dungeon and chains, a prisoner of nothing but himself' (HF 516; MC 
261). The observation, the clinical gaze, becomes a tool in the hands of a new 
personage in the Asylum, the keeper [la surveillant], who intervenes in the lives 
of the mad without recourse to instruments of constraint, but who simply 
operates with the use of observation and language. Crucially the keeper 
introduces a presence "from the other side", representing both the authority that 
confines and the reason that judges (HF 508; MC 251). 
The name of Tuke is often coupled with that of Philippe Pinel, who wrote on the 
situation of the mad, and famously released them from their chains in Bicetre. At 
least, so goes the story. As Gordon has pointed out, for Foucault the important 
thing about this tale is not its historical veracity - something which has be rightly 
questioned - but its impact as a founding gesture. 
28 This impact is not something 
that can be doubted: the apocryphal tale is taken as a fundamental shift to a more 
humane treatment of the insane. Foucault is therefore interested in how this story 
affects the theoretical discourse at the time. Like Tuke, Pinel's intervention is 
one that replaces physical with moral constraint. As Foucault suggests, "the 
asylum is a religious domain without religion, a domain of pure morality, of 
ethical uniformity". Whereas before the house of confinement was a `foreign 
country", limited and separated like the lazar house, as an asylum it now 
represents "the great continuity of social morality" (HF 513; MC 257). The 
previously uniform space of exclusion was medically fragmented into a 
polymorphous garden of species, but in moral terms this shift introduced a 
"homogeneous rule", extended to all those who would tend to escape from it. "In 
one and the same movement, the asylum becomes, in Pinel's hands, and 
instrument of moral uniformity and of social denunciation" (HF 514; MC 258). 
Foucault suggests that though both Pinel and Tuke effected a moral 
transformation with their patients, the situations are not entirely congruent. At 
the Retreat, religious segregation was used for the purposes of moral purification. 
For Pinel, the operation ensured an continuity of ethics between the world of 
madness and the world of reason. This act of social segregation allowed the 
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bourgeois morality of the outside to posit itself as an effective norm, and 
therefore permitted it to be imposed upon all forms of insanity as an absolute law 
(HF 515; MC 258). Pinel's importance also lies in the nosography of disease that 
he formulated. Although he was not the first author to attempt a classification of 
mental derangements'29 his Nosographie philosophique and Traite medico- 
philosophique, both published in the years of the Revolution, were enormously 
influential. The changes in treatment of various illnesses "did not only signify a 
reorganisation of nosological space, but, beneath the medical concepts, the 
presence and the operation of a new structure of experience" (HF 547). The 
system of classifications therefore reflects the effort to impose system and order 
upon the variations of vital phenomena'30 but also often has parallels in the 
physical situation of the patients, with different diseases located in different 
locations, as with Brissot. 31 
The other aspect of the twofold mechanism of the classical age, observation, is 
also an important part of Pinel's work. Once more, he is contrasted with the 
Retreat. There, though the mad were observed, and knew they were being 
observed, madness had only an indirect apprehension of itself, it lacked an 
immediate grasp of its own character. With Pinel, on the contrary, Foucault 
suggests that "observation operated only within the space defined by madness, 
without surface or exterior limits. Madness would see itself, would be seen by 
itself - pure spectacle and absolute subject" (HF 517; MC 262). Pinel suggested 
that he relied "entirely on observation", 3` a practical (and medical) device that 
allowed a moral and normalising dimension to intrude: "This theme is very 
important for the psychiatry of the nineteenth century: madness imprisons man in 
objectivity" (HF 542). 
This objectivity, this moral divide, produces a new dialectic, one that is forever 
renewed, between the Same and the Other. The shift is one such that "the 
madman is no longer the insane in the divided space of classical unreason; he is 
the mental patient [aliene] of the modern form of illness" (HF 546-7). But whilst 
some would see this as the dispassionate advance of pure medicine, Foucault 
argues that the doctor takes a "preponderant place within the asylum" by essence 
of his position, rather than his training. His presence converts the old house of 
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confinement into a medical space, but his intervention is not made by virtue of a 
medical skill, but by the power of morality: "It is not as a scientist [savant] that 
homo medicus has authority in the asylum, but as a wise man [sage]... as a 
juridical and moral guarantee, not in the name of science" (HF 523-4). What is 
key though is that the doctors think that they can make judgements by virtue of 
their scientific knowledge. Foucault therefore suggests that despite the 
restructuring of space on both the level of the real and the imaginary, the divide 
remains. Instead of the simply physical division, there is "that gigantic moral 
imprisonment which we are in the habit of calling, doubtless by antiphrasis, the 
liberation of the insane by Pinel and Tuke" (HF 530; MC 278). 
Before the explicit formulation of much of his critical apparatus, Foucault's 
Histoire de la folie showcased many details of a spatially aware historical 
approach. This history of madness looks at the way space has been used in 
relation to the mad, tracing the patterns of exclusion, ordering, moralisation and 
confinement which were brought to bear on their situation, altering their 
perception. Foucault shows an awareness of the way in which conceptions of 
space - theoretical, medical, moral, and philosophical - often relate to the 
exercise of power over the mad. 
II Not Through Bentham's Eyes 
The same point concerning the importance of space to the exercise of power can 
be made for the disciplinary project. Since its publication in 1975, Discipline and 
Punish has been read as a historical investigation of the prison, especially within 
French history. 33 The book- begins by contrasting the explosive torture of the 
regicide Damiens with the regime of the House of young prisoners - "a public 
execution [un supplice] and a time-table" (SP 14; DP 7). 
34 But much of the book 
is not about the punishment of criminals. Indeed, the majority of the text does not 
speak of the prison, but the standard reading of it certainly emphasises those 
parts that do. Just as Colin Gordon has argued that Histoire de la folie is often 
reduced to "three or four striking tableaux", 
3' we could argue that the same is 
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done to Discipline and Punish - the torture of Damiens and the House of young 
prisoners, the Panopticon, and the Carceral Archipelago. 
As the following reading makes clear, the research presented in Discipline and 
Punish is part of a much wider project, one that occupied Foucault for much of 
his life. This is a research project that picks up on themes initially explored in 
Histoire de la folie, is developed in The Birth of the Clinic and dominates the 
research of the 1970s. This project is what I will call the policing of society. The 
concept of police is one to which Foucault returns again and again in his major 
works. However, the comments in these works are frequently made in passing, 
and it is not always clear in what way he is using the concept. Support for his use 
of the concept has to be gleaned from remarks in lectures, essays and conference 
papers, as well as from the wider discussion of the term in Europe in the 
seventeenth to nineteenth centuries. 
Foucault suggests that from the beginning of the seventeenth century there 
appeared a number of treatises concerning the government of territory. At their 
core these texts argued that for a state to be well organised it should extend over 
its entire territory a system of policing as tight and efficient as that found in 
cities. By police it is clear that Foucault means more than a uniformed force for 
the prevention and detection of crime. Rather, the concept is one which is 
concerned with a far more general set of regulations embodying a type of 
rationality to ensure good government. 36 This meant that the term extended far 
beyond the juridical: it was involved in education, welfare, assuring urban 
supplies and the correct standards necessary for handicrafts and commerce, -the 
pricing of daily necessities, maintaining hygiene and health, fostering good 
working relations, and extended to the ways in which the city should be provided 
with street-lighting, bridges, adornment and splendour. The police would 
therefore oversee a range of activities - religion, morality, health, supplies, roads, 
highways and town buildings, public safety, the liberal arts, trade, factories, 
manservants and factory workers, and the poor (DE IV 272-4; FR 241-2; DE IV 
153-60; PPC 77-83). 37 "Police is the ensemble of mechanisms serving to ensure 
order, the properly channelled growth of wealth and the conditions of 
preservation of health `in general"' (DE III, 17; FR 277). 
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When Foucault discusses Louis Turquet de Mayenne's La Monarchie aristo- 
democratique (1611) he notes that there are four boards of police - two 
concerned with people in the positive and negative aspects of life, and two 
concerned with things, the first looking at commodities and manufactured goods 
and the second overseeing space and territory: private property, manorial rights, 
roads, rivers and public buildings (DE IV 154-5; PPC 77-8). Similarly the 
discussion of von Justi's manual Elements of Police notes that it begins with a 
study of territory (DE IV, 158-9; PPC 81-2). Foucault notes that this theme is 
frequently referred to in texts of this period: "architecture and urbanism occupy a 
place of considerable -importance". This is a development from works of the 
sixteenth century (DE IV, 270-1; FR 239-40). Foucault is interested in 
cameralism and Polizeiwissenschaft because of this notion of police, which, 
because it is concerned in very general ways with principles of order, security 
and discipline, can be used to understand the notion of power. What is of interest 
here is how the understanding of the control of space is central to police. Such a 
theme is developed in many of Foucault's studies of this time, and understanding 
how the themes of police and space interlink sheds light on Foucault's 
conception of power, which he suggests has space as a central component. 
In tandem with this it is worth discussing the subtitle of the book: the birth of the 
prison. Discipline and Punish is clearly about issues concerned with the penal, but 
also about something much wider. Early in the book Foucault makes it clear that his 
project is to write the "history of the modem soul" (SP 30; DP 23), and a few pages 
later he is even more explicit: "The history of this `micro-physics' of the punitive 
power would then be a genealogy or an element in a genealogy of the modem 
`soul"' (SP 38; DP 29). Foucault then suggests that the "soul is the prison of the 
body", and that he "would like to write the history of this prison, with all the 
political investments of the body that it gathers in its closed architecture" (SP 38-9; 
DP 30-1; emphasis added). This prison, not the prison. The shift from the definite 
article to the particular appears to "have been lost on most commentators. Quite 
clearly Foucault is explaining that the birth of the prison is about the birth of the 
S0111.18 
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Recasting Discipline and Punish within this wider context opens up a number of 
themes for discussion. First, the most viable model for the disciplined society is not 
the prison, but the army. Second, shifting the emphasis away from the prison allows 
us to better understand Foucault's remarks about schools, monasteries, hospitals 
and factories. These too are instruments in the birth of the modem soul and in the 
policing of society. Third, if the soul is the prison of the body, and the body is not 
simply understood in the singular, but as the social body, we gain insights into 
Foucault's remarks about the control of the population - bodies in plural. Fourth, 
we can note in passing how Foucault sees the links between man, the human 
sciences and the notion of the subject - an analysis which builds on the work of The 
Order of Things and is developed in The History of Sexuality. Fifth, implicit in the 
preceding, and important for the overall emphasis of this thesis, we can be attentive 
to questions of space in the disciplined society without solely restricting ourselves 
to the Panopticon. 
It is this last issue that this reading most seriously wishes to take issue with. Jeremy 
Bentham's Panopticon is treated in a striking passage, and Foucault did help in its 
rediscovery, but it takes up only a few pages of the text. Many have taken it not 
only as the most apposite example of the new method of surveillance-led control, 
but also as the model for many of the others. If Madness and Civilisation has been 
reduced to three or four tableaux, Discipline and Punish is often simplified to just 
one. Pasquale Pasquino suggests this to Foucault in a 1978 interview with him. 
Foucault replies: 
In reference to the reduction of my analyses to that simplistic 
figure which is the metaphor of the Panopticon... let us compare 
what they attribute to me with what I have said, and here it is easy 
to show that the analyses of power which 1 have made cannot at 
all be reduced to this figure... " (DE III, 628; FL 257) 
Instead of a reading which pays due attention to the place the Panopticon plays 
within the overall argument, all-too-often the world Foucault describes is seen 
through Bentham's eyes. 39 There is much more than that here. 
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A Torturous Sediment 
Before I look at the wider genealogy it is worth re-reading Discipline and Punish 
from the question of punishment. This is because noting the basic error that is 
made in many readings helps to contextualise the other research. Foucault's 
understanding of supplice is both judicial and political - it is one of a number of 
rituals by which power is manifested (SP 58-9; DP 47-8). Its manifestation of 
military might is important in its role as public spectacle: "A whole military 
machine surrounded the supplice: cavalry of the watch, archers, guardsmen, 
soldiers" (SP 61; DP 50). The ceremonies of supplice are visual displays of 
power, the marks of the sovereign are left in prominent places: "Pillories, 
gallows and scaffolds were erected in public squares or by the roadside; 
sometimes the corpses of the executed persons [des supplicies] were displayed 
for several days near the scenes of their crimes. Not only must people know 
[sachent], they must see [voient] with their own eyes" (SP 70; DP 58). 
Penal reformers - Foucault quotes de Mably - wished for a form of punishment 
that touched the soul rather than the body (SP 24; DP 16). Rather than simply 
destroy the body of the condemned, a gentle way in punishment could be found, 
one that took on several non j uridical elements, so to make the punishment not 
solely legal: "We punish, but-this is a way of saying that we wish to obtain a 
cure" (SP 30; DP 22). - "There must be no more spectacular, but useless [inutiles] 
penalties" (SP 128; DP 109) - punishment must be ordered, organised and 
thoughtful. Just as the garden of species had -proved a model for the 
understanding of the mad, it could also be used for a taxonomy of crimes: "One 
sought to constitute a Linnaeus of crimes and punishments... " (SP 118; DP 99). 
Regarding the new phase of punishment discussed by Beccaria, Bentham and 
Brissot, Foucault talks of four possible types of punishment. The first he finds 
expressed in the affirmation: "You have broken the social pact, you no longer 
belong to the social body, you have put yourself outside of the space of legality; 
we expel you from the social space where that legality functioned". This is the 
punishment of exile, banishment and deportation. The second is also a species of 
exclusion, but its mechanism is not of material deportation, of transfer outside 
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the social body, but isolation in the midst of moral space, of public opinion. 
Punishment at the level of scandal, shame, humiliation. The transgression [faute] 
is made public, the individual is held up for public condemnation. The third is 
that of forced labour, of reparation for social injury, making amends in a way 
useful for the State or the society, a compensation. The fourth is the penalty of 
talion, making the punishment correspond to the crime - killing those who kill, 
taking the goods of those who steal (DE II, 589-90). 
In the reformers' dream the object of punishment is "no longer the body, with the 
ritual play of excessive pains, spectacular brandings [marques eclatantes] in the 
ritual of supplices; it is the mind or rather a play of representations and signs 
circulating discreetly but necessarily and evidently in the minds of all" (SP 120; 
DP 101). Punishment needs to be constantly visible, a learning curve for the 
population as a whole, "a school rather than a festival; an ever-open book rather 
than a ceremony... The spectators must be able to consult at each moment the 
permanent lexicon of crime and punishment. Let us conceive of places of 
punishment as a Garden of the Laws that families would visit on Sundays" (SP 
131-2; DP 111)_ 
This, then, is how one must imagine the punitive city. At the 
crossroads, in the gardens, at the side of roads being repaired or 
bridges built, in workshops open to all, in the depths of mines that 
may be visited, will be hundreds of tiny theatres of punishment... 
The great terrifying ritual of the supplices gives way, day after 
day, street after street, to this serious theatre, with its multifarious 
and persuasive scenes. (SP 133; DP 113) 
However - and this is a point that is sometimes missed - this 
didn't actually 
happen, at least not for long. Foucault argues that deportation disappeared fairly 
quickly, mechanisms of scandal were never arrived at in practice, forced labour 
was generally a symbolic punishment and equivalence was thought of as archaic. 
Instead another mode of punishment comes to the fore - one that Brissot and 
Beccaria had barely mentioned - imprisonment, which arose suddenly at the 
beginning of the 19th century as an institution (DE II, 591-2). There are therefore 
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three moments to the change examined in Discipline and Punish. The first is the 
one based on the old monarchical law -a punishment directed at the body. "The 
other two both refer to a preventive, utilitarian, corrective conception of a right to 
punish that belongs to society as a whole; but they are very different from one 
another at the level of the mechanisms they envisage" (SP 154; DP 130). The 
problem arises in looking at what kind of punishment could strike the soul 
without touching the body: "What would a non-corporal punishment be? " Even 
prison causes some physical pain or privation. Foucault therefore suggests that 
modern forms of punishment retain "a `torturous' sediment [un fond 
«suppliciant»]" (SP 23; DP 16). 
The third moment in this history of punishment "put to work procedures for the 
dressage of bodies" (SP 155; DP 131) - it used the mind to affect the body, and 
vice versa- This is what Foucault means by suggesting that the soul is the prison 
of the body. To show these three moments, he sets up a series of triads: "The 
sovereign and his force, the social body, the administrative apparatus. Mark, 
sign, trace... The tortured body, the soul with its manipulated representations, the 
body subjected to training... three series of elements that characterise the three 
mechanisms... three technologies of power" (SP 155; DP 13 1). 40 The key 
question in Discipline and Punish is not so much why the sovereign and his force 
was replaced, but why was the third adopted in preference to the second. Why 
did the administrative apparatus replace the social body, why did the enclosed 
place of reform get chosen over the punitive city, "why did the physical exercise 
of punishment (which is not supplice) replace, with the prison that is its 
institutional support, the social play of the signs of punishment and the chattering 
[bavarde] festival that circulated them? " (SP 154-5; DP 130-1) 
In his answer to these questions Foucault suggests that four themes should be 
borne in mind. Punishment should be thought of both as "a complex social 
function" and "a political tactic", the technology of power should be made "the 
very principle both of the humanisation of the penal system and of the 
knowledge of man", and we should "try to discover whether this entry of the soul 
onto the scene of penal justice ... 
is not the effect of a transformation of the way 
in which the body itself is invested in power relations" (SP 31-2; DP 23-4). This 
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last claim is particularly worth pursuing. How does a spatialised history help us 
to understand the changes in poweribody relations - especially in non-penal 
institutions? 
The Army, Schools, Monasteries, Factories 
Foucault's discussion of the army, schools, monasteries and factories serves a dual 
purpose. First they provide many of the techniques later adopted in the modern 
prison; second they show how bodies were trained in a variety of ways, leading to 
the development of the modem soul. In the emphasis on the prison these examples 
are often passed by, though as Neocleous notes "if there is one institution that 
Foucault uses as his model it is the military rather than the prison". 4' The 
example of the military, and the use of military metaphors, is certainly key to 
Foucault's work. His emphasis on strategies, tactics and battle shows this, as 
does his remark in conversation with the geographers of Herodote that many of 
his spatial metaphors are taken from military discourse (DE III, 32-4). It is 
noteworthy that the first two chapters of the section entitled "Discipline" both 
heavily rely on the military model, and hardly mention criminal law. In looking 
at the roots of disciplinary methods, Foucault suggests that many had long been 
in existence, and in a note he states that though his -examples in these two 
chapters are drawn from the military, medicine, education and industry -note the 
lack of the penal - he could equally have taken them from colonisation, slavery 
and child rearing (SP 166n 1; DP 314n 1). 
Foucault's understanding of discipline is that it begins at the same time that an 
art of the human body was born... discipline is a political Anatomy of detail". 
This is why it needs to be interrogated with a "micro-physics" of power (SP 162- 
3; DP 137-9). The use of detail, of minute regulations, the exacting gaze of the 
inspections, the continual supervision in schools, barracks, hospitals and 
workshops provide the political dream of "docile bodies". "From such trifles", 
suggests Foucault, "the man of modern humanism was born" (SP 165-6; DP 140- 
1). What is important about these new mechanisms of power is that they 
introduce the notion of the norm. This norm - although probably a retrospective 
invention defined as much by what it is not as by what it is - allows "the shading 
177 
of individual differences" (SP 216; DP 184) -a potential polarisation. 42 
Behaviour and ability can be regulated according to an established standard. This 
is especially found in the examination, which "combines the techniques of an 
observing hierarchy and those of a normalising judgement", and is found in both 
schools and hospitals (SP 217-9; DP 185-7). 
Foucault suggest four arts of discipline: distribution within space; the control of 
activity - timetables, rhythms, dressage; the use of exercises; the articulation and 
combination of forces- The first is the most important for the purpose here - 
indeed as Foucault states, "discipline is above all an analysis of space" (DE III, 
515). Foucault subdivides this into four techniques. Enclosure [cloture] is the 
first of these, "the protected place of disciplinary monotony". Obvious examples 
include the confinement of paupers and beggars, but Foucault also talks of 
boarding schools, based on the monastic model, barracks and certain factories. 
But he suggests that enclosure alone is not sufficient, and a further subdivision, 
or partitioning [quadrillage] is needed - "each individual has his own place; and 
each place its individual ___ 
discipline organises an analytical space"_ Its model is 
"an old architectural and religious method", the monastic cell - discipline is 
cellular. 43 The partitions in dormitories serve this purpose (see VS 37; WK 27-8). 
These subdivided places are designated with particular purposes - Foucault calls 
these functional sites. This allows places to be coded, or recoded and used for 
new purposes, such as the lazarettos reused as venereal hospitals and madhouses 
in Histoire de lafolie, but also for the spatial distribution of diseases in hospitals, 
especially military and naval ones- Finally these enclosed, partitioned, and coded 
sites are placed in a classification, a rank. Foucault gives examples of the class, 
drawing out its parallels with the mechanisms of the army. 
These spaces are both real - they suggest the disposition of buildings, rooms and 
furniture - and ideal - they enable characterisations, assessments, 
hierarchies- 
They function as `tableaux vivantes', much as the project of the garden of species 
had organised the mad, and the nosology of disease had the clinic, they capture 
men in real and imaginary classifications - "the table was both a technique of 
power and a procedure of knowledge". A pairing of real and imaginary spaces - 
"tactics, the spatial ordering of men; taxonomy, the disciplinary space of natural 
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beings; the economic table, the regulated movement of wealth" (SP 166-75; DP 
141-9) 
Foucault also looks at the ideal model of the military camp - "The old, 
traditional square plan was considerably refined in innumerable new projects 
[schemas]. The geometry of the paths, the number and distribution of the tents, 
the orientation of their entrances, the disposition of files and ranks were exactly 
defined; the network of gazes that supervised one another was laid down... The 
camp is the diagram of a power that acts by means of general visibility". As 
Foucault points out, the model of the camp or its underlying principle was found 
in urban development, working-class housing estates, hospitals, asylums, prisons, 
schools. A shift has been made from the architecture of visual excess - palaces or 
churches - or that designed to observe the outside - fortresses - to that which 
allows internal control (SP 201-2; DP 171-2; DE III, 192; FL 228). It is also 
worth noting that though these models have primarily an internal function, 
occasionally they exercise "a role of external surveillance, developing around 
themselves a whole margin of lateral controls", in the way that schools train 
children and supervise parents (SP 246; DP 211). Similarly the areas surrounding 
institutions of this sort are obviously shaped by them - garrison towns, the 
environs of prisons, ports, etc. 44 
It is important to note that procedures for the control of space in one realm were 
often used in others. For example, the links between the spatial organisation of 
architecture and the organisation of bodies is clearly found in Foucault's 
description of the medal struck to commemorate Louis XIV's first military 
review in 1666 (SP plate 2; DP plate 1). "In the background is a piece of classical 
architecture. The columns of the palace extend those formed by the ranks of men 
and the erect rifles, just as the paving no doubt extends the lines of the exercise... 
The order of the architecture... imposes its rules and its geometry on the 
disciplined men on the ground. The columns of power" (SP 221; DP 188). 
Foucault also explicitly links the mechanisms used for tabulating the results of 
examinations - examinations that enabled 
both the individualising of specific 
features and a calculation of differences within a population - with those of the 
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examination itself: "small techniques of notation, of registration, of constituting 
files, of arranging facts in columns and tables" (SP 223; DP 190). 
It is somewhat of a mystery as to why the standard reception of Foucault has 
ignored so much of this text. This is especially so for those who wish to look at 
his work on space. The military camp, the naval hospital, the monastic cell are all 
examples of spatial analyses - albeit less striking than the Panopticon. 4' 
The Spaces of Medicine 
It was suggested above the Foucault's work in Discipline and Punish needs to be 
examined in the context of the wider research project he was engaged in the 60s 
and 70s. As with so many of his major themes, this wider project picked up on 
themes discussed in Histoire de lafolie. The research was continued in The Birth 
of the Clinic, and was pursued in College de France courses and occasional 
essays and lectures elsewhere. Much of this work is not translated into English, 
and has only recently become available in French. Foucault begins the first 
chapter of The Birth of the Clinic with a passage that serves as a succinct 
summary of how his histories are spatialised and how space is historicised. He 
suggests that for us, now, the human body defines the space of origin and 
distribution of disease, a familiar geometry, an anatomical atlas. But, he counters, 
"this order of the solid, visible body is only one way in which one spatialises 
disease. Without doubt neither the first, nor the most fundamental. There have 
been, and will be, other distributions of illness". Some of these other 
distributions will not necessarily rely on Euclidean anatomy, on classical 
geometry. The model that seems the norm to us is a "historical, temporary 
datum" (NC 1; BC 3). - 
In the eighteenth century medicine organised diseases on the basis of species - 
the Nosologie of Sauvages, the Nosographie of Pinel - and treated localisation in 
the organism as a subsidiary problem (NC 2-3; BC 4-5). The disease is defined 
by its place in a family, secondarily by its seat in an organism: "the organs are 
the concrete supports of the disease; they never constitute its indispensable 
conditions" (NC 9; BC 10). Foucault suggests that this location in a family and a 
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body are the primary and secondary forms of spatialisation. The tertiary 
spatialisation is "all the gestures by which, in a given society, a disease is 
circumscribed, medically invested, isolated, divided up into closed, privileged 
regions, or distributed throughout cure centres, arranged in the most favourable 
way". It is the place of political struggles, economic constraints, and social 
confrontations. It is here that the changes that led to a reformulation of medical 
knowledge occurred (NC 14-5; BC 16). We have here space of imaginary 
classifications, space of corporal reality, and space of social order. 
The ordered garden of species can only work in theory, as social reality 
complicates the picture: "Like civilisation, the hospital is an artificial locus [lieu] 
in which the transplanted disease runs the risk of losing its essential identity". 
The individuated disease comes into contact with a number of other diseases, the 
hospital is an "unkempt garden where the species cross-breed", and there is also 
the problem which doctors call prison or hospital fever. No hospital disease is a 
pure disease, therefore the family is the natural and desired locus of disease (NC 
15-6; BC 17). In the classifier's abstraction, we can see an echo of that practised 
by Cariesian geometry: "For the classifiers, the fundamental act of medical 
knowledge was the -establishment of a location [reperage]: a symptom was 
situated within a disease, a disease in a specific ensemble, and-this ensemble in a 
general plan of the pathological world" (NC 29; BC 29). 
After the Revolution, however, the clinic - the teaching hospital and clinical 
medicine - takes precedence over the family. This emergence - 
in its overall 
arrangement [-disposition] - is due to a number of changes, many of which are 
spatial. There is a change in the understanding of corporal space, from two- 
dimensional tissue, to the mass of the organ, with-its "internal surface"; a shift 
from a botany of symptoms to a grammar of signs; and symptoms are now 
located in the space of the body, rather than grouped into a single logical figure. 
A shift in the spaces of medicine; but space is still a central part of the analysis. 
The doctor's question changes from "what is the matter with you? " to "where 
does it hurt? " (NC xiv; BC xviii). 
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Two key points are found in the new understanding of disease: the notion of the 
gaze [le regard] and the importance of the physical body - especially open to 
examination in death. Foucault quotes Bichat's suggestion to his pupils - "Open 
up a few corpses: you will dissipate at once the darkness that observation alone 
could not dissipate" (NC 149; BC 146) - suggesting that this allows a greater 
knowledge of the disease: "From the point of view of death, disease has a land, a 
mappable [reperable) territory, a subterranean, but secure place where its 
kinships and its consequences are formed; local values define its forms" (NC 
151; BC 149). Foucault suggests that our epoch is one "that marks the suzerainty 
of the gaze" (NC 2; BC 4). Of course, the analysis of the living body has to 
presuppose much that cannot be seen: 
Disease exists in space before it exists for sight. The 
disappearance of the two great a priori classes of nosology, 
opened up for medicine an entirely spatial field of investigation, 
determined throughout by these local values. It is curious to 
observe that this absolute spatialisation of medical experience is 
due not to the definitive integration of normal and pathological 
anatomy, but to the first effort to define a physiology of the 
morbid phenomenon (NC 192; BC 188). 
_ 
Therefore, in The Birth of the Clinic, Foucault shows how spatial analyses help 
to map out the beginning of the modern episteme: "Since 1816, the doctor's eye 
has been able to confront a sick organism. The historical and concrete a priori of - 
the modern medical gaze was finally constituted" (NC 197; BC 192). 
But The Birth of the Clinic is somewhat light in its analysis of social space. In 
The Archaeology of Knowledge Foucault recognises this deficiency, suggesting 
that "we must also describe the institutional sites [emplacements] from which the 
doctor makes his discourse, and from which this discourse derives its legitimate 
source and point of application (its specific objects and instruments of 
verification)". The hospital is "a place of constant, coded, systematic 
observation... constituting a quantifiable field of frequencies"; private practice 
offers "a field of less certain, lacunary, and far less numerable observations, but 
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which sometimes facilitates observations that are more far-reaching in their 
effects, with a better knowledge of the background and environment"; and there 
are the research sites of the laboratory, "an autonomous place, long distinct from 
the hospital", and the library or "documentary field". Foucault goes on to suggest 
that the relative importance and impact of these sites has changed- (AS 69-71; 
AK 51-2). 
Foucault's research in this area was the topic of his 1973-4 seminar at the 
College de France, which studied "the history of the institution and the 
architecture of the hospital in the eighteenth century" (RC 69). The results of this 
research were published in a volume entitled Genealogie des equipements de 
normalisation in 1976, and reissued as Les machines a guerir [Curing Machines] 
in 1979. `6 Foucault's introduction to this work - "The Politics of Health in the 
Eighteenth Century "- and the three conference papers given to the Institute of 
Social Medicine in Rio de Janeiro in October 1974 help to patch together his 
thoughts in this area. The research- looks at the development of hospitalisation 
and its mechanisms in the eighteenth and early nineteenth century, and at the 
establishment of plans to make a study of habitat and all that surrounds it: waste 
collection, means of transport, and public resources which allow the functioning 
of everyday life, particularly in the urban environment (DE III, 208). 
Foucault suggests that social medicine is developed in France along with the 
expansion of urban structures. There are various interesting analyses. One 
suggests that the birth of cemeteries, on the edges of towns, with individual 
graves, is not due to Christianity, and a respect for the dead, but a politico- 
medico concern for the living and the contagion that the old graves brought. A 
similar move was made with abattoirs. There is also a greater control of 
movement - not just of people, but of things and elements, principally water and 
air. This includes a look at the development of sewers, where the underground [le 
sous-sol] was controlled by the authorities, even when the space above was 
privately owned (DE III, 219-21). Medicine undertakes the "control of urban 
space in general ... 
The city with its principal spatial variables appears as a 
medicalisable object" (DE III, 22; FR 282). A variant on the French model is 
found in Germany, with the development of the concept of Medi: inischepoli: ei, 
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the medical police, which appeared in 1764 (DE III, 212), and in England, where 
the principal aim is the health of the work force. Foucault suggests that in this 
period "urban topographies" were undertaken, which can outline the principles of 
an urban policy. This is in contrast to topographies of regions, which can only 
recommend corrections and compensations to matters such as climate and 
geology that are outside of human control (DE III, 22; FR 282). 
Foucault also discusses the "spatial adaptation of the hospital, and in particular 
its adaptation to the urban space in which it is located". This works on two 
levels: the situation of the hospital within the larger community - should it be 
large and encompassing, perhaps outside the town, where the risk of contagion is 
limited, or should there be a number of smaller hospitals spread throughout the 
community - and the internal space of the hospital itself, where the hospital is 
turned into a "curing machine" (DE III, 26; FR 286-7). Before the eighteenth 
century the hospital was essentially an institution for the assistance of the poor, 
an institution of separation and exclusion, the place where one went to die (DE 
III, 511). The model for the `medicalisation' of the hospital was not the civil 
hospital, but the naval hospital, such as those in London, Marseilles and La 
Rochelle. Some of the mechanisms developed out of the treatment of epidemics 
and the use of quarantine, some from the new means of discipline found in the 
army (DE III, 513-4). It is obvious that the models Foucault uses in his earlier 
work to show the development of medicine - the army, monasteries, slavery, 
schools, the Roman legion - are also those that shape the prison (DE III, 515). 
`x' 
Foucault suggests that the "question of the hospital at the end of the eighteenth 
century was fundamentally a question of space". This is evidenced in a number 
of areas. Examples include the locale of the hospital, where its situation had to 
conform to the sanitary controls of the town - the dangerous miasmas, 
contaminated air, and dirty water; the individuation of patient space, with the 
single beds, as opposed to the `lit dortoir' in which six slept, and the screens 
[draps] placed around the beds; and the constitution of a modifiable 
environment, with changeable temperature and air cooling. All of these showed 
the attempt to make the hospital not simply the place of the cure, but also an 
instrument of the cure itself: "the space of the hospital is medicalised in 
its 
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purpose and its effects" (DE III, 518-9). And, just as the mechanisms of 
discipline in the wider society do, the new hospital technology allows both the 
individual and the population to become objects of knowledge and medical 
intervention. The medicine of the eighteenth century, by its use of space, is 
simultaneously a medicine of the individual and the population (DE III, 521). 
The Panopticon and Panopticism 
It is surprising that the spatial analyses of the military, schools, monasteries and 
hospitals are neglected, but even more so that the chapter where Foucault 
introduces the Panopticon is given a partial reading. At the beginning of the 
chapter two methods of dealing with diseases, leprosy and the plague, are 
contrasted. These had earlier been examined in the second of the Rio medicine 
lectures (DE III, 517-8). Foucault suggests that whilst "the leper gave rise to 
rituals of exclusion... the plague gave rise to disciplinary diagrams" (SP 231; DP 
198). `8 These disciplinary diagrams [schemas disciplinaires] are shown in a 
plague town, where there is a strict spatial partitioning, careful surveillance, 
detailed inspection and order. This way of dealing with disease is not "a massive, 
binary division between one set of people and another", it is rather one that 
involves "multiple separations, individualising distributions, an organisation in. 
depth of surveillance and control, an intensification and a ramification of power" 
(SP 231; DP 198). 49 Foucault goes on to link these two models with their 
political/social counterparts: "the leper and his separation; the plague and its 
segmentations. The first is marked; the second analysed and distributed. The 
exile of the leper and the arrest-of the plague do not bring with them the same 
political dream. The first is that of a pure community, the second that of a 
disciplined society" (SP 231-2; DP 198): the military model of organised 
discipline replaces the religious model of exclusion (DE III, 218). 
As Foucault points out, the leper is the symbolic figure, the real figures were 
often beggars, madmen and criminals; the plague similarly stands as a symbol of 
how "all forms of confusion and disorder" were dealt with from the late 
eighteenth century (SP 232; DP 199). The opposition of the leper and the plague, 
as opposed to that of torture and the timetable, is less frequently utilised or 
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commented on in a Foucauldian study. 50 What is important about the use of these 
examples is that Foucault suggests that the former use of power, the exclusion, 
has the organisational grid of the treatment of the plague victim superimposed on 
top of it, providing a model for the growth of the disciplined surveillance society 
- "treat `lepers' as `plague victims', project the subtle segmentations of 
discipline onto the confused space of internment" (SP 232; DP 199). Instead of 
the exclusion without control of banishment, what Bender has called "liminal 
boundedness... a reign of randomness and licence with the precinct of 
confinement", '' the space of exclusion is now rigidly regimented and controlled. 
"All the mechanisms of power which, even today, are disposed around the 
abnormal individual, to brand him and to alter him, are composed of those two 
forms from which they distinctly derive. Bentham's Panopticon is the 
architectural figure of this composition" (SP 233; DP 199-200). 
Before I discuss the Panopticon itself it is worth dwelling on the mechanism of 
the plague town. Foucault suggests in a number of places that in the early 
nineteenth century there was a shift towards what he calls bio-politics, where the 
methods of dealing with populations within territories are modified in certain 
ways. These include the building up of profiles, increasing knowledge through 
monitoring and surveillance, and control through discipline. There is- a move 
towards prevention and regulation, within sites of exclusion clearly, but, by 
extension, this control is expanded to take in the whole society. Foucault's 
understanding of populations as "bodies in plural" perhaps, as Eckermann 
remarks, provides a defence against the charge of critics like Rorty and Taylor 
that Foucault's project is "apolitical", as it would seem that conceiving of bodies 
en masse is an inherently political exercise. 52 In this period, governments deal 
not just with a territory and the individuals or a "people" within, but with a an 
"economic and political problem" - population (VS 35-6; WK 25). 
a 
It is into this understanding that we must insert the Panopticon. What is 
important in Foucault's analysis is that there are two poles in the new mode of 
power. One is the mode of discipline, perhaps in enclosed institutions; the other 
is the understanding of bio-power, of control of populations. 
53 These controls are 
facilitated by police or governmentality. As Foucault notes, the Panopticon "is a 
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form of architecture, of course, but it is above all a form of government. It is a 
way for mind to exercise power over mind" (DE II, 437). Rather than see the rise 
of disciplinary mechanisms as the result of the birth of the prison, we should look 
at the emergence of the prison from the rise in general discipline and policing. 
In this section's call for an end to seeing Foucault's text through Bentham's eyes 
the important role of Bentham himself could easily be neglected. 54 I have 
suggested that we need to be attentive to the place in the text where the 
Panopticon appears - as the architectural figure of the convergence of the 
mechanisms for dealing with lepers and plague victims; as a product of a number 
of disciplinary themes. The Panopticon is an exceptional example, certainly, of 
the uses of power and space, but it is the culmination of a variety of technologies 
of power rather than their beginning. And yet Foucault designates the 
disciplinary society under the general rubric of panopticism. To understand this 
we need to be attentive to what Foucault actually says. Why does Foucault 
suggest that "Bentham is more important for our society than Kant or Hegel" 
(DE II, 594), that "our society is much more Benthamite than Beccarian" (DE II, 
729), and that Bentham is the "Christopher Columbus of politics" (DE III, 
466 )? 55 
Such comments make sense if we cease thinking of the Panopticon simply as a 
prison. Foucault notes its polyvalency - reforming prisoners, treating patients, 
instructing schoolchildren, confining the insane, supervising workers, putting 
beggars and idlers to work - and suggests that Bentham takes the penitentiary 
house as his prime example because it "has many different functions to fulfil - 
safe custody, confinement, solitude, forced labour and instruction" (SP 239, 
240n; DP 205-6). 56 Foucault tellingly makes the remark that in Bentham's 
scheme, "police, the French invention which immediately fascinated all 
European governments, is the twin of the Panopticon" (DE II, 729). Indeed, 
Bentham himself saw the Panopticon as having two branches: the prisoner 
branch and the pauper branch. 57 The prison is one piece of this general 
panopticism - this new form of police, of government. "It is there, 
in the general 
panopticism of society that one must place the birth of the prison" (DE II, 438). 
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I would therefore contend that in looking at the role of Bentham in Discipline 
and Punish, we need to look at panopticism, rather than the Panopticon. The 
former, although it bears a Benthamite designation, is much older than the 1791 
text. Panopticism provides a way of "dispensing with the need for the Prince. 
Panopticism is the general principle of a new `political anatomy' whose object 
and end are not the relations of sovereignty but the relations of discipline" (SP 
243; DP 208). 58 Foucault suggests that there are two images of discipline - the 
discipline-blockade, and the discipline-mechanism. The first of these is the 
enclosed institution, on the edges of society, turned inwards, the second is a 
functional device [disposit /] that makes the exercise of power more effective and 
enables subtle coercion of the society; a schema of exceptional discipline, and a 
generalised surveillance. 59 The latter of these Foucault designates "panopticism" 
(SP 244; DP 209), the former is surely exemplified by the Panopticon. 
We can best understand the birth of the prison from the general rise of what is 
designated panopticism, rather than the -reverse. Foucault makes the obvious 
point that the prison was not born within these codes, that it had existed for 
centuries before it became part of a penal system, but that its basic principle - the 
"deprivation of liberty" - became the penalty par excellence in the new society 
-which so valued its freedoms (SP 267-8; DP 231-2). 
60 Given that it is the 
culmination of trends found in military and scholastic discourse, it is indeed not 
surprising "that the cellular prison, with its regular chronologies, forced labour, 
its authorities of surveillance and registration, its experts in normality, who 
continue and -multiply the functions of the judge, should have become the 
modern instrument of penality... that prisons resemble factories, schools, 
barracks, hospitals, which all resemble prisons" (SP 264; DP 227-8). In these 
terms, suggests Foucault, the prison is "a rather strict barracks, - a school without 
leniency, a dark workshop, but not qualitatively different" (SP 269; DP 233). 
Rather than other institutions being a diluted form of the prison, the prison is the 
general trend in its most extreme form, with no gaps, no limits: "it carries to their 
greatest intensity all the procedures to be found in the other disciplinary 
dispositrfs" (SP 273; DP 236). 
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Ve can now respond to the charge that Bentham's Panopticon is not a good 
escription of "real life" in 19th Century prisons. Foucault suggests that if he had 
canted to describe "real life" in the prisons, he would not have gone back to 
; entham (DE N, 28-9; FE 81). Bentham's work is important as a theoretician's 
Thema, because "he describes, in the utopia of a general system, particular 
iechanisms that really exist" (DE III, 207; FL 240). 
The fact that it [the Panopticon] should have given rise, even in 
our own time, to so many variations, projected or realised, is 
evidence of the imaginary intensity that it has possessed for 
almost two hundred years. But the Panopticon must not be 
understood as a dream building: it is the diagram of a mechanism 
of power reduced to its ideal form; its functioning, abstracted 
from any obstacle, resistance or friction, must be represented as a 
pure architectural and optical system: it is in fact a figure of 
political technology that may and must be detached from any 
specific use (SP 239; DP 205). 61 
his 1972-3 College de France course resume, Foucault provided a succinct 
mmary of the themes in this research project. Understanding how the parts of 
research fit together enable a wider reading of this than simply one that looks 
the mechanisms of punishment and the establishment of the prison. 
A new optics, first: an organ of surveillance generalised and 
constant; all must be observed, seen, transmitted: organisation of a 
police; institution of a system of archives (with individual files), 
establishment of a panopticism. 
A new mechanics: isolation and regrouping of individuals; 
localisation of bodies; optimal utilisation of forces; control and 
improvement of productivity; in short, the putting into place of a 
complete discipline of life, time and energies. 
A new physiology: definition of norms, exclusion and rejection of 
those who do not conform, mechanisms for their restoration by 
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A new physiology: definition of norms, exclusion and rejection of 
those who do not conform, mechanisms for their restoration by 
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corrective interventions which are in an ambiguous manner 
therapeutic and punitive. 
Panopticism, discipline and normalisation schematically 
characterise this new hold [prise] of power over the body, which 
was put in place in the 19th Century. And the psychological 
subject which appears at this moment... is only the reverse side 
[I 'envers] of this process of subjectification [assujettissement]. 
The psychological subject is born at the point of conjunction of 
power and the body: it is an effect of a certain "political physics" 
(RC 49-50). 
What Discipline and Punish shows is how the supplice of the eighteenth century 
is replaced by the disciplinary dispositif of the nineteenth century: a dispositif 
that encompasses technologies of power that produce a docile body, a knowable 
"soul", and a subjectification of the individual (SP 308,345; DP 264,295). 
Being attentive to the meaning of the book's subtitle leads to two main 
realisations: first that the birth of the actual prison is enmeshed within the birth of 
the figurative prison, within the genealogy of the modem subject, an insight that 
better explains the change in penal practice; and second it allows us to see this 
genealogy as the main scope of the book. This genealogy of the modem soul and of 
the policing of urban space - two themes that are closely linked - is not simply 
pursued in Discipline and Punish, but is also the subject matter of other research. It 
is also further pursued in The History of Sexuality series. Realising all of this 
enables us to better understand the larger project - to be attentive to the role of 
Bentham certainly - but not to see the world and the text solely through his eyes. 
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Conclusion 
In his Thirdspace, Edward Soja suggests that there remains to be written a study 
which looks at the role of space in some of the key thinkers of the Western 
tradition. He mentions Foucault, Heidegger, and Nietzsche - amongst many 
others - but suggests that "what would severely hinder such an archaeology, 
however, is the almost complete absence of a secondary literature that explicitly 
and perceptively addresses the problematic relation between historicality and 
spatiality presumed to be embedded in these sources". ' Edward Casey's The Fate 
of Place satisfies Soja's request to an extent, though the emphasis is, as the title 
suggests, on place rather than space, and not on history at all. In addition, as I 
have suggested, it suffers from a number of flaws in its attention to Heidegger 
and his treatment of Foucault is minimal. 
Postmodernism, whatever the merits or difficulties attached to this problematic 
term, has often provided a smokescreen for dubious scholarship. If we are to 
critically explore the importance of space and its role within a historical study we 
must ensure that the tools we use function adequately. The research behind this 
thesis began as an attempt to write a history of HIV and AIDS in Britain, 
focusing on the spatial issues involved. For a number of reasons, the theoretical 
framework to be employed was drawn from Foucault. In working on Foucault 
and space it quickly became apparent that there was a dearth of adequate 
material. Key questions remained unanswered, fundamental texts were left 
obscure, and intellectual genealogies were inadequately explored. This thesis has 
sought answers to some of these questions, examine these texts, and trace these 
genealogies. 
In terms of Foucault's own work I have argued that Foucault's historical studies 
are spatial through and through, and that this is the fundamental legacy of his 
work to those interested in the question of space - rather than the two figures to 
which so much study has been given: the Panopticon and heterotopias. 
Understanding how space is fundamental to the use of power and to historical 
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research into the exercise of power allows us to recast Foucault's work not just as 
a history of the present, but as a mapping of the present. This orientation of a 
historical study to the present, rather than the past, is a theme I find common to 
Nietzsche, Heidegger and Foucault - and is framed by their responses to the 
Kantian question "how are synthetic a priori judgements possible? " Taking 
Nietzsche's response "why is belief in such judgements necessary? " as a guiding 
principle within his genealogical approach, and seeing how Heidegger's response 
to Kant is crucial to understanding the shift between the published and the 
unpublished divisions of Being and Time (the Kehre) and to the development of 
historical ontology, I have recast Foucault's historical approach as a historical 
ontology. Like Heidegger - and in, for example The Birth of Tragedy, Nietzsche 
- this is a history framed as a history of the present. Noting how Foucault's 
connaissance/savoir distinction parallels Heidegger's ontic/onto logical 
difference allows us to see both the continuity between archaeology and 
genealogy and between two of this century's foremost thinkers. 
This link, crucial though it is, is but one area of many where I suggest Heidegger 
is important in understanding what Foucault is doing- Other important issues - 
disposltlf, technologies and the question of power/knowledge - become clearer 
from a Heideggerian perspective. Perhaps most importantly though, the crucial 
work Nietzsche began in sketch form, and Heidegger elaborated in careful 
studies throughout his career, pave the way for Foucault's treatment of questions 
of space and time together in his spatial histories. The modernist marginalisation 
of space and prioritisation of time is abandoned with a carefully developed 
analysis of how they function together. As the final chapter has demonstrated, 
they are best seen at work not in abstract theorising, but in practical application. 
Both- during his life and increasingly after his death a number of Foucauldian 
studies - genealogies or histories of the present - have 
been written in a wide 
range of fields. It is to be hoped this thesis will help to continue this trend, with 
the theoretically enriched tools of historical ontology and mapping the present. 
Just as Nietzschean genealogy does not provide all the answers needed for these 
tools, the paradigm of Marxism does not - on its own - provide the 
basis for a 
historical and geographical materialism. The key thinker to be examined in this 
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regard. is Henri Lefebvre, who is the focus of my immediate post-doctoral work. 
Lefebvre's stated influences - Hegel, Marx and Nietzsche - are throughout his 
career used in dialogue with and criticism of Heidegger. 2 As David Harvey 
suggests, important work is to be done on combining the insights of Marx and 
Heidegger on the question of space. 3 This is precisely what Lefebvre does. A 
number of other important recent thinkers - Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Gilles 
Deleuze and Felix Gua. ttari, and Jacques Derrida, amongst others - have 
contributed to this debate. Sympathy to their complicated and diverse intellectual 
backgrounds precludes cursory treatment here, though especially in Derrida's 
case, they have occasionally been marshalled as secondary sources. ` 
Soja's aim of reasserting space within critical social theory requires, in his own 
words, continued work: 
The reassertion of space in critical social theory - and in critical 
political praxis - will depend upon a continued deconstruction of 
a still occlusive historicism and many additional voyages of 
exploration into the heterotopias of contemporary postmodern 
geographies. ' 
This work however must not be at the expense of a critical interrogation of 
history itself, and it must not ignore the specific situation of the thinkers 
marshalled to its cause. Above all, it must be philosophically and theoretically 
sound. In seeking to avoid these pitfalls, this thesis contributes to that aim. 
London - Colchester - Chamonix Mt. Blanc - Bath - München 
October 1994 - November 1998 
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Appendix 
Martin Heidegger, "Art and Space" 
Translated by Stuart Elden 
Originally published as `Die Kunst und der Raum', St. Gallen: Erker Verlag, 
1969. Republished in Aus der Erfahrung des Denkens, Gesamtausgabe Band 13, 
Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1983 [numbers in square brackets in 
the text refer to the pages of this version]. Previous English translation by 
Charles H. Seibert as `Art and Space', in A/fan and World, Vol 6 No 1,1973. 
French translation by Francois Fedier and Jean Beaufret as `Z'art et l'espace', in 
Questions IV, Paris: Gallimard, 1976. 
[203] `When one thinks greatly by oneself, one finds much wisdom 
inscribed in language. It is not likely that one brings it all oneself; but that 
much wisdom lies therein, such as there is in proverbs'. 
G. Chr. Lichtenberg 
AoKE1. bE t ya L sivai Kai x, & 7EOV TI(pOT val o Tönos. 
`It appears to be something of great importance and difficult to 
understand, the topos' - i. e. place-space [Ort-Raum]. 
Aristotle, Physics, Book IV 
[204] The remarks concerning art, space and their interplay remain questions, 
even when they are spoken in the form of assertions. These remarks are 
limited 
to the plastic arts, and within them to sculpture. Sculpted 
forms [Die plastischen 
Gebilde]' are bodies [Körper]. 
2 Their mass, consisting of diverse materials, is 
variously fashioned. The fashioning happens by limitation through an 
inclusionary and exclusionary limit. Through this, space comes 
into play; 
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occupied by the sculpted form as a closed, breached and empty volume. A well 
known state of affairs, and yet enigmatic. 
The sculpted body embodies something. Does it embody space? Is sculpture an 
occupation of space, a controlling of space? Does sculpture correspond with the 
technico-scientific conquest of space? 
As art, certainly, sculpture is a confrontation [Auseinandersetzung] with artistic 
space. Art and scientific technology consider and treat space toward various 
purposes in various ways. 
But does space remain the same? Is it not this space which received its first 
determination from Galileo and Newton? Space - this uniform extension, which 
is not distinguished at any point [Stelle], which is equivalent in all directions, but 
which is not perceptible through the senses? 
Space - which in the meantime provokes modem man, increasingly and 
obstinately, to its final and absolute domination? 
Does not modern plastic art follow this domination, insofar as it understands 
itself as a confrontation [205] with space? Does it not thus find this confirmed in 
its timely character? - 
But can physically-technically ordered space, however it may be determined, be 
taken as the sole true space? Compared to it, are all the other defined spaces - 
artistic space, the space of everyday dealings and intercourse - only subjectively 
conditioned primitive forms and transformations of a sole objective cosmic 
space? - 
But how is this, when the objectivity of objective world space remains 
unquestionably the correlate of the subjectivity of a consciousness foreign to 
other times which preceded the modem European age? 
Even when we recognise the diversity of the spatial experiences of previous ages, 
do we thereby gain an insight into the propriety [Eigentümliche]3 of space? The 
question, what space as space is, is not even asked, let alone answered. It remains 
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undecided in what way space is, and whether being in general can be attributed 
to it. 
Space - does it belong to the original phenomena [Urphänomenon] of which 
contact with, according to a word of Goethe, makes men overcome by an awe to 
the point of anxiety [Angst]? For behind space, it will appear, nothing more is 
given which it could be traced back to. Before it, nothing else is given to return 
to. The propriety of space must be given only from itself Can its propriety still 
be said? 
The necessity of such a question demands from us an admission: 
[206] So long as the propriety of space is not experienced, talk of artistic space 
remains obscure. The way that space carries through the work of art, remains, in 
the meantime, in uncertainty. 
Space, within which the sculpted form can be _met as a present-at-hand object 
[vorhandener Gegenstand]; space, which encloses the volume of the figure; 
space, which persists between volumes - are these three spaces in the unity of 
their interplay not merely derived from one physico-technical space, even if 
arithmetical measurement cannot be allowed to apply to artistic figures? 
Once it is agreed that art is the bringing-into-the-work of truth, and that truth 
signifies the non-concealment [Unverborgenheit] of being, ` must not then true 
space, that which uncovers its proper [Eigenstes] nature, begin to give the 
measure in the work of the plastic arts? 
Still, how can we find the propriety of space? There is an emergency route, 
which is admittedly narrow and hazardous. We will attempt to listen to language. 
Of what does it speak in the word space [Raum]? Within it speaks making space 
[Räumen]. This means: clearing out [roden], to 
i 
make free from wilderness. 
Making space brings forth the free, the openness for the settling and dwelling of 
humans. 
Making space is, thought in its propriety [Eigenes], the release [Freigabe] of 
places [Orten] to which the destiny of humans who dwell turn, in the fortune of 
their home, or in the misfortune of their homelessness, or in the indifference to 
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the two. Making space is the release of places where a god appears, the places 
from where the gods have disappeared, the places where the appearance of the 
godly tames long. Making space brings forth in each case, the placing 
[Ortschaft]5 prepared for dwelling. [207] Profane spaces are only the privation of 
often very remote sacred spaces. 
Making space is the release of places. 
In making space a destiny [Geschehen]6 speaks and at once conceals itself This 
character of making space is all too easily overlooked. And when it is seen, it 
remains difficult to determine, at least while physico-technical space is taken as 
the space to which all spatial determinations must, in advance, adhere. 
How does making space happen? Is it not a space making [Einräumen], and this 
again in the dual sense of allowing and arranging? 
First, a space making admits something. It lets openness hold sway, which, 
among others, allows the appearance of present things to which the dwelling of 
humans finds itself consigned. 
On the other hand, a space making prepares for things the potentiality to belong 
to their relevant where [Wohin] and, from this, to each other. 
In this twofold space making the granting of places happens. The character of 
this happening is such a granting. But what is place, if its propriety must be 
determined from the guide of releasing space making? 
Place always opens a region [Gegend], in which it gathers things in their 
belonging together. 
In the place plays the gathering in the sense of the releasing salvaging of things 
in their region. 
And the region? The older form of the word sounds `regioning [die Gegnet]'. It 
names the free expanse. Through it, the opennesszis urged to allow each thing to 
merge in its resting in itself This means, at the same time [208] retaining, the 
gathering of things in their belonging together. 
The question arises: are places first and only the result and the consequence of 
space making? Or does space making take its propriety from the reign of 
gathering places? If this is right, we must look for the propriety of making space 
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in the foundation [Gründung] of placing, and must think placing as the interplay 
of places. 
We must then pay attention to the fact that, and how, this play receives its 
departure from the belonging together of things in the region's free expanse. We 
must learn to recognise that things themselves are places, and not only occupy a 
place. 
In this case, we would be obliged for a long time to accept a disturbing 
[befremdenden] state of affairs: 
Place is not found within a pre-given space, such as that of physico-technical 
space. The latter unfolds only through the reigning of places of a region. 
The interplay of art and space must be thought out of the experience of place and 
region. Art as sculpture: no occupying of space. Sculpture would have no 
confrontation with space. 
Sculpture would be the embodiment of places which, preserving and opening a 
region, keep something free gathered around them granting the tarrying of all 
things and a dwelling for men amongst things. 
[209] If it is thus, what becomes of the volume of the sculpted forms, each 
embodying place? Presumably it [volume] will no longer delimit spaces from 
one another, in which surfaces surround an inner as opposed to an outer. That 
which named by the word volume must lose its name, of which the signification 
is only as old as modem technological natural science. 
The place finding and place forming characteristics of sculptured embodiment 
would first remain nameless. 1 
And what would become of the emptiness of space? Often it would appear only 
to be a lack. Emptiness is thereby held to be failure to fill a cavity or an 
interstice 
[Hohl- und Zwischenräumen]. 
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Yet presumably emptiness is closely linked to the propriety of place, and thereby 
no failure, but a bringing-forth. 
Once again, language can give us a clue. In the verb `to empty [leeren]' speaks 
the word `[Lesen] harvest',? taken in the originary sense of the gathering which 
reigns in place. 
To empty a glass means, to gather that which can contain into its having been 
freed. 
To empty the collected fruit from a basket means, to prepare the place for them. 
Emptiness is not nothing. Neither is it a lack. In sculptural embodiment 
emptiness plays in the manner of a searching-designing instituting of places. 
The preceding remarks certainly do not go far enough in showing with sufficient 
clarity the propriety of sculpture as a kind of plastic art. Sculpture: an embodying 
bringing-into-the-work of places, and with them an opening of regions for a 
possible dwelling for man, and the possible tarrying of the things that surround 
and concern them. 
[210] Sculpture: the embodiment of the truth of being in its work of instituting 
places. 
Already a cautious insight into the propriety of this art causes the feeling that 
truth, as non-concealment of being, is not necessarily dependent on embodiment. 
As Goethe said: `It is not always necessary that that which is true embody itself: 
it is enough that it hovers about spiritually and evokes harmony; if it floats 
through the air like the serene and friendly sound of a bell'. 
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Glossary of Greek Terms 
This glossary has been included to aid those with little or no knowledge of the 
Greek alphabet. Greek letters have been used throughout this thesis, especially in 
the Heidegger chapters, in accordance with Heidegger's own usage, and the 
norm in Heidegger scholarship. Whilst this makes the text harder, Heidegger's 
point is that to transliterate into Latin letters can lead us to equate the words with 
their modem, rather than Greek understanding. This glossary, which first 
transliterates, and then provides various translations, is useful in rendering the 
terms more accessible, but should therefore be used in tandem with the main text, 
and with caution. 
aiaOijrn, - aisthesis - perception 
cu. ý Omc - aletheia - truth, non-concealment, Unverborgenheit 
avOpdwrwS - anthropos - human being, person, man 
-yrl - ge - land, earth, ground 
baiµcov - daimon - fate, character, god, deity 
bstva, ftivöv - deina, demon - strange, uncanny, Unheimliche 
&ivötatov - deinotaton - the strangest, uncanniest [das Unheimlichste] of all 
beings 
E1n. 6, cij, uil - epi steine - understanding, knowledge 
sn trjµ'q noA. vnicrj - episteme politike - political knowledge, 
Aristotle's treatise 
The Politics 
`cazia - hestia - hearth 
Ex, Opöc - ekhthros - personal, private enemy 
ýoov 7roXxnxöv - : oon politikon - political animal or creature, 
being whose 
nature is to live in the möXtS 
iOoc - ethos - ethos, custom, 
domain, abode, dwelling place 
ifta - Idea - form, shape, type 
xatpög - kairos - right time, opportunity, crisis, moment 
Xöyoq - logos - word, reason, 
logic 
µ&iä - meta - beyond, after, meta 
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j twpi Guth - metaphysika - metaphysics 
} tipov - metron - measure 
`oplg ioq - horismos - horizon, boundary 
ovpavoq - ouranos - sky, heaven, Himmel 
nav-coitöpoq anopoS - pantoporos aporos - underway in all directions, on the 
way to nothing 
itavza - panta - all 
napoixria - parousia - substance, presence 
it paq - peras - end, boundary 
mcpi - peri - of, about, concerning 
no uoq - polemios - hostile, enemy 
m62 toq -polemos - war 
n6k -polls - city, city-state, state, site, Stätte 
ito? ttEia - politeia - constitution, of the mö?, 
nokun- öv -politikon - political, of the tön 
irö), oq -polos --pole, swirl, vortex 
nopoS - poros - passage, route, way 
is µEia is cpugwd - to meta to physika - beyond physics 
zsxvucx v- tekhnikon - that which belongs to rE 
iEXyq - tekhne [techne] - craft, art, technique, technology 
iönoq - topos - place, Platz, Ort _ 
`üwi roktc utokig - hypsipolis apolis - rising high above the n6kig, cast out from 
the töXig 
`vßpiS - hubris - aggression, violence 
yUctXcg - phylakes - guard, guardian 
cpvmS -physis - nature, physics 
xchpa - khora - land, country, receptacle, place 
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Endnotes 
The first time a text is mentioned the full reference is given; subsequent 
references are in an abbreviated form. Full references will be found in the 
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the analytic of the Dasein... ontology cannot be established in a purely 
ontological manner. Its possibility is referred back to a being, that is, to 
something ontical - the Dasein. Ontology has an ontical foundation" 
(GA24,26). 
40 Paul Natorp, Die logischen Grundlagen der exakten Wissenschaften, 
Leipzig: Verlag Teubner, 1910, pp. 276ff Cited in GA25,78. See 
Dahlstrom, "Heidegger's Kant Courses at Marburg", p. 30 1. 
41 On the word 'aesthetic' see G. W. F. Hegel, Introductory Lectures ofi 
Aesthetics, edited by Michael Inwood, Hannondsworth. Penguin, 1993, p. 
98nl. 
42 Immanuel Kant, Grundlegung , Iur Metaphysik- der Sitten, in Werke, Vol IV, p. 286; translated by James W. Ellington as Grounding for the 
Metaphysic of Morals,, in Cahn (ed. ), Classics of Western Philosophy, p. 
1010. 
43 See Theodore Kislel, "The Language of the Event- The Event of 
Language", in Sallis (ed. ), Heidegger and the Path of Thinking, pp. 87ff 
44 This point is extended to space in Yoko Arisaka, "Heidegger's Theory of 
Space- A Critique of Dreyfus", in Inquiry, Vol 3)8 No 4,1995, p. 45 8. 
45 Kritik der reinen Vernunft; Critique ofPure Reason, A-3 )4/B50. 
46 See Villela-Petit, "Heidegger's Conception of Space", p. 120. 
47 A similar claim- is made in GA41,16 - "That we name time first, that we 
say Zeitraum and not Raumzeit, should indicate that in this question time 
plays a special role. This does not mean, however, that space is derived 
from time or in second place to it". 
48 See Richardson, Heidegger, p. 117-8. For an attempt to rethink Being and 
Time through space, see Robert Frodeman, "Being and Space: A Re- 
reading of Existential Spatiality in Being and Time", in Journal of the 
British Societyfor Phenomenology, Vol 23 No 1, January 1992. 
49 
"'The unitary essence of boredom in the sense of the unitary structure of 
the two moments must therefore be sought in time after all. Not merely in 
time in general and universally, however, not only in time as we know it, 
but in the manner and way in which we stand with respect to the time that 
is familiar, in the manner and way in which this time stands into our 
Dasein and in which our Dasein itself is temporal. Boredom spring'sfrom 
the temporality ofDasein" (GA29/30,19 1). 
50 Villela-Petit, "Heidegger's Conception of Space", p. 127, does however 
suggest that these analyses should have been made from the point of view 
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of spatiality, citing Pierre Kaufmann, LExperience emotionnelle de Vespace, Paris: Vrin, 1967, 
51 Mulhall, Heidegger and Being and Time, pp. 524. Kisiel, The GenesIS oj' Heidegger'S Being and Time, pp. 360-1. 
52 As Heidegger admits late In life , 
'.. the body phenomenon is the most 
difficult problem" (GA 15,236; IR 146). 
53 Villela-Petit, "Heidegger's Conception of Space", p. 117. 
54 Martin Heidegger, letter to Rudolf Bultmann, 31 December 1927, quoted 
in Kisiel, The Genesis ofHeidegger's Being and Time, p. 452. 
55 Kisiel, The Genesis of Heidegger's Being and Time, p. 452-3. Klisl%, 
conspicuous absences are Eckhart, Paul, Schleierinacher and Jaspers. 
56 
11 See Rainer A. Bast & Heinrich P. Delfosse, Fiandbuchzum Textstudium 
von Martin Heideggers 'Sein und Zeit'. Band 1: Stellenindizes; 
Philologish-Krit[Scher Apparat, Stuttgart-Bad Cannstatt: frommann- 
holzboog, 1979, where Nietzsche does not feature in the bibliographic 
references. However,, Krell has suggested that, "however rarely cited in 
Being and Time, Nietzsche may well be the reg-riant genius of that work". 
See Intimations of Mortality, p. 128; and Tarmniaux, Heidegger and the 
Project ofFundamental Ontology, Chapter 6. 
57 Heidegger certainly read Holderlin early in his life, bUt whether he was at 
that stage inspirational in his philosophy is debatable. 
58 Though right at the end of the 197' 3 seminar in Zahringen Heidegger says 
"the think-ing-that is demanded here is what I call tautological thinking. 
This is the onginary sense of phenomenology" (Q IV, 487). 
59 Following Kisiel's work, it is possible to suggest that this was the Irutlal 
direction Heidegger was pursuing, and that Being and Time was a side 
move under-taken and then abandoned. The initial project, as outlined in 
the Aristotle book introduction certainly suggests as much. "For 
philosophical research, the de-structive confrontation 
[A use inandervet-7ung] with philosophy 1) s history is not merely an annex 
for the purposes of illustrating how things were earlier... [it] is rather the 
authentic path upon which the present must encounter itself in its own 
basic movements" (PIA 20-1). In distinction to the suggestion at the end 
of the introduction to Being and Time, which stated that Part Two would 
contain "a phenomenological de-struction of the history of ontology With 
the problematic of temporality as our clue" (GA2,39), towards the end of 
the actually published book, Heidegger talks of the "historiographical de- 
struction of the history of philosophy" to follow (GA2,392). Given that 
Part Two was never published it is impossible to know what Heidegger 
would have achieved in it. 
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I 
Notes to Chapter Three 
The Kehre is one of the most disputed areas of Heidegger scholarship. 
Krell provides a useful summary of the key issues in Chapter 6 of his 
Intimations of Mortality. He suggests three contexts for the Kehre- an 
impending turn in Western history concerning the technological era; the 
turn from Being and Time to Time and Being - i. e. the shift from the 
analysis of Dasein in particular to being in general that should have been 
found in the third division of Being and Time but that Heidegger was 
unable to think clearly at that time, a biographical turn introduced by 
Heidegger scholars to understand the development of his thought. Krell is 
critical of the developmentalist aspects associated with the third of these, 
but concedes that Heidegger's path of thought is far from one 
dimensional or uni-directional. My reading of this issue is that 
Heidegger's work after the first two divisions of Being and Time is 
precisely to articulate the turn to Time and Being, but that this path of 
thought takes far longer than expected, and necessitates a rethinking of 
key notions. The historical de-struction of the tradition - envisioned before but not performed in Being and Time (see the final note to Chapter 
Two above) - takes place not simply through Aristotle, Descartes and 
Kant, but also through the pre-Socratics, Holderlin and Nietzsche. Such a 
path of thought requires a rethinking notably of the issue of space and 
place; the role of history in the study of being; and the notion of the 
political. As Krell notes, Heidegger remarked in 1953/54 that in Being 
and Time "perhaps I ventured too far too soon" (GA12,93; OWL 7). 
Krell suggests that the work afterwards is "a catching up that actually 
moves backward" (p. I 11), Such a reading gels with Kisiel's genealogy 
of Being and Time, and with Heidegger's remark in the "Letter to 
Richardson" fhat "the thinking of the Kehre results from the fact that I 
stayed with the matter-for-thought [of] Being and Time, i. e. by inquiring 
into that perspective which already in Being and Time (p. 39) was 
designated as 'Time and Being""" (LR xvi/xvil). Bruce V. Foltz, 
Inhabiting the Earth: Heidegger, Environmental Ethics, and the 
Metaphysics of Nature, New Jersey-. Humanities Press, 1995, p. 33n22 
argues that the Kehre is not at issue in the topics he discusses. However 
later in the same note he suggests that the shift in Heidegger's treatment 
of nature is due to his reading of H61derlin. As shall be shown, this is one 
of the key issues at stake here. 
? Quoted by Heinrich W. Petzet, Preface to Martin Heidegger & Erhart 
Kdstner,, Briefwechsel, Frankfurt am Main: Insel, 1986, p. 10. 
3 The basic documents are available in HC, which also includes a number 
of critical pieces. Also useful is the selection of articles in the 
"Symposium on Heidegger and Nazism", edited by Arnold 1. Davidson, 
in Critical Inquiry, No 15, Winter 1989. The recent furore was initiated 
by Victor Fanias, Heidegger and Ala.: Jsm, translated by Paul Burrell & 
Gabriel R. Ricci, Philadelphia. Temple University Press, 1989; though 
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the most respected source of the case against is Hugo Ott, Martin 
Heidegger: A Political Life, translated by Allan Blunden, London: 
HarperCollins, 1993. A study that attempts to relate the politics to the 
philosophy is Richard Wolin, The Politics of Being: The Political 
Thought of Martin Heidegger, New York: Columbia University Press, 
1990. More successful., and nigh-on essential , is Derrida, Qf, 'ýPlrlt. Peter Osborne, "Tactics, Ethics or Temporality? Heidegger's Politics 
Reviewed" , in Radical Philosophy, No 70, March/Apnl 1995, provides a balanced survey of the available literature. Useful on the intellectual 
context generally are Jeffrey Herf, Reactionary Modernism: Technology, 
Culture and Politics in Weimar and the Third Reich, Cambridge- 
Cambridge University Press, 1984; Michael E. Zimmermann, 
Heidegger's Confrontation with Modernity: Technology, Politics, Art, 
Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1990; and Hans Sluga, 
Heidegger's Crisis: Philosophy and Politics in Nazi Germany, 
Cambridge MASS: Harvard University Press, 1993). Several other recent 
publications on Heidegger also provide thoughts on the subject, and 
indeed it has become almost a requirement to so do, but often little of 
interest is added. 
4 This approach is greatly shaped by the work of Dominique Janicaud, The 
Shadow of That Thought: Heidegger and the Question qf Politics, 
translated by Michael Gendre, Evanston EL: Northwestern University 
Press,, 1996. See also Pierre Bourdieu, The Political Ontology of Martin 
Heidegger, translated by Peter Collier, Cambridge- Polity Press, 1988; and 
Julian Young., Heidegger, Philosophy, Na.: ism, -Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1997. A useful representation of this case is_Derrida's 
"Heidegger: The Philosopher's Hell", a text which was included in the 
first edition of the Wolin collection as an unauthorised translation, which 
has been removed from later editions. This interview now appears in 
Jacques Demda, Poina... Interviews, 1974-1994, edited by Elizabeth 
Weir,, translated by Peggy Kamuf & Others, Stanford: Stanford 
University Press, 1995, retranslated,, and with a detailed explanation of 
why Derrida objected to its original English publication. In the interview, 
Derrida argues that Heidegger's thought cannot simply be reduced to 
"'that of some Nazi ideologue", and that "for more than half a century, no 
rigorous philosopher has been able to avoid an 'explanation' with 
[explication avec] Heidegger (p. 182). The French word explication, 
together with its verbal form expliquer, has a number of potential 
translations in English, among them explanation, discussion, argument 
and analysis, but can also, particularly in a later context in this same 
interview (p. 183) mean the more direct 'having it out with' or 
(. confrontation. It bears comparison with Heidegger's repeated use of the 
word A useinanderset.: ung. 
5 See Alfred Baeumler,. Nietzsche: Der Philosoph und Politiker, Leipzig- 
Reclam, 193 1; and his "Nietzsche and National Socialism" , in 
George 
Mosse (ed. ), Na.: i Culture, London: W. H. Allen, 1966. Georges Bataille's 
"Nietzsche and the Fascists", in Visions of Excess: Selected Writings 
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1927-39, edited by Allan Stoekl, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1993, and his On Niel.:. vche, translated by Bruce Boone, New York, 
Paragon House, 1992 provide a contemporary response. 
6 Otto Pöggeler, "Den Führer führen? Heidegger und kein Ende", 
Philosophische Runäschau, 32,1985. 
7 This reading of the German word was suggested, in a slightly different 
context, by Derrida's Qf Spirit, pp. 42ff 
8 In this context see Heidegger's interview "Only a God Can Save Us", HC 
104, where he claims that the parenthetical remark was present in the 
original manuscript but not read as he '(was convinced that [his] audience 
were understanding [him] correctly". See also RIrgen Habermas, "Martin 
Heidegger- On the Publication of the Lectures of 1935", in FIC. 
9 Walter Biemel, Martin Heidegger, translated by J. L. Mehta, London: 
Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1977, p. 28, provides a useful note to this- "The 
customary separation of systematic and historical modes of inquiry 
became untenable, for the systematic method of inquiry can be grasped 
only in the context of history, being itself always historically 
conditioned". 
to Heidegger points out elsewhere that wesan,, derived from Sein, to be, 
means to dwell, to sojourn (GA40,76ý IM 72). 
See Jacques Derrida, "Ousia and Gramme- Note on a Note from Being 
and Time", in Margins of Philosophy, Hemel Hempstead- Harvester 
Wheatsheaf, 1982, p. 3)-3n6;, and_on Heidegger and translation more 
generally, the essays in Section VIII of John Sallis (ed. ), Reading 
Heidegger: Commemorat ions, Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 
1993. 
12 In GA54,174; 209-10 Heidegger discusses -c67roq in slightly more detail, 
and suggests that it should be translated as place [Ort] not space. 
13 See Plato,, Timaeus and Critias, translated by Desmond Lee, 
Harmondsworth. Penguin, 1971. 
14 For a critical discussion of Heidegger's reading, see Jacques Derrida, 
Kh5ra, Paris: tditions -Galilee, 1993; translated by Ian McLeod as 
"Kh5ra", in On The Name, edited by Thomas Dutolt, Stanford- Stanford 
University Press, 1995. Alternative readings - noting the implications 
they have for feminist thought are found in Luce Irigaray, Speculum de 
I'autre femme, Paris- Editions de Minuit, 1974; Julia Kristeva, La 
Revolution du langage poetique: L'avant-garde a la fin A XIA' sikle: 
Lautreamont et A4'allarme, Paris. Editions du Seuil, 1974; and Judith 
Butler, Bodies That AlIatter: On the Discursive Limits of Sex, London: 
Routledge, 1993. For a commentary on Kristeva, see John Lechte, Julia 
Kristeva,, London: Routledge, 1990, p. 128. Fell argues that Heidegger's t: l 
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"Kehre is the 'turn' of space (dissimulated place) 'into' place, which it 
originally and always is", in Heidegger and Sartre, p. 204. On space and 
place in Greece generally, and the change from religious, qualitative, 
differentiated space to homogenous geometric space, see Chapter 3 of 
Jean Pierre Vernant, Mythe et pensee che-7 les Grecs, Pans: Franqois 
Maspero, 2ý edition, 1969. 
is Sophocles, The Three Theban Plays: Antigone, Oedipus the King, 
Oedipus at Colonus, translated by Robert Fagles, New York: Quality 
Paperback Book Club, 1994, p. 77. 
16 Using 'Commentaries' for Erlduterungen follows David Farrell Krell, 
other suggestions have included 'Interpretations', 'Elucidations' and 
'Soundings'. See Andr6 Schuwer, "Nature and the Holy: On Heidegger's 
1111) 1 Interpretation of H61derlin's Hymn 'Wie wenn am Felertage , in 
John 
Sallis (ed. ), Radical Phenomenology: Essays in Honor of Allartin 
Heidegger, Atlantic Highlands: Humanities Press, 1978, p. 23 1; James F. 
Ward,, Heidegger's Political Thinking, Amherst. University of 
Massachusetts Press, 1995, p. 290n3. 
17 1 have made extensive use of the French translations of GA4 - translated 
by Henry Corbin et. al. as Approche de H61derlin, Pans. Gallimard, 197-3 ) 
- and GA39 - translated by Frangois F6dier & Julien Hervier as Les 
hymnes de H51derlin: La Germanie et Le Rhin, Pans: Gallimard, 1988. 
18 The standard text is Beda Allemann, H61derlin und Heidegger, Ziirich: 
Atlantic Verlag, 1954; though this is somewhat dated and cannot,, of 
course, take into account the Gesamtausgabe. For a useful discussion of 
some of the other issues at stake see Wemer Marx, A There a Measure on 
Earth? Foundationsfor a LVOnmetaphysical Ethics, translated by Thomas 
J. Nenon & Reginald Lilly (eds. ), Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 
1987; George kovacs, The Question of God in Heidegger's 
Phenomenology, Evanston IL: Northwestern University Press, 1990; 
Christopher Fynsk, Heidegger: Thought and Historicity, Ithaca- Cornell 
University Press, 1986; the essays in the special -editions of Research in 
Phenomenology, Volume XIX, 1989; and Philosophy Today, Vol 37 No 
I, 
IC i -. The Other 4,, Winter 1993 and Krysztof Ziarek Semlosis of Listening 
in Heidegger's Writings on H61derlin and Celan's 'The Meridian"', in 
Research in Phenomenology, Volume XXIV, 1994. On Holderlin as 
understood in mainstream literary scholarship, see Ronald Peacock, 
H61derlin, London: Methuen & Co., 1973 [1938]; and David Constantine, 
Heilderlin, Oxford: Clarendon Press., 1988. 
19 For some of the reasons for this see Ott, Martin Heidegger, p. 14. 
20 They are due to appear as GA35,36,37 and 38. Heidegger was on 
academic leave for the winter semester of 1932-33. 
21 Heidegger, "Only a God Can Save Us", p. 102. See also, Karl Lowith, 
"My Last Meeting with Heidegger in Rome, 1936". in HC. 
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22 Ott, Martin Heidegger, pp. 133-4. LOwIth's postcard to Jaspers is quoted 
from the personal papers of the latter in the German Literary Archive in 
Marbach. 
23 Ott, Martin Heidegger, P. 305. 
24 The best English collection of Holderlin is found in the bi-lingual 
Friedrich Holderlin,, Poems and Fragments, translated by Michael 
Hamburger, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1980. 
25 On the role of time in Heidegger's reading of H61derlin, see the dispute 
between Richard Rorty and Michael Murray. Rorty, in "Overcoming the 
Tradition: Heidegger and Dewey", in Murray (ed. ), Heidegger and 
Modern Philosophy, p. 251, argues that "there is no indication that 
Heidegger thinks that poetry has a history. Less crudely put, there is no 
indication that Heidegger thinks that the historicity of being can be seen 
in poetry". Murray's response, in "Heidegger's Hermeneutic Reading of 
H61derlin: The Signs of Time' , in 
The Eighteenth Century, Vol 21 No 1, 
1980) convincingly shows this to be an error. 
26 On this part of the course see Arthur Grugan, "Heidegger on H61derlin's 
Der Rhein: Some External Considerations", in Philosophy Today, Vol 39 
No-1, Spring 1995. 
27 On place and locale in Holderlin more generally, though without 
reference to Heidegger, see David J. Constantine, The Significance of-- 
Locality in the Poetry of Friedrich H61derlin, London. The Modem 
Humanities Research Association, 1979. Constantine suggests that place 
need not interest a poet,, that many make no use of it, but it was important 
for H61derlin. 
) especially in 
his later work. He argues that Holderlin 
celebrates rather than desCnbes the places in his poetry. 
28 See particularly, "Bauen Wohnen Deriken", "Das Ding" and "DIchterlst 
Wohnet der Mensch" in VA; "Building Dwelling Thinking", "The 
Thing", and "... Poetically Man Dwells... ", in PLT. 
29 See Friedrich HOlderlin, Selected Verse, translated by Michael 
Hamburger, Han-nondsworth- Penguin, 1961, p. 246n for a note on the 
status of this poem. 
30 J. M. Bernstein,, The Fate of Art: Aesthetic Alienation ftom Kant to 
Derrida and Adorno,, Cambridge - Polity Press, 1992, p. 115. 
31 Miller, Topographies, p. 242 suggests that by the, time of "Building 
Dwelling Thinking", "Heidegger's thinking about space or enspacing has 
changed little , if at all, 
[from Being and Time] except in dropping the 
emphasis on failing". I would suggest that there is a fundamental change, 
the occlusion of which mars Miller's otherwise important discussion. 
32 On this, see Schuwer,, "Nature and the Holy" 
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33 For a discussion on the topic of blood, soil and earth, see Karsten Harries,, 
"Heidegger as Political Thinker", in Murray (ed. ), Heidegger and Modern 
Philosophy. The conclusion (p. 324) is that Heidegger IC came to see that 
his hope had been in vain and misguided, that the Nazi's Blut und Boden 
had little in common with H61derlin's Erde. This recognition forced 
Heidegger to reinterpret the nature of their leadership". It does not 
necessarily follow that Heidegger's use of earth and soil in his analyses is 
a move following Nazism, but it is certainly a dangerous political 
manoeuvre. The concept of earth - important in "On the Origin of the 
Work of Art" and later works - develops from the work on Holderlin. See 
Hans-Georg Gadamer, Philosophical Hermeneutics, edited and translated 
by David E. Linge,, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1976, p. 
217. Theodor W. Adorno, The Jargon of Authenticity [Eigentlichkeit], 
translated by Knut Tarnowski & Frederic Will, London: Routledge & 
Kegan Paul, 1973, p. 85, sees H61derlin as the "secret model" for the 
jargon of authenticity. 
34 See for example, Heidegger's own address of May 26th 1933 on Albert 
Leo Schlageter in "Political Texts, 1933-34"",, HC 40-2. On this issue see 
also GA39,72-3. 
35 See the 'Letter on Humanism' for a more detailed discussion of the 
reason for this (GA9,314; BW 218). 
36 In the discussion of 'The Rhine' Heidegger suggests that no Dasein is 
purely poetic, thinking or acting, but that we must think them together 
(GA39,184-5). For a discussion of these issues see Janicaud, The Shadow 
of That Thought, pp. 99-100. Some important themes are also discussed 
in Jacques Derrida, "Heidegger's Ear: Philopolemology (Geschlecht 
IVY% in Sallis (ed. ), Reading Heidegger, 1993. 
37 Megill, Prophets of Extremity, p. 172. See GA9,337-8; BW 241 for 
Heidegger's explicit distancing from the patriotic and nationalist 
overtones to Heimat. 
38 E. G. Kolbenheyer, Vortrdge, Aufsdtze, Darmstadt: Reden, 1966. Quoted 
in GA39,27. 
39 See Otto Poggeler, "Heidegger's Political Self-Understanding", HC 203. 
40 Hei-degger, "Only a God Can Save Us", p. 10 1. 
41 On Auseinandersetzung, see David Farrell Krell, "Analysis", N 1,230-1; 
and Will McNeill , 
44 Traces of Discordance: Heidegger-Nietzsche", in 
Peter R. Sedgwick (ed. ), Niet.: sche: A Critical Reader, Oxford: 
Blackwell, 1996. 
42 Quoted in Jacques Derrida, "Geschlecht fl: Heidegger's Hand", in John 
Sallis (ed. ), Deconstruction and Philosophy, Chicago: The University of 
Chicago Press, 1987, p. 165. 
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43 For more detail about the political implications of this and later courses 
on H61derlin see, particularly, Miguel de Beistegui, Heidegger and the 
Political: Dystopias., London: Routledge, 1998, Ward, Heidegger's 
Political Thinking; and Tom Rockmore, On Heidegger's Arazism and 
Philosophy, London: Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1992. 
44 See Dominique Janicaud, "The 'Overcoming' of Metaphysics in the 
H61derlin Lectures", in Sallis (ed. ), Reading Heidegger. Though Janicaud 
provides much useful detail, and is correct to see a shift between the first 
lecture course and the later two regarding the attitude to metaphysics (a 
shift from an attempt at a replacement to an overcoming) he neglects the 
differences between the attitudes to space and time, claiming that the 
project of a poetic dwelling is common to both. 
45 In the 1927 course The Basic Problems of Phenomenology, Heidegger 
makes a very similar point about time. See GA24,36 1. 
46 Janicaud, "The 'Overcoming' of Metaphysics in the Holderlin Lectures", 
p. 3 84. 
47 Megill, Prophets ofExtremity, p. 118. 
48 r Jacques Derrida, Spurs: Nietzsche's StyleslEperons: Les Styles de 
Nietzsche, translated by Barbara Harlow, Chicago: University of Chicago 
Press, 1979, p. 72/73. 
49 Heidegger, "Letter to the Rector of Freiburg University". HC 65. See also 
"Only a God Can Save Us", HC 101-3. For a supportive comment, see 
"Thinking the Apocalypse: A Letter from Maurice Blanchot to Catherine 
David" 
, in 
Davidson (ed. ), "Symposium on Heidegger and Nazism", p. 
476n2. 
50 Deffida, OfSpirit, p. 73. 
51 On Heidegger's irrespon . sible and egocentric use of texts, see Karl 
L6with,, Heidegger: Denker in diirftiger Zeit, Frankfurt: S. Fischer, 1953, 
p. 80. 
52 Ernst Behler.. Confrontations: DerridalHeideggerlNietzsche, translated by 
Stephen Taubeneck, Stanford: Stanford University Press, 199 1, p. 6 1. See 
also Tanner,, Nietzsche, p. 5. For a discussion of some of the pertinent 
points see Berrid Magnus, "The Use and Abuse of The Will to Power", in 
Solomon & Higgins (eds. ), Reading Nietzsche. 
53 Reported in Jacques Derrida, "Istrice 2: Ich bann all hier". in Points..., p. 
308. 
54 "Thus decision straddles the threshold of the Nietzschean gateway called 
4moment' or 'flash of an eye', Augenblick". David Farrell Krell, 
"Introduction to the Paperback Edition", N 1, xv. Amazingly, given that 
she wrote in 1965 and only used the available English translations (i. e. 
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Being and Time, Thus Spoke Zarathustra, and the original The Joyful 
Wisdom, without the benefit of the Nietzsche volumes), Donna Gene 
Hayes, in "Nietzsche's Eternal Recurrence: A Prelude to Heidegger", in 
Journal of Existentialism, Vol VI, No 22, Winter 1965/66, perceives 
many of the links between Heidegger and Nietzsche around this' key 
issue. She understands the implications for temporality, hints at those for 
history and suggests an interesting parallel between the three kinds of 
historical approaches and the lion, camel and child in Thus Spoke 
Zarathustra., but does not, as Guignon, "History and Commitment in the 
Early Heidegger"', does, link the historical approaches and temporal 
dimensions., nor does she show, as I am trying to do, the importance of 
space in and to this thought. 
55 Given the hijacking of the Ubermensch by Nazism, one could read this as 
a not-so-thinly-veiled critique of the movement. 
56 Martin Heidegger, Zollikoner Seminar: Protokolle - Gesprdche - Briefe, 
herausgegeben von Medard Boss, Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio 
Klostermann, 1987., p. 292. Quoted by William J. Richardson, 
"Heidegger among the Doctors", in Sallis (ed. ), Reading Heidegger, p. 
52. 
57 Richardson, "Heidegger among the Doctors", p. 52. See also Charles E. 
Scott, "Heidegger and Psychoanalysis: The Seminars in Zollikon", in 
Heidegger Studies, Vol 6,1990. 
58 One of the more useful,, and critical, contributions to this debate is Krell's 
"Introduction to the Paperback Edition". 
59 The main lecture course where Heidegger finds the results of an ontic 
science (in this case biology) important for his ontological project is 
GA29/30. 
60 See Maurice Merleau-Ponty, La phenomenologie de perception, Paris: 
Gallimard, 1945; translated by Colin Smith as The Phenomenology of 
Perception, London: Routledge, 1962. 
61 See also Q IV, 410. 
62 The third lecture course on Nietzsche, delivered in 1939, two years after 
the second, is where this perspective first becomes apparent. 
63 See GA6.1,404; N 11,186. Heidegger clarifies the points of divergence 
from Hegel regarding history in "The Onto-Theological Constitution of 
Metaphysics"" in ID, and "Grundsatze des Denkens", in GA79; 
"Principles of Thinking" in PIT. 
64 Dreyfus, Being-in-the- World, p. 278ff and passim. Dreyfus suggests that 
certain readings of Nietzsche, such as that of Nehwnas, Nietzsche: Life as 
Literature, also find this understanding there. 
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65 Krell, Daimon Life, p. 109. 
66 Dreyfus, Being-in-the- World, p. 259. See Thomas S. Kuhn, The Structure 
of Scientific Revolutions, Chicago: University of Chicago Press; Third 
edition, 1996. Of Heidegger"s work, see Die Frage nach dem Ding 
(GA41) and "Science and Reflection" in VA; QCT. 
67 The Letter on Humanism - addressed to a Frenchman., Jean Beaufret (see 
Q 111,129-30) - was particularly important in France, as it helped a 
generation (including Foucault and Derrida) to read Heidegger yet 
distance themselves from Sartre. For a commentary on this'. see Jean 
Beaufret, "Heidegger Seen From France", in Edward G. Ballard & 
Charles E. Scott (eds. ), Martin Heidegger in Europe and America, The 
Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1973. In Germany the situation was somewhat 
different, see Jdrgen Habermas, "RIrgen Habermas on the Legacy of 
Jean-Paul Sartre: Conducted by Richard Wolin" , in Political Theory, Vol 20 No 3, August 1992. 
68 David Farrell Krell, Daimon Life: Heidegger and Life Philosophy, 
Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1992, pp. 227-8. 
69 Krell suggests in his analysis that perhaps Heidegger could not speak of 
all his thoughts on Nietzsche. N 11,269. 
70 On the problems of the Nietzschean Nachlqj3, particularly with reference 
to Heidegger's reading of it, see also Derrida's famous discussion of the 
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"I have forgotten my umbrella" fragment, in S urslEperons, pp. 122ff 
71 Hannah Arendt, "Martin Heidegger at Eighty", in Murray (ed. ), 
Heidegger and Modern Philosophy, p. 302n3. On Arendt's relationship 
with Heidegger, which contextualises this remark, see El2bieta Ettinger, 
Hannah Arendt Martin Heidegger, New Haven: Yale University Press,, 
1995. 
Notes to Chapter Four 
Bibliographical infonnation taken ftom David Farrell Krell's introduction 
to this piece in BW 140-2, and Heidegger's own note in GA5,, 344; PLT 
: Wii-iv. 
2 Jacques Tarniniaux, through a close reading of the three versions of the 
lecture situates the Kehre within this period. It seems unlikely, however, 
that the Kehre is a result of the meditation on art. See "The Origin of 
'The Origin of the Work of Art"', in Sallis (ed. ), Reading Heidegger. A 
useful discussion of this essay and its relation to other works, is found in 
Harold Alderman, "The Work of Art and Other Things", in Ballard & 
Scott (eds. ), Martin Heidegger. 
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3 The main exception is found in NI, 85ff See also GAIO, 70-2; PR 47-8; 
"Memorial Address" in G; DT. On this, see Beatrice Han, "Au-dela de la 
Ii ie I metaphysique et de la subjectivit': Musique et Stimmune', in Les Etudes 
philosophiques, No 4,1997. 
4 Meyer Schapiro, "The Still Life as Personal Object: A Note on Heidegger 
and Van Gogh"', in Marianne L. Simmel (ed. ), The Reach ofMin& Essays 
in Memory of Kurt Goldstein, New York: Springer Publishing Company, 
1968, p. 205. This debate is one of the themes in the last essay of Jacques 
Derrida, The Truth in Painting, translated by Geoff Bennington & Rachel 
Bowlby, Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1987, pp. 255ff The 
argument is reported and summarised in Bernstein, The Fate of Art, p. 
140. 
5 Bernstein,,, The Fate of Art, p. 142. Derrida suggests that the location is 
important, as Schapiro's essay appeared in a volume dedicated to Kurt 
Goldstein, who had first introduced Schapiro to Heidegger's work (see 
Schapiro, "The Still Life as Personal Object", p. 203nl). Goldstein fled 
Nazi Germany for a number of reasons which, Derrida suggests, may not 
have been entirely foreign to the "pathos of the 'call of the earth', of the 
Feldweg or the Hok-wege". Derrida agrees with Schapiro that "nothing in 
the painting proves that they are peasant shoes", but concludes that there 
is no evidence to swing the case either way. Supporting Heidegger, he 
suggests the rural, earthy ideology of the soil Heidegger is accused of 
_projecting 
would not have been alien to Van Gogh. See T he Truth in 
Painting, pp. 272-3,345,362,367. Foltz again, this time implicitly, 
defends Heidegger, using the idea of earth as a link to deep ecology. 
Foltz,, Inhabiting the Earth. 
6 R. J. Hall, "Heidegger and the Space of Art", in Journal ofEkistentialism, 
Vol VIII No 29,, Fall 1967,, uses this passage as a springboard into an 
interesting, though limited, discussion of some of the themes that will be 
picked up later in this piece. 
7 Cited by Michael Hamburger, "Introduction", in H61derlin, Selected 
Verse, p. xxi. 
8 Andrej Warminski, Reading in Interpretation: H61derlin, 
- 
Hegel, 
Heidegger, Minneapolis- University of Minnesota Press, 1987, p. 67. 
Foltz, Inhabiting the Earth, p. x, does not consider that the return to the 
rural is an example of nostalgia, and uses this as a opportunity to berate 
"recent French philosophers" for not having much "to say about the 
natural environment or about the world outside of large cities in general"). 
9 See Martin Heidegger, "Sch6pferische Landschaft: Warum bleiben wir in 
der Provinz? " and "Der Feldweg" in GA13; "Why do I Stay in the 
Provinces? " and "The Pathway" in Thomas Sheehan (ed. ), Martin 
Heidegger: The Man and the Thinker, Chicago: Precedent Publishing, 
1981. 
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10 As Miller, Topographies, p. 253, notes, "Building Dwelling Thinking" 
fails to address the fact that the housing shortage which gives the essay Its 
impetus and contemporaneity is primarily urban and the result of the bombing of German cities by the Allies. The only hint of this is found 
when Heidegger suggests that "the proper plight of dwelling is indeed 
older than the world wars with their destruction" (VA 156; BW 363). 
There is therefore a double lacuna: political and platial. 
11 See also GA5 8; BW 149; 'Vissenschaft und Besinnung", in VA; 
"Science and Reflection7 in QCT. John Sallis, Echoes: After Heidegger, 
Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1990, pp. 195-9. 
12 See, for example, GA29/30,36ff, "Logos (Heraklit, Fragment 50)'" in 
VA; "Logos '(Heraclitus, Fragment B50)", in EGT; "Brief Uber den 
Humanismus"; "Letter on Humanism", GA9,184ff, "Von Wesen und 
Begriff der Owyiq. Aristotles, Physik B, I"; "On the Being and 
Conception of ftatý in Aristotle's Physics B, I" in GA9. % 
13 Heidegger takes issue with the standard translations of the title of this 
dialogue in GA54. This is discussed later in this section. It is notable that 
in a letter to Elizabeth Blochmann, dated the 19th December 1932,, 
Heidegger suggests she read Plato's Letter VII, which explains his 
political involvement in Syracuse. See Martin Heidegger, 
Correspondance avec Karl Jaspers, texte 6tabli par Walter Biemel et 
Hans Saner, traduite de Fallemand par Claude-Nicolas Grimbert, suivi de 
Correspondance avec Elizabeth Blochmann, traduite de I'allemand par 
Pascal David, Paris: Gallimard, 1996, pp. 271-2. See Plato, "Letter VIF, 
in The Collected Dialogues ofPlato Including the Letters, edited by Edith 
Hamilton & Huntingdon Cairns, Princeton University Press, 196 1. 
14 On the motive of Fflhrung in the Rectorship Address,, - see Philippe 
44 Lacoue-Labarthe 
, 
Transcendence Ends in Politics",, in Typography: 
Mimesis, Philosophy, Politics, edited by Christopher Fynsk, Cambridge, 
NIASS: Harvard Universit Press, 1989. 
ly 
15 P6ggeler, "Heidegger's Political Self-Understanding", p. 212. See Ernst 
JUnger, Werke, Stuttgart: Ernst Klett, Ten volumes, 1960. Der Arbeiter is 
in Volume 6, a useful summary essay, "Die Totale Mobilmachung",, is in 
Volume 5; translated by Joel Golb & Richard Wolin, as "Total 
Mobilisation" in HC. J. P. Stem, Ernst Anger: A Writer of Our Time, 
Cambridge: Bowes & Bowes, 1953, p. II suggests in Ringer's usage, 
'Arbeiter' means 'Technocrat'. This is useful because of the reference it 
makes to the role of technology in the new society of workers. 
16 Wolin, in HC 121. 
17 For a commentary, see Jean-Michel Palmier, Les Ecrits politiques de 
Heidegger, Paris: L'Herne, 1968, pp. 160-4. 
18 Michel Haar notes in passing that the Greek does not contain 8E: tvov or 
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UwO', raTov, but the plural Sciva and the comparative SstvoTEpov. See 
Heidegger et Vessence de Phomme, Grenoble: Jerome Millon,, 1990, pp. 
209-10. This remark is found in Haar's useful, if brief, discussion of 
Heidegger's reading of this choral ode. 
19 The Greek word 7ravTa is one of the central terms discussed in Martin 
Heidegger & Eugen Fink, "Heraklit", in GA15; Hk. See John Sallis & 
Kenneth Maly (eds. ), Heraclitean Fragments: A Companion Volume to 
the HeideggerlFink Seminar on Heraclitus, Alabama: University of 
Alabama Press, 1980. 
20 See the untitled forward to Hok-wege (GA5): "Wood is an old name for 
forest. In the wood are paths, most of which suddenly become impassable 
and end in anovergrown copse. They are called woodpaths. They all lead 
their own way but in the same forest. It often appears that one is the same 
as the other. Yet it only appears so. Woodmen and forest rangers know 
the paths. They know what it means to be on a woodpath" . 
21 Kisiel, The Genesis of Heidegger's Being and Time, p. 3. See 
Heidegger's hand-written pages reproduced at the beginning of GA 1. 
22 Sophocles, Antigone,, p. 77. Heidegger's own translation of the full choral 
ode is found as "Chorlied aus der Antigone des Sophokles" in GA 13. 
23 This stress on place rather than space does not mean that I adhere to the 
reading of de Beistegui, Heidegger and the Political. Although generally 
a very useful discussion of Heidegger's reading of the 7roxiý, de Beistegui 
suggests that the difference between space and place is that between the 
ontic and the ontological, that "the difference between space and place 
lies in the fact that the place refers to the very possibility from out of 
which anything like a constituted social, economic and political space 
might arise" (p. 143). Rather, as is clear throughout Heidegger's career, 
place is that which is a more onginary,, lived, understanding; space 
(founded on extension) an abstraction. Drawing on the discussion of 
Plato's Timaeus, we might suggest that XCOpa - which Heidegger suggests 
might mean "that which abstracts itself from every particular, that which 
withdraws, and in such a way preciselý admits and 'makes place' [Platz 
macht] for something else" (GA40,71; IM 66) - is the ontological 
foundation. See also "Der Kunst und der Raum"',, in GA13. Another 
useful general reading of Heidegger 5s discussion of the x0ktý is found in 
Ward, Heidegger's Political Thinking. 
24 See Aristotle,, The Politics, translated by T. A. Sinclair, revised and 
represented by Trevor S. Sanders, Hannondsworth: Penguin, 1981, 
1253a. Sanders' note (p. 59n14) is that mkiTmov ý(oov should be seen as 
"who lives/whose nature is to live in a polis". 
25 See GA54,100-1 for a discussion of why 'animal" is a poor translation of 
ýwov. For the wider context, see GA29/30 and Krell, Daimon Life. 
2 30 
26 Plato, Republic, 473c. 
27 To the earlier discussion, GA34,100, cited above, compare also GA6.1, 
168-9; N 151 166., which is closer to that found in the Holderlin lecture. It 
would appear therefore that by 1935-6 - with An Introduction to 
Metaphysics and the first Nietzsche course, that the retreat(ment) has 
begun. That said, Taminiaux, Heidegger and the Project of Fundamental 
Ontology, pp. 134-5, sees things somewhat differently. He suggests that 
there is no indication that Heidegger abandoned the Platonism of the 
Rectoral Address. A similar argument is made by Philippe Lacoue- 
Labarthe, La fiction du politique: Heidegger, Vart et la politique, Pans: 
Christian Bourgois) 1987. In distinction I would suggest that the 
Platonism may remain, but Heidegger's interpretation of it changes, as 
does his use of the word noktq, leading to his retreat from the political, at 
least in its modem sense. 
28 On this course, see Manfred S. Frings, 'Tannenides: Heidegger's 1942- 
43 Lecture Course Held at Freiburg University", in Journal of the British 
Societyfor Phenomenology, Vol 19 No 1, January 1988. A more detailed 
reading of this course's discussion of the n6)aý and its relation to truth 
and justice is found in Michael Dillon, Politics of Security: Towards a 
Political Philosophy of Continental Thought, London: Routledge, 1996, 
Chapter 3. 
29 See Plato, Republic (especially Waterfield's note on pxi); Platon, Der 
Staat, übersetzt und herausgegeben von Karl Vretske, Stuttgart: Reclam, 
1958. 
30 This is a theme found throughout Heidegger's work. As well as the whole 
of GA54, see, for example, "Vom Wesen der Wahrheit"'; "On the Essence 
of Truth" in GA9,, and GA34 
31 We might note that in their 1966/67 seminar, Heidegger lets Fink's 
translation of nokig in Heraclitus' Fragment 114 as Stadt go without note. 
See GA15,, 47; Hk 25. 
32 As Heidegger notes in GA6.1,168; N 1,165, in a discussion of Plato's 
I-lok1, rE1a,, "we can call Plato's inquiry into art political to the extent that it 
arises in connection with 7roXvrFAa; but we have to know, and then say, 
what 'political I is supposed to mean. If we are to grasp Plato's teaching 
concerning art as 'political', -we should understand that word solely in 
accordance with the concept of the essence of the noktý that emerges 
from the dialogue itself . 
33 Carl Schmitt, The Concept of the Political, translated by George Schwab, 
Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1996, p. 19. On the 
friend/enemy distinction see pp. 27-37. 
34 Indeed, Schmitt recognises as much, distinguishing between the public 
enemy and the private one (qOpOg), a distinction he claims 
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finds support in Plato's Republic. See The Concept of the Political, pp. 28-9. For an account of the role war plays in the Schmittian friend/enemy 
distinction, see Mark Neocleous, "Perpetual War, or, 'War and War 
Again': Schmitt, Foucault, Fascism", in Philosophy and Social Criticism, 
Vol 22 No 2, March 1996. 
35 Martin Heidegger to Carl Schmitt, 22 August 1933, English/German 
version, in Telos,, No 723.1987, p. 132. 
36 This allusion is to the work of Philippe Lacoue-Labarthe & Jean-Luc 
Nancy, in Retreating the Political, edited by Simon Sparks, London: 
Routledge, 1997, influenced as it is by Heidegger. On the two (at least) 
meanings of retreating, see pp. 112,138-9. For a discussion, see Nancy 
Fraser, "The French Derrideans: Politicising Deconstruction or 
Deconstructing the Political' , in Unruly Practices: Power, Discourse and Gender in Contemporary Social Theory, Cambridge: Polity Press, 1989; 
and Simon Critchley, The Ethics ofDeconstruction: Derrida and Levinas, 
Oxford: Blackwell, 1992, pp. 200ff. It is unfortunate that Ernst Cassirer, 
The Allyth of the State, New Haven: Yale University Press, 1946, treats 
Heidegger only very sketchily, and, because of the unavailability of 
materials at the time, is unable to discuss this retreat. 
37 "The Thing" will be considered in the next section. 
38 Krell, Intimations ofMortality, p. 96. 
39 Bernstein has criticised Heidegger's attitude to equipment (he specifically 
means in Being and Time and The Origin of the Work ofArt), by claiming 
that we relate to hydroelectric dams or assembly line robots in a different 
way to how we relate to hammers and shoes: "the essence of equipment 
has changed". This essay of Heidegger's seems to provide the corrective 
needed. See The Fate ofArt, p. 133. 
40 Harold Alderman, "Heidegger's Critique of Science and Technology", in 
Murray (ed. ), Heideggerb'nd Modern Philosophy, pp. 46-7, provides a 
useful example. Alderman quotes an advertising slogan: "Nature creates 
ore deposits. Anaconda creates mines",, and comments "the advertisement - 
further states that ores are not much good until someone uses them; with 
this use they become natural resources. Thus we have from within 
contemporary technology a partial recognition of its own nature". 
41 See also Heidegger's letter to Herbert Marcuse, of January 20th 1948: 
"To the serious legitimate charges that you express 'about a regime that 
murdered millions of Jews,, that made terror into an everyday 
phenomenon, and that turned everything that pertains to the ideas of 
spirit, freedom, and truth into its bloody opposite', I can merely add that 
if instead of 'Jews' you bad written 'East Gen-nans' [i. e., Germans of the 
eastern territories], then the same holds true for one of the allies, with the 
difference that everything that has occurred since 1945 has become public 
knowledge, while the bloody terror of the Nazis in point of fact had been 
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kept a secret from the German people". "An Exchange of Letters: Herbert 
Marcuse and Martin Heidegger", in HC 163. Heidegger's seemingly 
continual need to suggest comparable crimes on the part of others - here the allies' treatment of Eastern Germans, in the key passage discussed 
from "Das Ge-stell" the hydrogen bombs of the superpowers, the 
blockade by the Russians, in the lecture "Die Gefahr", the famine in 
China (GA79,56) - which Wolin likens to the common strategy of the 
Adenauer years (HC 158-9), betrays the fact that here, more than 
anywhere - else, Heidegger engages in criticism: c4serious legitimate 
charges... bloody terror of the Nazis". One can almost hear the strain to 
admit even this little. The other important part of this letter is Heidegger's 
admission of his own guilt: "You are entirely correct that I failed to 
provide a public, readily comprehensible counter-declaration [to the 
Rectoral. Address, after his resignation]; it would have been the end of 
both me and my family. On this point, Jaspers said: that we remain alive 
is our guilt" (p. 163). See Heidegger, Correspondance avec Karl Jaspers. 
As Safranski, Martin Heidegger, p. 413-4, notes'. Heidegger's 
understanding of technology and the holocaust bears comparison with 
that of Theodor Adorno in Negative Dialectics, translated by E. B. 
Ashton, London: Routledge, 1973. On these remarks, see Young, 
Heidegger, Philosophy, Nazism, Chapter 6. 
42 The passage is cited and criticised by Lacoue-Labarthe, La fiction A 
politique, pp. 58ff, and his discussion has been the starting point for 
-- reflections by many others. See for example Krell, Daimon Life, pp. 
138ffý Janicaud, The Shadow of That Thought, Chapter 6, de Beistegui, 
Heidegger and the Political, pp. 153-7. See also, for a fascinating 
dis 
' 
cussion. ) William V. Spanos, Heidegger and Criticism: Retrieving the Cultural Politics of Destruction, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota 
Press, 1993, Chapter 6. 
43 de Beistegul, Heidegger and the Political, p. 154. 
44 On this see Harries,, "Heidegger as Political Thinker" , especially p. 
323: 
"Heidegger's retreat from I politics is inseparable from his characterisation 
-of the essence of technology" . 
45 On this particular point, and for a useful outline of Heidegger's views on 
technology, see Michael E. Zimmerman,, "Beyond 'Humanism': 
Heidegger's Understanding of Technology", in Sheehan (ed. ), Martin 
Heidegger: The Man and the Thinker. The reference is of course 
implicitly to Descartes. Karsten Harries, "Heidegger as Political 
Thinker"", p. 323, puts this succinctly: "Cartesian metaphysics triumphs 
over the earth in technology. This triumph and the forgetting of earth 
belong together". On the relationship between Nietzsche and Heidegger 
on this issue, see Hans Siegfried, "Autonomy and Quantum Physics: 
Nietzsche, Heidegger, and Heisenberg" , in 
Philosophy of Science, Vol 57 
No 4, December 1990; and on Heidegger and science generally, Carl 
Friedrich von Weizsdcher, "Heidegger and Natural Science", in Werner 
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Marx (ed. ), Heidegger Allemorial Lectures, Pittsburgh: Duquesne 
University Press, 1982. 
46 See Jan Popma, The Worker: On Nihilism and Technology in Ernst 
iiinger, Brussel: Economische Hogeschool Sint-Aloysius, 1991. Popma 
even goes so far as to argue that Ringer is suggesting a plunge into 
totalitarianism in order to save us from it. See also Roger Woods, Ernst 
Anger and the Nature ofPolitical Commitment, Stuttgart: Akademischer 
Verlag Hans-Dieter Heinz, 1982; and Daniel Johnson, "Portrait: Ernst 
Janger' , in Prospect, No 17, March 1997. Woods claims that the later Ringer, after about 1936, takes issue both with the Nazis and with his 
own earlier work. For instructive discussions, see Javier A. fbafiez-Noe, 
"Heidegger, Nietzsche, Jfinger, and the Interpretation of the 
Contemporary Age", in The Southern Journal of Philosophy, Vol 
XXXIII, 1995; Zimmermann, Heidegger's Conftontation with Modernity; 
and Palmier, Les Ecrits politiques de Heidegger. 
47 Jünger, Der Arbeiter, in Werke, Vol 6, p. 234. 
48 Jünger, Der Arbeiter, in Werke, Vol 6, p. 176. 
49 On this see also Krell, "Analysis", N IV, 286ff 
50 Ringer, aer die Linie, in Werke, Vol 5, p. 280, quoted In GA9,220. For 
a interview with Ernst Ringer that touches upon many points, including 
Heidegger's critique, see "Le Travailleur Plan6taire: Entretien avec Ernst 
Ringer", in Michel Haar (ed. ), Martin Heidegger: Cahier de LHerne, 
Paris: Editions de L'Heme, 1983. 
51 See Simon Critchley, Very Little... Almost Nothing: Death, Philosophy, 
Literature,, London: Routledge,. 1997,, especially pp. 13-8, 
52 VA 32; BW 333; GA791 72; QCT 42; H61derlin, "Patmos 1)1% in Selected 
Verse, p. 203. 
53 See Marjorie Grene, "Landscape", in Ronald Bruzina & Bruce Wilshire 
(eds. ), Phenomenology: Dialogues and Bridges, Albany: State University 
of New York Press, 1982, where she notes the lack of discussion of 
spatiality in Being and Time, but suggests that as the work on the fourfold 
is concerned with being rather than Dasein it is unable to fill the lacuna. 
54 The source for the alternative translation is Jonathan Barnes, Early Greek 
Philosophy, Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1987, p. 124. 
55 On this matter generally, see Casey, Getting Back into Place; Vincent 
Vycinas, Earth and Gods: An Introduction to the Philosophy of Martin 
Heidegger, The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1969; on its relation to Taoism,, 
see Louise Sundararajan, "Dwelling, Building, . and 
Thinking. From 
Heidegger to Habitat Theory", unpublished paper. 
56 Holderlin, "In lovely blueness... ", Selected Verse, pp. 245-6. 
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57 Krell, "Analysis", N IV, 289. See Fell, Heidegger and Sartre, p. 222, for 
an alternative schema, that incorporates the fourfold,, and space, time, 
world and play into a round. 
58 Krell, Intimations ofMortality, p. 14 1. 
59 On this see, David Kolb, The Critique of Pure Modernity: Hegel, 
Heidegger and After, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1986, pp. 
189ff. Kolb concludes that though the romantic reading is appealing, it 
would be a mistake. He suggests that Heidegger is offering a different 
way of dealing with the modem world. 
60 Friedrich H61derlin, letter to Leo von Seckendorf, March 12,1804 
(Hellingrath V2, p. 333), quoted in VA 196; PLT 227. 
61 A useful discussion of this - though as I have noted in Chapter Three, 
marred by a lack of realisation of the shifting attitude to space - is found 
in Chapter 9 of Miller, Topographies. 
62 Both Hofstadter's English translation, and the French version translated 
by Andr6 Preau in Essais et Confirences, Paris: Gallimard, 1958, are 
slightly confusing. I have revised the translation carefully, consistently 
rendering Raum as space, Stdtte as site, and Ort as place. This is in 
accordance with my practice in this thesis as a whole. 
63 Several of these themes are -picked up in "Hebel - Der Hausfreund"., in 
GA 13; FTH. 
64 As noted in the French translation, this line did not feature in the original 
version, published in LEndurance de la pensee: Pour saluer Jean 
Beauftet, Paris: Plon, 1968. It is unclear as to whether it was present 
when the lecture was delivered in 1962. See Q IV, p. 224n. Robert J. 
Dostal, "Time and Phenomenology in Husserl and Heidegger", in Charles 
Guignon (ed. ), The Cambridge Companion to Heidegger, Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Presýs, 1993, p. 165, suggests that "what Heidegger 
means by this largely unexplained comment is not entirely clear". Dostal 
recognises the radical implications of this comment, and how it would 
entail "-substantial revision" of the earlier Heidegger's project. He closes: 
"it is hard to envision what shape an ontology based as much on spatiality 
as temporality would take. Perhaps the later Heidegger is attempting this 
in some way or another' . 
Notes to Chapter Five 
See David Macey, The Lives of Michel Foucault, London: Hutchinson,, 
1993, p. 450, for an encounter between Jana Sawicki and Foucault over 
precisely this point. Undaunted, Sawicki went on to produce Disciplining 
Foucault: Feminism, Power, and the Boaý, London: Routledge, 199 1. 
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2 There are some excellent spatial analyses util'sIng Foucauldian conceptsil 
though none of these undertake the detailed analysis this thesis purports 
to. See Peter Brown, The Body and Society: Men, Women and Sexual 
Renunciation in Early Christianity, London: Faber and Faber, 1989; Paul 
Carter, The Road to Botany Bay: An Essay in Spatial History, London: 
Faber & Faber, 1987; Paul Rabinow, French Modern: Norms and Forms 
of the Social Environment,, Cambridge, MASS: The NUT Press., 1989; 
Felix Driver, Power and Pauperism: The Workhouse System 1834-1884, 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993; Kevin Hetherington, The 
Badlands of Modernity: Heterotopia and Social Ordering, London: 
Routledge, 1997; David Theo Goldberg,, Racist Culture: Philosophy and 
the Politics of Meaning, Cambridge, MASS: Oxford, 1993; Edward W. 
Said, Orientalism: Western Conceptions of the Orient, Reprinted with a 
New Afterword, Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1995; and his Culture and 
Imperialism, London: Chatto & Windus, 1993. 
3 On the influence of Bachelard and Canguilhem, see Dominique Lecourt, 
Marxism and Epistemology: Bachelard, Canguilhem, Foucauk, translated 
by Ben Brewster, London: NLB, 1975; and Gary Gutting, Michel 
Foucault's Archaeology of Scientific Reason, Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1994. The fon-ner offers some useful interpretations of 
Bachelard and Canguilhem, but is less helpful on their influence on 
Foucault; the latter is far more useful. As James Miller, The Passion of 
Michel Foucault, London: Harper Collins, 1993, p. 59, notes, Althusser's 
enduring legacy to Foucault may have been to push him in the direction 
of Bachelard and Canguilhern. See Louis Althusser, "A Letter to the 
Translator" in For Marx, translated by Ben Brewster, London: Verso, 
1969, and for a discussion, Etienne Balibar, "From Bachelard to 
Althusser: The Concept of the Epistemological Break", in Economy and 
Society, Vol 7 No 3, August 1978. Though I do not wish to marginalise 
the influence of Bachelard and Canguilhem. on Foucault, I think it can be 
overstated and, in any case, Heidegger is central to Bachelard, Nietzsche 
important to Canguilhem. Foucault discusses their work in "Pieger sa 
propre culture" (DE H, 3$2), some interviews (see, for example, DE IV, 
431-57; PPC 17-46), the introduction to The Archaeology of Knowledge 
and the introduction to Georges Canguilhern, The Normal and the 
Pathological, translated by Carolyn R. Fawcett, Dordrecht: D. Reidel, 
1978 (DE 111,429-42). See Gaston Bachelard, The Poetics of Space, 
translated by Maria Jolas, New York: Orion Press, 1964. 
4 Jacques Derrida, " <<Etre juste avec Freud))", in Michel Delorme (dir. ), 
Penser lafolie: Essais sur Michel Foucault, Paris: Galilee, 1992, p. 180n, 
suggests that "this blank silence... the spacing of these omissions... is 
anything but the empty and inoperative sign of an absence". This is a 
useful corrective to Derrida's earlier claim that "Heidegger was almost 
never named by Foucault, who in any case never confronted him and, if 
one may say so, never explained himself on his relationship to him". See 
Jacques Derrida, "Introduction: Desistance", in Lacoue-Labarthe, 
Typography. 
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5 Their study conceives of four stages in Foucault: Heideggenan; 
Archaeological/Quasi-Structuralist; Genealogical; Ethical. See Hubert 
Dreyfus & Paul Rabinow, Michel Foucault: Beyond Structuralism and 
Hermeneutics, Brighton: Harvester, 1980. Foucault commented that 
Dreyfus and Rabinow were the first to suggest the influence: "Of course 
it was quite true, but no one in France has ever perceived it" (DE IV, 780; 
TS 12). Since their joint venture - which itself "was born out of a 
disagreement amongst friends" (p. vii) - it seems Dreyfus and Rabinow 
differ on their understanding of the links between the two thinkers. See 
Dreyfus, "Beyond Hermeneutics: Interpretation in Late Heidegger and 
Recent Foucault" , in 
Gary Shapiro & Alan Sica (eds. ), Hermeneutics: 
Questions and Proposals, Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press, 
1984; and "On the Ordering of Things: Being and Power in Heidegger 
and Foucault", in Timothy J. Armstrong (ed. ) Michel Foucault 
Philosopher, Hemel Hempstead: Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1992, which 
suggests that the links are large, and that power plays for Foucault a role 
similar to Being for Heidegger; while Rabinow tries to distance them, 
partly due to the political issues around Heidegger. See his "Modem and 
Counter-modem: Ethos and Epoch in Heidegger and Foucault", in Gary 
Gutting (ed. ), The Cambridge Companion to Foucault, Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1994. -Dreyfus undoubtedly knows 
Heidegger better than Rabinow does, and the latter is perhaps guilty of a 
selective reading of Foucault. More useful - in its general pronouncement 
that there are affinities between Foucault and the later Heidegger, if not in 
its detail - is Megill, Prophets of Extremity. See also Hinrich-Fink-Eitel, 
"Zwischen Nietzsche und Heidegger: Michel Foucaults Sexualität und Wahrheit im Spiegel neuerer Sekundärliteratur`% in Philosophisches - Jahrbuch, Vol 97 No 2,1990; Spanos, Heidegger and Criticism, Chapter 
5; Neil Levy, "The Prehistory of Archaeology: Heidegger and the Early 
Foucault". in Journal of the British Society for Phenomenology, Vol 27 
No 2,, May 1996; and Michael Schwartz, "Critical Reproblemization. 
Foucault and the Task of Modem Philosophy", in Radical Philosophy, No 
91, Sept/Oct 1998. 
6 Thomas Dumm, Michel Foucault and the Politics of Freedom, Thousand 
Oaks: Sage, 1996, p. 25n3. As was noted in Chapter Two, a very similar 
remark is made by Scott, The Question of Ethics, p. 216nl. Gilles 
Deleuze, Foucault, translated by Sean Hand, London: Athlone Press, 
19 8 8, p. 113, suggests that Foucault could understand Heidegger "only by 
way of Nietzsche and alongside Nietzsche (and not the other way 
round)". Interestingly, some of those that make the most explicit links are 
those who wish to criticise Foucault for his Heideggerianism, in the wake 
of the Nazi revelations. See for example-; Keith Windshuttle, The Killing 
of History, Paddington NSW: Macleay Press., 1996. This is discussed by 
Didier Eribon, Michel Foucault et ses contemporains, Pans: Fayard, 
1994, pp. 93-100. 
This also sets up a critical distance from Habermas's reading, which 
suggests that "Nietzsche's motif of a critique of reason reached Foucault 
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Philosophical Discourse ofModernity, translated by Frederick Lawrence, 
Cambridge: Polity Press, 1987, p. 239. It has also been suggested in a 
couple of places that Max Weber is the link. See John O'Neill, "The 
Disciplinary Society: From Weber to Foucault". in The British Journal of 
Sociology, Vol XXXVII, No 1, March 1986, p. 43; and Owen, Maturity 
and Modernity. Occasionally commentators discuss Heidegger in relation 
to Foucault, only to conclude that there is no important link. See, for 
example, J. G. Merquior, Foucault, Berkeley: University of California 
Press, 1985, p. 143. 
8 Macey, The Lives of Michel Foucault, p. 34; Didier Eribon, Michel 
Foucault, translated by Betsy Wing, London: Faber and Faber, 1993, p. 
30.1 
9 It is worth noting that Foucault read Heidegger again in 1963 (DE 1,25) 
and that he clearly knew Heidegger's Nietzsche by 1966 (DE 1,55 1); that 
he was taught by Jean Beaufret, the recipient of Heidegger's Letter on 
Humanism, and a noted Heideggerian; and worked on the translation of 
Ludwig Binswanger's Dream and Existence, a work infortned by 
Heideggerian Daseinanalyse, meeting with Binswanger and discussing 
Heidegger in the process. See Eribon, Michel Foucault, p. 3 0- 1. 
10 Miller, The Passion ofMichel Foucault, pp. 13 8,418n48; 50; 159. 
Derrida,, " oEtre juste avec Freud)> p. 180. 
12 The original text is Folie et diraison: Histoire de la folie a I'dge 
classique, Paris: Plon, 1961; later abridged as Histoire de lafolie, Paris: 
Plon 10/187 1964; and reissued as Histoire de lafolie a I'dge classique 
suivi de Mon corps, ce papier, ce jeu et La jolle, Pabsence Xwuvre, 
Pans: Gallimard, 1972; and Histoire de lafolie a I'age classique, Pans: 
Gallimard, 1976. The English translation, Madness and Civilisation, 
translated by Richard Howard, London: Routledge, 1989 , is 
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of the abridged versioO Chapter Four has since been translated by 
Anthony Pugh as "Experiences of Madness", History of the Human 
Sciences, Vol 4 No 1,199 1.1 have used the 1976 Tel version') which is - 
bar the new preface and the absence of one footnote - the same as the 
1961 original. The original preface and the 1972 appendices are found in 
Dits et ecrits. 
13 For some interesting comments on the notion of the limit, and its role in 
Foucault's thought, see Clare O'Farrell, Foucault: Historian or 
Philosopher? Houndmills: Macmillan, 1989. O'Farrell also recognises 
the influence of Heidegger in this idea, and the importance for Foucault 
of Heidegger's Nietzsche. 
14 In the original preface, Foucault suggested that his intent was to write a 
history, "not of psychiatry, but of madness itself', but then he swiftly 
suggests that this is a "doubly impossible task" (DE 1,164). Whilst he has 
238 
been criticised by Jacques Derrida, "Cogito and the, History of madness, ') 91 in Writing and Difference, London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1978, for 
attempting this impossible task, Foucault is clear that he is really writing 
the history of "that other form of madness", by which men confine their 
neighbours (DE 1,159; MC xi). He undertakes this by making a study of 
the "economic, political, ideological, and institutional conditions 
according to which the segregation of the insane was effected during the 
Classical period" (DE H, 223; "Monstrosities in Criticism" 
, in Peter Burke (ed. ), Critical Essays on Michel Foucault, Aldershot: Scolar Press,, 
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15 On this see Pamela Major-Poetzl, Michel Foucault's Archaeology of 
Western Culture: Towarda New Science of History, Brighton: Harvester 
Press, 1983. On -trarisgression, see Peter Stallybrass & Allon White, The 
Politics andPoetics of Transgression, London: Methuen, 1986. 
16 On Bataille., Blanchot, H61derlin, and Flaubert see,, respectively, "A 
Preface to Transgression" (DE 1 233-250., LCP 29-52); "The Thought 
from Outside" (DE 1518-39; MB); "The Father's 'No"' (DE 1 189-203; 
LCP 68-86); and "Fantasia of the Library" (DE 1293-325; LCP 87-109). 
See also Raymond Roussel; "Theatrum Philosophicum" (DE 11,75-99; 
LCP 165-196); "Le language de Fespace" (DE 1,407-12) and "Language 
to Infinity" (DE 1250-61; LCP 53-67). It has been suggested by Pierre 
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24). See Bataille, On Nietzsche; and Maurice Blanchot, The Space of 
Literature, Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1982. 
17 Miller, The Passion of Michel Foucault, p. 130-, suggests it was on the 
same day; Macey, The Lives ofMichel. Foucault, p. 129, the same month-, 
the Chronology in Dits et eCrits a month apart (DE 11) 25). 
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Miller, The Passion ofMichel Foucault, p. 130; Eribon, Michel Foucault, 
p. 152. 
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33-4). See Jon Simons, Foucault and the Political, London: Routledge, 
1995. 
20 See, for example, Didier Julia, Dictionaire de la philosophie, Pans: 
Larousse, 1992, p. 97; and Mark Poster, Foucault, Marxism and History: 
Mode of Production versus Mode of Information, Cambridge: Polity 
Press, 1994, p. 74. 
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1980, p. 14. 
22 As Colin Gordon, "Foucault in Britain", In Andrew Barry, Thomas 
Osborne & Nikolas Rose (eds. ), Foucault and Political Reason, London: 
UCL Press, 1996, p. 261, suggests, this phrase arouses the "double 
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empirically bound British culture. See also Thomas Flynn, "Foucault's 
Mapping of History", in Gutting (ed. ), Cambridge Companion, p. 30; and 
Beverley Brown & Mark Cousins, "The Linguistic Fault: The Case of 
Foucault's Genealogy, in Mike Gane (ed. ), Towards a Critique of 
Foucault, London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1986. 
23 On this period of Foucault's thought, see Deleuze, "A New Archivist" , in Foucault. 
24 For a useful discussion of this work, and the role of Bachelard and 
Canguilhem. in it, see Franýois Delaporte, '. (. The History of Medicine 
According to Foucault", in Jan Goldstein (ed. ), Foucault and the Writing 
of History, Oxford: Blackwell, 1994. See also Jeannette Colombel, 
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Descartes", in John Fekete (ed. ), The Structural Allegory: Reconstructive 
Encounters with the Alew French Thought, Minneapolis: University of 
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and Lois McNay, Foucault: A Critical Introduction, Cambridge: Polity 
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Megill, "Foucault., Structuralism, and the Ends of History", in Journal of 
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Structuralism, London: Fontana,, 1993. 
28 Mark Neocleous, Administering Civil Society, London: MacmIllan, 1996, 
pp. 62-3,182n3O. 
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29 Miller, The Passion of Michel Foucault, p. 417n37; also Macey, The 
Lives of Michel Foucault, p. 171; and Sheridan, The Will to Truth, p. 37. 
A detailed analysis of the revisions is made by James Bernauerl Michel 
Foucault's Force of Flight: Towards an Ethics of Thought, Atlantic 
Highlands, N. J.: Humanities Press, 1990, pp. 188-92. 
30 See Foucault's comment that "structuralism does not entail a denial of 
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583). 
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to Paris: A Critique of Structuralist and Post-Structuralist Thought, 
London: Verso, 1986, pp. 54-5. For an example, see Louis Althusser & 
Etienne Balibar, Reading Capital, translated by Ben Brewster, London: 
NLB, 1970, especially pp. 26-8. Neil Smith & Cindy Katz, "Grounding 
Metaphor: Towards a Spatialised Politics" , in 
Keith & Pile (eds. ), Place 
and the Politics of Identity, pp. 71-4, suggest that Foucault is like 
Althusser in his use of metaphors without analysis. This and the 
following chapter aim to demonstrate the erroneousness of this 
judgement. On Althusser generally see Gregory Elliott, Althusser: The 
Detour of Theory, London: Verso, 1988; Gareth Stedman Jones, " The 
Rise and Fall of French Marxism" in Lisa Appignanesi (ed. ), Ideas ftom 
France: The Legacy of French Theory: ICA Documents, London: Free 
Association Books, 1989; and Althusser's autobiography, The Future 
Lasts a Long Time, edited by OliVier Corpet & Yann Mouller Boutang, 
translated by Richard Veasey, London: Chatto & Windus, 1993. On the 
use of spatial metaphors generally, see flana Friedrich Silber, "Space, 
Fields, Boundaries: The Rise of Spatial Metaphors in Contemporary 
Social Theory", in Social Research, Vol 62 No 2, Summer 1995. 
32 Ian Hacking, "The Archaeology of Foucault", in David Couzens Hoy 
(ed. ), Foucault: A Critical Reader, Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1986, p. 33. 
33 It should be noted that whilst most commentators see this as a crucial 
essay for understanding Foucault, Mitchell Dean, Critical and Effective 
Histories: Foucault's Methods and Historical Sociology, London: 
Routledge, 1994, p. 14, suggests that we should remember that it is about 
-Nietzsche, and that we should not necessarily equate it with 
Foucault. It is 
however, I suggest, clear from Foucault's genealogical studies - as he 
calls them - that the essay is part of a program of future work. 
34 For example, see the opening line of the second paragraph of the preface 
to On the Genealo*, of Morality. The original German is "Meine 
Gedanken über die Herkunft unserar moralischen Yorurtheile"; the 
Kaufmann/Hollingdale translation renders it "My ideas on the origin of 
our moral prejudices"; a standard French translation has "Mes idees sur 
l'origine de nos prejug6s moraux"; the English translation by Diethe is 
"My thoughts on the descent of our moral prejudices". See KSA V, 248; 
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Hollingdale, New York: Vintage, 1967; La Genealogie de la morale, 
translated by Henri Albert, Poitiers: Fernard. Nathan, 1981; On the 
Genealogy of Morality, translated by Carol Diethe, Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1994. 
35 For a useful discussion of how these understandings distance Foucault 
from traditional history, see Michele Barrett, The Politics of Truth: From 
Marx to Foucault, Cambridge: Polity Press, 199 1, p. p. 132-3. 
36 Habermas, The Philosophical Discourse of Modernity, p. 249, sees this 
rejection of Ursprungphilosophie as a point of difference between 
Foucault, and Heidegger and Derrida. 
37 A different conception is provided by Philip Barker, Michel Foucault: 
Subversions of the Subject, New York & London: Harvester Wheatsheaf, 
1993, p. 71; and Owen, Maturity and Modernity, p. 151, who see 
archaeology as concentrating on the synchronic, genealogy on the 
diachronic. 
38 In the interview "Critical Theory/Intellectual History" (DE IV, 454-5; 
PPC 43), Foucault points out that if knowledge simply equalled power (as 
some critics would have him saying), then he would not have spent so 
much time examining their relation. 
39 A particularly clear formulation is found in VS 123-7,7-V; -K 94-6. For 
discussions, see Randall McGowen, "Power and Humanity, Or Foucault 
among the Historians" , in 
Colin Jones & Roy Porter (eds. ), Reassessing 
Foucault: Power, Medicine and the Body, Routledge: London, 1994, p. 95; 
Sawicki, Disciplining Foucault, pp. 20-1; David M. Halperin, Saint 
Foucault-- Toward a Gay Hagiography, New York: Oxford University 
Press, p. 16-8; Deleuze, Foucault, p. 71; Barker, Michel Foucault, p. 77- 
8. On the debt to Nietzsche, see many of those sources cited above, and 
notably Keith Ansell-Pearson The Significance of Michel Foucault's 
Reading of Nietzsche: Power,, the Subject, and Political(- Theory", in 
Sedgwick (ed. ), Nietzsche: A Critical Reader. 
40 Niccolo' Machiavelli, The Prince, in Selected Political Writings, edited 
and translated by David Wootton, Indianapolis: Hackett, 1994. 
41 It would seem that the target here is particularly Louis Althusser, as 
shown in his Lenin and Philosophy and Other Essays, translated by Ben 
Brewster, London: NLB, 1971. 
42 Nfichael Walzer., "The Politics of Nfichel Foucault". in Hoy (ed. ), A Critical 
Reader, p. 54. 
43 Especially damaging for the overall purpose here is Henri Lefebvre's 
criticism in The Survival of Capitalism: Reproduction of the Relations of 
Production, translated by Frank Bryant, London: Allison & Busby, 1976, 
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p. 116, that the concentration on marginal/peripheral groups in some 
studies (the allusion is clearly to Foucault) "neglects the centres and 
centrality; it neglects the global". Gregory, Geographical Imaginations, 
p. 365, suggests that this "comprehensively missed Foucault's point", but 
Foucault's response shows this is not entirely accurate. A balance is 
needed. ) and when setting out the project of a history of spaces, Foucault 
indeed talked of extension from "from the grand strategies of geopolitics 
to the little tactics of the habitat" (DE H1,192; FL 228). Sensitive to 
questions of space, Edward W. Said provides some of the best work on 
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level. See his Orientalism and Culture and Imperialism; and Nfichael 
Sprinker (ed. ), Edward Sai& A Critical Reader, Oxford: Blackwell, 1992. 
44 Though see the work of Gilles Deleuze and Fdlix Guattari, particularly 
Mille plateaux: capitalisme et schizophreme 2, Paris: Les Editions de 
Minuit, 1980; translated by Brian Massumi as A Thousand Plateaus: 
Capitalism and Schizophrenia, London: Athlone Press, 1988. In the 
"Notes on the Translation".. Massunii points out that Deleuze and Guattari 
use puissance to signify potential, capacity -a translation of Nietzsche's 
Macht - and pouvoir "in a sense very close to Foucault's, as a selective 
concretisation of potential". 
45 The French translation (of a text originally published in Italian) has the 
second as Clausewitz's hypothesis. As will be shown later, the hypothesis 
is clearly a reversal of Clausewitz, and therefore I have preferred the 
reading of it as Nietzsche's hypothesis. 
46 On the spatial side, Gregory, Geographical Imaginations, p. 276, sees 
this as a particular problem: "Foucault's analysis does not lead as directly 
as Lefebvre's to a 'politics of space', however, and one of the most 
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for any kind of resistance". 
47 C. 9 Nancy Fraser , 
Foucault on Modem Power: Empirical Insights and 
Normative Confusions", 'in Praxis International,, No 1.1981, p. 283. 
Habermas, The Philosophical Discourse ofModernity, pp. 276ff, suggests 
that Foucault reallses this, and other, problems, but "does not draw any 
consequences from them". On some of the issues around thisl see Paul 
Patton "Taylor and Foucault on Power and Freedom"' ,, and 
Charles 
Taylor, "Taylor and Foucault on Power and Freedom: A Reply' , in 
Political Studies, Volume XXXVII, 1989; Leslie- Paul Thiele, "The 
Agony of Politics: The Nietzschean Roots of Foucault's Thought", in 
American Political Science Reviewl Vol 84 No 3, September 1990; and 
Niko Kolodny, "The Ethics of Cryptonormativism: A Defence of 
Foucault's Evasions" , in 
Philosophy and Social Criticism, Vol 22 No 5, 
September 1996. 
48 Translated as Michel Foucault & Noam Chomsky, "Human Nature: 
Justice vs. Power", in Forts Elders (ed. ), Reflexive Water: The Basic 
Concerns ofMankind, London: Souvenir Press, 1974, p. 182. 
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, in Barry, et. al. (eds. ), Foucault and Political Reason, p. 184. Similar points are made by McNay, Foucault, p. 164-5; and Russell 
Keat, "The Human Body in Social Theory: Reich, Foucault and the 
Repressive Hypothesis 1)1) , 
in Radical Philosophy, No 42, Winter/Spring 
1986. See also Jean Baudrillard, Forget Foucault, translated by Nicole 
Dufresne, New York: Semiotext(e), 1987. 
50 See also Michel Foucault, "About the Beginning of the Hermeneutics of 
the Self: Two Lectures at Dartmouth", in Political Theory, Vol 21 No 2, 
May 1993, p. 204, where Foucault admits his earlier emphasis on 
domination as a problem. 
51 See also the 1975-6 College de France course, ((Il jaut difendre [a 
societj>>,, ed. par Mauro Bertani et Allesandro Fontana, Pans: 
Gallimard/Seuil, 1997., where Foucault analyses the models of war in 
peace. 
52 See Carl yon Clausewitz, Ott Vear,. translated by J. J. Graham, revised by 
F. N. Maude, London: Wordsworth, 1997, p. 25. On this see Pasquale 
Pasquino, "Political Theory of War and Peace: Foucault and the History 
of Modem Political Theory", in Economy and Society, Vol 22 No 1, 
February 1993; and Thiele, The Agony of Politics', p. 92 1. 
53 Though as Barry Smart, Michel Foucault, London: Routledge, 1988, p. 
1.34, points out, his own definitions are often vague. 
54 See, however, Neocleous, "Perpetual War, or, 'War and War Again': 
Schmitt, Foucault, Fascism 1)7 , 
for the dangers in this militaristic 
conception of society, a point that is also made by some feminists. See 
Joseph Rouse, "Power/Knowledge", 
- in 
Gutting (ed. ), Cambridge 
Companion, p. 113, and, on Foucault and feminism more generally, Terry 
K. Aladjem, "The Philosopher's Prism: Foucault, Feminism, and 
Critique" 
, in 
Political Theory, Vol 19 No 2, May 1991; and Caroline 
Ramazanoglu (ed.. ), Up Against Foucault: Explorations ofSome Tensions 
Between Foucault and Feminism, London: Routledge, 1993. 
55 For a discussion of Heidegger and Foucault on technology, and 
specifically on the differences in their understandings, see Jana Sawicki, 
"Heidegger and Foucault: Escaping Technological Nihilism", in Barry 
Smart (ed. ), Michel Foucault (1) Critical Assessments, London. 
Routledge, 1994, Vol 111; Mitchell Dean, "Putting the Technological into 
Government ", in History of the Human Sciences, Vol 9 No 3,1996; and 
Andre Glucksmann, "Michel Foucault's Nihilism" , in Armstrong ý(edj, Michel Foucault Philosopher. 
56 This point is developed out of a conversation with Morris Kaplan. See 
also Barry Hindess, Discourses of Power: From Hobbes to Foucault, 
London: Routledge, 1996, pp. 114-5, where he links Heidegger and 
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endowed with "soul, consciousness, guilt, remorse" etc. 
57 The first two terms are used in The Will to Knowledge, the central chapter 
of which is called "The Dispositif of Sexuality"; 'apparatus I is used in PowerlKnowledge; 'grid of intelligibility' is the suggestion of Dreyfus & Rabinow, Alfichel Foucault. For a brief comment, see Halperin, Saint Foucault, pp. 189-90M. 
58 For the former, see Heidegger, Essais et Confirences, p. 26(&n); for the latter, see Ringer, "Le Travailleur plan6taire", p. 150n2. 
59 Mitchell Dean, "Foucault, Government and the Enfolding of Authority", 
in Barry, et. al. (eds. ), Foucault and Political Reason, p. 226. See also 
Hindess, Discourses of Power, pp. 114-5; Alan Milchman & Alan 
Rosenberg, "Michel Foucault, Auschwitz and Modernity", in Philosophy 
and Social Criticism, Vol 22 No I, January 1996, p. 113 n22; and Macey, 
The Lives ofMichel Foucault, p. 355, all of whom conceive of dispositif 
in a way that corresponds closely to Heidegger's Gestell. For a 
discussion, see Gilles Deleuze, "What is a dispositij? " in Armstrong (ed. ), 
Michel Foucault Philosopher, and his "Desire and Pleasure", in Arnold 1. 
Davidson (ed. ), Foucault and his Interlocutors, Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 1997. None of these thinkers, however, make the explicit 
link I am suggesting. 
60 See also the-unpaginated inscit found in L'Usage des plaisirs and Le 
Souci de soi. 
61 Useful sources on Foucault's later work include Karlis Racevskis, 
Postmodernism and the Search for Enlightenment, Charlottesville: The 
University Press of Virginia, 1993; Barker, Michel Foucault: Subversions 
of the Subject; John Raj chman, Truth and Eros: Foucault, Lacan and the 
Question of Ethics, New York & London. Routledge, 1991; and Peter 
Dews, "The Return of the Subject in Late Foucault", in Radical 
Philosophy, No 5 1, Spring 1989. 
62 As was noted in Cliapters Two and Three, Heidegger's h1storiclsing of 
the sense of history is a crucial shift in his later work. A similar point is 
made by Paul Bove, In the Wake o Theory, Hanover: Wesleyan )f 
University Press, 1992, p. 2 1, though he sees this as a problem. 
63 David Couzens Hoy., "Introduction" to A Critical Reader, p. 6, makes the 
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Heidegger as the crucial link in the chain. 
64 As Deleuze, Foucault, p. 50, states, "archaeology does not necessarily 
refer back to the past. There is an archaeology of the present". See also 
John Rajchman, Michel Foucault: The Freedom of Philosophy, New 
York: Columbia University Press, 1985, p. 58; and the posthumously 
published interview "What our Present is" (FL 407-15). 
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Werke: Gesamtausgabe in zehn Bdnden, Leipzig: Modes und Baumann, 
1843, Vol I, p. 111; "An Answer to the Question: What is 
Enlightenment? *)'),, translated by Ted Humphrey in Perpetual Peace and 
Other Essays On Politics, History and Moral Practice, Indianapolis: 
Hackett, 1983, p. 41. 
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passe]" (DE IV, 37). 
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Hacking, "Self-lmprovement" , in Hoy (ed. ), A Critical Reader, p. 238; RIrgen Habermas, "Taking Aim at the Heart of the Present: On Foucault's 
Lecture on Kant's What is Enlightenment? "', in Michael Kelly (ed. ), 
Critique and Power: Recasting the Foucault/Hahermas Debate, 
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and its Legacy, Bonn: B ouvier, 1990; and Colin Gordon, "Question, 
Ethos, Event: Foucault on Kant and Enlightenmenf' , in Economy and Society, Vol 15 No 1, February 1986. The shift is often situated around 
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particularly, Kelly (ed. ), Critique and Power. 
70 David Couzens Hoy, "Foucault: Modem or Postmodem? ", in Jonathan 
Arac (ed. ), After Foucault: Humanistic Knowledge, Postmodern 
Challenges, New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 1988, p. 13. 
Progress was, for Nietzsche, merely a "'modem idea" (A 4). 
71 As Dean,, Critical and Effective Histories, p. 20, suggests, "the general 
context for a consideration of genealogy and archaeology is, then, a third 
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Illy . Referential Knowledge Acquisition , in Philosophy and 
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made by Soja, Postmodern Geographies, p. 18. 
73 David Harvey, Justice, Nature and the Geography of Difference, Oxford: Blackwell, 1996, p. 4. See, for example, Slavoj Ziz'ek (ed. ), Allapping 
Ideology, London: Verso, 1994, which seem to use the 'mapping' as a label and nothing more. On the defence of 'map' as a metaphor and more 
than a metaphor, see Gregory, Geographical Imaginations, p. 217. 
74 Foucault's use of spatial metaphors occasionally leads others to make 
remarks of this nature. For example, George Steiner, '. The Order of 
Things", in Burke (ed. ), Critical Essays on Michel Foucault, p. 85: "one 
wonders whether 'topology' would not have been more apt than 
C archaeology"'. 
75 Jorge Luis Borges, "Of Exactitude in Science" , in 
A Universal History of 
Infamy, Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1984, p. 13 1. 
76 See SqJa, Postmodern Geographies, p. 16, where he suggests that 
Foucault's "most explicit and revealing observations on the relative 
significance of space and time, however, appear not in his major 
published works but almost innocuously in his lectures and, after some 
coaxing interrogation, in two revealing interviews". In his later 
Airdspace, p. 154, Soja again treats "Of Other Spaces" as Foucault's 
central spatial contribution, though he recognises the dangers in this. 
77 SqJa, Postmodern Geographies, p. 19, rightly suggests that "Foucault's 
spatialisation took on a more demonstrative rather than -declarative 
stance", a statement which makes SOP's attempts to synthesise 
Foucault's declarations rather than showcase his demonstrations all the 
-more 
frustrating. As Gregoryl Geographical Imaginations, p. 297, notes, 
SOP's approach also snaps the links between FouCault's pronouncements 
on space and his genealogy of the subject, a problem I attempt to avoid 
through the contextual readings of Foucault's spatial histories. 
78 Several changes and interpolations' have been made to the translation of 
this piece, in order to clarify Foucault's point. This translation is 
especialty confusing when it transtates localisation as 'emplacement' and 
emplacement as site; a problem that seems to haunt many critical 
expositions of this piece. See, for example, Scja, Thirdspace, p. 156. 
79 James Harkess, "Translator's Introduction", TNP 2. 
80 See the translator's notes TNP 6ln5,, 62nl4. On Magritte in general, see 
Marcel Paquet, Magritte, Koln: Taschen, 1994. Foucault 1) s comments on 
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commentary on Velasquez (M&C 19-31; OT 3-16) and "Le Force de 
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especially pp. 16-21; Thirdspace, p. 154-163; John Marks, "A New 
Image of Thought T. 1 , 
in New Formations, No 25, Summer 1995; 
Hetherington, The Badlands ofModernity, Chapter 3; Casey, The Fate of Place, pp. 297-301; Georges Teyssot, "Heterotopias and the History of Spaces", in Barry Smart (ed. ), Michel Foucault (2) Critical Assessments, 
London: Routledge, Volume VII, 1995; Dumm, Michel Foucault and the Politics of Freedom, pp. 36ff. As Marks, pp. 68-9, and Hetherington, pp. 
46ff note " in a corrective to Soja, Foucault's understanding of heterotopia is both for thought and social space. 
82 This is at least part of -the reason why 'rnapping the presentt' is a usefull 
term for describing Foucault's work. Gregory, Geographical 
Imaginations, p. 359, reads Lefebvre's history of space as a history of the 
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3T ociety and Space, Vol 100,199922. The critique off '-)oja is drawn from 
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[1990], in Geographical imaginations. 
a pte. "' Notes tn. Ch r -ix 
rN -3 Pul-'e- an unicnown bbook- by Midnel Foucault". Gordon, Histoire de la 
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(eds. ), Rewriting the History of Madness: Studies in Foucault's Histoire 
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rI rench reception ofii'lStoire de lafiolie is more positive than the English, 
French commentators - whether critical or not - have tended to represent 
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"Taking Sides", in Critical Essays, translated by Richard Howard, 
Evanston: Northwestern University Press, -1972; Jacqueline Russ., Profil 
d'une wuvre: Histoire de la folle: Foucault, Paris: Hatier, 1979; and 
Georges Canguilhem 1) s three pieces and Michel Serres' "The Geometry of 
the Incommunicable" , in 
Davidson (ed. ), Foucault and his Interlocutors. 
3 Reading the full text truly gives the lie to Peter Sedgwicks suggestion 
that "the full text has many important passages but these are not crucial to 
Foucault's argument". Psycho Politics, London: Pluto, 1982, p. 272n 16. 
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Archaeology of Western Culture, p. 134, where she suggests that Histoire de lafolie has "only a limited sense of spatial relationships", suggesting 
that a more radical break is only found in The Birth of the Clinic and later 
works. Far more in tune with my attempt here is Serres valuable "The 
Geometry of the Incommunicable: Madness", only recently translated 
into English, which emphasises Foucault's language and the concomitant 
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5 Colin Gordon, "History, madness and other errors: a response", p. 391. 
6 See O'Farrell, Foucault: Historian or Philosopher?, p. 7 1. 
7 H. C. Erik Midelfort, "Madness and Civilisation in Early Modem Europe: 
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Manchester University Press, 1980, pp. 253,256,26lnl3. The monastery 
critique is picked up by Lawrence Stone, The Past and Present Revisited, 
London & New York: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1987, p. 271; Merquior, 
Foucault, p. 28; and Sedgwick, Psycho Politics, p. 134. For a defence see 
Dominick LaCapra, "Foucault, history and madness", History of the 
Human Sciences, Vol 3 No 1,, 1990, p. 33. 
8 The "myth" of the ship of fools is discussed by Winifred Barbara Maher 
& Brendan Maher,, "The Ship of Fools: Stultifera Navis or Ignis 
Fatuus? ",, in American Psychologist, Vol 37 No 7, July 1982. 
9 On Gheel,, see William Ll. Parry-Jones, "The Model of the Geel Lunatic 
Colony and Its Influence on the Nineteenth-Century Asylum System in 
Britain", in Andrew Scull (ed. ), Madhouses, Mad-Doctors and Madmen: 
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University of Pennsylvania Press, 1981. 
10 The lack of overall plan is supported by Andrew T. Scull, Museums of 
Madness: The Social Organisation of Insanity in 19th Century England, 
London: Allen Lane, 1979, pp. 18-9. 
The English translation has "the mad then led an easy wandering 
existence",, a translation Gordon suggests is simply wrong, facilement 
being an adverb rather than an adjective: easily, not easy. For Gordon, the 
sentence should read "the existence of the mad at that time could easily 
be a wandering one" ("Histoire de lafolie", p. 17). A useful discussion of 
this is found in Allan Megill, "Foucault, Ambiguity, and the Rhetoric of 
Historiography , in History of the 
Human Sciences, Vol 3, No 3, pp. 344- 
7. Anthony Pugh, the putative translator of the (forthcoming) full English 
version, suggests "the mad may well have led a wandering life at that 
time". Pugh, "Foucault, Rhetoric and Translation", in Still & Velody 
(eds. ), Rewriting the History ofMadness, p. 139. 
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in "L'eau et la folie" (DE 1,268-272). 
13 Rene Descartes, Meditationes de Prima Philosophia in (Euvres 
Philoso hiques: Tome H (1638-1642), Paris: Gamier Freres 1967 p 11 1 PP. 178-82; Meditations on First Philosophy, in Discourse on Method and 
Meditations on First Philosophy, Indianapolis: Hackett, 1980, pp. 58-60. 
As Barker, Michel Foucault, p. 107, notes, St. Augustine's foundation of 
thought - credo ut intelligam - takes into account the point of dreams and 
illusion, making him similar to Descartes (p. 209n92). However, St. 
Augustine crucially does not mention the possibility of madness, a point 
neglected by Barker. It would seem then that Descartes' introduction of 
madness as a source of doubt is as important as its subsequent dismissal. 
14 Descartes, Meditationes p183; Meditations, p. 61. 
15 Descartes, Meditationes, p. 178; Meditations, p. 58. Emphasis added. 
16 Descartes, Meditationes, p. 179; Meditations, p. 58. 
17 This reading of Descartes is critiqued by Derrida in "Cogito and the 
History of Madness". Derrida suggests that "the sense of Foucault's 
entire project can be pinpointed in this reading of Descartes ", but argues 
that it is a "nalve" reading (pp. 32,61). Derrida does not read Descartes' 
"but they are all demented" as dismissive and divisive, but argues that it 
can beýread in the same way that Foucault claims Descartes deals with the 
other two misleading possibilities. Just as the possibility of dreaming or 
deceit did not preclude the possibility of thinking, and, indeed, actually 
helped to prove it, Derrida argues that the possibility of madness too 
proves the validity of thought. As he puts it, even if my thoughts are 
completely mad", I am still thinking: "the Cogito is valid even for the 
maddest madman" (pp. 55,58). Having claimed this, Derrida is in a 
position to criticise the inference that Foucault draws from Descartes: it 
requires "'neither the exclusion nor the circumventing of madness. 
Descartes never intems m. adness... " (p. 55) Foucault responded to parts 
of Derrida's critique in "Mon corps, ce papier, ce feu" (DE 11,245-268), 
and implicitly in other works, notably The Archaeology of Knowledge. 
On this debate see Roy Boyne, Foucault and Derrida: The Other Side of 
Reason, London: Unwin Hyman, 1988; D'Amico "Text and Context"; 
Peter Flaherty, "(Con)-textual. Contest: Derrida and Foucault on Madness 
and the Cartesian Subject""', in Philosophy of the Social Sciences, Vol 16 
No 11 March 1986 and, more generally, Christopher Norris, Derrida, 
London: Fontana, 1987; Edward W. Said, The World, The Text, The 
,, London: 
Faber & Faber 1984. Derrida replies to some of Critic, 
Foucault's points in "oEtre juste avec Freud >>' . 
18 The importance of vision only really becomes clear when the original 
French is returned to. The word translated as 'observation' in Madness 
and Civilisation is regard, usually rendered as 'gaze' in Foucault's books. 
Whilst both translations are accurate, noting the French shows how this 
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greatly developed in The Birth of the Clinic, and its wider social 
implications - already there in Histoire de lafolie - are of course evident 
in Discipline and Punish. The notions of power [pouvoir] and knowledge 
[savoir] make use of a third dimension, that of the ability to see [voir], to 
survey and control space. On Foucault and vision see Martin Jay, 
Downcast Eyes: The Denigration of Vision in Twentieth-Century French 
Thought, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993; Thomas R. 
Flynn, "Foucault and the Eclipse of Vision", in Levin (ed. ), Modernity 
and the Hegemony of Vision; John Rajchman, "Foucault's Art of Seeing", 
in October, No 44, Spring 1988. 
19 See also Scull, Museums ofMadness, pp. 159-60. 
20 Louis-Sebastian Mercier, Tableau de Paris, Amsterdam: 1783, Vol VIII, 
p. 1, quoted in BY 375; MC 202. 
21 Samuel Tuke, Practical Hints on the Construction and Economy of 
Pauper Lunatic Asylums, York: William Alexander, 1815, p. 9. 
22 Samuel Tuke, Review of the Early History of the Retreat, quoted in Anne 
Digby, Madness, Morality and Medicine: A Study of the York Retreat 
1796-1914, Cambridge- Cambridge University Press, 1985, p. 14. On the 
Tukes and the Retreat see also Samuel Tuke,, Description of the Retreat, 
York: W. Alexander, 1813; D. Hack Tuke, Reform in the History of the 
Insane, London: J. & A. Churchill,, 1892; William K. & E. Margaret 
Sessions, The Tukes of York, York: William Sessions Limited, 1971; 
Mary R. Glover, The Retreat York: An Early Experiment in the Treatment 
of Mental Illness, York: William Sessions Limited, 1984; and Kathleen 
Anne Stewart, The York Retreat in the Light of the Quaker Way, York: 
William Sessions Limited, 1992. 
23 Samuel Tuke, Practical Hints, p. 11. 
24 Digby, Madness, Morality, and Medicine, pp. 54,66,71 
25 Erving Goffman, Asylums, New York: Anchor Books, 196 1. See also 
Scull, Museums of Madness, p. 104. On several of these points, with a 
noticeably large debt to Foucault, see Michael Donnelly, Managing the 
Mind: A Study of*Mental Psychology in Early Nineteenth Century Britain, 
London: Tavistock, 1983. 
26 Digby, Madness, Morality and Medicine, pp. 158-9,188. See also Scull, 
Museums ofMadness, p. 104; Samuel Tuke, Description of the Retreat, p. 
105. 
27 Glover, The Retreat York, p. 3 1. 
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28 Gordon, "Histoire de la folie"', p. 16. On Pinel, see Walther Riese, The 
Legacy of Philippe Pinel: An Inquiry into Thought on Mental Alienation, 
New York: Springer Publishing Company, 1969. 
29 Riese, The Legacy ofPhilippe Pinel, p. 154. 
30 Riese, The Legacy ofPhilippe Pinel, p. 172. 
31 Donnelly, Managing the Mind, p. 40. It should be noted that this was not 
always the case. See Samuel Tuke, Practical Hints, pp. 11,17: "It will be 
found necessary to separate them, rather according to the degree, than the 
species or the duration of the disease". 
32 Quoted in Riese, The Legacy ofPhilippe Pinel, p. 154. 
33 Foucault explicitly states that he is only looking at the birth of the prison 
in the French penal system (SP 40n; DP 3090), although the implicit 
suggestion is that some of his ideas would serve as a model for other 
countries. Foucault has been criticised for suggesting that the shift from 
torture to imprisonment is a European model, but it is clear from his 
1972-3 course at the Coll&ge de France that he only sees this as 
appropriate for French history. At the beginning of the course outline, a 
distinction is made between "four grand forms of punitive strategies", - banishment, compensation, branding or other corporal punishment, and 
imprisonment. Having suggested these four strategies, he goes on to talk 
about how France shifted from the thind to the fourth, a process he 
elaborates in more detail in Discipline and Punish. It is clear from this 
outline , if 
it were not already evident in his better known work, that on 
this point Foucault was making no claims for universality. See "La 
societe punitive" (RC 29-5 1). 
34 The French word supplice is usually translated as 'torture', but so too is 
torture. What is important about Foucault's use of supplice and related 
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the full range of the French", and therefore translates as 'torture', 'public 
execution' or 'scaffold' (Translator's Note in DP). To avoid confusion I 
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35 Colin Gordon, "History, madness and other errors: a response", p. 391. 
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meaning, but that the English police "is something very different" (DE 
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See Leon Radzinowicz, A History of English Criminal Law and its 
Administration ftom 1750, London: Stevens & Sons, Five Volumes, 
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making: Adam Smith, Police and the State of Prosperity in Policing and 
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of the Philosophy ofRight, edited by Allen W. Wood, translated by H. B. 
Nisbet, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991, §§236,239-48; 
and for a discussion, Mark Neocleous & Stuart Elden, "'The Police 
Includes Everything': Foucault, Hegel and the Police Concept", 
forthcoming. In seeing governmentality as a virtual synonym of police I 
am setting myself up in opposition to Nikolas Rose's suggestion, 
"Government,, Authority and Expertise in Advanced Liberalism",. in 
Economy and Society, Vol 22 No 3,1993, p. 289, that "governmentality, 
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Hindess, Discourses of Power, pp. 118ff. For discussions of 
governmentality, see, amongst others, the essays in FE and Barry 
Hindess, "Politics and Govemmentality",, in Economy and Society, Vol 
26 No 2,, May 1997. 
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implications it has for reading the book. See Dumm, Michel Foucault and 
the Politics ofFreedom, p. 71. Rudi Visker, Michel Foucault: Genealogy 
as Critique, London: Verso, 1995, p. 47, suggests that "in contrast to the 
expectation which the subtitle creates,, Foucault's subject here is not 
simply the birth of the prison, but also the birth of the human sciences"'. 
See also Miller, The Passion of Michel Foucault, pp. 210-1; Pasquale 
Pasquino, "Michel Foucault (1926-84): The Will to Knowledge"), in 
Economy and Society, 
- 
Vol 15 No 1, Feb 1986, p. 97. A much more 
penetrating analysis is found in the work of Frank Lentricchia, Ariel and 
the Police, Brighton: The Harvester Press, 1988. 
39 See for example, David Stewart, "Why Foucault? ", in Smart (ed. ), Michel 
Foucault (2) Critical Assessments, Vol VIII, p. 95, who suggests that 
Foucault utilises two general schemes - panopticism and heterotopias - in 
his work on space. Felix Driver, "Geography and Power: The Work of 
Michel Foucault", in Burke (ed. ), Critical Essays on Michel Foucault, 
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the passage on the Mettray colony. 
40 The English translation of this paragraph is somewhat dubious, not in the 
choice of words, but in the slip made in the alteration of the punctuation, 
such that a less-than-wholly attentive reader may miss Foucault's point. 
41 Neocleous, Administering Civil Society, p. 61. See also pp. 83-6, and his 
"Perpetual War, or 'War and War Again': Schmitt, Foucault, Fascism". 
42 Foucault suggests that the poles of right and wrong, and good and sin 
map onto those of the normal and the pathological (SP 232-3; DP 199). 
See Canguilhem, On the Normal and the Pathological, p. 149: "the 
abnormal, whilst logically second, is existentially first". On the rise of 
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the History of Statistics", in FE. 
43 Robin Evans, Ae Fabrication of Virtue, Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1982, p. 119, points out that the "term penitentiary 
referred to a monastic cell, set aside for sinful monks -a place of 
penitence and remorse". On monasteries,, factories and prisons, see Dario 
Melossi & Massimo Pavarini, The Prison and the Factory: Origins of the 
Penitentiary System, translated by Glynis Cousin, London: Macmillan, 
1981. 
44 Bentham suggests that the prison be 'located in the neighbourhood of a 
great metropolis, the place which contains assembled the greatest number 
of men , including those who most need to have displayed before their 
eyes the punishment of crime", Theorie des Peines et des Recompenses, 
p. 203, quoted in Pasquale Pasquino, "Criminology: the Birth of a Special 
Knowledge" (FE 240). See also Jeremy Bentham, The Rationale of 
Punishment,, London: Robert Heward, 1830, p. 353. 
45 Details of the English translation perhaps help to explain the imbalance. 
In the French text thirty plates are included, showing a range of 
disciplinary diagrams and scenes - hospitals,, schools, colleges, a 
menagerie, a number on the army, and several of penitentiaries. The 
English text cuts these down to merely ten, of which only one is of a 
military scene, none are of hospitals or schools, and the majority are of 
the prison. 
46 Michel Foucault, Blandine Barrett Kriegel, Anne Thalamy, Frangois 
Beguin & Bruno Fortier, Genealogie des equipements de normalisation, 
Fontenay sous-Bois. - CERFI, 1976; Les Machines a guerir (aux origines 
de VhJpital moderne), Bruxelles: Pierre Mardaga, 1979. On the history of 
this research see Macey, The Lives ofMichel Foucault, pp. 324-6. 
47 In an 1977 interview, published as the preface to the French edition of 
Jeremy Bentham's Panop'ticon, Foucault suggests that the themes that 
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his study of hospital architecture (DE 111,190; FL 226). 
48 On Foucault and diagrams generally see Deleuze, Foucault, especially 
the chapter entitled "A New Cartographer", and his "What is a 
I. dispositif 7' , in Armstrong 
(ed. ), Michel Foucault Philosopher. Foucault 
describes himself as a cartographer in "Sur la sellette" (DE 11,725). 
49 The model is used by Rabinow, French Modern, pp. 34ff, to relate to the 
1832 cholera epidemic in Paris. See also Thomas Osbome, "Security and 
Vitality: Drains, Liberalism and Power in the Nineteenth Century", in 
Barry, et. a]. (eds. ), Foucault and Political Reason. For two fictional 
accounts of the plague, but with a clear picture of the grid that Foucault 
uses as a model, see Daniel Defoe, Journal of the Plague Year: 
Han-nondsworth: Penguin, 1966, especially pp. 57ff, With a commentary 
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50 A notable exception is found in Sarah Nettleton's work on dentistry - Power, Pain and Dentistry, Buckingham, Open University Press, 1992, 
and "Inventing Mouths: Disciplinary Power and Dentistry", in Jones & 
Porter (eds. ), Reassessing Foucault. Nettleton uses the two concepts as 
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community (of the public health movement, notably dentistry). Another 
interesting analysis, again examining how the two concepts work in 
parallel, and complement each other, is found in Milchman and 
Rosenberg's study of Nazi Germany. The Final Solution is an example of 
the exclusion principle, and Milcbman and Rosenberg argue that the 
disciplinary model is evidenced in the domestic politics of the Nazi 
regime. See Milchman & Rosenberg, "Michel Foucault, Auschwitz and 
Modernity". 
51 Bender, Imagining the Penitentiary, p. 44. 
52 Liz Eckermann, "Foucault,, Embodiment and Gendered Subjectivities. 
The Case of Voluntary Self- Starvation"), in Alan Petersen & Robin 
Bunton (eds. ). Foucault, Health and Medicine, London: Routledge, 1997, 
p. -_164. See Charles Taylor and Richard Rorty's contributions to Hoy (ed. ), Foucault: A Critical Reader. On the shift from bodies to 
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Featherstone, Mike Hepworth and Bryan S. Turner (eds. ), The Body: 
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53 For Foucault, the "political sipificance of the problem of sex is due to 
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the body and the control ýf the population" (DE 111,153; FR 67). See also 
VS 191-2; WK 145. 
54 For a introduction to Bentham's life and thought, see James Steintrager, 
Bentham, London: George Allen & Unwin Ltd, 1977; L. J. Hume, 
Bentham and Bureaucracy, Cambridge-. Cambridge -University 
Press, 
1981; and Elie Halevy, The Growth of Philosophical Radicalism, 
London: Faber and Faber, 1972. On the Panopticon itself, see Gertrude 
Himmelfarb, "The Haunted House of Jeremy Bentham", in Victorian 
Minds: Essays on Nineteenth Century Intellectuals, Gloucester, MASS: 
Peter Smith, 1975; Janet Semple, Bentham's Prison: A Study of the 
Panoplicon Penitentiary, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1993, and her 
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No 1. May 1992. James Mill, "Prisons and Prison Discipline"'. in Political 
Writings, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992, provides a 
exposition of Benthamite attitudes to punishment; his relationship to 
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Foucault's reading of Bentham is discussed in Terence Ball's 
introduction, and Ball's Reappraising Political Theory, Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1995. 
55 In Discipline and Punish Foucault describes panopticism as 44a sort of 
4easy when you think of it' ['oeuf de Colomb] in the political sphere" 
(SP 240; DP 206). 
56 For the various uses envisaged, see Jeremy Bentham, Panopticon; or The 
Inspection-House, London: T. Payne, 179 1, Vol 1, pp. 107,110,113, 
121 , Vol 
2, pp. 184,19 1 n; Pauper Management Improved Particularly by 
Means of an Application of the Panopticon Principle of Construction, 
London: 1812; and the pamphlet Thoughts on the Plan of Construction on 
the Panopticon, or Universal Inspection Principlefor a Proposed Lunatic 
Hospital Asylum for the Lodgement of Persons Labouring under Insanity 
in all its Various Forms, London: C. H. Reynell, 1828. 
57 Jeremy Bentham, The Works of Jeremy Bentham, edited by John 
Bowring, Edinburgh: William Tait, 1838-43, Vol XI, p. 104. On this see 
Giovanna Procacci, "Social Economy and the Government of Poverty 1ý1 in 
FE; Driver, Power and Pauperism; and Mitchell Dean, The Constitution 
of Poverty: Towards a GenealogY of Liberal Governance, London: 
Routledge, 199 1. 
58 On panopticism see Michel Serres, "Panoptic Theory", in Thomas M. 
Kavanagh (ed. ), The Limits of Theory, Stanford: Stanford University 
Press,, 1989; Miran Boz'ovic"s introduction to Jeremy Bentham, The 
Panopticon Writings, London: Verso, 1995; and Jacques-Alain Miller, 
"Jeremy Bentham's Panoptic Device", in October, No 4 1, Summer 1987. 
59 1 will usually leave dispositif untranslated. 
60 Foucault suggests that the Enlightenment,, "which discovered the liberties, 
also invented the disciplines" (SP 258; DP 222), something it drew from 
the Romans, in their Republicanism and their military schema. (SP'171-2; 
DP 146). 
61 On the correspondence between programmes and practice see Barry 
Smart,, Foucault, Marxism and Critique, London: Routledge, 1989, p. 
128,. and Rabinow, French Modern, pp. 12,212. On Foucault and the 
Panopticon see Paul Patton, "On Power and Prisons"'. in Meaghan Morris 
& Paul Patton (eds. ), Michel Foucault: Power, Truth, Strategy, Sydney: 
, 
1979; and Barry Smart, "On Discipline and Social Feral Publications, 
Regulation: A Review of Foucault's Genealogical Analysis", in David 
Garland & Peter Young, The Power To Punish, London: Heinemann, 
1983. 
Many cntics contend that as the Panopticon was "never built",, it was "a 
failure", and cannot stand as a viable exemplar. See, for example, 
Semple, "Foucault and Bentham", p. I 11; Roy Porter, "Battery 
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Bentham". in The Times Literary Supplement, No 4726, October 29th 
1993; Anne Crowther "Penal Peepshow: Bentham's Prison that never 
was", in The Times Literary Supplement, No 4847, February 23rd 1996; 
Ball, Reappraising Political Theory, p. 160. Paul Q. Hirst, 
"Power/Knowledge - Constructed Space and the Subject", in Richard 
Fardon (ed. ), Power & Knowledge: Anthropological and Sociological 
Approaches, Edinburgh: Scottish Academic Press, 1985, p. 188, similarly 
suggests that it was not built, but argues that this does not invalidate it as 
an example. It is necessary to set the matter straight. Simply regarding its 
potential as a prison, the Panopticon was characterised by two points - its 
architectural design, and the system of private contract that Bentham 
envisaged. The reason it was not built in its exact form in Britain was 
mainly becau 
, 
se the control aspects of the design could not be separated 
from the financial ones. Prisons that existed before were usually privately 
run, and Bentham looked to continue this, but he was out of date in this 
area, as there was a crucial shift toward the state taking over the control 
of administration. John Howard, author of two important works on 
enclosed institutions in Europe, was one of the first to suggest that the 
county, rather than the prisoner, should pay the fees. See his State of the 
Prisons in England and Wales, Warrington: 1778, and An Account of the 
Principal Lazarettos in Europe, Warrington: William Eyres, 1789. See 
also Evansl The Fabrication of Virtue, p. 10. For an analysis of the rise of 
the prison that is more attentive to the shifts in state power see Michael 
Ignatieff, A Just Measure of Pain: The Penitentiary in the Industrial 
Revolution 1750-18501 London: Macmillan, 1978. The neglect of the 
state seems to be a more serious charge than one which suggests that the 
shift in penal practice is determined by economic - changes. The classic 
case for this is made by Georg Rusche & Otto Kirchheirner, Punishment 
., 
New York: Russell & Russell, 1968. See also and Social Structure, 
Melossi & Pavarini, The Prison and the Factory; and Theodor W. 
Adorno & Max Horkheimer, The Dialectic of Enlightenment, translated 
by J. Cumming, London: Allen Lane, 1973. For a discussion of the 
problems in these analyses, see David Garland, Punishment and Modern 
Society: A Study in Social Theory, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1990, 
especially pp. 83 -110; and Poster, Foucault, Marxism and History. 
However, the Millbank penitentiary and Pentonville were both heavily 
influenced by Bentham's work, for all the botched nature of these 
institutions, such as the many blind spots. Outside of Britain, Panopticons 
were built. Norman Johnston has provided a survey of some of the other 
penitentiaries based on Bentham's plan, citing one built in Spain in 1852, 
three in Holland in the 1880s, the Stateville penitentiary in Illinois, the 
notorious Cuban Isle of Pines in 1926, and as recently as 
1952 the 
Badajoz Provincial Prison in Spain. Norman Johnston, The Human Cage: 
A BriefHistory ofPrison Architecture, New York: Walker and Company, 
1973, p. 20. See also Norval Morris, "The Contemporary Prison. 
1965- 
Present", in Norval Morris & David J. Rothman (eds. ), The 
Oxford 
History of the Prison, New York: Oxford University Press, 1995. Indeed 
in Discipline and Punish Foucault suggests various variants of the 
basic 
257 
design - its strict form, semi-circle, cross-plan, the star shape (SP 290; 
DP 250) - and in the French text refers the reader to nine of the plates for 
examples (SP 290n4; see SP plates 18-26; DP plates 4-6). 
Notes to the Conclusion 
I Soja, Airdspace, pp. 172-3(&n). 
2 The key text on the influences is Henri Lefebvre, Hegel, Marx, Nietzsche 
ou le royamme des ombres, Paris-Tournoi: Casterman, 1975. For the 
combination, see notably La Production de Vespace; The Production of 
Space. 
3 Harvey, Justice, Nature and the Geography ofDifference, pp. 313-6. 
4 See, for example, Merleau-Ponty, Laph ' om'nologie de percept'on; The en e 
Phenomenology of Perception; Deleuze & Guattari, Mille plateaux; A 
Thousand Plateaus; Edmund Husserl, L'Origine de la geometrie, 
traduction et introduction par Jacques Derrida, Paris: Epimethee, 1962; 
translated by John P. Leavey, Jr. as Edmund Husserl'S Origin of 
Geometry: An Introduction. 
5 Soja, Postmodern Geographies, p. 248. 
Notes to the Appendix 
Gebilde is more usually object or structure, but the prefix Ge-, so 
important to Heidegger, means bringing together (see for example 
Gebirge, mountain range; Gemdt, disposition; Gestell, enframing); bilden 
is to form. Gebilde literally means then the bringing together of the form. 
2 
The German language has two words for body,, der K6rper and der Leib, 
two words that are close to synonyms and are both translated by the 
English 'body. Der K6rper is closer to the understanding of body as 
mass, and is used for animals and humans. Der Leib is used only for 
humans, and can mean body in a less tangible way 
3 This and related words are of great importance to the later Heidegger, 
developing from his important treatise of the 1930s, unpublished in his 
lifetime, GA65. 
4 Heidegger argues throughout his career that aXOE'a, usually translated as 
'truth' [Wahrheit], must be understood as non-concealment. See, for 
example i; "On the Essence of Truth" , "Vom 
Wesen der Wahrhe*t" in 
GA9; GA34; GA54. 
5 This is normally translated as locality; but the final lecture course on 
258 
H61derlin speaks of the placing of the place [die Ortschaft des Ortes]. 
The English translation speaks of the 'locality of the locale', which loses 
the meaning of the original. See GA53,23. This is discussed in Chapter 
Three above. 
6 This word is related to die Geschichte,, history; das Schicksat, fate or 
destiny; geschehen, to happen, etc. 
7 As a noun Lesen means harvest, reading, lection, gathering, col-lection; 
the verb lesen means to read, to gather or to collect. 
r 
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